

From Darius I to Philip II: The Story of the Greek Poleis

Mark Luttenberger


VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

MARK LUTTENBERGER

FROM
DARIUS I
TO PHILIP II

THE STORY OF THE GREEK POLEIS



From Darius I to Philip II: The Story of the Greek Poleis

Mark Luttenberger

Copyright © 2017 Mark Luttenberger

All rights reserved

First Edition

PAGE PUBLISHING, INC.

New York, NY

First originally published by Page Publishing, Inc. 2017

ISBN 978-1-64082-680-9 (Paperback)

ISBN 978-1-64138-488-9 (Hardcover)

ISBN 978-1-64082-681-6 (Digital)

Printed in the United States of America

To my loving wife and daughters, Gail, Heidi, and Amanda

Preface

The purpose of this book is to tell the story of the classical Greek *poleis* from the reign of Darius I of Persia to the death of Philip II of Macedonia. Although written in a narrative format, the emphasis is on the political, military, and economic aspects of the Hellenic city-state. It is not written primarily for the academic community but for those students of history who are fascinated by this period of Western civilization. It by no means pretends to be a definitive history of the period. No history can be.

Based on the literary sources from antiquity, the basic political and military story of the period has been known since Renaissance scholars began to recover the ancient texts. Since then, historians, professional and amateur, with assistance from philologists, archaeologists, numismatists, economists, and others have continued to fill in the blanks. The development of archaeology, as a scientific discipline in the nineteenth century, has unearthed data in the form of inscriptions, art, buildings, weaponry, coinage, and other material remains of daily life, to supplement the evidence of the ancient writers. New scientific methods and technology have allowed modern scholarship to better analyze the data discovered. Economic studies of the period have gained momentum in the past two generations to demonstrate that the classical period was an age of prosperity for the Hellenic world. New quantitative studies of the Greek *poleis* have contributed to our understanding of the primary institution that defined Hellenic culture. For these reasons, I have endeavored to write this book after forty years of study outside the academic world.

There is no dispute that there is a basic understanding of the history of this period. This narrative is not intended to offer a revolutionary viewpoint based on new evidence or a historical thesis. However, it is designed to show that many questions remain regarding the basic story. This will always remain the case.

While writing this book, I would like to thank those who read parts or the entire draft and provided a critique of the contents, prose, and structural layout. My gratitude goes to Dan Sommerfeldt and Dan Leeds for reading the manuscript in the rough draft. Valuable input was provided by Dan Sommerfeldt in the economic sections of the book. He also provided valuable input in the fine points of Microsoft Word. Dan Leeds provided valuable literary criticism as well as a request for pictures to better understand the content. Amanda Riesenberg gave valuable input on the area of Greek sports. She also provided a critique of the book's layout. Heidi Klebs reviewed the picture selection

and provided humorous encouragement while writing the book. To my former professors at the University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh, who have all joined our ancestors, I wish to thank them for stimulating my lifelong love affair of history, in particular the Greco-Roman world. Needless to say, any remaining errors are my responsibility.

A special thanks belongs to my wife Gail. She has supported this endeavor for forty-plus years. She has spent countless hours in bookstores and museums as I searched for valuable information. Her companionship and excitement, as we visited many sites from antiquity throughout Greece and Italy, made these visits most enjoyable. She is the photographer for the personal pictures illustrated throughout the book.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank the staff at Page Publishing for their contribution to the publication of the book. In particular, I would like to acknowledge Olivia Marr, my Publication Coordinator, for her kind help in guiding me through the publication process.

Introduction

For twenty-five hundred years from the classical Greek age to the twenty-first century AD, philosophers, rhetoricians, political scientists, archaeologists, historians, etc., have been writing about the history and culture of the ancient Greeks. From the Greeks themselves, through the Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Medieval, Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Industrial periods, Western civilization has been enthralled and fascinated with the accomplishments and failures of the ancient Greeks. Greek ideas about art, philosophy, science, political theory, rhetoric, religion, mathematics, and history still influence humankind today. The civil discord and military conflicts among themselves and against foreign foes still demonstrate today that man's inhumanity toward his fellow man has not changed in twenty-five centuries.

Every year authors continue to present new books to the modern reader about various aspects of the classical Greek world. The standard definition of the classical period (479–323 BC) encompasses the years from the defeat of the Persian king Xerxes to the death of Alexander the Great. What more can be said that has not already been said in some shape, manner, or form? Apparently plenty! From the time of Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and their peers in the fifth and fourth centuries, historians have been interpreting, analyzing, and pontificating about the triumphs and tragedies of this period of human history. What is the attraction about a population living in small city-states called *poleis* (in contrast to modern nation-states) encompassing the eastern half of the Mediterranean Sea who identified themselves from a political standpoint with their native city (Spartans, Athenians, Thebans, Syracusans, Milesians, Olynthians, etc.) and yet have a common culture that allowed them to identify themselves as Hellenes? This author, like most historians past and present, believes that the past is not dead. Our knowledge of the past continues to evolve as new evidence is accumulated (i.e., archaeology) and old evidence is reevaluated (i.e., literature, inscriptions, etc.). History has something to tell us about the journey of the human race on a small planet in the Milky Way galaxy.

Scope and Premise

The scope of this book concentrates on the political, military, and economic history of the Greeks from the beginning of the Persian wars in 499 BC to the death of Philip II in 336 BC. This history does not look

at this era as a rise and fall as many historians through the centuries have done. Hellas' victory over Persia and Carthage put the Greeks in the mainstream of Mediterranean world. During the most of the Archaic age (776–479 BC), the Greeks occupied territory on the fringe of the Middle Eastern kingdoms as well as the states city-states of Phoenicia, Carthage, and Etruria. However, by 500 BC the *poleis* of the Aegean basin, Sicily, and Italy became the primary political, military, and economic threats to these states. By the end of the sixth century, many Greek *poleis* along the Anatolian coast (modern Turkey) were incorporated into the Persian Empire. Disenchanted with their subject status, these eastern Greeks eventually revolted. Their revolt embroiled the Greeks of the mainland in war with the Persians. The Greek victory over Xerxes in 479 stimulated the growth of Hellenic power and prosperity in the following decades. Fifth-century contemporaries witnessed the Greeks, in particular Athens, at the peak of their power on the international stage. Although the fourth-century Greek states weakened themselves through their continuous quarrels, internal and external, there was no Mediterranean state that threatened their independent existence until the coming of an unknown Macedonian called Philip II.

The *polis* and its citizens continued responding to the problems of the fifth and fourth century with new solutions. However, the classical period witnessed a continuation of the issues and conflicts that had plagued the Greeks from the sixth century. The issues of *stasis* (civil discord/civil war) within the city-states, the internecine wars, the struggle for hegemony, or just plain survival by the smaller states are not unique to this period of time. The 150-year period after 480 was a vibrant period in artistic development, philosophical inquiry, and political theory for the Greeks. The conflicts in the Greek world stimulated the politicians, rhetoricians, and philosophers of the time to develop a better world. In the fourth century, Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics* attempted to create a form of government based on the concept of the *polis* that would lead to the moral improvement of man and achieve "the Good" not only for the individual but also for the state and society. Perhaps anachronistic, their ideas are still studied today.

The premise of this history is that there was dynamism in politics, ideology, economics, and culture throughout the classical period. Despite class conflicts, political turmoil, and economic hardship in many *poleis* during the classical period, in the aggregate, political dynamism and economic prosperity was prevalent into the Hellenistic period. Hellenic power, prosperity, and influence became dominant in the eastern Mediterranean. Yes, the Hellenes succumbed to Macedon/Macedonia. Yes, they lost that "freedom and autonomy" that they

cherished. Their inability to unite against Macedonia (338 BC) as they did against Persia (480 BC) resulted in submission. Philip II was not Xerxes. He understood the Hellenes. Through diplomacy and war he utilized the Roman concept of “divide and conquer” to take advantage of the Hellenes’ loyalty to their *poleis* rather than their common cultural heritage. The Greek remained a citizen of “his” *polis* first and a citizen of Hellas second. Although hypothetical, had the Greeks formed a stronger coalition against Macedonia, it is probable that they would have retained their independence. It was not their weakness or decline that brought submission. It was the strength and vibrancy of Macedonia under the leadership of Philip II that emerged victorious!

Greek politics, society, and culture were enmeshed with the *polis*. However, despite its faults, the Greek *polis* remained a viable entity into the Roman period. Its size limited its ability to influence human affairs with the rise of the large Macedonian kingdoms in the Hellenistic period and the super-state of Rome afterwards. The *polis* remained a center for local self-government. Although its leaders implemented the policies of these successor states, local affairs remained in their hands. As long as the *polis* behaved itself, it was basically left alone by Macedonian kings and Roman emperors. The concept of the *polis* changed, but the entity continued to exist into Rome’s imperial period.

Brief Historical Review

In the year 500 BC the Persian Empire was the greatest empire the world had yet seen. Stretching from Thrace and Macedonia in the west to India in the east, the Great King Darius I sitting on his throne in Susa was truly the King of Kings. The royal roads that stretched from Susa to the provinces brought the wealth of Egypt, Babylonia, India, and Asia Minor to the royal treasury. The Persian fleet dominated the Eastern Mediterranean. The army proved itself superior to all opposition. Persia was at peace.

In 499 the Ionian Greeks interrupted that peace with their rebellion. Seeking support from their mainland kinsman, their envoys only received aid from Athens and Eretria. Neither was a major power in the Greek world. Sparta and the recently established Peloponnesian League remained aloof. In 498 the Ionians, accompanied by a small force from Athens and Eretria, burned Sardis, the old Lydian capital but now a provincial Persian capital, and retreated. The Athenians and Eretrians sailed home. Their adventure in Asia was ended. In 493 the rebellion was suppressed. However, Darius I had a long memory. He wanted revenge on Athens and Eretria. In 490 he launched a campaign that ended in Persian defeat by Athens at Marathon.

Undeterred, Darius made further preparations but did not live to see their finalization. His son Xerxes would. Thus began the Persian wars.

Throughout the Hellenic world, the Hellenes were not a united people. Hellas was a cultural unity. It was not a political unity. Hellenes were identified with their individual *polis*. Hellenes were Athenians, Spartans, Milesians, Corinthians, Syracusans, etc. Before the fifth century, there was little outside interference in the political development of Hellas. Each *polis* had its small area of interest. Sparta was the largest *polis* in terms of territorial size with its control of Laconia and Messenia. It was the strongest power in Hellas as leader of the Peloponnesian League. Despite their differences, a coalition united around the leadership of Sparta and Athens to oppose Persia. Victorious against Xerxes in 479, the Greeks again divided. Hellas was divided between Athens with the Delian League and Sparta with the Peloponnesian League. This division lasted seventy-five years until Athens was defeated in the Peloponnesian War in 404. Sparta was now supreme, but that supremacy was short-lived. Despite much civil discord and shifting relationships throughout the fifth century, Sparta and Athens dominated the big picture.

In the fourth century, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Syracuse continued their policies of domination within their spheres of interest and tried to extend their hegemony over the other *poleis*. New states such as Olynthus in the Chalcidice, Pherae in Thessaly, and Phocis in central Greece threw their hat in the ring in the struggle to dominate Hellas. New federations arose such as the Chalcidian, Boeotian, and Arcadian Leagues to extend their power or for self-defense. The Amphictyonic League was more assertive in the Sacred War of the 350s. Unlike the fifth-century struggle for hegemony between Athens and Sparta, the fourth century witnessed multiple states attempting this same feat. In the end, all these *poleis* saw their power and influence weakened. The way was paved for Phillip II of Macedon to become hegemon (leader) of Greece after 338 BC.

Throughout the classical period, the *stasis* (civil discord/civil war) within the city-states between the people (*demos*) and the nobility over political goals (democracy versus oligarchy or even tyranny) and social and economic issues (class distinctions, wealth distribution, judicial reform, etc.) were never completely resolved. *Stasis* was the curse of Hellas! The island of Corcyra was the classic example of political, social, and economic conflict that continued into the fourth century. The civil war in Corcyra, recorded by Thucydides in the 430s prior to the Peloponnesian War, was repeated in the 370s as recorded by Xenophon. The *demos* and the nobility struggled over democracy versus oligarchy with multiple deaths inflicted on both sides contingent on which party was in power at the time. As in the fifth century, the

demos appealed for aid to Athens and the oligarchs appealed to Sparta. The Greek states never escaped the curse of class conflict whether democracy, oligarchy, or tyranny was in place. Plato and Aristotle retained the concept of class differentiation in their ideal societies.

In Sicily, Syracuse became the dominant power in western Hellas after the victory by Gelon over the Carthaginians in 480. From the tyranny of Gelon through the tyranny of Dionysius I, Syracuse remained the dominant Hellenic power in the west. Dionysius I came to power in 405 after overthrowing the democracy that had existed since the 460s. Again the Carthaginian invasion of Sicily in 406, which destroyed the major *polis* of Acragas in 405, allowed Dionysius to use this threat as his justification to end the democracy. Carthage's defeat of Syracuse in the same year forced Dionysius to conclude a peace. From this low point, he built up the power of Syracuse for the remainder of his thirty-eight years of rule. As in the fifth century, Syracuse and Carthage fought for political supremacy in Sicily. The other cities on the island—Greek, Sican, Elymian, and Sicel—were caught between the hammer of Syracuse and the anvil of Carthage. Their domestic politics often was determined by which power was dominant at the moment. This rivalry between these two powers led to multiple wars throughout the classical period.

As in the previous century, democracy, oligarchy, and tyranny would be utilized in a round robin of political change. The fifth century began with the tyranny of Gelon and ended the tyranny of Dionysius I. The fourth century saw Dionysius rule until 367 and ended with the tyranny of Agathocles in Syracuse. The tyrants of Syracuse continued to deal with tyrants throughout Sicily and Italy. Only in the third century would this state of affairs cease with the Roman conquest of Italy and Sicily after the First Punic War. Unlike the Greek states around the Aegean, tyranny remained among the *poleis* of Sicily and Italy.

Although affairs in Greece between Greeks changed little with the turn of the century, relations with Persia were altered. After the Persian wars, the Persian Empire was the enemy of most Greeks throughout the fifth century. It had little influence in Greek affairs and was at peace with Athens after the peace of Callias in 445. Only with the last decade of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC) did Persia again become involved in Greek affairs. By this time Athens and Sparta were militarily and economically exhausted and needed Persian financial resources to pay their soldiers and sailors. Finally, Sparta emerged victorious when the Persian prince, Cyrus II (the Younger), gave his full support to the Spartan Lysander. Under Lysander's leadership, the Spartan fleet captured the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405. This victory spelled doom for Athens.

In the fourth century, Persia often played the arbitrator in Greek affairs through its use of Persian gold. Persian support of Sparta turned to opposition after Spartan support for Cyrus the Younger in his revolt against Artaxerxes II in 401. During the Corinthian War (395–387/386), Persia first supported the enemies of Sparta and then Sparta with the King's Peace (Peace of Antalcidas). This peace was also called a "Common Peace" (*Koine Eirene*), and its terms became the template used in the Greek world for the various peace treaties concluded into the 360s. Persia always became the arbitrator because the Greek states sent their ambassadors to the king or his representative in Sardis or Susa. The Great King's gold aided Sparta, Athens, or Thebes in their pursuit of hegemony. Persian support for one power or another in the peace negotiations largely influenced the peace terms. In the end, none of the various peace treaties lasted. Eventually the Greek powers were exhausted. They did not have the political, financial, and military resources to withstand the rise of Macedonia.

At the beginning of the fourth century, had the Greeks consulted the oracle at Delphi about the future of Macedonia, it is doubtful Apollo would have predicted Macedonian domination of the Greek and Persian world by the end of the century. During the fifth century, Macedonian fortunes vacillated between subordination or independence and weakness or strength. Under King Amyntas I, Macedonia submitted to Persia about 510 when Darius attacked the Scythians and conquered Thrace. Macedonia regained political independence under Alexander I (495–452) after Persia withdrew from the Balkans with Xerxes's defeat. Alexander expanded the Macedonian state to the Strymon River in Thrace and rivaled Athens for control of the north Aegean area. Under his successor Perdiccas II (451–413), Macedonia became weaker and used both Athens and Sparta as allies in the Peloponnesian War to regain power in north Aegean. Archelaus (413–399) began to rebuild the state and its infrastructure, but his assassination ended his reforms. However, his removal of the Macedonian capital from Aegae to Pella survived. Under Amyntas II (393–370), the Macedonian state was defeated by Bardylis and his Illyrians, which forced Amyntas to flee Macedonia for two years. With help from some Thessalians, he was restored to power only to lose it again in conflicts with the Illyrians and the Chalcidian League. Under his rule, the Macedonian kingdom was reduced in size and became a puppet of Sparta or Athens. During the decade after his death, three kings ruled. Alexander II (370–368), Ptolemy (368–365), and Perdiccas III (365–359), Philip II's older brother, ruled a weak state that looked to Thebes for support. Phillip II was a hostage in Thebes to guarantee friendly relations between Thebes and

Macedonia. After Perdiccas' defeat and death at the hands of the Illyrians, Macedonia was a nonfactor in Greek power politics. When Phillip II was elected king in 360/359, Macedonia had to be rebuilt.

By the time Philip II came to power, the Greek powers of Sparta, Thebes, and Pherae were past their prime although they did not acknowledge it. After the battle of Leuctra (371), Sparta's power was broken. After the battle of Mantinea (362), Thebes could no longer dominate. Pherae could not maintain its power base in Thessaly in the 360s after the assassination of the tyrant Jason in 370. Athens remained. However, after Athens' defeat in the Social War (357–355), it no longer had the resources to become the dominant power in Hellas. Persia could not take advantage of this state of affairs because it was dealing with various satrap revolts in the 360s and 350s. After these revolts were suppressed, Persia concentrated its activities on the suppression of the Egyptian rebellion.

In this summation of the Greek, Persian, and Macedonian state of affairs before the accession of Phillip II, an outside observer would probably recognize that the Greek powers were weaker but remained vibrant states. The dominance of Sparta was over. But Athens, Thebes, Pherae, and Syracuse were still major players in Hellenic affairs. The Persian Empire would continue to rule the Asian lands, but it had major internal problems. Carthage was checked. Rome was barely a blip on the Hellenic radar screen. There was no foreign state in the Mediterranean that could subdue them. The meteoric rise of Macedonia under Phillip II's leadership revolutionized the power structure not just in Hellas but in the Balkans. Persia was faced with a new enemy. However, the Great King could not look into a crystal ball to see that Persia's days were numbered.

Sources

The history of this period is dependent primarily on the writings of Greek authors and their Greek perspective. We have no authors who wrote from the Persian, Macedonian, or Carthaginian perspective. Major contemporary writers were Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon (history); Aeschylus and Aristophanes (playwrights); Plato and Aristotle (philosophy and political theory); Isocrates (rhetoric); and Lysias, Demosthenes, and Aeschines (orators) wrote and spoke to their contemporaries. They did not necessarily write for posterity although Thucydides most certainly did. They were concerned with the issues of the day and the fate of their fellow citizens. They often glossed over events that we today wish were described in greater detail. It was assumed that their audience knew about events that they discussed. Also, they had a different agenda (political, philosophical,

moral, etc.) when describing the events of the day.

Except for Thucydides, historical accuracy to satisfy the demands of modern scholarship was not on their radar screen. Herodotus was an Asiatic Greek from Halicarnassus who wrote in the mid-fifth century. His main thesis was to explain the conflict between east and west that culminated in the Persian invasion of Hellas and ended with Persian defeat in 479. Though concerned with the truth, accurate historical information was subordinated to a description of the cultures that existed around the eastern Mediterranean basin. Thucydides was an Athenian general who was exiled for his military failure to defend Amphipolis in Thrace against Sparta in the late 420s. He states that his purpose was to explain as truthfully as possible the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta that brought great destruction to the Greek world and destroyed the Athenian Empire in 404. Xenophon was an exiled Athenian cavalry commander who fought for Sparta in the campaigns of Agesilaus II in the 390s. His history, the *Hellenica*, begins where Thucydides ended in 411 and ends with the battle of Mantinea in 362. He focused on Sparta and Peloponnesian affairs. His hero is the Spartan king Agesilaus II (400–360/359), whose reign encompassed the first four decades of the fourth century. The reign of Agesilaus accompanies the majority of Xenophon's narrative. All these contemporary writers must be approached with a critical eye to separate truth from fiction. Many commentaries have been written over the years discussing the trustworthiness of these authors. Let it be said here that no author is followed blindly. We are Sherlock Holmes sorting through the information to discover the evidence that will accurately portray the history of the period.

Later Greek writers from the Roman period such as Diodorus Siculus, Plutarch, Polybius, Pausanias, and Arrian are also analyzed with a critical eye. Latin writers with relevant information include Cornelius Nepos and Justin. Although they had the advantage of hindsight and could consult writers that are no longer available to us, except for Polybius, their cut-and-paste approach to history forces us to judge their accuracy based on the reliability of their sources. In the case of Plutarch and his parallel lives, he wrote with a moral purpose to show how the great men of Greece and Rome succeeded and failed based on their character. Polybius, a second-century BC Achaean Greek, was highly critical of previous historians, but he wrote from the perspective of a defeated Achaean Greek, and his goal was to explain how Roman domination of the Mediterranean basin happened. The reliability of Diodorus, a first-century BC Sicilian Greek, in his universal history has been shown to rest on the authors he chose to follow. Some periods are more accurate than others. Fortunately for us today, he mentions events that Xenophon chose not to. He also is a primary

source for the rise of Macedonia and the Greeks of Sicily and Italy. Nepos provides short biographies of many classical Greeks. Justin, a Latin author dated between the second to fourth century AD, describes events relevant to Philip of Macedon that are not mentioned by other authors.

Some writings assigned to Xenophon were not his. Thus, historians call these writings pseudo-Xenophon or the more common name of the "Old Oligarch." The *Constitution of the Athenians* (*Athenian Politeia*.) is assigned to the Old Oligarch. The bracket symbol for pseudo-Xenophon will be [Xen.] rather than the normal designation of (Xen.) for Xenophon.

Aristotle provides a large amount of information in the *Politics* and *Constitution of the Athenians* about the political structure of the *polis* and Athens in particular. Plato's *Epistles* provide information about his visits to Syracuse ruled by Dionysius I and II. Demosthenes, Aeschines, and many other fourth-century Athenian orators provide much information. However, their speeches often skew the data to fit their political agenda. Therefore, caution must be exercised to separate fact from rhetoric.

To supplement and verify the information from these ancient authors, we have consulted documents of the time that usually appear in inscriptions on buildings, stelae, and monuments. Many inscriptions are now published along with their translations. These inscriptions allow us to evaluate the political, diplomatic, economic, social, and religious activities of the period. Archaeology throughout the Mediterranean basin continues to provide new information to evaluate.

In the Egyptian village of Oxyrhynchus, in 1906 and 1934, a set of papyrus documents by a Greek writer of the fourth century BC, who modern historians call the Oxyrhynchus Historian, was discovered. This set of papyri classified as the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* provides an alternative view to Xenophon's account of the early fourth century. Thus, archaeological discoveries remind us that history is a living exercise. New evidence and new scientific techniques of analysis could alter our view of the past, perhaps even radically. How intriguing!

Modern scholarship will be consulted to illustrate the various problems of and approaches to writing a truthful history of the period. Many illustrious scholars from the nineteenth and twentieth century have contributed to our understanding of the classical period. The second edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History* (volumes IV, V, and VI) and the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (third and fourth editions) are excellent resources for a general understanding of the period. The chronological system adopted in the second edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History* will be followed to avoid arguments about the dating of controversial events. When appropriate, alternative dates will be

mentioned. Another valuable resource is *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis* developed by the Copenhagen Polis Center. For an updated review of the economic structure of the Greek world, *The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World* is an excellent reference book discussing the economic problems of antiquity.

For the ancient writers, we will use their writings published in the Loeb Classical Library and the Penguin Library. For the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, we used the edition of McKechnie and Kern, which uses the Bartolletti numbering system. Excellent sources for original documents are found in *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* by Meiggs and Lewis, and *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404–323 BC* by Rhodes and Osborne. The Internet is new to modern scholarship, but if one is persistent, valuable information is published every day that can aid our understanding of classical Greece.

(Bernard 2001) Map 1 – The Greek World

Map 1—The Greek World



(http://plato-dialogues.org/tools/gk_wrlld.htm)

What Is a Greek?

Characteristics

Before we can tell the story of classical Greece, we must answer one question. What is a Greek/Hellene? Geography, language, religion, political and social behaviors are the basic criteria to define a Greek of the classical period.

The geography of mainland Greece/Hellas determined the settlement pattern of the early inhabitants. Separated by mountainous and barren terrain, the early inhabitants settled in small, fertile valleys, along the coast with good harbors, and in the islands. The isolation of these early settlements set the pattern of particularism that would be followed throughout Greek history. The amount of land and its fertility limited the population size that could be supported by an agrarian economy. In comparison to other ancient states and the modern nation-state, the future states of the Greek world in the second and first millennia BC would remain territorial small.

During the Mycenaean period in the Bronze Age of the second millennium BC, the territory of the Greek world consisted of the mainland that forms the “modern” Greek state, which was reestablished in the nineteenth century. In reference to antiquity, the twenty-first-century Greek state encompasses the mainland from Macedonia southward, the Aegean islands, Crete, Thrace, and the islands in the Ionian Sea. In modern terminology, the geographical heart of the classical Greek world stretched from Turkey to Italy. Thessaly south through the Peloponnese was the home of the Mycenaeans. Early in the first millennium BC, a racial group, now identified as Dorian, entered the Greek mainland and settled alongside the descendants of the Mycenaeans. Eventually these Dorians primarily settled in the Peloponnese and subjugated the local population to form the states of Argos and Sparta. Some made their way to the island of Crete.

After the collapse of Mycenaean civilization in the twelfth century BC at the end of the Bronze Age, many Greeks fled to Asia Minor and settled in areas that were similar to the places they left. Consequently, the fertile river valleys and coastal areas with good harbors were the magnets that attracted these new settlers. This pattern was replicated

in the age of migration from the eighth to sixth centuries. Whether due to economic expansion, overpopulation, political/social upheaval that restricted local opportunities, or perhaps a sense of adventurism by individuals, the Greek *poleis* of the mainland and Asia Minor sent colonies throughout the Mediterranean basin.¹ It has been estimated that perhaps twenty thousand to forty thousand male Greeks emigrated by the end of the seventh century. This might have been about 2–3 percent of the population of the Greek world.² How many men brought families, married the local inhabitants, or returned home will probably never be known. The Black Sea area, Sicily, and Italy were the main areas of settlement. These Greek states replicated the physical and political structure of the mother city. As a result, the physical development of the Greek state would always remain small in comparison to Near Eastern kingdoms like Egypt and Persia.

A basic characteristic is a common language. Although there were various spoken dialects that often made communication difficult, the dialects were basically understandable to most Greeks. By the fifth century, Herodotus tells us that the Greeks believed they shared a common language, ethnic heritage, religion, and a common way of life (Hdt.VIII.144). Modern scholarship has classified five major Greek dialects—Ionian, Aeolian, Dorian, Arcado-Cyprian, and North-West.³ These dialects were spoken from Asia Minor to Sicily. An alphabet, derived from the Phoenicians, was developed by the eighth century to create the written word. The works of Homer and Hesiod were some of the earliest oral traditions transformed into the written word. The epic poetry of Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* provided a template by which the various spoken dialects could be composed into a common written form. This poetry was written in the language of its origin and structure that was often separate from the spoken language of its author. As an example, Hesiod was a Boeotian who spoke the Aeolic dialect but wrote in the Ionic dialect. Poetry dominated the written landscape until the fifth century. Then the narrative form of literature began to supplant poetry as the common form of written expression. Through literature, inscriptions, correspondence, and interactive political and social behavior, etc., the Greeks developed a standard written language by the third century.

Greek religion was poly-theistic centered on the Olympian gods, defined in Homer and Hesiod, and mentioned in the Mycenaean period from Linear B tablets. Their acknowledged common shrines tied the Greeks to a common heritage.⁴ These gods were anthropomorphic beings who interfered in human affairs. By the seventh century the gods were portrayed as human but were more powerful and long-lived, if not eternal. In their stories about the gods, the epic poets and tragedians portrayed a contradiction in the Hellenic view of these

deities. Divine intervention could determine the fate of an individual as well the *polis*. On one hand, the deities represented *dike* (justice), reason, and morality to uphold the *eunomia* (social order/harmony) of the *polis*. On the other hand, they were amoral beings, or perhaps immoral, with their rivalries, jealousies, seductions, and punishments of states and individuals. They could be friend or foe. They were patrons of peace and war. If proper attention was not paid to the deities, the fate of humans was at their mercy. The Greeks swore oaths for many occasions such as peace, war, public festivals, law courts, etc., to ensure that that secular order was protected by the divine order. If these oaths were violated, divine retribution would occur against the *polis* (community) and the individual violator.

Despite local regional characteristics, Zeus, Hera, Apollo, Poseidon, Athena, etc., were worshipped as common deities. Shrines at Delphi, Delos, Dodona, Ephesus, Olympia, etc., were developed to honor the deities. Originally local shrines, they developed into Panhellenic centers of worship, and the treasures of Hellas were stored there under the protection of the gods.⁵ Looking for divine guidance, embassies were sent from the *polis* to these shrines for oracular advice to resolve issues within the *polis*, between *poleis*, or with foreign states. Individuals could also ask for oracular guidance from the temple priest or priestess. These shrines were unifying institutions that could mediate inter-state or intra-state disputes, guide foreign policy, and support local law by providing religious justice on behalf of the gods for the state or an individual. In time the Greeks developed various community and sporting festivals to honor the Olympic deities. The Olympian, Nemean, Pythean, and Isthmian games to honor the gods became Panhellenic sporting and artistic institutions that lasted centuries. Community festivals such as the Panathenea in Athens, Hyacinthia in Sparta, Panionia at Mycale, near Miletus, etc., glorified the local deity, community, and the arts.

Whether local or Panhellenic, shrines were considered sacrosanct. They were inviolable and a place of refuge. In peace or war, if an individual sat by the god's altar, the individual could not be seized by enemies or the officials of the state. If the rule of sanctuary was disobeyed, only the god could punish the violator. However, there were numerous instances where the sanctity was violated.⁶

Animal sacrifice performed by state magistrates, rather than temple priests, were conducted to determine the will of the gods. Conducted in the name of war, peace, and justice, these sacrifices could be performed anytime. However, there were designated events or dates in the calendar year that mandated that the *polis* conduct these sacrifices. Religion and the *polis* were interconnected. There was no separation of church and state. Unlike the temple states of the

Middle East, the Greeks used state officials to properly honor the gods. In the early development of the *polis*, the *basileus* (king) performed the religious rituals. Later when the kings were replaced by the nobility and the *demos* (people), other officials were assigned to honor the gods. In Athens, in the classical period, the archon *basileus* performed these religious functions (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*57.1–2). Worship of the Olympic gods was a public function for the well-being of the social order of the *polis*.

In addition to the Olympic gods, local chthonic (non-anthropomorphic) deities (rivers, mountains, hearth, nymphs, etc.) were worshipped in the urban centers, villages, rural areas, and individual homes. Local religious events, such as the Eleusinian Mysteries at Eleusis in Attica, were associated with the local community. These events were associated with a specific location, phyle (tribe), phratry (kin membership), deme (local district), or individual. These cults were often independent from the official deities of the *polis*. Members of the priesthoods of these local cults came from the local communities, tribes, and phratries. These priesthoods could be hereditary. These cult deities were more personal and apply to the individual's concern for justice, fate in the afterworld, life's struggles, etc. Individuals would contribute prayers or votive offerings on behalf of themselves or the family. These acts of worship were private and could be secretive. The Eleusinian Mysteries required a secret formal inauguration and addressed the relationship between the individual and the afterworld. Because they were secretive, the details of these rituals have not survived antiquity. Chthonic cults represented the private and personal side of Greek religion.

Perhaps the criterion that most defines a Greek is his identity and citizenship with his *polis*. Although we have discussed various characteristics that define a Greek, the *polis* is the necessary and sufficient condition that separates the Hellene from other people that inhabited antiquity. Aristotle claimed that the *polis* was the highest form of political development (Arist.*Pol.*1251a; 1253a). Only in the *polis* could the individual citizen be more than a beast of burden. Through the *polis*, freedom, civilization, and man's ability to use reason could be achieved. The monarchical states (Persia, Egypt, Macedonia, etc.) represented slavery, barbarism, and ignorance. Only in the *polis* could man strive to attain his highest state of freedom and happiness. Under monarchy, man could be no better than a slave. If this is true, what is this political structure?

The *Polis* Defined

There were two fundamental forms of the Greek state by the classical period. The first form was the *ethnos*, which consisted of a

territory of tribal communities that were not based on an urban center. Scattered in villages, tribal members periodically met under the guidance of their leadership to discuss issues and actions as the need arose. *Ethnos* was a political community.⁷ However, political cohesion was weak since the population was small and scattered. A common shrine for worship often existed as a unifying center. In time of danger, the tribal members might rally near a citadel for defense. Since these areas were politically weak, they were minor players in Hellenic affairs. These Greeks lived in central and northwest Greece located in the areas known as Aetolia, Acarnania, Locris, etc.⁸

The second and dominant form was the *polis*. The etymology of the *polis* indicates that the term originally meant a "fortified place."⁹ In time, the term meant a city (urban center) and/or a city plus the *chora* (hinterland) it controlled.¹⁰ The concept of *autonomia* (autonomy) of the *polis* as an independent state in external affairs developed in the classical period. In the archaic period, *poleis* were subjects of Lydia and Persia in Asia Minor, colonies of a Greek mother-city, and subjects of larger *poleis* on the Hellenic mainland (i.e., Sparta, Corinth, Thebes, Eretria, etc.). Hansen states that

The Greek view of the *polis* was that it was community of citizens as to their political institutions: a *polis* was a self-governing community. But self-government does not necessarily imply independence.¹¹

Although the *autonomia* of the *polis* in external affairs was a critical component in the fifth century, this independence was limited when many *poleis* became members of the Hellenic League, Peloponnesian League, Delian League, Boeotian League, etc. Membership meant that they followed the leadership of the hegemon (i.e., Sparta, Athens, and Thebes) in foreign affairs.

The concept of the *polis* has many connotations. The Greeks applied the term *polis* to many different usages. *Polis* was applied to Hellenic and foreign political communities. It was applied to fortified and unfortified cities. It applied to independent or subject communities. It applied to members of a league. It also applied to subject communities within a *polis* such as the perioecic communities of Lacedaemon.¹² Hansen further states,

Roughly speaking, the word *polis* had four different senses: (a) "stronghold" or "citadel," (b) "nucleated settlement," (c) "country" or "territory," and (d) "political community."¹³

Consequently, the attempt to give a precise definition of the term that covers all applications is neither practical nor enlightening.

The concept of the *polis* as a city-state is a modern concept

developed by nineteenth-century German historians who used the term *Stadtstaat*. We accept the modern definition of *polis* as a self-governing city-state that comprises an urban center and its hinterland. The *polis* was also a community of citizens with a constitution (Arist.*Pol.*1276b1). Thus, a *polis* could theoretically exist without a territory according to Aristotle.¹⁴ We must be satisfied with the understanding that multiple characteristics were applied to the concept of *polis* by the Hellenes. Therefore, we must paint the term *polis* with a wide brush.

The Development of the *Polis*

The *polis* appeared in Asia Minor, Cyprus, and the Greek homeland between 900–700 BC. The *polis* was a territory with a defined border and homogeneous population based on an urban center that was the political, religious, administrative, and economic center for the people of the area. The population had an ethnic identity such as Ionian, Dorian, Aeolian, etc. “In the Greek homeland, every *polis*, except island *poleis*, belonged to an *ethnos*.”¹⁵ However, the Greek colonies were not composed of one ethnic group. The earliest literary evidence indicates that the *polis* existed by 650 at the latest.¹⁶

The *polis* developed by many means. The Greeks used the term *synoikismos* (or synoecism), which means “coming together” to describe the amalgamation of smaller communities into a larger urban center.¹⁷ This new urban center dominated and was identified with the surrounding territory/hinterland (*chora*). This urban center was often fortified and located near high ground for defense (Athenian Acropolis, Theban Cadmea, Corinthian Acrocorinth, etc.). It often had a patron deity such as Athena in Athens, Apollo in Sparta, Hera in Samos, etc. This unity of population, urban center, territory, and religious affiliation defined the *polis*. In contrast to this definition stands Sparta. Sparta never developed an urban center. Sparta remained a conglomeration of five separate unwallled villages located in a plain along the Eurotas River.¹⁸ The village of Amyclae was a few miles south of the other villages. An acropolis existed. Spartan territory consisted of Laconia and Messenia with a large servile population attained through conquest. This servile population also had a different ethnic identity. Thus, Sparta did not fit the pattern for a typical Hellenic *polis*.

A *polis* also developed by the colonization (*apoikismos*) of people to another location. Whether the people emigrated voluntarily or were state sponsored, they coalesced around a defensible position that eventually grew into a self-governed urban center. The population of the *polis* grew due to the natural increase of the founding members, the incorporation of local natives, and later immigration. In the age of

migration, most colonists probably left voluntarily. In the fifth century, colonies in the Chersonese in 447, at Thurii in Italy in 444, and Amphipolis in Thrace in 437 were state sponsored by Athens (Diod.XII.32.2; Plut.*Per*.19). Hieron of Syracuse destroyed Catana in Sicily and resettled it with settlers from the Peloponnese (Diod.XI.49.1–2).

The final method of development was the natural growth of a village into a city or the transplantation of populations from one area to another. Older cities such as Athens and Thebes existed in the Mycenaean period. However, the social, economic, and political organization was centered on the palace complex governed by a king. These cities declined during the Dark Age after 1100 BC and probably reemerged as *poleis* sometime prior to 700 BC. Gelon built up Syracuse by transplanting the population of defeated *poleis* to Syracuse in the 480s.

The population of the *polis* consisted of two basic categories: citizens (*polites*) and noncitizens. The citizens were defined as the free male population that was eligible to participate in the government and the judicial system. Eligibility for citizenship was defined by sex, age, wealth, and military service. Native noncitizens were composed of men who did not meet citizenship requirements, women, and children. They were free members of the state with legal protections but could not participate in governmental affairs. Noncitizens could be free or non-free. Metics (resident foreigners) were free members who paid taxes, performed military obligations, and had legal protections but could not participate in the government. Metics were commonly found in the commercial states such as Athens and Corinth where market exchanges existed for agricultural and industrial commodities. In the Dorian states of the Peloponnese, Thessaly, and Crete, the perioeci (dwellers around) were native free members of the state who provided military service, paid taxes, and had legal protections but were not granted citizenship. In Laconia, these perioeci along with the Spartiates (citizens of Sparta) comprised the term “Lacedaemonians” used by the ancient writers. The non-free members of the state comprised slaves and serfs. The helots (*heilōtai*) in Laconia and Messenia, along with the penestae in Thessaly, were serfs tied to the land. They had minimal or no legal protections while their labor provided the agricultural support for their masters. Slaves formed the other non-free segment of the state. Slaves were Greek and non-Greek. Slaves were owned by individuals or the state. Slaves owned by individuals performed domestic, industrial and agricultural, and commercial labors. State-owned slaves were often prisoners of war assigned to perform state functions such as mining and public works. State tasks such as mining often meant a death sentence for the

slaves since this was hazardous work. Manumission of slaves was permitted, but they were not allowed to become citizens by law. Despite the harshness of slavery, we are informed of no slave revolts that were common in the later Roman Republic in the last two centuries BC.

The term *politeia* means both citizenship and constitution. The *politês* (citizens) of the *polis* were the constitution of the state. The constitution of the *polis* is defined by the quantity of citizen participation. The broader the eligibility requirements implied, the larger the degree of participation by the citizen body (Arist.*Pol.*1278b10–15). Monarchy (one-man rule by birth), aristocracy (nobility rule by birth), oligarchy (nobility rule by wealth), tyranny (one-man rule by force), and democracy (rule by the people) were the five basic constitutions that defined the *polis* from its origins to the fifth century. In general terms, this was the evolutionary progression of the *polis* from 800 to 500 BC. In the fifth and fourth centuries, tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy were the competing constitutional forms the Greeks fought over. The trend was toward a broader classification of citizenship in the Greek world, but this was not a straight line trajectory. How did these constitutional forms develop?

The Evolution of the *Polis*

As Homer relates in the *Iliad*, early Greek armies were led by kings and fought with warrior elites. They rode to battle in chariots or on horse. In battle, these warriors fought on foot in individual combat with the enemy. The king and the warrior elite ruled in the Mycenaean period and early *polis*. The king (*basileus*) governed the state. The members of the warrior elite advised the king through some form of a council. In time, the monarchy was replaced with an aristocracy (*aristocratia*). This government of nobles defined by birth expanded the council from an advisory board to permanent administrative body of the state. From this council, the nobility selected magistrates to handle the religious, administrative, judicial, and military affairs.

From these early beginnings, two factors occurred by the seventh century that made aristocratic forms of government obsolete. The first factor was increased economic prosperity. The aristocrats' wealth derived from the land. Agriculture and animal husbandry were the main forms of wealth. They lived on their estates. The majority of the population lived on subsistence farming, pastoralism, and small trades. Improved prosperity from the expansion in agriculture, industry, and trade along with population growth led to the growth of the *polis*. With limited amounts of land, the growth of the *polis* primarily occurred in its urban center. Industry and trade forced its participants to live in the

city. This prosperity and urban expansion encouraged those urban members of society, who benefitted from these changes, to demand greater participation in the affairs of state. Consequently, the nobility by birth was replaced by a nobility of wealth (oligarchy). Commercial centers, such as Corinth, Athens, Aegina, Miletus, etc., rose because of the increased trade within the Aegean basin that then expanded throughout the Mediterranean world.

The second factor was the development of hoplite warfare. Its origins are lost in the mist of the past, but we know from Herodotus that Greek hoplites existed in the seventh century and served in Egypt under Pharaoh Psammetichus I. They are referred to as "men of bronze" (Hdt.II.152). They are also featured on the pottery of the time period. The development of hoplite warfare and the appearance of the *polis* seem connected, but the relationship between the two is hotly debated.

Instead of small warrior elites, accompanied by light-armed men from the lower social order, engaging in individual combat, hoplite warfare required masses of heavily armored men who fought as a group in a formation called the phalanx. Only citizens could become hoplites. Battles were fought as singular engagements where the one phalanx opposed the other. Since hoplite armies engaged in frontal assaults, the larger and better trained army prevailed. Hoplite wars were generally determined by one engagement with the victor in possession of the battlefield. Victory was a group achievement. It has been suggested that hoplite armies represented 10 percent of the total population.¹⁹ Therefore, victory was a celebration by the citizens since the citizens were the state.²⁰ The glory of the *polis* replaced individual glory.

The requirements for an army of hoplites forced the *polis* to expand the franchise. These men, designed to defend the state, were expected to participate in state affairs. Thus, in an oligarchy, the initial franchise of nobles was expanded to represent the hoplites, which could be small farmers, tradesmen, merchants, etc. These men participated in state affairs through an assembly. Barred by legal and economic restrictions from the council and magistracies, through the assembly they voted on major issues presented to them by the council or magistrates. In time, the further expansion of the franchise led to a democracy. Eventually there was probably a fine line between an oligarchy and a democracy as defined by citizen participation.

How did tyranny (one-man rule) evolve in a *polis*? Tyranny (*tyrannis*) was often the constitutional bridge between oligarchy and democracy (Arist.*Pol.*1286b10–20). Although tyranny would come and go throughout the classical period, the heyday of tyranny occurred in the seventh and sixth centuries. Some tyrannies were established by

ambitious individuals using force to gain the position such as Pisistratus in Athens and Gelon in Syracuse. Other tyrannies arose from stasis in the *polis*—in particular, oligarchies (Hdt.III.82). Demanding participation in the state, noncitizens would choose a leader to represent their interest in the conflict with the nobles. Often meeting strong hostility by the nobles, the leader would be granted a bodyguard by the people or gather an armed force by which he staged a coup d'état and disbanded the ruling oligarchy. Through death or exile the elite would be eliminated. The tyrant would then either rule by force and or reform the state to meet the demands of his supporters. The tyrants often promoted economic expansion and the arts such as Periander in Corinth and Pisistratus in Athens. Thucydides claims that tyranny first developed in the commercial *poleis* (Thuc.I.13.1). For example, the Cypselid tyranny replaced the Bacchiad aristocracy in Corinth in the seventh century. Early tyrannies also appeared in the commercial states of Megara and Sicyon in the Peloponnese. Fortunately in most *poleis*, tyranny did not last more than two or three generations throughout Hellenic history. A broader based oligarchy replaced the Cypselids in Corinth in the first quarter of the sixth century. An early form of democracy replaced the Pisistratids in Athens after 510. In the mid-fifth century, a democracy replaced the Deinomenids in Syracuse. In the classical period, tyranny was the bane of Sicilian *poleis*. It occurred more in Sicily than any other area of the Hellenic world. For the Greeks, tyranny was the ultimate constitutional violation because it nullified the participation of the citizen in the affairs of state.

For Hellas, democracy (*democratia*) did not appear until the late sixth century and flowered in fifth-century Athens. Periclean Athens became the symbol for democracy. In the modern world, democracy means representative government. Through periodic elections, the people select leaders to govern them according to the laws of the land. To the Greeks, democracy means the direct rule of the people in their assembly. They selected their leaders through election or by lot. They made laws in the assembly. They were judge and jury in the law courts or assembly. They debated affairs of state in the council and assembly. They punished their leaders who violated the law or failed in their missions. Because democracy is the dominant form of government in Western civilization in the twenty-first century, Greek democracy is often praised as the highest form of constitutional development. The irony is that the many philosophers, rhetoricians, and thinkers of the fourth century were not fans of democracy. These men favored limited government ruled by the wealthy and educated elite to provide “the good” for the people. The *Republic* of Plato and the *Politics* of Aristotle are still read today by students of history,

philosophy, and political science to understand Greek political theory.

The Structure of the *Polis*

The structure of the *polis* was designed to meet the religious, administrative, military, economic, and judicial responsibilities of the state. To repeat, this means the citizens. Magistrates, a council, and an assembly were the basic structures that existed regardless of the constitution in operation. By definition only citizens could participate in these institutions. All citizens participated in the assembly. Qualifications for a magistracy and council were restricted to citizens who met certain age, social, and wealth qualifications. Membership in the council was also restricted to those who held certain types of office. In pre-democratic Athens, membership in the Areopagus was limited to those who performed the function of archon, which was the chief magistracy. Only in Sparta did the hereditary kingship continue to exist next to these institutions.

The magistrates had different names and functions in the various *poleis*. These magistrates had religious, administrative, fiscal, military, and judicial functions that were originally conducted by a king. An eponymous (chief) official originally was selected to replace the king, and often the name of the year was identified with this chief official. In Athens the year was named after the eponymous archon. In Sparta the year was named for an ephor. With the growth of the *polis*, the functions of the chief official were disseminated among multiple officials with designated titles. Aristotle claims in Solonian Athens, about 580 BC, a board of ten archons divided the various functions of the state (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*13.2). Except for Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, we do not know the names and detailed functions of minor officials of the various *poleis*. However, the major officials conducted similar functions. Their primary tasks were often political and military. Archon and later *Strategos* in Athens, Ephor in Sparta, *Strategos* of Syracuse, and Boeotarch in Thebes are a few titles of the leading magistrates. In Sparta the kings conducted the military campaigns, but domestic and foreign affairs were guided by the ephors. Since magistrates were unpaid, these positions were restricted to the upper classes that could afford to serve. Therefore, the nobility dominated the state affairs. Even in democratic Athens, nobles such as Cimon, Pericles, and Nicias were continuously returned to positions of power. Not until later in the fifth century did Athens begin to pay magistrates.

Officials served for a designated period of time, which usually meant an annual basis. By the modern standards of the social-welfare state, the quantity of officials and the bureaucracy always remained small. Annual replacement of officials probably led to government

inefficiency. However, citizen participation, not government efficiency, was the goal of the *polis*. However, the nobility could provide a certain degree of professionalism as civilian or military officials because they had the economic means to serve on a regular basis. Plutarch's lives of famous Greeks demonstrate the amount of service they provided their *polis*.

A Council (*boule*) existed to handle the affairs of state. It was a deliberative body that met in the Council house (*bouleuterion*). It met at designated times of the year but probably met as often as necessary. The Council supervised the magistrates and reviewed their performance to ensure that they did not violate the laws of the *polis*. Members handled foreign policy and received ambassadors. Domestic legislation was debated and approved. Contingent on the type of constitution, the Council presented an agenda for the assembly to approve new laws or set state policy. Within the Council, there was a smaller body of members, called the *probouloi*, which would set the agenda for the larger body to discuss. The Council performed judicial functions such as trials for murder, treason, misbehavior in office, etc. Membership in the council was restricted to citizens who met certain requirements such as age, wealth, office holder, etc. Time of service could be for a defined period or for life. In Athens, membership in the Areopagus was for life, but the Council of Five Hundred was selected to serve on an annual basis. Membership in the *Gerousia* (Council of Elders) in Sparta was for life. However, the minimum age requirement of sixty years, except for the kings, probably ensured a fairly rapid turnover of membership.

In theory, the Assembly (*ecclesia*) consisted of the entire citizen body that met at assigned times. In the archaic period, the assembly met in the *agora* (marketplace). In the classical period, the assembly gathered in the theater.²¹ In practice, attendance was dependent on affordability and locale of the citizens. Poorer citizens often could not afford to attend. Distance of travel often precluded attendance by citizens. Larger territorial *poleis* such as Athens and Sparta made it prohibitive for citizens to attend on a regular basis. To encourage attendance, Athens introduced pay for its citizens later in the fifth century, which continued into the restored democracy of the fourth century (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*62). Therefore, due to affordability and location, attendance in the assembly was often dominated by the urban population.

In oligarchy and democracy, the assembly voted on major issues of state. It also met at designated times of the year but could be summoned when necessary. By ballot or voice vote, citizens would approve or disapprove the issues presented. In oligarchy, the assembly usually could only vote a measure up or down. It could not

debate. In democracy, the assembly could debate and amend the issues. In Athens, the *prytaneis*, a section of the Council, probably prepared the agenda for the assembly in the fifth century. In fourth-century Athens, the *prohedroi* replaced the *prytaneis* in this function. In Sparta the ephors prepared the agenda for the Assembly.²²

Despite the political structure of the *polis*, there were two basic types of law. The first type was the fundamental/traditional order of *nomos*. These constitutional laws (*nomoi*) were often based on religion and custom. Only with difficulty could these laws be supplanted by the assembly or council. These laws defined the structure of the state (Arist.*Pol.*1289a15–20). Laws that maintain public order, define social classes, treason, prevent private vengeance, prescribe methods to honor the gods, etc., are examples that maintain the *eunomia* (harmony) of the state. To mitigate *stasis* in the seventh and sixth centuries, many *poleis* had appointed lawgivers to create fundamental laws that applied to all members of the *polis*. Solon in Athens, Lycurgus in Sparta, Pittacus in Mytilene, etc., created legislation defining the social, political, and legal structure of the *polis*. These fundamental laws, like the United States Constitution, could not be replaced except by special legislation. Religious oaths were sworn to uphold these laws. Thus, these rules were protected by the gods. Violation of these laws was not just a legal matter but a sacred matter. Therefore, regardless of the constitution of the *polis*, there were restrictions that neither the legal prerogative of the assembly nor council could alter except by special measures.

The second type of law was legislation that met the daily requirements of the *polis*. Routine legislation in the Athenian Assembly was called a *psephisma*. Legislation by other institutions was called a *psephismata*. Taxation, administrative rules, state expenditure, and civil disputes are examples of routine legislation. These laws could be made by the Athenian Council or Assembly. Through routine constitutional procedure, they could be routinely changed.²³

The Functions of the *Polis*

The maintenance of the political and social order of its inhabitants was the fundamental function of the *polis*. Citizens had political guarantees as members of the body politic. To maintain social order, it was the responsibility of the *polis* to meet the requirements of women, children, and other noncitizens living within the *polis*. Therefore, as with the structure of the *polis*, the functions of the *polis* included the religious, administrative, judicial, economic, and military requirements of the population.

Like other states in antiquity, there was a relationship between the

secular order of the state and the sacred order of the gods. Proper respect and honor paid to these deities ensured good social order in the state. The integral relationship between the secular and the divine implied that violation of civil law often meant violation of sacred law and vice versa. Whether a violation of secular or sacred law occurred by a state official or private individual, the violation impacted the entire community. As stated earlier, the citizens and the state were identical. A violation by an individual was a violation by the citizen body. Punishment of the individual was insufficient to appease the gods. Famine, disease, natural disasters, etc., were viewed as divine punishment for the entire community. Thus, a form of community repentance was also conducted to absolve the *polis* of guilt. Therefore, the worship of the gods was conducted by state officials. It was imperative to maintain the close relationship between the secular and divine order.

Although temple priests existed, their duties were confined to the temple and individual citizens.²⁴ No state function was conducted without prayers and animal sacrifices. Religious festivals, council and assembly meetings, court procedures, battles, etc., were preceded by animal sacrifice conducted under the auspices of state officials. Sacrifices were performed by the chief officials of the *polis*. Unfavorable sacrifices meant state functions could not occur and military engagements were avoided. The *polis* had a patron deity that protected the community. Hera in Argos, Athena in Athens, Artemis in Ephesus, and Apollo at Sparta are examples of these patron deities with their accompanying temples and festivals. Treaties were often confirmed with oaths to the gods. Gifts were given by the *polis* to the temple of the patron deity or to the Panhellenic shrines of Hellas in appreciation of divine favor. The maintenance of good relations with the divine world was a primary function of the *polis*.

Although mentioned earlier, it is important to emphasize that Greek respect for the gods meant that the grounds of the temple were sacrosanct. Asylum was granted to any person who entered the temple. Even if the person was a criminal, that person could not be touched by the magistrates until they left the premises.²⁵ Thus, refugees in war, political exiles, common citizens, and others often sought sanctuary in the temples as protection by the gods.

Defense of the *polis* against foreign foes was also a primary state function. Whether this was against fellow Greeks or non-Greek states, the freedom and autonomy of the *polis* were themes that were ever present in the Hellenic world. Without this freedom and autonomy, the *polis* and its citizens were no better than slaves. The twenty-first century would refer to this concept as the right of self-determination by the state to conduct its own affairs. To maintain this autonomy and

freedom, the leaders of the *polis* conducted the army and navy when on campaign. In Sparta, the kings conducted military campaigns. The polemarch, *strategoi*, *tagos*, Boeotarch, etc., were the military leaders in other *poleis*. These leaders were often the nobles of the *polis*. The citizens who met the minimum requirements provided the hoplite force of the army. Other citizens of the poorer class served as light-armed infantry known as peltasts in the fourth century. The wealthy class often served as cavalry because of the expense involved to maintain a horse. The cavalry and light-armed soldiers remained junior branches in Greek warfare in the classical period.

The growth of naval warfare incorporated members of the community not qualified to serve as hoplites. By the fifth century, the trireme became the basic ship used in warfare. Requiring a crew of two hundred men, members of the lower social classes served as rowers.²⁶ During the fifth-century democracy of Athens, the freeborn citizens of the *thetes* class served as rowers. These rowers were the backbone of the navy. The navy and the constitution were the twin pillars of support for the *polis*. Throughout the classical period, the rowers in all Hellenic fleets were freemen.

Besides self-defense, the administrative function of the state was to provide internal law and order. *Eunomia* (harmony), *dike* (justice), and *eleutheria* (freedom) were the goals of good government.²⁷ *Stasis* was the failure of government.²⁸ Political and class conflict became the bane of good government from the early eighth century well into the Hellenistic period of the late third century. As will be observed, the island state of Corcyra, on the west coast of the Greek mainland, witnessed several bouts of civil war in the fifth and fourth centuries. Civil discord in Corcyra was one of the causes of the Peloponnesian War. The officials, with the support of the law, replaced the judicial powers of the patriarchal heads of families, clans, and tribes.²⁹ Laws replaced blood feuds. Punishment of offenders was reserved for the institutions of the *polis*, not tribal leaders. In time, the laws of the *polis* were codified and published for all citizens to ensure judicial equality.

Enforcement of the law was rudimentary. There were no police forces to maintain order. Designated officials could arrest people for various crimes. There were prison officials, but prisons were not designed for long-term incarceration. Prisons held the accused until the time of trial. Once convicted of a crime, a person was fined, executed, or exiled. Long-term incarceration was not an option. Trials were conducted before assigned magistrates, a council, an assembly, or jury courts. In democratic Athens of the fifth century, jury courts of the people evolved. Jury selection was by lot to guarantee impartiality. There were no lawyers for the state or defense. A state official or private citizen acted as prosecutor. A private citizen acted for the

defense.

There was no distinction between civil and criminal law. Criminal charges were either public or private.³⁰ Violation of the secular law implied violation of sacred law. Murder was a violation of secular and sacred law. In Athens, the Areopagus was assigned murder trials because the entire community suffered from the blood pollution of the victim. In his tragedy the *Eumenides*, Aeschylus demonstrates that justice, through Apollo, should be a function of rational debate in the Areopagus and not subject to emotion as represented by the Furies, who wanted revenge for Orestes slaying of his mother Clytemnestra. State executions for murder eliminated the blood feud between families and appeased the gods. Civil disputes such as payment for debt, property rights, economic exchanges, etc., could go before assigned magistrates to arbitrate the issues. If arbitration failed, then court trials could occur.

By comparison to the modern state, public finance was small because state functions were small. Unlike the twenty-first-century welfare state, the *polis* was not responsible for education, welfare, health care, transportation, safety in the workplace, etc. To prevent famine, the *polis* did provide food supplies for the populace. Although there were officials to collect and distribute revenue, there was no organized and centralized state treasury to monitor revenue and expenditures. Temple precincts were often used to store treasure that might be used in time of emergency. These temple treasuries could exist within the *polis* or at the great Hellenic shrines such as Delphi and Olympia. Private donations and state contributions could be made to these sanctuaries. There were no annual budgets, and the revenue stream projection was crude at best. The state could only spend the revenue that was collected. There were no central banks in the modern sense to fund state expenditures. Consequently, the *polis* could not engage in deficit spending to fund state objectives.

Multiple sources of revenue did exist to support the *polis*. Taxation existed in the form of a tax on land, import and export dues, harbor dues, etc. There was no income tax on citizens. In emergencies, special assessments (*eisphora*) could be made on the citizens, but this was rare. A tax could be imposed on *metics* (foreign residents). Income also derived from farming out private business contracts such as mining. Revenue from fines and property confiscations also added to the revenue stream. In war, revenue could accrue from booty or as compensation for the cost of the war by the peace treaty.

The Economy of the *Polis*

Agriculture, industry, and trade were the backbone of the Greek economy. The goods from these sectors along with the adoption of coinage brought forth a market exchange economy. From a barter-based economy, the introduction of coinage, as a portable means of exchange for goods and services, allowed the economy of the Hellenic world to grow exponentially. This market economy achieved a mature stage by the fifth century.³¹

All three sectors expanded from the ninth to fourth centuries through population growth, colonization, improved utilization of natural resources, development of markets, and improved contacts with the kingdoms throughout the Mediterranean basin. Corinth, Aegina, Miletus, and Athens became major centers of commerce.

Despite the growth of commerce and industry, most Greeks throughout the Hellenic world continued to live off the land. Agriculture included crop farming, animal husbandry, and pastoral migration. Therefore, the economic foundation of most *poleis* remained agrarian. Agriculture in the Black Sea area, Sicily, and Italy was extremely productive, and these areas were exporters of foodstuffs. Their primary market was the Greek mainland. Grain (wheat and barley), grapes (wine), and olives (olive oil) were the staples of agricultural production.³² However, on the mainland many Greeks lived on small farms that provided a marginal income. Any surplus was sold in the local marketplace to the urban population. The nobility owned larger estates farmed by renters, serfs, or slaves. Any surplus was exported. However, the limited fertility of the soil always made the mainland vulnerable to periods of famine from bad harvests. Consequently, Sicily, Italy, Egypt, and the Black Sea area became major centers for the importation of foodstuffs. Athens, Corinth, Megara, and other commercial centers, with their large urban population and limited hinterland, were net importers of food on a routine basis. At the end of the Peloponnesian War (431–404), Lysander prevented the arrival of the grain fleets from the Black Sea. Thus, starvation forced Athens to surrender.

Thessaly, central Greece, and the Peloponnese always remained agrarian. The serf population in Thessaly, Laconia, and Messenia supported their masters. Thessaly, with its fertile plains, was famous for its horse breeding. Unlike other Greek *poleis*, a larger percentage of Thessalians were cavalrymen rather than hoplites. The Thessalian cavalry came into prominence under Philip II and Alexander III. The Spartans were able to maintain a professional army because the citizens relied on the Laconian and Messenian helots (*heilōtai*) to support them.

The growth of industry in antiquity has a different meaning than the concept of industrial growth from the dawn of the Industrial Age in

the eighteenth century AD. No great factories existed. Nor did the plethora of commercial goods available today to consumers exist then. Industries were small operations with perhaps tens of employees at best.³³ Employees were free or slave. Division of labor to improve the efficiency of production was basically nonexistent. Employees were craftsmen that completed a product from beginning to end. Manufacture of pottery, weapons, agricultural equipment, and timber are a few samples of industrial production. Mining provided iron, gold, and silver for manufacture and commerce. Silver and iron mining occurred on the mainland. Gold and silver were mined in Thrace. Copper, to make bronze, was imported from Cyprus. Corinth was an early leader in pottery production in the eighth and seventh century. This dominance was supplanted by Athens when black and red ware pottery in the sixth century was developed. In the ancient world, pottery was the standard packaging and storage material for goods. Olive oil, wine, grain, fish, etc., were stored and shipped in large jars.

Development of early commercial centers from Miletus and Ephesus in Asia, to Corinth and Megara on the mainland, and then to Syracuse in Sicily facilitated trade throughout the Hellenic world. Located on the Greek isthmus, Corinth controlled traffic between the Aegean basin and the western Greeks. The construction of the *diolkos*, under the sixth-century tyrant Periander, allowed merchant and naval vessels to be transported across the isthmus from the Saronic to the Corinthian Gulf.³⁴ This shortened trade routes and allowed Corinth to collect dues from these vessels. Unfortunately, the quantity of trade that used the *diolkos* cannot be determined. Corinth remained a major commercial center until her decline in the fourth century. This dominance was supplanted by Athens by the late sixth century. From this time to the Hellenistic period, Athens remained the dominant commercial center of Hellas.

The minting of coinage came to the Greek world by the late seventh century via the kingdom of Lydia in Asia Minor (Hdt.I.94).³⁵ It was adopted early in the commercial centers of Miletus, Ephesus, Aegina, and Corinth and spread rapidly throughout the Aegean basin. The *poleis* of Sicily and Italy adopted coinage in the sixth century. Coinage was minted from gold, silver, and electrum.³⁶ Since coinage was a more portable means of exchange to pay for goods and services, it facilitated the economic growth of the commercial states. Weights and measures were standardized for these metals to minimize the disputes over their valuation (Arist.*Pol.*1257a35). Valuation was based on the weight of the coin. A coin was often stamped with its place of origin to better identify its value. The commercial states provided officials to monitor coinage exchanges in the local agora (marketplace) to ensure that the weights and measures maintained

their correct valuation. In the sixth century, the Euboic and Aeginetan standards for coinage were prevalent. These improved measures of exchange provided an easier means for the *polis* to collect revenue from commercial activities. In the fifth century, the Athenian owl became the dominant coinage for Aegean commerce. Sparta, forever the anachronism, remained an agricultural state and used iron bars for exchange. Thus, Sparta did not participate in the expanding commercial world of the classical period.

The *Polis* at War

In the archaic period, warfare dominated by the heavily armed infantryman appeared sometime between 700 and 650 BC.³⁷ The hoplite (*hoplitēs*) defined by the shield (*hoplon* or *aspis*) he carried became the dominant feature of a Hellenic army. The development of a hoplite force cannot be assigned to a particular *polis* but appears to have been adopted by the major *poleis* within a short period of time.³⁸ In tandem with the hoplite was the development of the phalanx, a mass formation of these heavily armed infantrymen.

Who was a hoplite? The hoplite had to be a citizen who met the minimum age and property requirement. Farmers, craftsmen, and small merchants composed this group. Since he provided his own equipment, the hoplite came from the middling social orders.³⁹ His shield was three feet in diameter with two handles, a bronze armband (*porpax*) for the forearm and a hand grip (*antilabe*), held by the left hand. Made of wood, the concave shield had a bronze band on the circumference.⁴⁰ A thin bronze face was sometimes put on a shield. Insignia were painted on the shield for identification. The shield had limited movement outward and could not protect the right side of the body. The limitations of the shield limited the hoplite's mobility. Thus, he was forced to fight in a tight formation. Consequently, the hoplite was dependent on his neighbor to protect his right side in combat. This tight fighting formation developed into the phalanx.

The hoplite wore body armor consisting of a helmet, greaves, and corselet designed for protection in close combat. The Corinthian helmet was made from a single sheet of bronze that covered the head and face from the shoulder up. A T-shaped opening provided space for the eyes, nose, and mouth but limited his vision. Since the ears were encased in the helmet, the soldier had limited hearing. A crest often existed on the top of the helmet.⁴¹ Other types of helmet were adopted, but the Corinthian appears most often on pottery. To protect the chest and back, the hoplite wore a corselet consisting of two bronze sheets attached by metal bands. Attached to the calf muscles, the hoplite wore bronze greaves to protect the ankles and shin. In combat, he

carried an iron-tipped, long-thrusting spear and a short iron sword.⁴² In early hoplite warfare, he probably carried at least two spears, one held in each hand. One was used as a javelin to throw at a distance. The other was used for thrusting in close combat. In the archaic period, a full complement of equipment might have weighed about seventy pounds (36 kg). In the classical period, some of this body armor was either eliminated or made lighter for mobility.⁴³

Picture 1 – This personal picture illustrates different types of Corinthian helmets.

Picture 1—Corinthian Helmets



This heavily fortified infantryman with limited mobility forced the adoption of the phalanx formation in combat. This formation consisted of men formed in a tight line and usually eight men deep. The phalanx required flat terrain for battle. It was impossible for hoplites to maintain cohesion in rugged terrain. In battle, opposing armies approached in tight formation and relied on the “shock” value of the initial encounter to gain an advantage. Weight, numbers, skill, discipline, and courage of the soldiers were factors to carry the day. The “shoving” or “pushing” of shields (*ōthismós*) was a method used in combat to force one side to retreat. In the classical period, some armies were twenty-five men deep or more, but this formation was rare (Thuc.IV.93.4). Susceptible to flanking movements because of their exposed left side, opposing forces stretched their line to match the enemy. The best troops were put on the right side of the phalanx. The right side was expected to defeat the enemy and then wheel to catch the opposing force in the flank forcing them to flee.

Generalship was important in selecting favorable conditions of where and when to fight. Ingenuity and guile were the hallmarks of a good commander to put his army in a favorable fighting position.⁴⁴ However, once the time, place, and tactical disposition of the army was determined and the sacrifices to the gods for divine support completed, commanders often had little control once the battle began. Since commanders fought alongside the troops in battle and usually commanded the right wing, they were unable to observe the entire battlefield. There were no reserve forces to meet battlefield

contingencies. Consequently, once engaged, generalship was limited but could be effective if circumstances were right. Once engaged, victory often depended on the courage, skill, and discipline of the infantryman. Adcock provides a short summation of battle.

The recipe for victory is to have more *or* better, or more *and* better, hoplites than the opponent. Except for the successful exploitation of an advantage on the right wing—and this requires more tactical control than most generals could apply—the battle is a head-on collision all along the line. It would seem to follow that it is almost irrational to engage in battle unless the hoplite strength of the two sides approaches parity.⁴⁵

Keegan further describes battle after the initial assault.

Under this impact, some men inevitably went down at once, dead, wounded, or overborne by the rear. That might create a breach in the shield wall. Those in the second or third ranks strove to open it wider with their spears, thrusting and jabbing from their relatively protected position at whoever they could reach. If it widened, there followed the *othismos*, 'push with shield,' to widen it further and to win room in which swords, the hoplite's secondary weapon, might be drawn and used to slash at the enemy's legs.⁴⁶

In summation, hoplite battles were brutal affairs. However, they were often short in duration. Many casualties often occurred when one side took flight. If the hoplite discarded his shield and spear in flight, he was still weighed down by his body armor. Consequently, he was exposed to the mobility of cavalry or light-armed troops. However, pursuit was short, which limited casualties by the retreating army.⁴⁷ The victor possessed the battlefield and set up a trophy honoring the achievement. The defeated appealed to the victor to allow them to bury their dead. After burial and honoring the dead, both sides returned home. Excluding the fifth-century Peloponnesian Wars and the fourth-century Corinthian War, one battle often ended the war.⁴⁸

Hoplite campaigns were usually of short duration. They were often restricted between late spring and fall to accommodate the farmers' need to sow and harvest their fields. Logistical support from the *polis* was often limited. Citizen hoplites were not paid by the *polis*. Citizenship and military duty went hand in hand.

Although cavalry forces existed, they were a small contingent in a Hellenic army. Large cavalry forces were limited primarily to Boeotia and Thessaly because of the flat fertile ground, which was conducive

to rearing horses. Cavalry is known to have formed one-sixth of hoplite forces in Boeotia.⁴⁹ Since the cost to maintain a horse was prohibitive for a cavalryman, this branch of service was restricted to the nobility. The rugged terrain of Hellas also limited the use of cavalry in combat.⁵⁰ The Greeks did not possess saddles with stirrups. Thus, controlling a horse was more difficult. For these reasons, the effective use of cavalry was limited.

The primary functions of the cavalry were defense, pursuit, and reconnaissance. Cavalry were often a defense force to protect the flanks of the phalanx. They often did the most damage when pursuing the defeated forces. In flight, infantry often abandoned weaponry, which exposed them to cavalry attack. Cavalrymen wore light armor consisting of a helmet, corselet, and shield. Weaponry consisted of a javelin, lance, or bow, and a short sword. The small size of Greek horses prevented the development of heavily armored cavalryman as existed in Persian armies. In Hellas, cavalry remained a small defensive force until the rise of Macedonia.

Light-armed troops, composed of the lower social orders, were a part of a Greek army but were not a prominent feature until the Peloponnesian War (431–404). As peltasts (*peltastes*), named from their shield (*pelta*), they came of age under the leadership of the Athenian Iphicrates in the Corinthian War (395–387/6).⁵¹ Light-armed troops consisted of archers, slingers, and javelin throwers. They wore minimal body armor, if any. Their primary function was skirmishing. They were no match for hoplites on level ground but were effective in rugged terrain. Once new battlefield tactics were developed, they became very effective in the fourth century.

In the fourth century, mercenaries (*misthophoroi*) often replaced the citizen soldier. Although Greek mercenaries were in Asian armies since the seventh century, they did not become prevalent in Hellas until the fourth century. Continuous warfare combined with the change in social attitudes in the fourth century led to the increased use of professional mercenaries in all branches of the military. The citizen soldier, with his limited training, was no longer a match against the skill of a professional soldier. For many citizens, their pursuit of civilian activities precluded their desire to fulfill military obligations. However, other men pursued the economic opportunities that a professional soldier could gain. Pay, booty, and adventure enticed many men to become soldiers of fortune. These men were often recruited by a particular commander who hired out his services to various states when his native *polis* did not require his services.

In Athens, the office of *strategos* was transformed from a political/military position to a professional military position in the fourth century. Athenian generals such as Iphicrates, Chabrias, Chares, and others

served as hired guns when not required for Athenian service. In his old age, the Spartan king Agesilaus went to Egypt in the late 360s to fight and earn money for Sparta. In the 350s, Pammenes of Thebes, with his Boeotian troops, was employed by Persia. These commanders hired their own soldiers when serving foreign rulers. Iphicrates fought in Egypt and Thrace when not fighting for Athens. With abundance in the supply of soldiers of fortune, officials often found it easier to hire mercenaries than disrupt the local economy by the withdrawal of the citizens. In the 350s, the Phocians fought the Sacred War using mercenary soldiers funded by the treasures taken from the scared precinct of Delphi. Despite the increased use of mercenaries, the citizen-soldier hoplite remained the backbone of Hellenic armies into the Hellenistic period.


Little is known of Greek naval warfare until the Persian wars (499–479). In the archaic period, warships known as triaconters (thirty rowers), penteconters (fifty rowers), and other types of ships were primarily used to transport troops as described by Homer. The rowers became hoplites or light-armed troops when they landed on shore.⁵² Only with the development of the trireme (*trieres*) in the sixth century were ships designed to fight at sea.⁵³ In the archaic period, naval encounters that are reported often involved small quantities of vessels.⁵⁴ Few naval tactics were employed. These naval encounters probably involved ships attacking each other with the victor boarding and capturing the opposing vessel. The fighting contingents were rowers that transformed into archers and hoplites when the ships approached.

Not until the battle of the Lade in 494 do we hear of large fleets of triremes (*trieres*) opposing each other. The trireme was designed for speed, maneuverability, and ramming. The prow had a bronze beak to shear the oars or penetrate an enemy hull when rammed. These were the main methods to incapacitate the enemy vessel. The hull was designed to withstand “severe shock.”⁵⁵ From the nose of the ram to the stern, a trireme was about 120 (thirty-seven meters) feet long and eighteen feet wide (six meters). The hull above the water line was about six feet (two meters). It was powered by 170 rowers but had sails for longer voyages. During the heyday of the Athenian Empire, the crews of triremes were highly skilled sailors. An excellent warship, the trireme was vulnerable to rough seas as described by Herodotus. Engineering improvements in the fifth century allowed triremes to become troop and cavalry transports (Plut.*Cim.*12.2).⁵⁶ After the defeat of Xerxes, the power of Athens was based on its navy. War at sea was put on an equal footing with land warfare. The trireme, although supplanted by larger vessels in the Hellenistic period, remained a mainstay in the naval arsenal into the Roman period.

Siege warfare did not become effective until the fourth century when Dionysius I of Syracuse used new weapons in his wars against Carthage. However, this new technology did not grow roots on the Greek mainland. Under Philip II of Macedon, these weapons were advanced with the probable use of torsion technology. Catapults, first used by Dionysius I, were more powerful using torsion technology under Philip II.⁵⁷

Picture 2 – Example of a catapult design developed in the fourth century.

Picture 2—Example of a Catapult



(<http://www.hellenicaworld.com/Greece/Technology/en/CatapultTypes.html>)

Since siege technology was not exponentially advanced in classical warfare, walled cities were usually reduced by internal betrayal, undermining the walls, or long sieges that often took months, if not years, to reduce the inhabitants by starvation.⁵⁸ In 340/339, Philip failed to capture Perinthus and Byzantium despite his best siege efforts. In the fourth century, walls of stone began to replace the brick walls. Battering rams and siege towers were the only significant assault weapons utilized to attack a walled city.⁵⁹ Under Philip II and Alexander the Great, more sophisticated towers were used to attack walls. Due to its defensive strength, a walled city was a symbol of independence and power. Thus, when cities were successfully taken, it was demanded that the walls be destroyed.⁵⁹ The destruction of the walls was a symbol of subjection by the defeated.

The *Polis* Quantified

Social and economic analysis of the classical *polis* by scholars in the last thirty years has come up with some interesting figures to quantify information about classical *polis*. Based on the criteria of literary evidence, archaeological data, and the parameters set into computer models, data for population size, territorial size, rural versus urban population, size of urban centers, etc., have been quantified. Much of the following data is provided by Hansen and Nielsen in *An*

Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis as calculated by the Copenhagen *Polis* Center in Copenhagen, Denmark. Some 1,500 *poleis* might have existed between 750 and 323 BC. Evidence suggests that 1,035 *poleis* existed at various times throughout the archaic and classical periods. Of the 1,035 *poleis*, 166 have not been located.⁶⁰ There might have been 862 *poleis* in existence in the year 400 BC.⁶¹

Evidence exists for the territorial size of some 635 *poleis*. Territorial size varied from about 1.5 mi² (3 km²) for the island of Delos to 1,800 mi² (4,700 km²) for Syracuse.⁶² Athens comprised about 1,000 mi² (2,600 km²) after the unification of Attica. Sparta was the largest territorial *polis* in the Greek world comprising about 3,300 mi² (8,500 km²), which included Laconia and Messenia. In contrast to the large territories of a few *poleis*, it is estimated that 80 percent of all *poleis* had a territory of 125 mi² (200 km²) or less.⁶³ Only 10 percent of *poleis* exceeded 312 mi² (500 km²). By comparison the Persian Empire was about 2,100,000 mi² (5,500,000 km²) at its territorial peak under Darius I.

Demographic studies suggest that the *polis*'s population varied from less than a thousand inhabitants to over 250,000 in Athens. Total population for the Greek world in the fourth century is estimated at between 7,500,000 and 8,250,000. Demographers define an urban center in antiquity as having a minimum population of five thousand. By this definition, 32 percent of the Greek population was urban. Population for the Greek mainland and the islands is estimated from 2,750,000 to 3,250,000. Population density was about forty-four people per km².⁶⁴ It appears that 80 percent of all *poleis* had a minimum population of one thousand inhabitants. With these figures, Hansen argues, in contrast to Finley, that the Greek world was more urbanized than previously thought.⁶⁵ Many urban dwellers in smaller *poleis* were probably farmers who daily left the city to tend their fields. This increased urbanization implied greater economic prosperity than previously believed.

Attempting to determine the urban population of the Hellenic world is highly speculative. It is estimated that 3,500,000 lived in the cities.⁶⁶ In the small *poleis*, the majority of the population lived in the city. In the larger *poleis*, those with a territory over 500 km² (390 mi²), the majority of the population lived in the hinterland.⁶⁷ Determining the population of the individual *polis* is conjectural at best. Figures also vary for the fifth and fourth centuries. The peak total population of Athens was perhaps 250,000 in the fifth century and 200,000 in the fourth.⁶⁸ At their peak in the fifth century, the citizen population of Megara was perhaps thirty thousand, Corinth fifty thousand, Sparta thirty-five thousand and Acragas over twenty thousand etc.⁶⁹ From

these ballpark figures, the best we can say is that the population of Hellas was about 40 percent urban and 60 percent rural.

The *Polis* Idealized

Aristotle claims that “it is clear that the city-state is a natural growth, and that man is by nature a political animal” (Arist.*Pol.*1253a5).⁷⁰ For the Greeks, the *polis* was the highest form of political development for social man. Freedom of the individual citizen (again only men) was best attained in the *polis*. Freedom and autonomy of the *polis* was equated to the freedom and autonomy of the citizen. The *polis* separated the Greeks from the barbarian (non-Greek). The *polis*’s primary objective was the well-being of its citizens. The *polis* was designed to allow the citizen to achieve his ultimate potential as a human being. This principle does not apply to women, children, and foreign residents. As stated in the definition of the *polis*, the citizens were the *polis* and the constitution was defined by the amount of participation in the mechanisms of government.

By definition, all people living under a monarchy, which included most people bordering the Hellenic world, were slaves because they served a king first. Aristotle states, “One who is a human being belonging by nature not to himself but to another is by nature a slave” (Arist.*Pol.*1254a15).⁷¹ Under monarchy, the king was the state. The king was the master. His word was law. The king had first claim to the fruits of his subjects’ labor. The king’s primary concern was his own well-being. The well-being of his people was a secondary concern. Thus, the subjects’ inability to participate in state affairs made them slaves. Therefore, the Greek, who acknowledged no master, was superior as a free citizen.

Plato and Aristotle emphasized the point that the aim of the *polis* was to develop “the good” in its citizens. Society’s goal was the “good life” (Arist.*Pol.*1278b20–30). This was the essence of the *polis*. By broad definition, “the good” implied the moral betterment of the citizen. In their usage, moral had a broader connotation than the ethical meaning we generally use today. Moral was tied into the Greek concept of *arête* (excellence). This means the development of the individual intellectually, economically, politically, physically, and spiritually. Plato’s *Republic*, his ideal state guided by philosopher-kings, aimed to balance man’s reason, emotions, and appetites to create an ideal social order. Aristotle claims that man’s reason separates him from the animals because he can perceive the difference between good and evil and right from wrong (Arist.*Pol.*1253a15). For Aristotle the citizen should determine his own path to discover “the good” within the confines of the *polis*.

From a nonphilosophical position, Thucydides glorifies Athens in Pericles's Funeral Oration for the support the state gives the individual and vice versa (Thuc.II.36–46). He talks about the environment of Athens that allows the individual to grow, physically, spiritually, aesthetically, and politically. Pericles says,

Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility, what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man possesses. No one, so long as he has it in him to be of service to the state, is kept in political obscurity because of poverty. (Thuc.II.37.1–2)⁷²

Although Pericles glorifies the democracy, the sentiments expressed here about citizen participation, respect for law, and personal growth can be applied to citizens of the other states as well, regardless of their constitution. The citizen had an emotional, political, and religious bond to his community through his participation. For these reasons, the Greeks viewed the *polis* as the ultimate form of political development.

1 See Morris in (Scheidel, Morris and Saller 2007), 219.

2 (Scheidel 2003), 134–135.

3 (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996), 635.

4 The twelve Olympian gods were Zeus, Hera, Poseidon, Demeter, Apollo, Ares, Artemis, Athena, Aphrodite, Hephaestus, and Hestia. Hestia was later replaced by Dionysus on the Parthenon frieze. Though a major god, Hades was not located on Olympus.

5 (Perlman 1976), 4–5. The term *Panhellenism* is a modern term. It was not used by the ancient Greeks. Perlman argues that *Panhellenism* was a negative term that separated Greeks from barbarians rather than a term of common unity. *Panhellenism* suggested a cultural unity but never a political unity except for propaganda purposes.

6 The Spartan Pausanias was seized from the sanctuary shortly before his death in the 460s (Thuc.I.128.3–134).

7 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 42.

8 (Ehrenberg 1964), 24–25.

9 (M. H. Hansen 2006), 39–41.

10 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 4.

11 M.H. Hansen 2006), 49.

12 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), P.28. Xenophon gives multiple examples (Xen.Hell.VI.5.21; Lac.Pol.XV.3; Ages.II.24).

13 Ibid, 39.

14 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 70.

- 15 Ibid, 4.
- 16 Ibid, 17. The poets Archilochus and Tyrtaeus mention the *polis* of Thasos and Sparta.
- 17 Ibid, 115–116. Hansen provides an analysis of the definition of *synoikismos*.
- 18 Sparta's five villages were Pitana, Limnae, Mesoa, Cynosura, and Amyclae.
- 19 (M. H. Hansen 2006), 107.
- 20 (Adcock 1957), 2–4. Adcock suggests that there is a causal relationship between the development of hoplite warfare and the political and social development of the *polis*.
- 21 (M. H. Hansen 2006), 103.
- 22 The Spartan Assembly was also called an *Ecclesia*, not *Apella* as once was thought.
- 23 See Rhodes in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 567–568. (Ehrenberg 1964), 56–57.
- 24 (Ehrenberg 1964), 76–77.
- 25 (M. H. Hansen 2006), 118–119.
- 26 A trireme consisted of 170 rowers, ten hoplites (marines), four archers, and sixteen others to sail and maintain the vessel. A trierarch was the captain of a trireme.
- 27 (Ehrenberg 1964), 50–52.
- 28 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 126–128. A critique of *stasis* is provided, which states that often citizens were more loyal to their social group than the *polis*. Thus civil war was a recurrent theme in Greek history.
- 29 Ibid, 77.
- 30 Ibid, 79.
- 31 (Ober 2015), 101–122. Ober provides a discussion of Greek wealth.
- 32 (Ober 2015), 26–27.
- 33 (Davies 2007), 347–348.
- 34 (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996), 475. The diolkos was a stone track across the isthmus. Warships, smaller merchant vessels, and goods were transported. Wheeled wagons hauled the goods.
- 35 (Osborne, Archaic Greece 2007), 292–295.
- 36 Electrum is a silver/gold alloy also known as white gold. It was a natural mineral found in Lydia (modern Turkey). The first coins were made from electrum.
- 37 (Viggiano and Van Wees 2013), 57. This is the traditional date that many historians assign to the development of hoplite warfare. Some historians have argued that hoplites appear in Homeric armies. However, the debate still rages whether Homer represents a historical period or is a summation of multiple eras.
- 38 (Viggiano 2013), 124. Viggiano suggests that Pheidon of Argos was the first ruler to adopt the hoplite phalanx in the early seventh century, which allowed him to defeat the Spartans at Hysiae in 669 BC.
- 39 Aristotle says that a strong middle class provided stability in the polis. A broad-based citizenship led to oligarchy or democracy (Arist.Pol.1295b35–40; 1296a22–35). (Hanson 1999), 113–115. (Van Wees 2013), 222. Contrary to the concept of hoplites developing from a “middling class,” Van Wees argues that the early hoplites came from the aristocracy. Only after 550BC did the middling classes become the hoplites of the classical period.
- 40 The earlier Greek shield contained one handle and had a leather carrying strap (*telamon*) to allow the shield to be worn over the shoulder.
- 41 (A. Snodgrass 1967), 50–51.
- 42 If this was the age of iron, one may ask why bronze was used for body armor. (Keegan 1993), 247–248. Keegan suggests that the ironsmiths were unable to

create iron that was malleable enough to forge into body armor.

- 43 (Krentz 2013), 135. Krentz disagrees with the nineteenth-century German historians who calculated the 72 lbs (36 kg). Nineteenth-century German historians calculated 2 lbs per kg. (Today 1 kg equals 2 lbs 3.27 oz.) Krentz states that in the classical period, a hoplite's armor may have been 31 to 46 lbs (14–21 kg). (Delbrück 1975), 86. Delbrück uses the 72 lb figure. (Hanson 2013), 265–266. Hanson suggest that even if armor was about 50 lbs, it was still heavy for the hoplite who may have weighed between 120–150 lbs.
- 44 (Lendon 2005), 83–90. Lendon provides an analysis of the ingenuity required of good commanders.
- 45 (Adcock 1957), 14. In the literary sources that list the size of the opposing forces in the classical period, most are about equal in numerical strength (Thuc.IV.93–94). This is the “orthodox” description of hoplite warfare. This description has been questioned by historians who disagree with this static nature of battle and argue for greater individual mobility on the battlefield. (Krentz 2013), 143–148. Krentz argues that armies could not maintain their tight formations in battle. Therefore, the battle dissolved into individual or small group encounters.
- 46 (Keegan 1993), 250.
- 47 (Lendon 2005), 79–83. An exception to this rule was the battle of Delium in 424 between Athenians and Boeotians. The Boeotian cavalry pursued the defeated Athenians and inflicted numerous casualties.
- 48 After their defeat in the battle of Sepea in 494, in which they lost 6,000 men, the Argives made a thirty-year peace with Sparta (Hdt.VI.76–81; VII.148). In 338 BC, the Macedonian victory at Chaeronea ended the war with Athens and Thebes.
- 49 See Garland in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 681.
- 50 In his essay *On the Cavalry Commander*, Xenophon states that cavalry is weak without infantry support (V.13).
- 51 (A. Snodgrass 1967), 78–80.
- 52 (Hale 2013), P. 189. Like Viking longships, the rowers hung their shields along the railings of the ship.
- 53 (Morrison and Williams 1968), 129.
- 54 The undeclared naval war between Athena and Aegina in the 490s was sporadic involving few ships.
- 55 (Hale 2009), XXIV; 20–24. Hale describes the construction process of the trireme.
- 56 (Morrison and Williams 1968), 246. Triremes were classified as fast, troop transports, and horse transports.
- 57 Catapults were similar to large bows that shot large bolts (arrows) at enemy soldiers or walls. Flaming bolts were used to burn buildings or gates.
- 58 In the Peloponnesian War, Athens besieged Potidaea for over two years, and it took Sparta and Thebes two years to reduce Plataea before both states succumbed to starvation.
- 59 Diodorus mentions battering rams and towers used in Sicily by Carthage to capture Selinus in 409 (Diod.XIII.54.7).
- * The walls were dismantled at Thasos in 463, Athens in 404 and Mantinea in 385.
- 60 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 71.
- 61 Ibid, 53.
- 62 Ibid, 72. At its territorial peak in the fourth century under Dionysius I, Syracuse controlled 12,000 km².
- 63 Ibid, 83.
- 64 (Ober 2015), 84–89; (M. H. Hansen 2006), 31.
- 65 (M. H. Hansen 2006), 96–97; (Finley 1973), 97–98.

- ⁶⁶ Ibid, 79–80. Hansen uses the assumption of 150 people per hectare to determine population density in the cities. By knowing the territorial size, in hectares of the city, one can calculate the population size.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid. P.71.
- ⁶⁸ (Garnsey 1993), 123; 137. (N. Hammond 1986), 528. Hammond suggests a smaller population of 160,000 in the fourth century.
- ⁶⁹ Citizen population figures are often based on the hoplites listed in battle, naval ships engaged, or casualty figures listed in the literary sources. Some historians are now calculating population size from territorial size, size of a household, food import figures, etc. Regardless, all figures are suggestive only.
- ⁷⁰ (Aristotle 1977), 9.
- ⁷¹ (Aristotle 1977), 19.
- ⁷² (Thucydides 1954), 117.

The Hellenic World in 500 BC

The Setting

On the eve of the Classical Age (479-323), some hundreds of Hellenic *poleis* occupied territory from the shores of the Black Sea to the north coast of Africa, and from Asia Minor to the south of France.⁷³ Economically, politically, culturally, and militarily, they had relationships with Persians, Egyptians, Carthaginians, Iberians, Gauls, Etruscans, and Scythians. The Mediterranean basin was a cosmopolitan world. The Achaemenid Persian Empire was the colossus of the east. In the west, the city-state of Carthage was on the verge of becoming the political and military colossus that would challenge the Greeks and Romans for the next three centuries. In between these states lay a *ménage* of small Greek *poleis* each following their separate paths. No *polis* was more than a local power. How did these independent Greek *poleis* rise to challenge Persia and Carthage for dominion in the Mediterranean basin? This is their story.

The Year 500 BC – Persia

The Persian Empire was the colossus of the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean basin. The empire stretched from India to Egypt. Under the leadership of the Achaemenid King Cyrus II (559–530), the Persians emerged from Anshan, their homeland in central Iran, in the middle of the sixth century. Cyrus began his conquests with the defeat of King Astyages and Media in 550. Although Greek writers would equate the Persians as Medes, they were two separate groups with distinct cultures. Proceeding to conquer Croesus of Lydia (546), which brought the Greeks of Asia Minor under his control, and Nabonidus of Babylonia (539), Cyrus brought his kingdom to the Mediterranean coast. He now controlled much of the Middle East. Upon his death, his son Cambyses II (530–522) conquered Egypt in 525. After the mysterious death of Cambyses, Persia suffered through a succession crisis with Darius I (522–486) emerging as the new Great King.⁷⁴ By 514 the Persian armies had conquered India (modern Pakistan) for Darius. At the end of the sixth century, the Persians controlled parts of Thrace along the Black Sea and the north Aegean

coast. Macedonia was a subordinate kingdom. At its territorial peak, the Persian Empire is estimated to have had 2,100,000 mi² with twenty to twenty-five million subjects.⁷⁵ The world had not seen an empire of this magnitude before.

The Great King ruled the empire from four capitals, Susa in Elam, Ecbatana in Media, and in the homeland, Persepolis and Pasargadae. Although the king was responsible for all aspects of the empire, he delegated to officials the responsibilities for administration, defense, revenue, and justice. All land and people from aristocrats to slaves were subject to his commands. The Great King had no equal on earth. Therefore, any subject who approached the king performed the act of *proskynesis* (*proskunêsis*/obeisance/bow down) as a symbol of respect and subordination. Although not divine, the Great King was the chosen representative on earth for Ahura Mazda, recognized as the supreme god of the Persians from the time of Darius I. The Great King was omnipotent on earth, and his word was law. Like other oriental rulers, he was isolated from his people as a symbol of his uniqueness. He was seen only on special occasions.⁷⁶

Under Darius I the empire was divided into twenty satrapies (provinces) under the auspices of the satrap (governor) who ruled at the king's discretion (Hdt.III.89). The size of the empire and the time required for communication with the king left these satraps with great power and autonomy. The satraps were appointed from the Persian aristocracy and often were relatives of the king. They were responsible for the administration of their province, collection of taxes, military defense, and maintenance of law and order. The Persians adopted the established bureaucracy in these old kingdoms to administer their districts.⁷⁷ The Great King periodically sent out representatives to review the provincial administration. If the review was unsatisfactory, the satraps were removed. If the review was positive, they could remain in their position for life. Only when the Great King led a campaign did he visit the satrapies.

The king maintained a standing army centered on the ten thousand Immortals and a royal body guard of select infantry and cavalry. These soldiers came from Persia and Media and were professionally trained. When necessary, manpower was levied from the empire to fill out the infantry and cavalry requirements. The commanders were appointed by the Great King and came from the aristocracy. They were usually relatives of the king. Their commands were independent unless accompanied by the king. In addition to the central army, the satraps maintained standing armies in their provinces that were recruited from the local population. The infantry wore light body armor and were armed with the bow, spear, and short sword.

They used a wicker shield for protection. Though the army could be large, it was not professionally trained except for the core troops. Therefore, military efficiency was often questionable. A standing fleet was also maintained in the Mediterranean. Though the fleet commanders were usually Persians, the ships were provided primarily from the Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Egyptians with contingents from smaller seafaring states.

In 513 Darius I launched a campaign of expansion into Europe against the Scythians who lived north of the Danube River. Herodotus does not state his objective. Perhaps it might have been the pacification of the agricultural area around the Black Sea and prevention of Scythian raids into Asia. To cross from Asia to Europe, Darius commissioned Mandrocles of Samos to build a bridge across the Bosphorus near Byzantium (modern Istanbul). To commemorate the crossing, Darius set up two columns listing the people of the empire who comprised his army. Undoubtedly an exaggeration, Herodotus states the size of the army at seven hundred thousand men. He then marched to the Danube where he had ordered the Greek components of the fleet to build a bridge across Danube (Hdt.IV.87–89). Crossing this bridge of boats, he campaigned in Scythia but failed to conquer them. The hardship of the campaign forced him to return to the Danube. Despite Scythian solicitation that the Greeks should destroy the bridge before the arrival of Darius, the Greeks remained loyal. Darius crossed safely and returned to Asia with the army (Hdt.IV.122–142).

Although Darius's objective against the Scythians is uncertain, the campaign was probably not a total failure. Darius left behind an army under the command of Megabazus, who proceeded to subdue the eastern Thracians in 512 (Hdt.V.2). The Paeonians were defeated in 511, and many were transplanted in Asia (Hdt.V.14–15). King Amyntas I (540–495) of Macedon (Macedonia) medized (provided earth and water as an act of submission) peacefully in 510 (Hdt.V.18). Alexander I succeeded Amyntas in 495 and continued his vassalage to Persia. These conquests resulted in a Persian satrapy in the southern Balkan region. This satrapy survived until Xerxes defeat in 479. In control of the north Aegean coastline, the colossus of Persia now straddled the northern border of the Hellenic mainland. Would the Great King try to absorb the mainland next?

The Year 500 BC – Hellas

By modern definition, there was not a nation/state or country called Hellas or Greece. The modern state with a defined territory, government, bureaucracy, and population only existed in rudimentary

elements in these small city-states called *poleis* by the Greeks. What we today classify as the Hellenic world consisted of a number of city-states that dotted the Mediterranean basin. After the age of colonization in the eighth through sixth centuries, these Greeks or Hellenes had small city-states (*poleis*) located along the coast of the Black Sea, Turkey (Anatolia/Asia Minor), Sicily, Libya, Italy, France, and Spain. The center of this world was the communities that occupied the mainland and the islands of the Aegean basin that we today call Greece.

They were classified by racial identity as Achaeans, Arcadians, Ionians, Aeolians, and Dorians. The Ionians and Aeolians could trace their origins to the Greeks of the Bronze Age. The Achaeans and Arcadians of the Peloponnese believed themselves to be indigenous to the Peloponnese. Athens was an Ionian state in the Bronze Age. The Dorians (Spartans, Argives, etc.) were believed to come from somewhere in northwest Greece or the Balkans after the collapse of the Mycenaean civilization about 1100 BC. The later Greeks viewed the Dorians as conquerors since the subsequent Dorian states of Sparta, Argos, Crete, etc., ruled a subservient population in the subsequent archaic and classical periods.

The constitution of most *poleis* at the beginning of the fifth century was aristocratic, oligarchic, or tyrannical. Oligarchies and tyrannies were the most common. Sparta and the states of the Peloponnese were oligarchic. In Sicily, tyranny was the predominant form of government. Athens was the lone exception. Athens, under the reforms of Cleisthenes after the elimination of its tyranny in 510, had broadened membership in the political community. Compared to later political development, Athens' constitution was on the theoretical border between an oligarchy and a democracy. However, these reforms set Athens on the road to democracy, which was complete by the mid-fifth century.

By 500 Sparta, through the leadership of the Peloponnesian League, was the acknowledged strongest military power in the Greek world. Spartan power rested on the strength of its hoplite army supported economically by a serf population. Athens was neither a major military power nor a political power. However, it was becoming an economic power. Like all other Greek states, Athenian military strength rested on the shoulders of its hoplite citizens. The later development of a navy made Athens a naval rival to the other commercial states of Hellas. The navy along with the leadership displayed in the Persian War altered Athens' position in the Hellenic world. The dual leadership and victory of Athens and Sparta in the Persian War set the table for the rivalry between Sparta and Athens

that divided the Hellenic world in the fifth and fourth centuries. How did this victory over Persia and the subsequent rivalry between Sparta and Athens occur?

The Year 500 BC – Sparta

In 500 the homeland comprised Laconia and the subject region of Messenia. Sparta was a Dorian state. Sometime during the ninth century BC, the Dorian invasion, from northwestern Greece, led to the settlement of Dorians in Laconia. These newcomers spoke Greek with a Doric dialect. Eventually the *polis* of Sparta developed. Sparta comprised five towns that always retained their own identity. Unlike other Greek *poleis*, Sparta would never build a wall around these towns. Even if the Spartans wanted to, the town of Amyclae was a few miles south of the other towns. The conquest of Laconia resulted in a subject population defined as *perioikoi* (perioeci/dwellers around) and helots (captives/serfs). The Spartan citizen was assigned a *kleros* (hereditary land) for his economic support (Arist.*Pol.*1270a20). How and when these initial allotments were determined is lost in the mist of time. This land was tilled by the helots with a percentage of the produce assigned to their Spartan masters. Unlike the helots, the perioeci were independent but had limited political and legal rights. They were farmers, merchants, tradesmen, shopkeepers, etc. They were obligated to provide military service in the Spartan army. The perioeci along with the Spartans became known as “Lacedaemonians.” Laconia and Lacedaemon became identical terms to describe the Spartan homeland.

In the First Messenian War (740–720), the Spartans conquered neighboring Messenia. The same social and economic division of helot and perioeci was transplanted to the Messenian population. The Messenian population was subordinate to Sparta. The land was assigned to their Spartan masters. In the seventh century, Argos and Sparta fought for dominance in the Peloponnese. Argos gained the upper hand in 669, when, under the leadership of King Pheidon, the Argives defeated the Spartans at Hysiae. Failing to restore its dominance in the Peloponnese over the next thirty years, the Spartans fought the Second Messenian War (640–620) when the Messenians revolted and held out in their fortress on Mount Ithome. The Messenians’ defeat secured their subjection to Sparta until liberated by the Thebans after Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra in 371. Through the sixth century, Spartan power grew. The Spartan victory over Argos in the battle of “Three Hundred Champions” in 546 ended the Argive challenge to Spartan supremacy for the next fifty years (Hdt.1.82).

As mentioned in our section on the *polis*, the Spartan government

is classified as an oligarchy. According to Spartan lore, the constitution was created by the lawgiver Lycurgus in the late ninth century (Thuc.I.18.1). Many modern scholars believe the constitution evolved over a period of time but reached completion in the early seventh century.⁷⁸ Plutarch's *Life of Lycurgus* provides us with the best information about the constitution called the "Great Rhetra." He also acknowledges the difficulty of dating the actual man called Lycurgus (Plut.Lyc.1). Whether Lycurgus was an actual person or a mythical figure, he was believed to be real by the Spartans. His constitution remained unchanged for centuries. In book 2 of the *Politics*, Aristotle analyzes the constitution as a mixture of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy.⁷⁹ However, he classifies the *politeia* as an oligarchy because the wealthy few had political dominance. He analyzes the functions of the kings, ephors (chief magistrates), *Gerousia* (council), and *Ecclesia* (assembly).

In agreement with Aristotle, modern scholars classify the Spartan constitution as an oligarchy. By definition, an oligarchy is a government with a limited franchise based on wealth. Classified as *Homoioi* (peers/similar), the citizens had a minimum social/economic status that gave them the eligibility to participate in the government. There were wealth differences (Arist.Pol.1270a15–20). However, as long as a Spartan contributed his allotment of produce, from his assigned estate, to his *pheiditia* (military-mess), he was a citizen (Xen.Lac.Pol.V.2–3). Full citizens were identified as Spartiates (*Spartiatai*), in distinction from the general Spartan population. Their profession was the army. The land and helots, assigned by the state, supported the individual Spartiate. This political, social, and economic system was probably in place by the end of the seventh century.

Although the political order remained constant, the social and economic order was more fluid. Over time, the rich accumulated more wealth and influence as many Spartans lost their citizenship status. Sparta contained about eight thousand citizens in 480 (Hdt.VII.234). By Aristotle's day, Spartan citizenship was reduced to less than a thousand (Arist.Pol.1270a30–35). Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon record numerous instance of the wealth disparity.⁸⁰ By law, Spartiates were prohibited from participation in agriculture, industry, and commerce. It seems obvious that the law was circumvented over time. This circumvention is one explanation to account for the increasing wealth disparity in Spartan society. Inheritance law allowed Spartans to break up their lands among all surviving sons. Thus, in time the land allotment to the Spartan citizen was inadequate to provide the requirements for the *pheiditia* (Arist.Pol.1271b40–45). Consequently, Spartiates lost their citizenship. Therefore, by the mid-fourth century Spartan manpower could not support Spartan political

ambitions. This is how Spartiates lost their citizenship. How did they earn citizenship?

To earn citizenship status, Spartan sons were removed from their mothers at the age of seven and placed in the educational system called the *Agôgê* until they turned age eighteen.⁸¹ This was done to make loyalty to the state supreme to family loyalty. At the age of twelve, the boy was expected to gain a young warrior as his mentor. Although this was a homosexual relationship, the mentor was expected to teach his protégé how to be a warrior (Plut.*Lyc.*16.4–17.1). When the youth reached manhood at age eighteen, some were chosen for further education to prepare them for leadership roles in the state. At the age of twenty, the Spartans were then selected to a mess and become part of the army. Failure to be selected probably prevented a person from becoming a citizen and perhaps a soldier. He would then be classified as an “inferior” in Spartan society. For the next ten years the Spartan served the state in the army. At the age of thirty he became a Spartiate (full citizenship) and could participate in the Assembly.

In the Lycurgan constitution, the two Spartan kings came from the Eurypontid and Agiad royal houses. Although hereditary, they were approved by the Assembly if there was a succession dispute. If a king was a minor, a regent would be appointed.⁸² The kings were the political, military, and religious leaders. They served for life but could be removed from power for violations of law or bad behavior. Every month in the presence of the ephors, the kings swore an oath to maintain the laws (*nomoi*) of the *polis* (Xen.*Lac.Pol.*XV.7). They jointly led the army on campaign and represented the state. Their word was law while on campaign (Hdt.VI.56–57). They made the religious sacrifices on campaign. A king could be checked by his compatriot. After the conflict between Cleomenes I and Demaratus during the invasion of Attica in 506, the army was only led by one king accompanied by two ephors as observers. In the classical period, some kings were very powerful while others appear to be nonentities. Cleomenes I (521–491), Archidamus II (469–427/426), Agis II (427/426–400), and Agesilaus II (400–360/359) were dominant personalities in politics as well as military affairs. These men were joined by the regent Pausanias (480–466), the victorious commander at Plataea. Whatever their influence might have been on the home front, the kings always remained the commanders of the army and conducted the major campaigns. Obviously this was the monarchical aspect of Aristotle’s constitution.

The ephorate contained five ephors who were the chief magistrates of the Spartan state. The ephors provided a check on the power and ambition of the kings. They were the only magistrates that

remained seated in the presence of the kings. They were annually elected with a minimum age requirement of thirty. How candidates for the ephorate and other offices were selected prior to an election is unknown. Ephors could not be elected twice. There were few limitations to their power while in office. All matters involving internal and external security were their responsibility. They supervised the annual war on the helot population through the *krupteia*.⁸³ The ephors proposed laws for review and approval by the *Gerousia* and Assembly. They had judicial functions (Xen.*Lac.Pol.*VIII.3–4). Kings, magistrates, and the general public were subject to their prosecution if they violated the laws or interests of the *polis*. Civil and criminal suits were judged. Fines, exile, or death were imposed for various offenses on anyone. If an ephor abused his power, he was subject to punishment by his peers.

In foreign affairs, the ephors could introduce declarations of war and peace for approval by the Assembly. They determined which foreign envoys could enter Lacedaemon, how long they could remain, and which topics of negotiation were allowed (Arist.*Pol.*1270b8–1271a15). They summoned the *Gerousia* and Assembly to discuss affairs of state. Once war was approved, the ephors determined which part of the army was activated and who commanded (Xen.*Lac.Pol.*XI.1–2). In the fifth century, two ephors accompanied the king on campaign to oversee his actions. Kings and ephors often clashed over policy whether internal or external. Unfortunately, the literary sources mention few ephors by name or the policies they advocated.

The *Gerousia* was composed of thirty members—the two kings plus twenty-eight elders elected by the Assembly. Except for the kings, the minimum age requirement for an elder was sixty. Apart from their prestige, the kings had no more power or influence than the other members. The other members could claim that they represented the citizen body because they were elected. How the selection process of candidates for election was determined is unknown. Aristotle says the elders campaigned for the office (Arist.*Pol.*1271a10–14). The frequency of elections is unknown. It is reasonable to assume that an election occurred shortly after the death of a member. These elders served for life. However, there was probably a regular turnover in membership due to death. The *Gerousia* was a deliberative body with legislative and judicial functions. Its members could debate internal and external issues. The *Gerousia* had probouleutic authority. This means the members, along with the ephors, prepared the agenda for the Assembly to vote on affairs of state. The *Gerousia* was the most important court.⁸⁴ It handled all capital cases (Xen.*Lac.Pol.*X.2; Arist.*Pol.*1270b38–40). These included the trials of kings, ephors,

crime of treason, etc. Since humans tend to be more conservative as they age, it is reasonable to assume that the *Gerousia* was probably a conservative body and defender of the political *status quo*. Aristotle criticized this institution because its members were not open to new ideas (Arist.*Pol.*1270b35). This was the oligarchic element of the constitution.

The base of the Spartan constitution was the *Ecclesia* (Assembly). The Assembly consisted of all male Spartan citizens. The minimum age requirement was thirty. They served for life unless their citizenship was revoked. Revocation could come from violation of the law, failure to provide their share to the soldier's mess, cowardice in battle, etc. The Assembly was not a deliberative body. Its role was to approve or disapprove the measures brought before it. The issues of the day were probably decided by the most influential men before the Assembly was convened. Since the rule of obedience was instilled in Spartans from youth on, Spartiates showed extreme deference toward their leaders (Xen.*Lac.Pol.*II.10; VIII.1–3). Therefore, a voice vote, judged by the ephors, determined whether a measure passed or failed (Thuc.1.87.1–2). The members of the *Gerousia* and ephors were also elected by this method. How often the Assembly convened is uncertain. This was the democratic element of the constitution.

The institution that has defined Sparta throughout history is the army. The story of Leonidas and the three hundred Spartans at Thermopylae cemented the legend of courage, honor, and obedience that symbolized the Spartan soldier to their fellow Greeks and posterity. What was the structure of the army? Although a fourth-century source, Xenophon, provides the best description in his *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians*.⁸⁵ The Spartan infantryman wore a red cloak, greaves, corselet, and helmet, and carried a bronze shield, thrusting spear, and short sword into battle. In the fourth century, the army and cavalry were divided into six *morai* (regiments). Each *mora* consisted of six hundred men and was officered by a colonel (*polemarch*), four captains (*lochagoi*), eight first lieutenants, and sixteen second lieutenants.⁸⁶ The two kings commanded the full army on campaign. Other officers were assigned command of smaller units that did not require the presence of a king. The perioeci and helots accompanied the army on campaign as hoplites, light infantry, or logistical support. The army marched in column and then wheeled into the proper formation to encounter the enemy. When the army of the Peloponnesian League was called out, the Spartans occupied the right wing as the position of honor (Xen.*Lac.Pol.*XI.3–10).

In summation, the Spartan constitution was judged an oligarchy by contemporary Greeks. Outside of a general outline, we do not know

how the Spartan constitution functioned on a daily basis. The foundation of the state was based on a minimum wealth requirement. One could not be a Spartan citizen if an individual could not meet his obligation to the *phheiditia*. Leadership in the state was limited by the economic restriction, age, military honor, and the educational system developed in the *agôgê*. The *polis*, not kinship, commanded the loyalty of its citizens. The constitution was designed to preserve *eunomia* (harmony/good order) among the citizens. The army was the centerpiece that maintained that order. Discipline in the army implied discipline within the state. Obedience to military commanders meant political obedience to civilian authorities. As Aristotle implied, lack of political, social, and economic innovation in Sparta eventually would lead to decline. However, in the year five hundred Sparta was powerful. With a military manpower of eight thousand Spartiates professionally trained, Sparta possessed the strongest army in Hellas.

Foundation of the Peloponnesian League

In the sixth century Sparta became the dominant power in Hellas (Hdt.1.69).⁸⁷ Through its conflicts with the neighboring states, Sparta slowly built up a system of alliances that eventually became known as “the Lacedaemonians and their Allies.” Historians call it the Peloponnesian League. Spartan power began in the seventh century with the conquest of Messenia. Through the control of the land and people of Laconia and Messenia, Sparta became the largest territorial state in the Hellas. In the sixth century frontier wars, Sparta gained support in Elis and Arcadia. It also gained a reputation as an opponent of tyranny (Thuc.1.18.1). Spartan forces overthrew tyrants in Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, etc. Consequently, pro-Spartan oligarchies came to power (Thuc.1.19). In 510, Sparta supported the Athenian request to overthrow the tyrant Hippias. However, his expulsion ultimately resulted in democracy in Athens. There is no specific date that can be assigned to the formation of the Peloponnesian League. It developed over a period of time through a series of bilateral agreements between Sparta and its allies. The League had achieved its final form by the end of the century.⁸⁸

The foundation of the league was a defensive/offensive alliance (*symmachia*) with Sparta as the hegemon.⁸⁹ Sparta imposed no military and financial contribution on the members except in time of war. The allies promised to maintain “the same people friends and enemies as the Lacedaemonians did, and follow the Lacedaemonians by land and by sea wherever the Lacedaemonians lead the way” (Xen.*Hell.*11.2.20).⁹⁰ It is doubtful that allies could withdraw from the

League if Sparta disapproved (Thuc.V.30.1). For Sparta, the allies provided external security against Argos and other hostile states. The allies were also obligated to assist the Spartans in their internal affairs if the helots revolted.⁹¹ For the member states, Sparta was obligated to defend them if attacked by a non-member *polis*. Sparta was not obligated to interfere in conflicts among member states.

The model treaty might have begun with Sparta's victory over Tegea around 560 after a series of conflicts (Hdt.I.67–68). Instead of annexing Tegea, Sparta created an alliance. Through the ensuing years, Sparta made a number of bilateral alliances. Each alliance was with Sparta alone. The allies supported Sparta but not necessarily each other. Thus, each ally looked to Sparta for leadership. In principle, each member was "free and autonomous." Autonomy (*autonomia*) implied that each *polis* conducted its internal affairs without Spartan interference. Freedom (*eleutheria*) meant that each *polis* conducted its own external affairs without interference unless it violated the terms of the alliance with Sparta. A religious oath was sworn by both participants to sanctify the alliance. However, Thucydides implies that there was a religious clause ("if there be no hindrance on the part of gods or heroes") in the oath of alliance that allowed an ally to refuse obedience to Sparta (Thuc.V.30.3–4).⁹² Therefore, if some action violated a sacred law or a sworn separate agreement, disobedience trumped the oath of alliance.⁹³ In a League meeting, any agreement or action approved by a majority of the allies was binding on all members (Thuc.V.30.1). Again, the religious clause might have allowed a member to disobey the majority decision. Whether a formal constitution of the League developed, or the rules of operation developed by custom, is still debated by historians.⁹⁴

Sparta's defeat of Argos in 546 solidified Spartan military dominance in the Peloponnese. By 510, Boeotia, Phocis, Chalcis, and Athens might have been allies but not part of the League. Athens was an independent *polis* after the Spartan failure to establish Isagoras as tyrant in 506. Aegina and Megara, *polis* located outside of the Peloponnese, joined the alliance at some point in the fifth century.

Originally, Sparta summoned the allies without consultation. Only Sparta could request a League conference. After the failure in 506 to overthrow the new democracy in Athens, Spartan policy was changed. The Corinthians withdrew their support for Sparta when they discovered that Cleomenes's intention was to overthrow the democracy and install Isagoras as tyrant (Hdt.V.75). Beginning in 505, Sparta called a meeting of the allies to discuss policy and actions to be taken. Sparta, as one half of the alliance, was represented by the Assembly of the Spartiates. The allies, meeting in a Congress (*synedrion*) with each member having one vote, represented the other

half of the alliance. Sparta provided the League chairman to set the agenda and conduct the meetings. It is likely that the views of some of the participants were known in advance. After a debate, the chairman called the vote of the allies (Thuc.I.125). For a policy or actions to be taken, both sides had to agree. Disagreement by either side negated any action or policy. If both sides agreed to a course of action, all members had to abide by the decision (Thuc.V.30.1). This means that all Spartiates, as citizens of the *polis*, and each individual *polis*, as a member of the alliance, had to implement the decisions agreed upon. Thereafter for the next century, the “Lacedaemonians and their Allies” marched in unison and were the counterweight to the “Athenians and their Allies.”

The Year 500 BC – Athens

In 500 Athens was a rising star in the Hellenic world. With the assistance of Sparta, the Athenians overthrew the tyranny of the Pisistratids in 510. The tyranny established by Pisistratus in 546 continued through his sons Hippias and Hipparchus after his death in 527. After the assassination of Hipparchus in 514, Hippias ruled alone. Compared to other tyrannies, the rule of the Pisistratids was mild until the death of Hipparchus. Now suspicious of the Athenian people, Hippias ruled with an iron fist (Hdt.V.62; Thuc.VI.54.6; 59.1–2; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*19.1–2). Plotting to end the tyranny, the Athenian exiled aristocratic clan of the Alcmeonidae enrolled the support of the oracle of Delphi to their cause. They provided financial support to rebuild the burnt temple of Apollo and perhaps even bribed the priestess (Hdt.V.63). Consequently, whenever the Spartans came to Delphi to enquire about private matters or state affairs, they were told by the priestess to end the Athenian tyranny. The Spartans had a reputation for opposition to tyranny although it did not oppose all tyrants. Why did Sparta decide to intervene? The sources do not provide information about the internal politics at Sparta. Possible motives were obedience to the Delphic oracle since the Spartans were deeply religious; fear of an alliance between Hippias and Argos since Sparta and Argos were age-old enemies (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*19.4); suspicion of Persian support for Hippias, who had recently married his daughter to the tyrant of Lampsacus in Asia Minor, who had Persian support; even the harsh rule of Hippias; or a combination of reasons. We can provide plausible suggestions but no definitive answer.

In 511 Sparta launched a small sea expedition, under Anchimolius, that landed at the port of Phalerum to encourage an Athenian coup. Defeated by the forces of Hippias, who received a thousand cavalry from Thessaly, the Spartans returned home.

Following this embarrassment, in the summer of 510, the Spartan army under King Cleomenes I was sent to Attica. The Spartan army routed the Thessalian cavalry. The Thessalians fled. Entering Athens, the Spartans and Athenians besieged Hippias on the Acropolis. Though well supplied and fortified, Hippias surrendered when his children were captured attempting to leave Attica. He was allowed to leave Athens with his family. Hippias settled at Sigeum on the coast of Asia Minor (Hdt.V.64–65; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*19.3–6). Mission accomplished, Cleomenes took the Spartan army home. The Athenians were left to govern themselves. Athens was not a major player in Hellenic politics at this time. Without Spartan intervention and support from the exiled Alcmeonidae, the Athenians were unable or unwilling to end the tyranny. At this point the Athenians were grateful for their liberation. However, this gratitude would soon change.

The tyranny was over. Under the Pisistratids, the Solonian institutions to govern Athens remained. The archons were the main magistrates. The Council of Four Hundred, a hundred members from each of the four tribes, was the main governing body. An Assembly existed. The four social/economic classes remained.⁹⁵ The laws remained intact. This constitution was oligarchic with the nobility dominating political affairs. Aristocratic rivalry in the government after Solon contributed to the tyranny of Pisistratus who suppressed this rivalry. With the demise of the tyranny, the aristocrats renewed their old game.

Cleisthenes and Isagoras became the leading figures in this rivalry. Cleisthenes was an Alcmaeonidae. Herodotus could not identify the aristocratic family of Isagoras. Isagoras was elected archon eponymous for 508/507. Apparently on the losing end in this rivalry, Cleisthenes appealed for popular support and promised the people a greater role in the government. During Isagoras's term, Cleisthenes introduced new constitutional measures, which were approved. What the legislative methodology that he used to get his measures passed is unknown. As an ex-archon, Cleisthenes was a member of the Council of the Areopagus. Membership was restricted to ex-archons. The Areopagus had legislative and judicial functions at this time. However, since the membership of the Areopagus were aristocrats, it is questionable that they would have supported legislation to give more power to the people. The Council of Four Hundred had the responsibility to deliberate and introduce legislation to the Assembly. There is no evidence that he brought his ideas before this body. The assumption is that he introduced his measures in the assembly. Was this constitutional? We do not know. His ideas were positively received by the people. The complexity of these reforms suggests that perhaps the reforms were passed at a later date.

A political crisis occurred. These proposed reforms alarmed Isagoras and his supporters. Isagoras appealed to Sparta to suppress the opposition. Since Sparta traditionally backed oligarchies, Cleomenes sent a warning to Athens to banish Cleisthenes. Cleisthenes voluntarily left. By midsummer 507, Cleomenes leading a small force returned to Athens. Now Cleomenes demanded the expulsion of seven hundred supporters of Cleisthenes. Next he ordered the dissolution of the Council. Most likely this was the Council of Four Hundred. He wanted to install Isagoras and his supporters in control of the government. Was Cleomenes endorsing a tyranny or a more limited form of oligarchy? The answer is speculative. Neither form happened. Encountering opposition from the Council and the populace, Cleomenes and Isagoras found themselves besieged on the Acropolis. On the third day, they capitulated. Cleomenes and his men returned to Sparta. Isagoras and some supporters fled Athens. Others were caught and executed (Hdt.V.66; 69–72; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*20).

Alcmaeon, who might have been a member of Cleisthenes's clan, had been elected as chief archon in the spring of 507 during the annual election. He was elected for the year 507/506. He entered office during the summer at the beginning of the calendar year. Cleisthenes and his supporters were recalled. It is now that Cleisthenes's constitutional reforms were probably enacted. The reforms were a complete social and political reorganization of the Athenian *polis*. These reforms expanded the citizen franchise and their privilege to participate in the government. These reforms laid the foundation of the democracy that would develop in the fifth century when all the male citizens, regardless of their social/economic class, controlled the affairs of state through the Assembly.

What were these reforms? Cleisthenes's fundamental constitutional change was a restructuring of the tribal organization to weaken the power and influence of the nobility. Was *isonomia* (political equality) his objective? Was his idea of *isonomia* restricted to the participation of the top three social classes in the Assembly? Cleisthenes has left no writings of his own to explain his ideas and objectives. Scholars have suggested that this was an objective.⁹⁶ In principle, the reduction of the power of the nobility would be demonstrated when the Assembly would have increased authority to pass legislation. If this was the goal, it failed. During the fifth century, the influence of the nobility remained. Nobles like Aristides, Cimon, Pericles, Nicias, Thucydides, and Alcibiades were elected leaders by the *demos*.

Under the Solonian constitution, Attica was divided into four Ionian tribes. These tribes were subdivided into phratries and gens, which were kinship based. Within their geographical area, tribal

leadership controlled the land distribution, wealth, religious cults, and local politics. They sent their representatives to Athens to conduct the affairs of state. These blood relationships led to the political rivalry of the nobility over the years. To weaken the influence of the nobility, Cleisthenes altered their power base.

He ended their geographical dominance through the dissolution of the four tribes. Attica was now divided into 139 demes based on geography and population, which were assigned new names. The deme became the basic political unit. The citizens of Attica registered in their deme and elected demarchs to handle local political and religious affairs. Membership in a deme became hereditary regardless of where future generations lived. These demes formed the base of the political pyramid.

At the next level, Attica was divided into thirty sections called *trittys* (thirds). These were formed by combining local demes. The number of demes and population varied in a *trittys*. Most of the *trittys* were composed of local demes, but there were exceptions. Under the old constitution, Attica had three natural geographical areas cataloged as hill, coast/shore, and plain (Hdt.1.59; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*13.4–5). The aristocrats were also referred to by these geographical locations. Cleisthenes took these three areas and divided them into ten sections each. This is the origin for the term *trittys*.

To reduce the influence of the nobility further, ten tribes were created to replace the four Ionian tribes. These new tribes were composed of a *trittys* from each area of the coast, hill and plain. Rather than representing distinct geographical units, these new tribes were a coalition of members that represented all of Attica. To provide a religious sanction to this change, one hundred names of local heroes were provided to Apollo at Delphi. From this list, ten names were chosen by the oracle to identify the ten tribes (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*21). Thus, sanctioned by the oracle of Delphi, geography, not kinship, was the foundation of these new tribes. Along with their father's name, citizens were now identified by the deme they were assigned.⁹⁷ Therefore, when these tribes met in the Council, they had to represent the interests of the entire *polis*. With a diversified population, it was difficult for the nobility to develop a power base within the tribe. Rather than blood ties, nobles probably solicited supporters based on the power of their personality, ideas, and financial contributions to supporters. Although factions could still coalesce around personalities or issues, these factions were more fluid in their alliance.

To accommodate these ten tribes, the Council of Four Hundred was replaced with the Council of Five Hundred. In the old Council there were one hundred members from each tribe. In the new Council, each tribe selected fifty members, to represent it. Whether they were

chosen by lot or direct election is not certain. Later they were chosen by lot (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*32.1). These representatives came from all the *trittys* within the tribe. These councilors were elected on an annual basis. The Attic Lunar calendar was divided into twelve lunar months of twenty-nine to thirty days. However, there was a Conciliar calendar of ten months that ranged from thirty-five to thirty-eight days.⁹⁸ These months were classified as a *prytany*.⁹⁹ Each tribe was assigned one *prytany* (month) to represent the entire Council on a day-to-day basis. During their month, the tribe selected by lot a different member to be the *prytanis* (president) for the day. Thus, there was greater participation in the Council by all members. The *prytaneis* (presidents) prepared an agenda for meetings of the entire Council and Assembly, conducted the meeting of the Council and Assembly, met foreign ambassadors, and handled daily correspondence. Eligibility for the Council was probably restricted to the top three social classes with a minimum age requirement of thirty (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*4.3; 30.2). Most likely, council members could serve no more than two terms in a lifetime.

We are not informed if Cleisthenes's reforms affected the other institutions. The Council of the Areopagus was probably not disturbed. There is no evidence to suggest that the selection and functions of the nine archons were changed. Therefore, the Areopagus and top magistracies remained under the control of the top two social classes. Membership in the Assembly was probably restricted to the top three social classes also. Consequently, the lowest class (*thetes*) was excluded from political participation.¹⁰⁰ Cleisthenes's reforms expanded political participation but were still limited to the top three social classes.

Were all these reforms implemented and operational within a year? From the evidence of our sources, the legislation setting up the constitutional structure was implemented at this time. Promising to give the people greater participation in the state, these reforms were probably passed in the Assembly. It is reasonable to suggest that the structuring of the demes, *trittys*, and tribes took a few years to establish boundaries and establish political structures on the deme level. In the time of Cleisthenes, Herodotus states that the male citizen population was thirty thousand (Hdt.V.97; VIII.65).¹⁰¹ Aristotle says that five years passed before a new oath was created for the Council of Five Hundred, which suggests that 503/502 was the date of implementation for this institution (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*22.1–2). How long it took for the constitution to function smoothly we are not told.

The Impact of Cleisthenes

Modern historians identify Cleisthenes as a major political figure in Hellenic history. His reforms did not establish the democracy that appeared later in the fifth century. The *thetes* were still left out of the political process. However, these reforms laid the foundation for that democracy. At this time, it is reasonable to suggest that the Athenian constitution was either a broad-based oligarchy or a narrow-based democracy dependent on one's definition. The problem with Cleisthenes for historians is his fate. The ancient writers tell us little about his life before these reforms. We know that he was an archon in 525. There is no evidence about him after these reforms. Did he lead the charge for the implementation of these measures? Did his supporters carry through these measures? Was he a political opportunist or a sincere reformer? The thoroughness of the reforms suggests that there was considerable thought and planning. It is reasonable to suggest that he did want to broaden the participation of the citizens in the political process. Did he live to see his reforms take shape? We do not know. He remains a mystery.

The political crisis begun with the Cleisthenic reforms ended in 506 with the Athenians defending the new constitution against outside interference. Humiliated by his forced withdrawal from Athens, Cleomenes I resolved to install Isagoras in power, perhaps as a tyrant. By the spring of 506, he had organized a coalition to attack Athens. In a combined operation, the Boeotians, led by Thebes, Chalcis, and the Peloponnesian League were to invade Attica on three fronts. Cleomenes advanced to Eleusis in Attica where the Athenian army was assembled. Here the campaign fell apart. Before he could engage the Athenian army, the Corinthians, along with Demaratus (515–491), the other Spartan king, refused to support him. They discovered that the political objective was the establishment of a tyranny in Athens (Hdt.V.74). The Corinthians claimed that this mission was unjust. Corinth's opposition carried great weight because it was the strongest member in the Peloponnesian League. Until this time, both kings commanded the army jointly. The army could not fight if the kings disagreed. Cleomenes was forced to withdraw, and the Peloponnesian army disbanded. After this campaign, the Spartan army was commanded by one king only (Hdt.V.75).

With this fortunate turn of circumstances, the Athenian army marched north to engage the Boeotians and Chalcidians. Before their forces could combine, the Athenians attacked and defeated the Boeotians at Oenoe and took seven hundred captives. Supposedly on the same day, they crossed over to Euboea and defeated the Chalcidians. The captives from Boeotia and Chalcis were later ransomed. Shortly after this the Athenians confiscated land from the aristocrats of Chalcis and established four thousand cleruchs (settlers),

which probably acted as a garrison. Chalcis was made subordinate to Athens (Hdt.V.74–77; M&L 15).¹⁰²

The Athenian victory over the coalition had significant consequences for Athens and Hellas. Unknown to the citizens at the time, Athenian independence was secured. The new constitution was given time to grow roots. The foundation was laid for the democracy. The Athenians gained a new pride in their *polis* and themselves. They demonstrated that they could defend themselves without allies. Athenian prestige grew in the Hellenic world. Cleomenes attempted a final plot to restore Hippias as tyrant, but it failed due again to Corinthian opposition (Hdt.V.91–94). Cleomenes's policy was now rejected in Sparta. Sparta no longer interfered in Athenian politics. The foundation of the Peloponnesian League was changed by Corinthian opposition. Sparta could no longer summon the Peloponnesian League and act unilaterally. Now Sparta had to consult the allies to gain their approval before League actions were taken. Under the Pisistratids, Athens was developing economically as a commercial state to rival Corinth, Aegina, Miletus, etc. Now Athens would grow politically and militarily to become a major player in the Hellenic world. Hindsight demonstrates that the years 508–506 were a turning point in Greek history. Athens' defeat would have meant a reinstallation of tyranny or oligarchy and probable subordination to Sparta. This Athenian political crisis, centered on the new constitution, set Athens on a path to glory and immortality. Over the next twenty years, the Athenians would cement their position in the Greek world to stake a claim to political leadership in the war with Persia. How did Athenian power grow?

⁷³ The classical period is defined as the years 480 to 323 BC. It begins with the Persian War against Xerxes and ends with the death of Alexander the Great.

⁷⁴ (Rahe 2015), 66–67. Rahe suggests that Darius accession as king firmly established that Persians, not Medes, would be the dominant ruling elite of the empire.

⁷⁵ See Scheidel in (Scheidel, Morris and Saller 2007), 45.

⁷⁶ (Cook 1983), 132–135.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 173–174.

⁷⁸ (Cartledge 2004), 64–65. (N. Hammond 1986), 102–103. Cartledge argues for a seventh century date while Hammond argues for a ninth century date.

⁷⁹ (Aristotle 1977), 132–151. See lines 1269a30–1271b40 for Aristotle's critique of the Spartan constitution.

⁸⁰ The wealthy Spartans are referred to as rich, of good families, having great possessions, first men, etc. Examples are Hdt.VI.61 and VII.134, Thuc.I.6.4 and V.15.1, and Xen.*Lac.Pol.*V.3 and *Hell.*VI.4.10–11.

⁸¹ (Cartledge 2006), 69–71.

⁸² Pausanias was appointed regent for Pleistarchus, the son of King Leonidas, who was killed at Thermopylae in 480.

- 83 The ephors justified the periodic punishment and murder of helots by young Spartans who acted in secrecy (Plut.*Lyc.*28).
- 84 (Cartledge 2004), 65–66.
- 85 (Xenophon 1971), 135–189. Military reforms probably occurred since the time of Lycurgus, but we cannot trace those changes easily. Xenophon's description applies to the fourth-century army (Xen.*Lac.Pol.*XI–XIII).
- 86 (Anderson 1970), 74.
- 87 King Croesus of Lydia appealed to Sparta for aid against Cyrus I of Persia in the 540s. Sparta refused. Croesus was defeated by the Persians and his capital, Sardis, captured in 546 (Hdt.I.76–84).
- 88 (N. Hammond 1986), 195. A date of 505 seems to be a reasonable date for completion of the organization of the League.
- 89 (Cartledge 2004), 82–85. Cartledge describes the League as “a hegemonic symmarchy of unequal type” (83).
- 90 (Xenophon 1968), Vol.I, 111.
- 91 (De Ste. Croix 1972), 97–98; 106–107.
- 92 (Thucydides 1965-1976), Vol.3, 59.
- 93 (De Ste. Croix 1972), 118–120. Examples of religious violation were an ally could refuse to participate in a campaign if it conflicted with a sacred festival, violated an ally's oath with another *polis* (Thuc.V.30.1–4), contravened a divine oracle, etc. Evidence is scanty in the literary sources of disobedience for religious reasons.
- 94 (J. Larsen 1933), 259–260. Larsen argues for the development of a formal constitution about 505. A series of bilateral agreements with Sparta was replaced by a formal organization. A League assembly determined the actions of the League. (Kagan 1969), 17–18. Kagan argues that an analysis of League actions should be based on reality, not legal theory. He disbelieves a formal constitution existed.
- 95 The four social/economic classes defined by Solon were based on annual agricultural production. These were the aristocrats (*pentakosiomedimnoi* – five hundred bushels), cavalry (*hippeis* – three hundred bushels), farmers, craftsmen, etc. (*zeugitai* – two hundred bushels), and the laborers (*thetes* – less than two hundred bushels).
- 96 (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988) For a discussion of the motives of Cleisthenes, see Ostwald, 321–325.
- 97 An example is Pericles, son of Xanthippus of the deme Cholargus (Plut.*Per.*3.1).
- 98 (Planeaux 2015). The ten months are Eretheis, Aigeis, Pandionis, Leontis, Akamantis, Oineis, Kekropis, Hippothontis, Aiantis, and Antiokhs. After a reform in 407/406, the Lunar and Conciliar calendars were harmonized. The first four months comprised thirty-six days and the last ten were thirty-five days (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*43.2).
- 99 (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996), 1269. See for the definition of a *prytaneis*.
- 100 (Kagan 1991), 15. Kagan uses the term “hoplite democracy” to describe Athens after Cleisthenes's reforms.
- 101 (Meiggs 1964), 2–3. Meiggs supports Herodotus citizen population. (Ober 2015), 162–165. Ober suggests that the number of male citizens was between thirty thousand and fifty thousand in Cleisthenes's time.
- 102 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 28–29. See inscription number 15.

The Road to Marathon

Hellas on the Brink

The political crisis over, the Athenians solidified their new constitution by the end of the sixth century. By 501 a new oath was installed to swear in the members of the Council of Five Hundred. In this same year, the Athenians began to elect the ten *strategoi* (generals) for the army. Whether the office of *strategos* was a creation of Cleisthenes or an existing institution is uncertain. Regardless, this magistracy grew in importance throughout the fifth century. Whether the generals were elected from a list of nominations by the tribes or one general represented each tribe we are not definitively informed from any source. Also speculative is a reform that reorganized the army by tribe with a general commanding the tribe. An army reorganization imitating the political structure seems reasonable, but the evidence cannot verify the suggestion beyond doubt. At the battle of Marathon in 490, the *strategoi* were still subject to the overall command of the archon polemarch (Hdt.VI.109). The polemarch magistracy, as the chief military commander, disappeared in the fifth century. Along with the army, the *strategoi* became commanders of the navy also. The *strategoi* eventually took over many of the political functions of the nine archons. Political and military leadership became intertwined.

The growth of Athenian commercial prosperity brought Athens into conflict with the other commercial states. Aegina, a small island located a few miles out in the Saronic Gulf, was a prosperous maritime state that had trade relations with the mainland, Asia Minor, the Black Sea, and Italy. These were markets Athens was expanding into. Attic pottery was also exported to Etruria in northern Italy. In 505 a conflict broke out between the two states. Consisting basically of piratical raids on land and sea, this conflict was on a small scale but ongoing for many years. In 491 Aegina medized to gain Persian support since it was losing the conflict with Athens (Hdt.V.81; V.86).¹⁰³ The animosity between these *poleis* would continue until the eve of Xerxes's invasion. In 482, Themistocles urged the Athenians to build two hundred triremes to fight Aegina (Hdt.VII.144).

Sometime between 505 and 499, Athens sent an embassy to Artaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, to counteract the intrigue of Hippias

to garner Persian support for his restoration. Artaphernes demanded the restoration of Hippias. The Athenians rejected this demand. Herodotus states that this rejection was the beginning of hostilities between Athens and Persia (Hdt.V.96). For the Athenians, the defense of their *polis* implied an anti-Persian policy. Fortunately, this anti-Persian policy coincided with the anti-Persian policy of Cleomenes in Sparta.

Athenian hostility toward Persia and Aegina led to the development of the Piraeus as the port of Athens. Themistocles, the eponymous archon for 493, suggested that the three harbors of the Piraeus be developed for the future growth of Athenian power (Thuc.1.138.3–5).¹⁰⁴ The regular harbor of Phalerum was too small to shelter and store of ships for an expanded navy. The development of the Piraeus would not be complete until the 470s.

Spartan policy toward Persia had been one of antipathy since the defeat of Lydia in 546. Appealing for support against Cyrus, Croesus looked to Hellas, in particular Sparta, for Greek aid (Hdt.I.82–83). After their victory over Argos in 546, the Spartans prepared to sail. But before they sailed, word was received that Croesus was a captive and Lydia defeated. Why did Croesus look to Hellas? Since the seventh century, Greek hoplites, in particular the Ionians of Asia Minor were serving in the armies of the eastern kingdoms. Egypt, under Psammetichus I, and Lydia, under Gyges, used the Ionians in their armies. Greek hoplites already had a reputation as excellent soldiers. By the mid-sixth century, the Spartan army's reputation, as the preeminent Greek fighting machine, had crossed the Aegean. Contrary to its withdrawal from eastern affairs after Xerxes's defeat, Sparta was actively involved in the Aegean world at this time. Sparta would remain involved.

The next episode that aroused Sparta's attention was the medism of Polycrates, the tyrant of Samos, in 525. By 532 Polycrates established his tyranny and created a strong navy to expand his power. He captured some islands and cities along the coast. He made an alliance with Amasis of Egypt. However, when the Persians were planning their campaign against Egypt, he offered men and ships to Cambyses. Herodotus claims he sent his Samian opponents to fight for Persia. On the way to Egypt, these men mutinied and sailed to Sparta. Sparta and Corinth agreed to back their revolt against Polycrates. Why? His overthrow would prevent the addition of the Samian fleet to the Persians and inhibit Persian expansion among the Greek islands. The geographical location of Samos made it a strategic military base for a fleet. Whoever controlled Samos had easy access of sail throughout the Aegean. After a siege of forty days, perhaps in 524, that failed to dislodge Polycrates, the allies returned to the

Peloponnese (Hdt.III.39–48; III.54–56). Sparta would not interfere in the eastern Aegean again.

Unfortunately for Polycrates, his luck ran out. In 522 Polycrates was lured to Magnesia by Oroetes, the Persian satrap of Lydia and Ionia. Whatever the Persian grievance against Polycrates, perhaps he acted too independently, Oroetes had him tortured, killed, and crucified. In his summation of Polycrates, Herodotus says he was the most powerful tyrant in Greece except for the Syracusan tyrants of the fifth century (Hdt.III.120–125). Persia ruled Samos after its conquest in 517 and left the tyrant Syloson to govern. Was the fate of Polycrates meant as a warning to future Greek opposition to Persian rule? If so, the warning went unheeded. Sparta further demonstrated its anti-Persian policy by removing the pro-Persian tyrants Lygdamis of Naxos in 517 and Hippias of Athens in 510.

During his reign, Cleomenes I (520–490) consistently followed anti-Persian policies, and he led the Spartan forces against pro-Persian tyrants. However, he also resisted involvement in affairs far removed from the Peloponnese. His hostility to Athens only subsided when the Athenians became hostile to Persia. He rejected Aristagoras's overtures to support the Ionian Revolt in 499 (Hdt.V.97). Turmoil in the Peloponnese made him cautious. Argos, the traditional enemy, was also asserting itself. A border conflict escalated into a major confrontation. At Sepea in 494, the Spartans under the command of Cleomenes destroyed the Argive army. The Argives suffered six thousand casualties (Hdt.VI.76–81; VII.148). It would take a generation before Argos would recover the manpower loss.

The hostility between Athens and Aegina continued. It is uncertain if Aegina was a member of the Peloponnesian League. With the help of twenty vessels loaned from Corinth, the Athenian fleet of seventy triremes defeated the Aeginetans in 492. Aegina appealed to Argos for aid. Argos refused. A thousand Argive volunteers came to Aegina to support the oligarchs. The Athenians invaded the island and defeated the Aeginetans and Argives (Hdt.VI.89–93). With this trouble in its backyard, Sparta would not support the Asiatic Greeks during the Ionian Revolt.

The Ionians

The *poleis* of Ionia and the adjacent islands were the most prosperous in the Greek world at the end of the sixth century.¹⁰⁵ Often located in bountiful agricultural river valleys along the coast of Asia Minor, they also had extensive trade relations throughout the Near East and the Mediterranean basin. Miletus was the wealthiest city in Ionia. In the early eighth century through the sixth, colonies from

Miletus were established along the coast of the Black Sea. Sinope and Trapezus on the south coast of the Black Sea, Istrus at the mouth of the Danube River, Panticapaeum in the Crimea, and others were established. The Ionian cities of Phocaea, Teus, Colophon, and Samos also contributed to the colonization of the Propontis and Thracian coasts. From these colonies, trade expanded into central Anatolia (Turkey), Europe, and the Asian steppes (Russia). Fish was harvested from the Black Sea. Grain came from the Crimea. Minerals such as silver, iron, and electrum arrived from these areas. The forests provided timber and pitch for shipbuilding for these mercantile states. Expanding from these areas, the Phocaeans founded the colony of Massilia (Marseilles), along the coast of southern France, and Alalia, on the island of Corsica. About 610, the Ionians and other Greeks founded Naucratis in the Nile delta of Egypt. Naucratis was not a colony. It was a settlement of foreigners allowed by the Egyptians for purpose of trade (Hdt.II.178–179). From the Near East to the western Mediterranean these Greeks migrated, traded, and travelled. The west coast of Asia Minor was one of the most prosperous areas in the Persian Empire.

Ionia was also the cultural center of Greece. The Greek alphabet appeared first in Ionia. The epic poems of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* originated here. Herodotus dates Homer to the ninth century (Hdt.II.53). Smyrna might have been Homer's home. In the seventh century, Callinus of Ephesus and Archilochus of Paros wrote elegies. On the island of Lesbos, Alcaeus and Sappho wrote lyric poetry during the late seventh and early sixth centuries. These poems expressed Greek individualism and were personal in nature. Greek science and philosophy emerged in the sixth century. The Milesians, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes speculated about the essence of the universe. The universe and life's origins derived from elements (air, water, etc.) that were not created by the gods. There was an intellectual curiosity about what Aristotle classified as *archê* (the beginning). Nature and religion were separated for the first time. The pre-Socratic philosophers of the sixth century such as Pythagoras of Samos, Heraclitus of Ephesus, and Xenophanes of Colophon attempted to equate nature with moral order. Nature was eternal. There was a rational order that nature and man must obey. Through reason and logic, nature can be understood. There was some mysticism in their speculations, but it does not minimize their effort at a rational explanation of their world. In science, art, and philosophy, these eastern Greeks paved the way for their mainland and western successors of the classical period.

The Ionian Revolt (499–493 BC)

The Ionian Revolt began in 499 and would last for six years before it was completely suppressed by Persia. Begun at Miletus, the revolt spread through Ionia, Caria, Cyprus, and the Hellespont area to the Bosphorus. At the time of the revolt, the *poleis* of Ionia proper were ruled by tyrants backed by Persia. They paid an annual tribute to the Great King. Their soldiers served in the Persian army. Their merchants traded with the Persian Empire. The Ionians prospered under Persian rule. For almost fifty years the Greeks of Ionia lived under Persian rule. Why did they choose this time to escape the tentacles of Persia?

Herodotus begins his story with individual intrigues by Histiaeus and Aristagoras, the tyrant of Miletus, as the origin of the revolt. These might have been immediate reasons, but were there long-term influences? The expansion of the empire by Darius was a major factor for the revolt. It is most likely that the Persian conquest of Thrace in 512 damaged the trade of the Ionians with the people who lived around the Black Sea. Military operations often have a short and sometimes long-term negative impact on trade patterns. Interruption of trade meant loss of revenue for the *polis* as well as individuals. Military demands by Darius on the manpower, fleets, and treasure of the Greeks impacted their prosperity. These military demands would negatively affect the people's attitude toward the tyrants. In Ionia, tyranny remained the dominant form of government because it was supported by Persia. Herodotus indicates that there was internal hostility toward the tyrants (Hdt.IV.137; V.37–38). Thus, the opposition to Persia probably derived in tandem with the Ionians' opposition to their local tyrants. Contacts with the mainland informed the Ionians of the hostility toward Persia of some *poleis* led by Sparta and Athens. Did the winds blowing eastward from Athens encourage the Greeks to seek greater political freedom? Perhaps, but the suggestion lacks solid evidence to support it. Oligarchies were prevalent in mainland Greece, and the birth of democracy began in Athens. Expansion of the political franchise was the trend in the homeland. It is reasonable to expect that the concept of *isonomia* (political equality) expounded by Cleisthenes had crossed the Aegean as part of the intellectual exchange among all Hellenes.

Herodotus is our only literary source for this revolt and he sees this event as another episode in the unity of the growing conflict between mainland Hellas and Persia. Writing in the mid-fifth century, his main theme was to explain this conflict of cultures. The Ionian Revolt began a twenty-year period of hot and cold war between Persia and some of the Greek states. Sparta, Athens, and their allies emerged victorious. These states would be honored, and they gloried in this achievement. It must be remembered that the Hellenic world was not unified, and many major *poleis* remained neutral or medized

during this struggle. In fact the oracle at Delphi, Hellas' most sacred shrine, encouraged appeasement to Persia (Hdt.VII.140–141). The Persian victory over the Ionians would not have made the eventual Greek victory in 479 obvious to those living during the next decade. Ultimate Greek victory was not preordained. The survivors of the Persian wars viewed this conflict as a watershed moment in their lives. Western civilization derived from this Hellenic victory. Like Herodotus, it is our responsibility to explain how Hellas defied the greatest power the Mediterranean world had yet seen.

The revolt began in Miletus. Aristagoras was the tyrant. Two events encouraged him to raise the insurrection. The first originated in the island of Naxos. Early in 499, wealthy exiles from the island of Naxos arrived in Miletus seeking support to be returned to power. Naxos was a strategic island in the Cyclades between Asia Minor and the Greek mainland. A base on Naxos could provide logistical support for a Persian invasion of the Greek mainland. Aristagoras appealed to Darius's brother Artaphernes, who was the satrap of Lydia and Ionia, for Persian support and offered to finance the expedition. Artaphernes obtained the approval of Darius. The appointment of Megabates, a relative of Darius, to the command the army and a fleet of two hundred triremes indicates that Darius assigned a high priority to this mission. By unknown means, the Naxians were forewarned of the assault and were prepared. After a four-month siege the Persians withdrew (Hdt.V.30–34). The mission failed.

Aristagoras realized that there would be ramifications for this failure. He had quarreled with Megabates during the voyage to Naxos. He could not finance the expedition as promised. His credibility with Artaphernes was probably ruined. Darius would demand a scapegoat. Failure probably meant that he would be removed from power and executed. While considering his options, a message arrived from Histiaeus, his mentor and former tyrant of Miletus now serving Darius at Susa, encouraging him to revolt. Aristagoras sent his supporters to seize the other tyrants still with the Ionian fleet that had returned from Naxos. In late summer of 499, Aristagoras surrendered his tyranny and proclaimed *isonomia* to garner support from the Milesian citizens. To gain Ionian support for Miletus, Aristagoras ordered the captured tyrants returned to their cities. The citizens would determine the fate of these tyrants. Most of the tyrants were expelled. A few were executed. Like Miletus, *isonomia* was proclaimed in the cities that joined the revolt (Hdt.V.35–38). Whatever the propaganda value of *isonomia*, the Ionians probably wanted more political freedom within their *poleis* as well as their relations with Persia.¹⁰⁶

New constitutions were established, but Herodotus does not describe them. Most likely these governments were oligarchic, but the

franchise was expanded. When and how the Ionians organized themselves is unknown. A loose confederation was formed, and representatives of the *poleis* occasionally met to discuss common issues. What seems evident is that the Ionians' military strategy was to win their freedom at sea. The commercial nature of the Ionian *poleis* forced them to have large fleets to police the seas and guard their interest. The fleet contributions in the Battle of Lade in 494 were larger than any that could be mustered in mainland Hellas at this time (Hdt.VI.8). Throughout the war, a major land battle was avoided, but multiple sea battles occurred. There was no unified command to coordinate strategy. Each city selected its own commanders and was responsible for its self-defense. How the revolt was financed is not mentioned, but we are told that the Ionians rejected the use of the treasure of Apollo at Didyma (Hdt.V.36).

In the winter of 499/498, Aristagoras sailed to Hellas to seek support. His first stop was Sparta. King Cleomenes refused to send a Spartan army to Asia. At Athens, Aristagoras was promised twenty triremes. Eritrea sent five triremes. If he solicited aid from other *poleis*, their response was negative. Athens and Eretria brought down the wrath of Darius after the suppression of the Ionian revolt. Prior to the arrival of this assistance, the Ionians rescued some captured Paeonians from Phrygia and returned them to their homeland (Hdt.V.49–51; V.97–98).

In 498, after the arrival of the Athenians and Eritreans, the Ionians sailed to Ephesus. Disembarking the army, these allies marched to Sardis, the capital of Lydia. Capturing the lower town, they were unable to dislodge Artaphernes from the acropolis. The lower town was burnt. Fearing the arrival of Persian reinforcements, the Ionians withdrew to Ephesus. Providing no further aid, the Athenians and Eritreans sailed home. Their involvement in the revolt was ended. As the future would show, their participation brought dire consequences. The Ionian fleet sailed to the Bosphorus and Byzantium joined the revolt. The liberation of this area gave them access to the resources, especially foodstuffs, of the Black Sea area. To the south of Ionia, some of the coastal Carian cities revolted. The revolt further spread to the island of Cyprus. On Cyprus, Onesilaus of Salamis besieged the Phoenician city of Amathus. Cyprus was settled by Greeks and Phoenicians. From the Black Sea to the Levant, the western border of the Persian Empire was in state of rebellion (Hdt.V.99–105).

In 497 the Persian counteroffensive began. Darius sent Histiaeus to Miletus to restore it to Persian control. Histiaeus betrayed Darius and joined the revolt. A Persian army and fleet arrived in Cyprus from Cilicia. The Ionians sent their fleet and an army to defend Onesilaus. A land and sea battle occurred simultaneously in the early summer. The

battle, near Salamis, was the largest land engagement of the war between the two armies. Although their commander was killed, the Persians were victorious and Onesilaus was killed. At sea the fortunes of the Ionians were reversed. They were victorious. The Persians besieged the revolted cities. After the city of Salamis fell, the Greeks sailed away (Hdt.V.106–115). Cyprus was under Persian control by the end of the year.

On the mainland, the Persians assembled three armies commanded by three sons-in-law of Darius. Darius meant business. The first army under Daurises campaigned in the Hellespont area. The second army commanded by Hymaees was assigned the coast of the Propontis. The third army, conducted by Otanes, marched against Ionia and Caria. Upon receiving news that the revolt had spread in Caria, Daurises marched south. He defeated a Carian army in a fierce battle somewhere along the Menander River. The Milesians joined the Carian survivors. A second battle occurred. The Persians were victorious and inflicted even heavier casualties. Whether it was 497 or in 496, the army of Daurises was caught in an ambush by the Carians. He was killed and the army destroyed. At some point in 497/496, Hymaees fell sick and died in the Troad. The third army of Otanes captured the cities of Clazomenae and Cyme. With events going badly for the Greeks, Aristagoras decided to flee. He fled to Myrcinus in Thrace where he was killed fighting some Thracians (Hdt.V.116–126). For the balance of 496 and 495, the Persians remained quiet.

For the Ionians, the year 494 was the beginning of the end. The Persians were prepared to strike at the heart of the revolt. The submission of Miletus was the objective. The Persians united their armies. A Persian fleet of six hundred triremes from Phoenicia, Cilicia, Cyprus, and Egypt was formed and sailed to Miletus. Aware of the danger, the league representatives met at the Panionium to make preparations. The decision was made to oppose the Persians at sea. The Milesians were left to defend their city while the naval forces gathered at the Lade, a small island outside Miletus. Here the showdown would occur. The league navy consisted of 353 triremes with the largest contingents from Miletus, Lesbos, and Chios. Dionysius of Phocaea was assigned the command, and he trained the fleet to fight as a unit. In the battle of the Lade, the Persians were victorious when Herodotus claimed the Samians betrayed the Greeks and sailed away. The defeated ships fled home. Miletus suffered the fate of *andrapodismos*.¹⁰⁷ The city was besieged, captured, and sacked. The survivors were enslaved and sent to Susa for resettlement (Hdt.VI.6–20).

In 493 the Ionian Revolt ended. Each *polis* was now left to its own defense. The Persian army and fleet acting in unison reduced the

cities of the mainland and islands to subjection. The revolt was suppressed with harshness. Persian control was reestablished all the way to the Bosphorus (Hdt.VI.31–33). Although suppressed, the revolt did result in a change of Persian policy. Conciliation rather than retribution was the policy followed to restore peace. It is reasonable to suggest that the policy was ordered by Darius. The satrap Artaphernes summoned the Ionian representatives and compelled them to agree to submit their disputes to arbitration. The territories of the Ionian *poleis* were surveyed to assess tribute on a new basis. In the spring of 492, Mardonius, another son-in-law of Darius, arrived in Ionia with an army and fleet. Before he continued his march to the Hellespont, he removed the tyrants and established democracies in many Ionian *poleis* (Hdt.VI.42–43).¹⁰⁸ Hatred of tyranny was one of the causes of rebellion. Perhaps democracy would bring peace to Ionia. This enlightened policy brought peace to the Eastern Aegean until the defeat of Xerxes.

The destruction of Miletus, the largest city of Ionia, was a devastating psychological blow to the Hellenic world. In Athens in 492, the tragedian Phrynichus wrote a play titled *The Capture of Miletus*. The audience was brought to tears, and the play was banned. The author was fined a thousand drachmae (Hdt.VI.21). Although prosperity would return to the *poleis* of Ionia, they were never as wealthy or powerful as they were at the end of the sixth century. The quantity of ships, supplied at the Lade, was never provided under the Athenian Empire. The cultural supremacy of Ionia passed to Athens in the fifth century. Athens eventually became the school of Hellas. In the classical period, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Syracuse became the preeminent states of Hellas. Would the fate of Ionia happen to the Hellenic mainland? The mainland Hellenes were fearful, but they would be prepared.

Prelude to Marathon – Persia

With peace restored to Asia, Darius looked westward to the Hellenic mainland. He did not forget the role that Athens and Eretria played in the burning of Sardis. Mission accomplished in Ionia, Mardonius continued on to the Hellespont with the army and fleet. In early summer, he crossed the Straits and marched westward along the Thracian coast. The Greeks on Thasos medized on his approach. King Alexander I of Macedon did likewise. Was Mardonius's objective Hellas or mastery of the states along the north Aegean? Perhaps it was the security of the Thracian satrapy? The question is speculative. He never got past Macedonia. The fleet encountered a storm while sailing around Mount Athos. Herodotus reports that three hundred

ships and twenty thousand men were lost. These might have been conventional numbers for Herodotus, but regardless, the losses were severe. While camped in Macedonia, the army was attacked at night by the Byrgi, a Thracian tribe. The army suffered heavy casualties and Mardonius was wounded. Mardonius proceeded to subjugate the Byrgi. Since it was late in the campaigning season, Mardonius returned to Asia with the fleet and army (Hdt.VI.43–44).

Herodotus implies that the expedition was a failure since few Greeks were subjugated. We cannot accept this conclusion. We do not know what Mardonius's objectives were. Since Darius appointed a son-in-law, this campaign had great importance. Mardonius did accomplish the pacification of the north Aegean coast from the Hellespont to the eastern border of Macedonia. The area remained under Persian control until Xerxes's defeat. We are not informed that Darius imposed a punishment for failure. This same Mardonius commanded the Persian forces a dozen years later at Plataea. Despite heavy losses, his forces withdrew peacefully. The army of Xerxes followed this same path to the Greek mainland. The evidence indicates that the results of Mardonius's campaign were satisfactory to Darius.

Prelude to Marathon – Hellas

The defeat of the Ionians left the mainland *poleis* with a sense of foreboding. Athens and Eretria suspected that they would be the targets of revenge and conquest. Sparta was hostile to Persia. Spartan hostility meant that the allies in the Peloponnesian League would also be hostile. For the Greeks of central and northern Hellas, the jury was undecided which way they would respond to Persian overtures. The islanders of the Aegean were vulnerable to the Persian navy. Prior to the battle of the Lade, Miletus, Chios, and Lesbos had the largest fleets in the Hellenic world. These fleets were destroyed. At the Lade, Chios supplied one hundred triremes (Hdt.VI.8). Athens, Corinth, and Aegina were the leading commercial states on the mainland, and they could probably provide one hundred ships combined in the late 490s. Athens only had fifty triremes in the war with Aegina in 492, and Corinth loaned Athens twenty ships (Hdt.VI.89). How could the mainland states oppose the Persian juggernaut?

As mentioned, Athens and Aegina were at war. This conflict continued until the eve of Xerxes's invasion. In 492 Argos was quiet. The destruction of the Argive army at Sepia in 494 by the Spartans left Argos with a minimal force to oppose any enemy. The Greeks of Sicily and Italy were ruled by tyrannies. They had their own problems. They could provide no assistance. By land and sea the mainland Greeks were extremely vulnerable.

In 491 the Great King made preparations for an assault on the Hellenic mainland. He ordered the coastal cities from the Levant to Asia Minor to provide triremes and transport ships for the fleet. Envoys were sent among the islanders and mainland *poleis* asking for earth and water as a token of submission. Many islanders and a few mainland *poleis* acquiesced. The Athenians and Spartans executed the Persian envoys (Hdt.VII.133). Their actions indicate that Sparta and Athens were irrevocably committed to hostility with Persia. A problem arose when Aegina medized. Aegina, located in the Saronic Gulf, was only a few miles from Attica and the isthmus. If Aegina became a Persian naval base, the Persians could attack the mainland anywhere at any time.

Recognizing the danger the medism of Aegina presented, the Athenians sent ambassadors to Sparta to ask them to intervene in Aegina. Why did they ask Sparta to intervene? Aegina might have been a member of the Peloponnesian League, but this is not certain. Agreeing to this request, King Cleomenes went to Aegina to demand that they revoke their submission and surrender those Aeginetans who medized. The Aeginetans refused. They claimed that he had no authority without the presence of Demaratus, the other Spartan king. Herodotus claims that Demaratus encouraged the Aeginetans to resist Cleomenes's demands. Angered by the Aeginetan response, Cleomenes returned to Sparta (Hdt.VI.48–51).

To eliminate his nemesis, Cleomenes had Demaratus removed as king on the grounds of illegitimacy. Cleomenes had bribed Perialla, the Delphic priestess, to support his claim. The Spartans held the oracle at Delphi in high regard and were strict in their religious practices. Demaratus was removed from the kingship and replaced with Leotychidas II (491–469) (Hdt.VI.61–67). Regardless of the truth of the charge, the Spartans probably removed Demaratus because he was less hostile to Persia than Cleomenes. As far back as Cleomenes's attempted restoration of Isagoras in Athens in 506, Demaratus and Cleomenes had different policies in the internal politics of Sparta. This fifteen-year opposition now resulted in the dismissal of Demaratus. After an alleged later insult by Leotychidas, Demaratus left Sparta and fled to Persia where he would become an adviser to the Great King. Twenty years later Leotychidas would be removed from the throne for corruption (Hdt.VI.72).

In early fall Cleomenes returned to Aegina accompanied by Leotychidas. The Aeginetans succumbed to Spartan pressure and surrendered hostages as a pledge of good behavior. These hostages were given to Athens by Cleomenes. This was probably his own decision since the Aeginetans would appeal this decision in Sparta

after the death of Cleomenes in November 491. A Spartan court ruled in favor of Aegina. Following this decision, Leotychidas, accompanied by Aeginetan envoys, went to Athens in December to request the return of the hostages to Aegina. The Athenians refused stating that they could not release the hostages without the presence of both Spartan kings (Hdt.VI.73; VI.85–87). Leotychidas left empty-handed. The Spartans did not force the Athenians to return the hostages. Retention of the hostages was in the interest of Sparta and Athens to ensure that Aegina would not submit to Persia.

The undeclared war between Aegina and Athens would continue in 490. The Aeginetans raided an Athenian festival at Sunium and captured some Athenian nobles. Athens plotted to overthrow the Aeginetan government. A minor land engagement on Aegina between Athens and Aegina, supported by some Argive volunteers, resulted in an Athenian victory. The war dragged on for another decade (Hdt.VI.87–93). Neither side would achieve a decisive advantage. However, the Persians gained no support from Aegina during their attack on Athens.

Death of Cleomenes I

After the removal of Demaratus, Cleomenes's bribery of the Delphic oracle became known. Fearing punishment, Cleomenes fled to Thessaly and then Arcadia. Rumor had it that Cleomenes was conducting an anti-Spartan plot gaining the support of some Arcadians. In November 491 Cleomenes returned home at the invitation of the Spartans to resume his throne. In Sparta, his erratic behavior forced his kinsmen to lock him up in the stocks. Getting a knife from the helot assigned to guard him, he committed suicide through self-mutilation (Hdt.VI.74–75). Herodotus claims that some Greeks believed he went mad and died because of his sacrilegious behavior. The Spartans say he was addicted to strong wine.¹⁰⁹ Although there is no evidence, perhaps he was assassinated by orders of the Spartan ephors and his madness was used as a cover up for this political act. Whether mad or murdered, his death was a suspicious end for a powerful king.

Cleomenes ruled for thirty years. His reign was long but controversial. Contemporaries and scholars have found him to be an enigmatic character. A man with a strong personality and member of the senior Agiad house of the monarchy, Cleomenes dominated his contemporaries in Spartan politics. Herodotus always has him acting as the senior leader on campaign. Although checked by Demaratus at Athens in 506 and Aegina in 491, he is always portrayed as a man of action. Excluding his attempt to restore Isagoras in Athens, Cleomenes

opposed tyranny. The removal of Lygdamis of Naxos (417) and Hippias of Athens (510) are examples of this opposition. His anti-Persian policy allowed Sparta to be the spokesperson for the Greek opposition. He supported Athens in its anti-Persian policy. He appears to have been a good military commander. His victory over Argos at Sepea in 494 destroyed the Argive army. Argos remained neutral in the Persian wars and would not challenge Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnesian League for two generations. His removal of Demaratus appears to be a ruthless act of political revenge. His bribery of the Pythia of Delphi suggests that he might have had few religious scruples. The accusation by his contemporaries that his madness was divine retribution for his political actions indicates he was not as pious toward the gods as his fellow Spartiates were. During his reign, the Peloponnesian League adopted the constitution and form we know for the classical period. At his death, Sparta was the hegemon of the Peloponnesian League, which was the only major alliance in the Greek world. Cleomenes lived a life of controversy, but Sparta was a stronger power at the end of his reign than at the beginning. Leonidas (490–480), Cleomenes brother and successor, would lead the Spartans at Thermopylae. Cleomenes was the first Spartan that we are informed about who suffered from the corruption of power. He would not be the last. More examples would appear in the classical age.

Marathon

In 490 Darius launched his revenge on Athens and Eretria for their support of the Ionians. The attack would be an amphibious assault across the Aegean Sea designed to punish these *poleis*. Darius assigned the command to Datis, a Mede, and Artaphernes, his nephew and son of the satrap Artaphernes. They were accompanied by Hippias, the ex-tyrant of Athens. This armada of triremes and transports for the horses and troops assembled in Cilicia in the spring. Herodotus says the fleet was composed of six hundred triremes. Whether this figure is true or not, a large force would have gathered to achieve naval supremacy. Was this assault designed to be a raid in force to sack and burn Athens and Eretria in retaliation for the burning of Sardis? Or was it designed to establish a sea-lane through the islands and establish an army of occupation in Attica as an operational base for a larger invasion of conquest? The army and cavalry size was limited by the transports. The Persian army might have consisted of twenty-five thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry.¹¹⁰ This army was probably not large enough, unless joined by other Greeks, to defend a conquered Athens against a counterattack by the land forces of the Peloponnesian League. The total manpower of the Persian force

was perhaps ninety thousand.¹¹¹ The Persian naval superiority could not be maintained indefinitely. There were no ports on the mainland with an infrastructure that could shelter and support this fleet. The Persians knew the Greeks were not a united people. They probably believed that a successful raid in force would encourage many Greeks to submit peacefully. Thus, punishment, not conquest, was the probable mission for this expedition.

The mainland Greeks probably received word of this expedition, but they were unsure of its mission. They might have suspected that the Persians would sail to the Hellespont or Macedonia where Mardonius campaign ended two years earlier. There is no record of a fleet of this size ever having sailed the open sea before.¹¹² From Cilicia the fleet sailed north to Samos. From here they sailed southwest toward the Cyclades. The Persians attacked the island of Naxos and caught the Naxians unprepared. They burnt the city of Naxos and enslaved the Naxians who did not escape. Naxos' strategic location could provide logistical support for the Persians. The Persians next stopped at the island of Delos. They made no conquest, but they made offerings to Apollo. Sailing through these islands, Datis took hostages and added them to ensure the good behavior of these islanders in his rear.

By August Datis arrived at the island of Euboea, separated from Attica and Boeotia by the narrow Euripus Straits. Datis demanded the submission of Carystus on the southern end of the island. The Carystians refused but surrendered after a short siege. The sacrifice of the Carystians bought time for Eretria to prepare a resistance and ask Athens for assistance. The Athenians responded by sending the four thousand cleruchs that were living on the island to defend Eretria. Aware of the internal division among the Eretrians whether they should medize, the Athenians retired to Chalcis. From here they crossed the Straits of Euripus into Attica. The Eretrians withstood a siege for six days. On the seventh day the city was betrayed by two citizens who might have opened a gate. For the next few days the city was sacked, burned, and its citizens enslaved (Hdt.VI.94–101). The first object of revenge was achieved.

Datis landed his men at Marathon in Attica on September 10 (the eighth day of the Boedromion in the Athenian calendar). Marathon was close to Eretria for logistical support. The plain of Marathon was the best location in Attica for the Persian cavalry to operate. Marathon provided an adequate water supply for the troops and horses. Herodotus states that Marathon was suggested by Hippias. Marathon was less than a day's march from Athens. In the Assembly, Miltiades persuaded the Athenians to oppose the Persians at Marathon rather than defend the city (Nepos.*Milt.*4.4–5). The next day, the Athenian

army marched to Marathon. The army was composed of nine thousand hoplites. The next day they were joined by one thousand hoplites from Plataea, Athens' ally from Boeotia. There were no archers or cavalry to challenge the Persians. The Athenians were led by their ten *strategoi* (generals), one from each tribe. The *strategoi* had operational command and met in council to determine strategy and tactics. Callimachus, the archon polemarch, was the supreme commander. The *strategoi* sent a messenger, Philippides, to Sparta warning them of the Persian landing and requesting that Spartan troops be sent. The Spartans agreed. However, they could not march for six days until the next full moon. They were celebrating the Carneian festival in honor of their patron deity Apollo.

The generals decided to wait for Spartan aid. Occupying a good defensive position, the Athenians refused Persian overtures for battle. Afraid of the Persian cavalry, they improved their defense against a cavalry attack on their left flank. The *strategoi* rotated command to a different commander each day. In conference the generals were evenly divided. Five wished to avoid engagement until the Spartans arrived. The other five, led by Miltiades, wanted to engage immediately if conditions were favorable. The supporters of Miltiades agreed that he should take command on their assigned days. In agreement with Miltiades, Callimachus ended the deadlock and agreed to attack without the Spartans (Hdt.VI.109–110).

Miltiades was a member of the Philaid family of the Athenian nobility and a supporter of the Pisistratids. Hippias had sent him to the Chersonese where he ruled as a tyrant for many years over territory that his uncle had conquered. Miltiades was among the Greek tyrants who supported Darius's Scythian invasion in 512 (Hdt.VI.39–41). However, he fled to Athens in 493 after the Persians tightened their control of the northern Aegean after the end of the Ionian revolt. Miltiades was tried but exonerated for his tyranny in the Chersonese. Miltiades was elected a *strategos* in the Athenian army for 490. His leadership skills and personality dominated the general staff at Marathon (Plut.*Arist.*5.1–2).

On September 19 (seventeenth of Boedromion) Miltiades led the Athenians and Plataeans forward. The Athenians occupied the center and right wing led by Callimachus. The Plataeans occupied the left wing. Protected on their left by their defenses and on the right by a marsh, they could not be outflanked by the Persian cavalry. Forewarned that the cavalry was not immediately available to the Persians, Miltiades attacked the Persians at dawn.¹¹³ The Greek wings were strong, and the center was left weak. Facing the Persian infantry and archers, the Greek wings were victorious, but the center was broken by the Persian and Sacae infantry. The Greek wings enveloped

the Persian center. The Persians broke through the trap and fled toward their camp. Failing to withstand the Greeks, some Persians fled into the Great Marsh and drowned. Others fled to the sea to escape onto the Persian ships. Callimachus was killed fighting by the ships near the beach. A memorial to him was dedicated on the Athenian Acropolis (M&L 18).¹¹⁴ Seven Persian ships were captured. The surviving Persian forces escaped to sea (Hdt.VI.111–115).

The victory was complete. However, the Persian fleet was observed heading south toward Cape Sunium. A signal was alleged to be sent from Mount Pentelicus informing the Persians that Athens was weakly defended. Although never proved, it was alleged a member of the Alcmaeonidae clan might have sent the signal. The Athenian army, leaving one tribal unit at Marathon under the command of Aristides, raced back to Athens. By evening they were in a defensive position near Athens when the Persian fleet arrived near the port of Phalerum. Realizing that a landing was impossible, the Persians sailed away the next day (Hdt.VI.116–117; Plut.*Arist.*5.3–5).

At Marathon the Persians suffered 6,400 casualties. The Athenians and Plataeans lost 192 men. The Athenians erected a stone monument listing the dead and their tribal affiliation. A separate burial mound was created honoring the Plataeans. Miltiades was given a private memorial (Paus.I.32.3). The Spartan advance force arrived in Athens the day after Marathon. They proceeded to the battlefield to witness the scene and study the Persian dead for future reference. Their late arrival did not tarnish the reputation of the Spartans because nobody questioned their religious scruples.

When Datis sailed backed to Asia, the Greek hostages and captives were taken with him. The Eretrians were taken to Susa for Darius to decide their fate. They were not killed. They were settled east of Susa near an oil field (Hdt.VI.119). They never returned to Hellas.

Significance of Marathon

Marathon was the first major engagement between the mainland Greeks and Persians. The Athenians and Plataeans were honored for their unexpected victory. The casualties suggested the superiority of the Greek hoplite against the lighter-armed hordes of Persia. For the Athenians and Plataeans, it was a great victory. The victory was certainly a morale booster for all Greeks who opposed Persia. The tactics and weapons used by the Persians were studied by the Spartans when they visited the battlefield. Lessons learned by the Athenians and Spartans could be used later. Marathon became a symbol of Greek freedom and another defining moment in the rise of

Athens to Hellenic preeminence. The spoils of war were dedicated to Apollo at Delphi (M&L 19).¹¹⁵ The Athenians would annually honor the dead at Marathon. After the later disgrace of Miltiades, the memorial to him at Marathon was not removed. The significance of the battle remained a memorial to all who fought. However, Marathon was only the prelude!

The power of Persia remained enormous. The defeat was a minor blip on the Persian radar screen. Darius made preparations to renew the attack. Next time the Persian army and fleet would be even stronger. Due to unforeseen events at the time, the attack on Hellas would not come for another decade. Darius would be dead. His son Xerxes would lead the expedition. Although Athens had successfully resisted, the mission was not a failure. Eretria was sacked. Some islands in the Cyclades submitted. The fleet was unchallenged. The fleet controlled the Aegean Sea. Darius would not be deterred. A greater Hellenic effort would be required the next time the Persians arrived on the horizon. When would the Persian hammer of conquest next fall on the Greek anvil of freedom? The Greeks could only wonder.

¹⁰³ Medism was an act of submission to Persia. A conquered people offered “earth and water” to the Great King acknowledging his supremacy.

¹⁰⁴ (Hale 2009), 112. The three harbors of the Piraeus were Zea, Munychia, and Cantharus. Zea and Munychia on the east side were developed exclusively for the navy. The largest harbor of Cantharus on the west side was developed as a naval and commercial harbor.

¹⁰⁵ The original members of the Ionian League in the mid-sixth century were Miletus, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teus, Clazomenae, Phocaea, Samos, Chios, and Erythrae. League meetings were conducted at the Panionian near Cape Mycale, which was sacred ground dedicated to Poseidon (Hdt.1.142; 1.148).

¹⁰⁶ (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988). For a review of the concept of isonomia for the Ionians, see Murray, 474–475.

¹⁰⁷ This term describes the physical destruction of the city as well as the enslavement of the population. (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 120–121.

¹⁰⁸ Herodotus does not describe the constitution of these democracies. It is reasonable to believe that the franchise was expanded, but to whom is unknown. The Athenian democracy did not include all social classes until the mid-fifth century.

¹⁰⁹ The Greeks drank their wine diluted with water. Strong wine was undiluted.

¹¹⁰ See Hammond in (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988), 504.

¹¹¹ (Rahe 2015), 145.

¹¹² Triremes were ships of war that carried limited supplies for the two hundred rowers and marines (Hdt.VII.184; VIII.17). In Greek warfare the ships often island hopped to gather supplies on a daily basis for their crews. Although they were sturdily built, triremes were not designed to withstand storms on the open sea. Multiple examples of their destruction by storms are mentioned in Herodotus and Thucydides.

- ¹¹³ No ancient source provides an explanation for the absence of the Persian cavalry. (Rahe 2015), 152–155. Rahe hypothesizes that the Persians may have loaded the horses on the transports the prior evening in preparation of a partial withdrawal to attack an undefended Athens.
- ¹¹⁴ (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 33–34. See inscription number 18.
- ¹¹⁵ (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 35. See inscription number 19.

The Persian War (480–479 BC)

The Basic Story

The Persian War, centered on Xerxes's invasion of Hellas, described by Herodotus (books 7, 8, and 9) was a defining moment in the history of Hellas and Western civilization. This war issued in the classical age. The victories of Marathon, Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale echo through the ages. The story of the three hundred Spartans and their allies defeated at Thermopylae is perhaps even more famous. Darius, Xerxes, Miltiades, Leonidas, Themistocles, and Pausanias are names that reverberate and symbolize the east-west conflict that Herodotus immortalized.

The story has been told numerous times. Books and movies have been made. Suffice it to say that the war (a series of conflicts) began for the Greeks with the Ionian Revolt in 499. Athens and Eretria gave aid in 498. After the Greeks burned Sardis, they withdrew their support. In revenge Darius's forces sacked Eretria in 490 and landed at Marathon to punish Athens. Despite appeals for aid, Athens and Plataea fought alone and won. The victory and the 192 casualties were commemorated throughout Hellas.

However, the defeat was not forgotten by Darius. He wished to launch another invasion, but the Egyptian revolt in the 480s changed his plans. Darius died in 486. His son Xerxes carried out the next invasion in 480. The Greeks created a Hellenic League to meet this threat. Most *poleis* did not join this League, nor was the Delphic oracle optimistic about a Greek victory. At Thermopylae and Artemisium, the Persians emerged victorious. Their next step was the sack of Athens. Persia appeared unbeatable. However, at Salamis, the Greek navy, led by the Athenian contingent under Themistocles, commanded by the Spartan admiral Eurybiades, won a great victory and turned the tide of the war. Xerxes withdrew the majority of his forces back to Asia. He left a strong army under Mardonius in Greece to renew the conflict in 479. The Greeks, under the leadership of Sparta and its Regent Pausanias, defeated the Persians in Boeotia at Plataea. The Greek fleet under the leadership of the Spartan king Leotychidas and the Athenian *strategos* Xanthippus carried the war to Asia Minor and defeated the Persian fleet and army at Mycale. All Persian forces

eventually withdrew from Hellas, Macedonia, and Thrace. We know the story. How did this series of events occur?

Athens

The repulse of the Persians at Marathon gave the Athenians great confidence in themselves. However, they believed the Persians would return. A problem from Marathon remained. Who signaled the Persians that Athens was lightly defended? The Alcmeonidae clan of Cleisthenes was accused. How could the enemies of the tyranny of Hippias succumb to the oriental despotism of the Great King? Herodotus thought the charge was absurd (Hdt.VI.121–124). Who provided the signal has never been determined. No ancient source provides an answer. It is reasonable to hypothesize that supporters of Hippias might have signaled. However, twenty years removed from power, how many supporters of Hippias remained? The fate of Eretria might have affected a pro-Persian segment of the population to medize. To the Athenians the signal remained an unsolved mystery.

At the suggestion of Miltiades, the Athenians went on the offensive. Islands that had medized were to be attacked and brought under Athenian control. Miltiades was given the command of seventy triremes to attain this objective. Sailing through the islands to the Cyclades, he eventually arrived at the island of Paros. Paros was near Naxos, which had succumbed to Datis. Control of the islands of the Cyclades would give the Athenians command of the central Aegean. Miltiades began a siege of Paros. After a twenty-six-day siege, Miltiades lifted it. Herodotus blames his withdrawal on the gods, but most likely he left because he feared the return of the Persian fleet. A false Persian fire signal was observed. He was also wounded during the siege. When he returned to Athens, Miltiades was accused of treason by Xanthippus, who claimed that Miltiades deceived the people. This trial, by his political enemies, was probably designed to embarrass him. Miltiades was found guilty and fined fifty talents. Shortly afterwards he died from his wound. Whatever the merits of the trial, he was still honored after death. The memorial erected in his honor at Marathon was not removed. Cimon, Miltiades's son, would pay his fine and serve Athens for the next forty years (Hdt.VI.132–136; Nepos.*Milt.*7).

During the decade of the 480s, many prominent Athenians were exiled through the political process of ostracism. Athenian tradition assigns the law of ostracism to the reforms of Cleisthenes (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*22.1). The date of implementation has been questioned by scholars. It was twenty years after the reforms of Cleisthenes before the law was first utilized.¹¹⁶ Although the twenty-year time

differential between passage and usage of the law seems unusual; there is a modern example that resembles this law. The impeachment clause of a president, adopted in the Constitution of the United States, was not used for eighty years until President Andrew Johnson was impeached and tried in the United States Senate in 1867. Without sufficient evidence for an alternative date, it is reasonable to accept the law as part of Cleisthenes's reforms. Whatever the precise circumstances were, the political climate in Athens of the 480s allowed the law to be used on a regular basis.

Ostracism was a political process. The law was designed to prevent an individual from becoming too powerful and threatening the constitution. Individuals ostracized were not legally punished. They were exiled for ten years but could then return with full political privileges. Their property was not confiscated. Their income was retained. Citizenship was not revoked. The only restriction was that they could not live within the borders of Attica. Individuals were ostracized by an annual vote in the Assembly. A minimum of six thousand votes was required for an ostracism to occur. The people wrote the name of their choice on an ostrakon (potsherd) in secret ballot. Only one person per year could be ostracized. The person with a majority of votes was ostracized.¹¹⁷ Under this law a number of people would suffer this fate in the 480s. After this decade the law was used sparingly until the law was eliminated in 417.

Although our knowledge of the internal politics of Athens in the 480s is limited, it is certain that political rivalry contributed to the use of the law. Herodotus tells us little about the internal affairs of Athens. In his *Lives* of Themistocles and Aristides, Plutarch describes their intense rivalry (Plut.*Them.*3.1; *Arist.*3.1). The individuals ostracized spanned the political spectrum. These rivalries were certainly based on personalities, internal and external policy differences, and perhaps family rivalries. There were political factions. However, there were no political parties as exist in modern democracies. Political leaders appealed directly to the people. Their supporters would vary contingent on the issues involved. All ostracized individuals were from the nobility.

The nobility had the wealth and leisure to devote their time to affairs of state. Although Miltiades was only fined in his trial, his prosecutor Xanthippus requested the death penalty for his guilt. The victor of Marathon had some bloodthirsty enemies. We cannot determine how much the shadow of Persia impacted domestic politics. It is reasonable to hypothesize that some Athenians expected the imminent return of war with the Persians while others hoped that a peace might be achieved. Hipparchus, a relative of the Pisistratids, was the first man ostracized in 487. Perhaps he was too pro-Persian and an opponent of the democracy. In 486 Megacles was ostracized

for a similar reason. Two years later the pendulum swung in the opposite direction. Xanthippus, an opponent of tyranny, was ostracized in 484 because his influence was too great. In 483/482 Aristides became a victim because he opposed the policies of Themistocles and was not always friendly to the democracy (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*22.4–8; Plut.*Arist.*7.1–2). In 480, on the eve of Xerxes's invasion, the ostracism of these men was revoked to allow their return to defend the state. Aristides and Xanthippus would play prominent roles defending Athens. What the precise reasons or issues were for these ostracisms are open to speculation. Ostraca discovered in excavations in Athens demonstrate that many men were candidates for ostracism by the people.¹¹⁸ Many individuals and issues were evaluated by the Athenians. We can only guess why the people voted as they did.

We do know of two pieces of legislation that had major ramifications for Athens political development. The first occurred in 487/486 when the electoral process for the archonship was changed. Since the end of the tyranny, the nine archons were selected by the people in a direct election. The reform ended direct elections. The nine archons were now chosen by lot from a list of five hundred candidates selected in the demes (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*22.5). This reform weakened the ability of political leaders to garner support by direct appeal to the people. The randomness of the selection process ensured that the chief magistrates only had a small following among the people. Consequently, this reform weakened the influence of the archonship.

The diminished power and influence of the archons allowed the *strategoí* to become the dominant political leaders. This military office now became a political office as well. The ten *strategoí* were still selected by direct election. One *strategos* represented each tribe. The victory at Marathon probably increased the prestige of the board of *strategoí*. These generals were not professional soldiers. They had no military commands until assigned by the assembly. One or all could be assigned to a specific command. Only through personal influence or military success could one *strategos* dominate his colleagues. The *strategoí* grew in power because they were responsible for the defense of the *polis* and they could be reelected annually. Through their leadership of the army and navy, the generals acquired political influence. Pericles later maintained his prominent position through his annual selection to the office of *strategos*.

The second piece of legislation had major repercussions for Athens and Hellas. A new vein of silver was discovered at the Laurium mines in Attica. Rather than distribute this new wealth to the people, in 483/482 Themistocles persuaded the Assembly to pass a naval bill to build two hundred triremes for use in the war against Aegina (Hdt.VII.144; Plut.*Them.*4.1–2). Currently Athens was stalemated in

the conflict with Aegina. Although Aegina was the immediate enemy, Thucydides and other Greeks realized that Persia was the unmentioned enemy. These ships would become the heart of Athenian resistance to Xerxes two years later.¹¹⁹ This naval act changed the political, military, social, and economic outlook of the Athenians. Rather than trust the defense of the *polis* to the hoplites of the army, the fleet would become the foundation of Athenian power. The Athenians would endeavor to become masters of the sea. A superior fleet would defeat Aegina and protect Athens from another amphibious assault from Persia. The fleet brought victory against Xerxes, the growth of the Athenian Empire, and the expansion of the democracy to include the *thetes* social class. This act of statesmanship by Themistocles and the Athenian people has resonated through the ages as one of the great pieces of legislation passed by the Athenian democracy. The Athenians put their faith in the *polis* and the greater good. Time proved the wisdom of this legislation.

Sparta and the Peloponnesian League

On the eve of Marathon, the Spartans demonstrated their opposition to Persia with their agreement to come to the aid of Athens. Although late to the battle, the Spartan army arrived with two thousand hoplites (Hdt.VI.120). Who commanded this force we are not told. This was no token force. Their late arrival due to their piety toward the gods did not detract from their reputation among the Greeks. As hegemon of the Peloponnesian League, the “Lacedaemonians and their Allies” represented the strongest armed force in Hellas. The Spartiates alone numbered eight thousand strong. The Spartan kings, Leonidas and Leotychidas, followed the anti-Persian policy pursued by Cleomenes. In the decade following Marathon, Herodotus mentions little about the internal affairs of Hellas. His concern was to describe the Persian preparations. There is no evidence from any source that suggests there was any internal dissension in Sparta regarding its anti-Persian policy. Both kings fought against Xerxes. Leonidas died at Thermopylae. Leotychidas participated in the victory at Mycale.

In Athens’ war with Aegina, Sparta and Corinth, Sparta’s strongest ally in the Peloponnesian League, sided with Athens. Corinth, like Athens, was a maritime rival with Aegina. As mentioned earlier, Corinth loaned twenty triremes to Athens in 491 to attack Aegina. We do not know whether these ships eventually returned to Corinth or became part of the Athenian fleet in the 480s. Spartan support preserved an oligarchy in Aegina and prevented the Aeginetans from supporting Datis. Despite its hostility toward Athens, Aegina was part of the Hellenic alliance against Xerxes.

After its disastrous defeat at Sepea in 494, Argos remained quiet in the Peloponnese. The Argive manpower loss provided one excuse for Argos to remain neutral against Xerxes. Though hostile to Sparta, Argos did not medize. However, Argos' neutrality forced Sparta to be wary of Argos' intentions. All was quiet on the Peloponnesian home front at the time of Xerxes's invasion.

Persia

Darius did not accept the defeat at Marathon as a definitive event in his desire to subject Athens and the mainland Greeks to conquest. He commanded the subjects of Asia to provide men, ships, material, and provisions for an even larger invasion force. For the next three years Darius built up his army. However, before he could launch his next assault, the Egyptians revolted in early summer of 486. In November Darius I died. His son Xerxes (486–465) used these forces to suppress the rebellion. By early 484 the rebellion was over. Either now or in 482 a rebellion broke out in Babylonia, but this did not delay Xerxes's plan to follow in Darius's footsteps (Hdt.VII.1–7).

Xerxes would not launch another amphibious operation across the Aegean. He would go by land. With the Persians, Medes, and other eastern contingents, Xerxes would march from Persia across the Anatolian plateau. He would cross the Hellespont near Abydos. The fleet and other army contingents would gather near the Hellespont. Following the north Aegean shore, he would march through the Chersonese, Thrace, and Macedonia to attack Hellas from the north.

In preparation for this assault, in 484 Xerxes ordered that two bridges should be built across the Hellespont to support his forces. These were constructed near Abydos. To protect the fleet from the disaster that struck in 492, a canal was to be built across the isthmus of Mount Athos. Sailing through the canal, the fleet would not be exposed to another storm (Hdt.VII.22–25). Supply depots and roads were to be built for the expedition. It would take the next three years to complete these engineering and logistical tasks. It is a safe bet that the Greeks were aware of these undertakings and what they meant.

In the spring of 481 Xerxes assembled his Persians, Medes, and others at Critalla, in Cappadocia, and marched to Sardis. Other forces probably joined en route. By fall the Persian army arrived at Sardis. Here the army wintered. From Sardis Xerxes sent heralds to the Greeks requesting their submission (Hdt.VII.132). Heralds were not sent to Athens and Sparta. Xerxes meant to punish them. Rather than earth and water, Xerxes required their "iron and blood."¹²⁰ Athens and Sparta had previously murdered heralds sent by Darius requesting their submission (Hdt.VII.133).

Herodotus claims that when Xerxes left Susa, the exiled Spartan King Demaratus sent a message to Sparta warning it that Xerxes was marching to the Aegean (Hdt.VII.239). If true, how and when the messenger arrived we are not told. It was a three-month journey if one traveled on the Persian royal road from Susa to Sardis (Hdt.V.53). Perhaps it would require another month to arrive at Sparta from Sardis. If this time frame is correct, the Spartans might have received the message by late summer 481. Messengers were sent to the other Greeks informing them of the danger. Therefore, the Greeks were already aware of Xerxes's appearance when the Persian heralds arrived in the winter seeking earth and water. How many *poleis* would medize?

The Hellenic League

Informed of the Persian threat, the Athenians sent heralds to Delphi seeking divine guidance. Herodotus does not date this visitation to the Delphic oracle. However, its words were famous to the Athenians. It is reasonable to suggest that the consultation at Delphi occurred at this time when the Athenians were debating whether to fight or flee. The Delphic priestess Aristonice urged the Athenians to flee prophesying that Athens would be burned and the temples destroyed. Disturbed by this advice, the messengers asked for a second message that would provide some hope. The messengers presented the words of the second oracle in the Assembly. The ambiguity of its meaning was debated. Themistocles convinced the people that the words "wooden wall" and "holy Salamis" meant that the fleet and the island of Salamis would be their salvation. The Athenians voted to stay and resist Persia. Although the date is open to scholarly debate, a fourth century copy of "The Decree of Themistocles" was discovered that documents the decision to resist Persia with the fleet and evacuate Athens if necessary (Hdt.VII.140–144; M&L 23). Although the arguments are by no means definitive, it is reasonable to suggest the passage of this decree in the fall of 481.¹²¹

Learning that Athens would fight, the Spartans invited the Greeks to a congress in Sparta in October to determine their resistance to Persia. This congress occurred before the arrival of the Persian heralds seeking submission. Athens, Sparta, and the Peloponnesian League would resist. Who else? Eventually there would be thirty-one members in the alliance. The balance came from the islands and central Greece. In what sequence the members joined is uncertain. Historians classify this alliance as the Hellenic League. Meeting near the temple of Poseidon, at the Isthmus of Corinth, in the fall of 481, the

representatives swore an oath to resist (Paus.III.12.6). What the exact structure of the alliance was is uncertain. There probably was some type of assembly of the allies created. What the powers of the assembly might have been is uncertain. This assembly probably could issue decrees binding on member states.¹²² Perhaps based on a suggestion by Themistocles, the members agreed to set aside differences until the Persian threat was removed. Thus, the war between Athens and Aegina was suspended. The alliance was defensive only (Thuc.I.18.3). Sparta was appointed the hegemon of this Hellenic League. Spartans would be assigned to command the army and fleet (Hdt.VII.145; VIII.3; Plut.*Them.*6.3). Despite disagreements during the war among the allies, this unity of command under Spartan leadership was not revoked. Sparta and Athens would be the twin towers of resistance.

The first action of the League was to send spies to Sardis to gather information about the Persian forces. In Sardis the spies were caught. Rather than executing the spies, Xerxes had them see the strength of army. Hopefully in shock and awe, the spies would report back to the Greeks the futility of resistance.

League representatives were sent to Argos, Syracuse, and other states that did not attend the congress soliciting support for the alliance. In response to the League appeal, the Argives sought advice from Delphi. The priestess advised then to remain neutral. The Argives informed the League envoys that they would disobey the oracle if the Spartans agreed to a thirty-year peace and shared command of League forces. The Spartans refused these conditions (Hdt.VII.146–152). Argos remained neutral. Even the Persian danger could not overcome the ancient enmity between Argos and Sparta. In Boeotia, Thebes reluctantly joined the alliance, but the Thebans would medize after Thermopylae. The Phocians joined the alliance.

Gelon, the tyrant of Syracuse, also rejected the appeal because he was not offered the supreme command of the Greeks. It is alleged that Gelon later sent men and money to Delphi to observe the war. If Xerxes was victorious, his representatives were to offer his submission. If the Greeks were victorious, the men and money were to return to Syracuse. Herodotus does mention Gelon's fear of a Carthaginian invasion of Sicily as an alternative explanation for his refusal to aid the mainland (Hdt.VII.153–165). Regardless of the explanation, Gelon did not join the Hellenic alliance, but he did lead the Greek resistance in Sicily to the Carthaginian invasion in 480.

By early winter of 481/480 the Persian heralds arrived in Thessaly seeking submission. It is probable that the Thessalians submitted at this time. On their northern border, Macedonia was an ally of Persia. Their *poleis* would be the first attacked by the Persians. However, they

appealed for aid from the Hellenic League. In the spring of 480 the Greeks sent an army under the command of the Spartan Evaenetus to the pass at Tempe to encourage the Thessalians to resist. However, this army only stayed a few days. Informed of their danger by the Macedonian king and learning of a pass that would flank their position at Tempe, the Greeks retreated to the isthmus at Corinth. After this withdrawal, all the Thessalians medized and provided troops for Xerxes (Hdt.VII.172–174).

In the spring of 480 the League representatives met at Corinth to determine their strategy for resistance. The Athenians assigned the command of the Athenian fleet to Themistocles. The Spartan Eurybiades was the commander of the League fleet. After the return of the army from Tempe, it was decided that the front line of defense would be the pass at Thermopylae, guarded by the army, and Artemisium, guarded by the fleet (Hdt.VII.175–176; Plut.Them.7.3). In early June the Greek forces awaited the might of Persia. For logistical reasons, the army and fleet remained at the isthmus until the Xerxes forces arrived in Hellas. Not until the end of summer would Xerxes's army arrive at the border of Thessaly.

Xerxes March to Hellas

In the spring of 480 the Persians left Sardis and marched to Abydus on the Hellespont. Here the fleet and army were united under Xerxes's watchful eye. It took the month of May for all forces to cross and organize on the European side. Marching in separate columns, the army reunited with the fleet at Doriscus, an administrative center for the Thracian satrapy, by the end of June. At Doriscus the fleet was hauled ashore to clean the hulls. From here the army marched in three separate columns to Macedonia arriving at the border of Thessaly by the end of August. Xerxes marched with the coastal column. The fleet sailed along the shore and through the canal cut at Mount Athos, arriving at Therma on the Thermaic Gulf of Macedonia (Hdt.VII.121–123). The journey from the Hellespont to Athens took four months (Hdt.VIII.51).

The pace of the expedition was deliberately slow for many reasons. Herodotus states that although the Persian commissariat was well provisioned and supply depots were established, the Persians wanted to live off the land, confiscating the ripe crops along the way (Hdt.VII.50). Roads needed to be built for the army and provisions to transit. Storms in the Aegean were less prevalent in the summer months. Therefore, the fleet would have an easier time sailing through the northern Aegean. The sea-lanes would be secured as the fleet


passed through the north Aegean. Men, ships, and supplies were collected from the Greeks along the coast and the northern islands. Men were collected from the inland tribes of Thrace, Paeonia, Chalcidice, and Macedonia. Opposition by the inland tribes was suppressed by the army, thereby strengthening Persian control within the Thracian satrapy. The army could be trained and integrated during these hostilities. These roads, sea-lanes, and conquests improved the Persian line of communications with Asia. The size and pace of this irresistible force was meant to discourage the Greeks and encourage them to submit. If victorious, the Persians could remain through the winter to consolidate their conquests. The Persian logistical strategy for victory was well planned.

What was the composition of this irresistible force? Herodotus describes the army and fleet. He states that the army was composed of 1,700,000 men! He goes on to describe the contingents, armaments, and commanders. He does remark that he cannot confirm the size of the individual contingents (Hdt.VII.60–88; VII.185). This number is certainly an exaggeration, perhaps to enhance the Greek victory. His description of the Persian forces that left Susa is accepted. The Persians were composed of four elite royal regiments of one thousand men each. Two were infantry and two were cavalry. Another ten thousand cavalry and ten thousand infantry, called the Immortals, provided the remainder. It is reasonable to accept these figures since the Persian elite would have accompanied the king. Therefore, the Persian contingent consisted of 24,000 men (Hdt.VII.40–41). Perhaps, the actual fighting forces in the army were 220,000 men of all arms.¹²³

The size of the Persian fleet described by Herodotus has been accepted by scholars. His figure of 1,207 triremes is supported by Aeschylus (Hdt.VII.89–98; VII.184; Aesch.*Persians*.341–343). The fleet was composed of contingents from Phoenicia, Egypt, Cyprus, Ionia, and others from Asia. Each ship contained 170 rowers with at least thirty infantry and archers. Therefore, if fully manned, the fleet contained 241,400 men. In addition to these vessels, another 120 triremes were provided by the Greeks of Thrace and the northern islands. This would add another 24,000 men (Hdt.184–185). With horse transports, supply ships, and smaller warships, penteconters with eighty men, perhaps another three thousand vessels were assembled. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe the Persian navy, warships and transports, contained at least four hundred thousand mariners.¹²⁴

On the eve of the invasion, the combined Persian forces probably contained between six hundred thousand and seven hundred thousand men. If true, this is a tribute to the organizational skills of the Persian commanders. The quantity is impressive, but what of the

quality? The contingents of the fleet came from good maritime states. How well the fleet was trained to fight as a unit we are not told. Each contingent had its own commanders. The structure of the army was probably similar to the fleet. Each contingent fought under its own commanders. There were well-trained elite units who had long fought under Persian command. However, the newly conquered troops were probably not well integrated into the army. How loyal would the recently medized Greeks be in battle against the free Greeks? Time would tell if the might of Asia led by the “King of Kings” would defeat a few recently united Greek *poleis*.



Map 2 – Xerxes's route invasion of Hellas (<http://explorethemed.com./images/Maps/PersianWars936.jpg>).

The Eve of Battle

In early September the Persian army entered Thessaly and marched along the coast to the plain of Halus along the Gulf of Pegasae. Here it awaited the arrival of the fleet. At this time, a portion of the Greek army, led by King Leonidas with three hundred Spartiates, was at Thermopylae. The Greek fleet, under the command of Eurybiades, was stationed at Artemisium on the north shore of the island of Euboea. In early September the Spartans were celebrating the Carneian festival to Apollo and the Olympic Games were in progress. Upon the completion of these events, the Spartans and the rest of the Hellenes would then march northward.

Sailing from Therma in Macedonia to join Xerxes, the Persian

fleet anchored off the Magnesian coast near the channel of Scythos north of Artemisium. In route they captured two Greek observation ships. Aware by signal of the loss of these ships, the Greek fleet retreated to the Euripus Straits and used Chalcis as a base of operations. At dawn of the next day, September 12, a gale arose from the northeast and caught the Persian fleet exposed to the wind and waves. For three days the storm raged and ravaged the fleet. When the storm passed by September 15, Herodotus states that four hundred warships were destroyed along with numerous supply ships, the loss was probably less but still devastating. The Greeks, anchored in the Euripus Straits near Chalcis, were protected from the storm. On the fourth day they thanked Poseidon and returned to Artemisium. The Persian supply ships and damaged warships anchored within the Gulf of Pegasae while the other warships sailed to Aphetae. A rear guard of fifteen ships accidentally sailed on. They were captured by the Greeks (Hdt.VII.179–195).

With the army and fleet united, Xerxes marched to a date with Leonidas of Sparta at Thermopylae. The fleet would engage the Greek fleet under Eurybiades. The Athenian contingent, commanded by Themistocles, provided the largest part of the fleet. Their maritime skills would be tested for the first time. The opening salvo was about to begin.

Artemisium and Thermopylae

The pass of Thermopylae was called the “Hot Gates.” Named for the hot sulfur springs located nearby, in antiquity the pass was about four miles (six kilometers) long located between the mountains and the sea.¹²⁵ The eastern and western entrances, called gates, were only a few meters wide. The “Middle Gate” was fifty to sixty-five yards wide (fifteen to twenty meters). Here the Greeks made their defense. An old wall, originally built by the Phocians, was reinforced by the Greeks to block the passage through this gate. The geography allowed a small force to check a larger force. Unfortunately, there was a pass that flanked this position. Leonidas discovered its existence upon his arrival. The Persians would learn of it by a native named Ephialtes. Leonidas chose to defend the front section of the pass from the Middle Gate.

When Xerxes learned the pass was defended, he sent a scout to observe the opposition. Upon arrival at the pass by September 12, the scout could not determine the size of the army because they were hidden by the wall. However, he did observe the Spartans exercising and combing their hair. In contrast to other Greeks, the Spartans grew their hair long. The Greek force consisted of three hundred Spartiates

chosen from men who had sons left behind to continue their bloodlines.¹²⁶ Accompanying the Spartans were nine hundred emancipated helots.¹²⁷ These helots are not mentioned by Herodotus. From the Peloponnese, Leonidas brought five hundred Mantineans, five hundred Tegeans, 120 Orchomenians, one thousand other Arcadians, four hundred Corinthians, two hundred Phlians, and eighty Mycenaeans. From Boeotia, Leonidas collected four hundred Thebans and seven hundred Thespians. Another one thousand men from Phocis and some from Opuntian Locris joined at Thermopylae (Hdt.VII.202–205). Throughout his narrative of Thermopylae, Herodotus implies Spartan hostility toward Thebes. If true, perhaps these four hundred Thebans were taken as hostages rather than allies to prevent Theban submission to Persia. This force allowed Leonidas to oppose Xerxes for three days from September 17 to September 19.¹²⁸

Simultaneously, the Greek fleet was stationed at Artemisium. The fleet comprised 271 triremes. The Athenians contributed 127 triremes, the Corinthians forty, the Megarians twenty, the Aeginetans eighteen, the Sicyonians twelve, the Spartans ten, the Epidaurians eight, the Eretrians seven, the Troezenians five, the Styrians two, the Chalcidians twenty, and the Ceans two. Nine penteconters from Ceos and Opuntian Locris were also present (Hdt.VIII.1–2). Vastly outnumbered, the Greek fleet could not challenge the Persian fleet on the open sea. From Artemisium the fleet could protect the army at Thermopylae from a seaborne landing in their rear. It also could prevent the Persian fleet from sailing through the Oreus channel to the Euripus Strait to attack Attica. If the Persian fleet tried to sail around the island of Euboea to approach Attica from the south, the Greeks could attack the Persians in the flank or sail through the Euripus Strait to check them along the coast of Attica.

Thermopylae and Artemisium were meant to be defensive positions only. The balance of the Hellenic army and navy were still at the isthmus. The primary objective for the fleet was probably to protect the rear of the army. The strategy was to delay the Persians until the Greeks could unite all their forces and come north.

In the morning of September 17 Xerxes launched the assault against the pass. From his throne he observed the progress of the battle. The first contingent to attack was the Medes. Fighting in relays, Leonidas's men inflicted heavy casualties. Xerxes next sent in the ten thousand Immortals, commanded by Hydarnes, expecting that these elite troops would end Greek resistance. They failed. At the end of the day, the pass was still blocked. On the second day the Persians renewed the frontal assaults with the balance of their best troops but still could not break the Greek defense.

Sometime during the second day, a Malian Greek, named Ephialtes, appeared to tell Xerxes about the pass to flank Thermopylae. Xerxes ordered the Immortals to march at night, under the guidance of Ephialtes, capture the pass, and attack the Greeks from the rear in the morning. At dawn the Persians arrived at the top of the pass and surprised the Phocians guarding the pass. The Phocian resistance was weak and the Phocians fled. Unhindered, the Persians descended down the pass. Aware that the Persians were approaching from the rear, the Greeks met in council. Probably aware that the Greeks were frightened and not willing to fight on, Leonidas dismissed them. Despite the heroic portrayal by Herodotus, perhaps the Greeks were ordered to protect the rear but fled or left without Leonidas approval. The Thebans were forced to remain. Regardless, Leonidas, with the surviving Spartans, Thespians, and helots, decided to stay, fight, and die.

On the final day, September 19, Leonidas and his survivors marched out from the wall to face the enemy in the pass. The Greeks fought until Leonidas was killed. Fighting and retrieving his body, the survivors retreated behind the wall to a small hill. Here the Persian archers killed the last of the Spartans and Thespians. The Thebans surrendered and were consequently branded by the Persians. Herodotus states that four thousand Greeks perished. In reprisal, Xerxes had Leonidas's body decapitated with the head placed on a pole. After the war the Greeks erected a monument to the dead inscribed with words that have been quoted for centuries (Hdt.VII.210–228).

Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by
That here, obedient to their laws, we lie.
(Hdt.VII.228)¹²⁹

This phrase demonstrates the loyalty the Spartans, like other Greeks, felt toward their *polis*. They were loyal to Sparta first. The *polis* and law trumped the individual. From the age of seven, the Spartan *agôgê* (educational system) trained the individual to subordinate himself to the state and maintain an iron discipline of obedience to his leaders and the constitution. From king to private, this phrase of the soldiers' heroism emphasizes obedience to the *polis*.

While the army was defeated and annihilated at Thermopylae, over this same three-day period, the fleet at Artemisium fought the Persian fleet to a draw. The original assembly of 271 triremes was reduced by three ships when they were lost while scouting the Persian fleet. On the first day of battle, September 17, the Greeks adopted a defensive position to protect the army at Thermopylae. The Persians did likewise. However, the Persians sent a detachment of two hundred triremes to sail around the east coast of Euboea and enter the Euripus

Strait from the south. Stationed in the Euripus Strait, the Persian fleet would block the Greek retreat when they were defeated at Artemisium. Herodotus hints that the release of these ships greatly reduced Persian naval superiority at Artemisium (Hdt.VIII.13). Not until the afternoon of the next day would these ships be in place. Therefore, on the first day, both sides intended to avoid battle.

Informed of the Persian strategy by the arrival of a Greek from the Persian fleet, Eurybiades called a council of war. Encouraged by Themistocles to fight, despite Corinthian opposition, the decision was made to engage the enemy despite the possible four to one odds against them. Although Herodotus accuses Themistocles and Eurybiades of accepting bribes to fight, their decision was based on sound strategy and the mission to defend the army (Hdt.VIII.4–8; Plut.*Them.*7.2–4).

In the afternoon the Greeks rowed out to challenge the Persians. The Greek strategy was to cripple or sink the Persian ships by ramming them. Greek triremes were larger and equipped with a bronze ram to either shear off the oars of the enemy vessel or ram them from the side or rear. They only carried thirty fighting men. The Persian triremes were smaller, faster, and carried more fighting men trained by the army (Hdt.VII.185).¹³⁰ Persian strategy was to grapple and board the enemy to capture the enemy boat. The Greeks approached the Persians in a single line. The Persians approached in the same manner. With their numerical superiority, the Persian attempted to encircle the Greeks. Countering this move, the Greek wings back watered to form a circle (*diekplous*), with their prows facing outward to attack the Persians as they approached. This maneuver became standard in Greek naval warfare in the fifth century. Tightening the circle to draw in the Persians, the Persian ships were spread out in their encirclement. At the assigned signal, the Greeks attacked and rammed numerous vessels. Due to the lateness of the day, the battle was short with minimal damage to each side (Hdt.VIII.9–11).

Author: Ελληνικά: Χρήστης Templar 52 (<https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Olympias.1.JPG> 2006)



Picture 3—Picture of a Trireme

Picture 3 – Trireme Olympias of the Hellenic Navy – Modern replica of the Athenian Trireme.

At night the Greeks withdrew and probably beached their ships. Their original plans might have been to sail to the Euripus to engage the two hundred ships dispatched earlier. During the night, another severe storm arose. It caught the Persians, stationed at Aphetae, at sea as well as those sailing around Euboea. Many ships were destroyed at Aphetae and off “the Hollows” of Euboea. What the exact damage was we are not told. Since the main Persian fleet never received a signal from the ships sailing around Euboea, it was assumed they were destroyed. On September 18, a reinforcement squadron of fifty-three Athenian ships arrived. They confirmed the total destruction of the ships sailing around Euboea. With this news and these additional ships, the Greeks attacked again late in the day. The engagement again probably resulted in minimal damage to both sides (Hdt.VIII.12–14).

On the last day, September 19, the final naval engagement occurred. Perhaps learning of the victory at Thermopylae, the Persian admirals ordered another attack at midday to redeem their reputation before Xerxes. The Persians attacked in a crescent formation to encircle their opponents. The Greeks rowed out to meet them but stayed close to their base. What the tactics were or casualties suffered is not mentioned by Herodotus. He only states the fight was fierce with losses heavy to both sides. Half the Athenian ships were damaged. That night the Greeks learned of the annihilation of Leonidas. The fleet damaged and the army destroyed, there was no strategic reason to

stay. The next day they sailed for Salamis with the Corinthians in the lead and the Athenians in the rear (Hdt.VIII.15–21).

Postmortem Analysis

Thermopylae and Artemisium were the first trials of strength. Despite heavy casualties, the Persians were victorious at Thermopylae. From storms and battle, the Persians suffered heavy losses in men and ships at Artemisium and off the coast of Euboea. The naval engagements resulted in a draw. Exact losses for the fleets of both sides are not available to us. However, in a war of attrition, the Persians could sustain their losses easier than the Hellenes. Herodotus tells us that four thousand Greeks died at Thermopylae. Figures for the Persians are speculative although Herodotus mentions twenty thousand dead at Thermopylae (Hdt.VIII.24).¹³¹ Unlike Marathon, the Greeks could not count the Persian dead. It is reasonable to suggest that a very small percentage of the Persian army was lost. However, certain elite forces were reduced in number. Persian army morale was probably temporarily discouraged, but victory can be an immediate tonic for the restoration of that morale. Persian knowledge of Hellas would have informed them that future battles would be fought in more open spaces. It must be remembered that we have no account of the war from the Persian viewpoint.

Though the fleet was heavily damaged, Herodotus and Aeschylus tell us the Persian fleet still vastly outnumbered the Hellenes at Salamis. If true, either the Persian fleet was replenished with reinforcements or the storm losses might have not been as large as implied. Regardless of the explanation, the odds of victory remained heavily in favor of Persia. The Persian leadership could not have been discouraged. They did not create the greatest known empire if easily discouraged by a setback.

Artemisium demonstrated to the Hellenes that in confined waters, the Greeks could hold their own against the Persian fleet. It was a morale booster. However, the Greeks realized that they could not win a war of attrition. They were fighting for home and hearth. Defeat meant submission. If Xerxes was defeated, the Persians would return to Asia.

Thermopylae became a symbol for Greek freedom after the defeat of Xerxes. But at present, Thermopylae was a defeat. Now the Spartans, and their fellow Hellenes, could only mourn the loss of their king, fathers, brothers, and husbands. Divided council by the Hellenic League at Corinth regarding future strategy against Xerxes strongly suggests that the Greeks were not confident of victory. The odds were still long by land and sea that the Persian hammer of conquest would

be shattered by the anvil of Hellenic freedom.

The war changed at Salamis. How?

The Persian Advance

Victorious, the Persians buried their dead along with those of the Greeks at Thermopylae. Revenge was performed on the body of Leonidas. His head was removed and impaled on a pole as a symbol to warn the Greeks of their fate (Hdt.IX.78).

Before Thermopylae, the Greeks were encouraged to medize and treated mildly if they did. After Thermopylae, vengeance became the name of the game. The Greek resistance had angered Xerxes. Conquest would now be achieved through fire, pillage, and death.

For two days Xerxes remained at Thermopylae to bury the dead, pay homage to the gods, and supervise the repair of the fleet. Heralds were dispatched through central Greece urging their surrender. On September 22 the Persian army departed in multiple columns heading south through Locris and Phocis. The Locrians submitted and suffered no damage as this Persian column proceeded along the coast. The Phocians refused to medize and suffered for their participation at Thermopylae. In two separate columns, the Persians marched through Doris and Phocis burning the cities and temples, destroying farms, and killing or enslaving captured Greeks. One of these columns headed west toward Delphi. The Delphians fled. Only by the divine intervention of Apollo was the precinct preserved according to Herodotus (Hdt.VIII.25–39; Diod.XI.14.2–4). Whatever the reason, the Persians withdrew and did not sack Delphi. Probably the separate columns were expected to rendezvous by a certain date.

In advance of the Persian arrival, Macedonian officers, selected by King Alexander I, were sent into Boeotia to protect the cities that medized. The Persian columns reunited in Boeotia before they marched on Athens. Plataea and Thespieae were sacked because of their participation at Thermopylae (Hdt.VIII.50). The survivors fled to the Peloponnese.

Encountering no opposition, the Persians entered Athens on September 27. Except for the recalcitrant defenders on the Acropolis, Athens was deserted. The Athenian fleet, after their return from Artemisium, transferred all remaining inhabitants to Salamis, Aegina, or Troezen on the western shore of the Saronic Gulf. It is uncertain if other allied ships aided the evacuation. Prior to Xerxes's invasion, the Athenians had made plans for evacuation. The Decree of Themistocles calls for the evacuation of Attica (M-L 23).¹³² Many Athenians probably fled as Xerxes invaded Hellas. However, it is likely that thousands were evacuated after Artemisium. The slow Persian

approach to Athens after Artemisium gave the Athenians time to flee. Unfortunately, much of their private possessions were left behind to be pillaged by the Persian army.

The Persians attacked the Acropolis after appeals by the Pisistratidae, supporters of the old tyrant Hippias, to surrender failed. The Acropolis was taken when some Persian soldiers scaled the heights on an undefended side. The defenders were killed and the temples looted and burnt. For two days Athens was sacked and burned (Hdt.VIII.51–54). The countryside of Attica was also pillaged as the Persian army proceeded toward Megara.

While the army marched to Athens, the fleet remained behind. For three days after Artemisium, the fleet remained to make repairs and await reinforcements. Ravaging the coast of Euboea as they sailed, it took another three days to pass through the Euripus Strait and sail along the coast of Attica. The fleet arrived at the port of Phalerum by September 28.

Aware that the Greek fleet was in the channel between the island of Salamis and Attica, the Persian fleet occupied the Phalerum harbor to observe the Greek fleet. Herodotus says the fleet was as large at Salamis as at Artemisium while Aeschylus states the fleet size to be 1,207 ships (Hdt.VIII.66; Aesch.*Persians*.341). In combination with other ships stationed around the island of Salamis to seal off the Greeks, the Persian fleet might have numbered 1,427 vessels.¹³³

The Greek Withdrawal

Withdrawing from Artemisium through the Gulf of Euboea, Themistocles had a few Athenian vessels leave inscribed messages on the rocks at various stopping points urging the Ionians in the Persian fleet to join the allies or fight with a minimum effort. Sowing the seeds of mistrust, it was hoped that the Persian admirals would fear betrayal by the Ionians and prevent their use in battle. The loss of the Ionians would reduce the numerical odds in the next engagement between Greek and Persian. How successful was this ploy? We cannot be sure. The Ionians fought for the Persians at Salamis. How vigorous the Ionians fought, we do not know.

The Greek fleet withdrew to Salamis through the Euripus Strait. The Greeks of Euboea were urged to flee, and the families of the Athenian cleruchs were evacuated. The Athenians released the Plataeans from their service to return home to protect their city in Boeotia. Expecting to encounter the Greek army in Boeotia, according to the original strategy, the mariners were disillusioned when they observed that the army had not come north. While the Athenians headed home, the balance of the fleet sailed to the island of Salamis.

Arriving at Athens, the Athenian fleet assisted the Athenians as they fled Attica to the islands of Salamis Aegina, and to Troezen in the Peloponnese. Some Athenians remained behind. They intended to defend the city from the Acropolis and trusted that Athena would protect them (Hdt.VIII.40–41). As mentioned, these Athenians died on the Acropolis. After the evacuation, the Athenian fleet rejoined the Greek fleet at Salamis. The Greek fleet was reinforced with the balance of the ships stationed at the isthmus. The fleet increased in size to 378 triremes and comprised the Athenians, islanders, and Peloponnesians. With 180 Athenian vessels plus twenty ships provided to their cleruchs from Chalcis, this Athenian contingent of two hundred triremes accounted for better than half of the fleet (Hdt.VIII.42–48). Despite the losses at Artemisium, the Athenians had replacement ships ready at their docks in the Piraeus. The Areopagus provided the funds to recruit men to operate the ships (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*23.1). With the addition of a couple of defectors from the Persian fleet, on the eve of battle, the Hellenic fleet would number 380 triremes and a few penteconters (Hdt.VIII.82).¹³⁴ If the ships were fully manned, approximately eighty thousand Greeks fought at Salamis. Whatever the precise figures, the Greek fleet might have been outnumbered by a two to one margin.

While the fleet gathered at Salamis, the Peloponnesian army was gathered at the isthmus near Corinth. Instead of marching north, as Leonidas probably expected, the Peloponnesians decided to build a wall across the isthmus near Corinth and defend Hellas from here. Built by the army, the wall made of stone and brick stretched from the Saronic Gulf to the Corinthian Gulf. The army was commanded by Cleombrotus, the brother of Leonidas. Many of the *poleis* of the Peloponnese were represented but not all. Whether these absent *poleis* actually medized or remained neutral is unknown. Herodotus accuses them of medizing (Hdt.VIII.71–73). The army expected the fleet to withdraw to the isthmus where each could act in mutual defense.

Salamis

On the arrival of the Persian fleet, the Greek fleet was in a state of turmoil. Since their arrival at Salamis, the fleet commanders debated whether to stay or retreat to the isthmus near Corinth. Numerous councils of war among the commanders were held in the days prior to the battle. Under pressure from the Peloponnesians, Eurybiades finally agreed to retreat. This decision was strongly opposed by the Athenians, Aeginetans, and Megarians. Athens was already destroyed. If the fleet withdrew, Aegina and Megara would be abandoned to

Persian depredations and their populations would suffer the fate of the Athenians. In another war council Themistocles threatened to sail away with the Athenian ships and refugees and leave the Peloponnesians to their fate. His hand forced, Eurybiades agreed that the fleet would stay and fight.

Map 3—The Battle of Salamis



Map 3 – The battle of Salamis (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Maps_of_the_Battle_of_Salamis).

During the evening of September 28/29, Themistocles initiated a final gambit to prevent a Greek withdrawal.¹³⁵ Realizing the decision would not be palatable to the Peloponnesians, Herodotus reports that Themistocles left one meeting to send a messenger named Sicinnus to the Persian fleet to warn their admirals and Xerxes of the Greek retreat. Themistocles acted on his own cunning and initiative to force the Greeks to fight at Salamis.¹³⁶ Sicinnus told the Persian commanders that he represented Themistocles, who was a friend to Persia. He reported that there was disunity among the Greeks and that they were ready to retreat. To prevent their escape, the Persians should deploy a force to block the Greek retreat. Why would the Persian commanders accept the word of a Greek informant? The answer is not recorded. Perhaps Sicinnus's story confirmed what they heard from other informants. The Persians ignored the warning of a Greek informant prior to the Greek retreat after Artemisium (Hdt.VIII.23). Or they feared that the Greeks would flee to the isthmus near Corinth to fight another day. Whatever their reasons, now forewarned, the Persians ordered the Egyptian contingent of two hundred ships to sail around the east coast of Salamis to block their

escape through the straits near Megara.¹³⁷ This contingent sailed after dark expecting to arrive in position by dawn the next day. Simultaneously the main fleet was also ordered to sea to block the eastward flight of the Greeks. The Persians landed four hundred soldiers on the island of Psyttalia (modern Ayios Yeoryios), which guarded the entrance to the straits between Salamis and the mainland. Their objective was to kill those Greek survivors who would swim ashore from the naval battle. Throughout the night, the main Persian fleet blocked the Greek escape eastward through the strait between Cape Cynosoura on Salamis and the Attic coast. While the Persian sailors were on alert, the Greek sailors slept. Not till dawn would they launch their ships.

During the evening Aristides arrived from Aegina to inform Themistocles of the Persian ships that sailed by the island. Themistocles had Aristides give his report in another council meeting. Disbelieving Aristides report, the Peloponnesian still argued for withdrawal. The arrival of a Tenean trireme, commanded by Panaetius, that deserted from the Persian fleet confirmed Aristides's report. Aware that there was no longer time to withdraw, the Greeks prepared to fight (Hdt.VIII.74–82; Plut. *Them.*11–12).

Herodotus emphasizes Corinthian opposition to the strategy of Themistocles to fight at Salamis but does mention that the Corinthians disputed this claim. It is doubtful that Corinthian hostility toward Themistocles was as severe as portrayed. In the 460s when Herodotus was relating his history to the Athenians, Corinth and Athens were bitter enemies in the First Peloponnesian War. However, in the twenty years prior to the Persian wars, Corinth and Athens had friendly relations. Corinth supported Athens in the war with Aegina and lent twenty ships to Athens. The debate between Athens and Corinth over strategy might have been an honest difference of opinion. Themistocles's strategy proved correct, and he achieved high honors after Xerxes's defeat. Had the Persians been victorious, the Peloponnese was exposed to seaborne landings by the Persian fleet. We can accept Herodotus's basic story, but Corinthian hostility might not have been as severe as implied. All allies fought valiantly at Salamis.

By dawn of September 29 (nineteenth of Boedromion), the antagonists were positioning themselves under the observant eyes of Xerxes.¹³⁸ If the Greeks had 380 triremes fully manned, then there were 76,000 men.¹³⁹ The Persians probably had a minimum of 150,000 men engaged in battle. Phoenician ships had 230 men, which included rowers, archers, infantrymen, and other seamen.¹⁴⁰ Out of Xerxes's view, the Egyptians had blocked the channel near Megara. The Greeks placed seventy ships, led by the Corinthians, in their rear to

check the arrival of the Egyptians if they approached through the Bay of Eleusis. As Xerxes sat on his golden throne, erected near the Heracleum in Attica, he watched the fleet's approach. Unable to see the Greek fleet, the Persians entered the channel led by the Phoenicians. The remaining 310 Greek ships were positioned from west to east in a battle line at least two miles wide. The Athenians were positioned on the west (left) wing opposite the Phoenicians. The Peloponnesians were opposed by the Ionians on the east (right) wing with the Aeginetans on the far right. Other Persian nationalities occupied the center.

Sailing into the channel past Cape Cynosoura, the Persians approached the Greeks. The Greeks advanced in their columns. Then they backed water with their prows facing the enemy to draw the Persians in closer. Like Artemisium, this confinement limited the maneuverability of the Persian ships. The Greek tactics were to ram the compressed Persian vessels. Both fleets were stationed between the island of Psyttalia and the coast of Attica. The front line of the Phoenicians might have consisted of some ninety ships abreast. As the Persians approached, the Athenians and Aeginetans on the wings moved forward to begin ramming. With oars sheared, hulls punctured, and wreckage floating, the Persians in front were wedged between the Greeks and the oncoming vessels in their rear. The swells, rising in the channel from the east, raised the taller hulls of the Persians higher in the water, which exposed them even more to ramming. In time the Phoenician ships retreated. However, their best ships and crews were lost. Realizing that the Egyptian contingent was not coming, the seventy Greek ships, assigned to protect the rear, joined the battle to add to the carnage. The battle raged all day as ships advanced or retreated on both sides (Hdt.VIII.84–96; Plut.*Them.*13–15; Aeschylus.*Persians*.353–433).

The Persians on Psyttalia were trapped between the Greek fleet and Greek hoplites on the island of Salamis. Crossing the narrow channel to Psyttalia at some point in the day, the Athenian hoplites, led by their general Aristides, attacked the Persians and slaughtered them (Hdt.VIII.95; Plut.*Arist.*9; Aeschylus.*Persians*.447–465). By land and sea, when evening arrived, the promise of a morning victory succumbed to an evening defeat. Xerxes refused to renew the battle the next day. Casualties for the belligerents are uncertain. No figure is recorded.¹⁴¹ The Persians suffered heavily. Many men drowned because they could not swim. Some were killed in the water and others when attempting to reach land. Aeschylus describes the carnage after the Persians began to flee:

Our vessels heeled

Over; the sea was hidden, carpeted with wrecks
And dead men; all the shores and reefs were full of
dead.

Then every ship we had broke rank and rowed for
life.

The Hellenes seized fragments of wrecks and
broken oars

And hacked and stabbed at our men swimming in
the sea

As fishermen kill tunnies or some netted haul.

The whole sea was one din of shrieks and dying
groans,

Till night and darkness hid the scenes.¹⁴²
(Aeschylus.*Persians*.420–429)

After the battle, an attempt might have been made to entice the Greeks away from Salamis, but it failed. The Phoenician contingent sailed home shortly after the battle. Xerxes remained in Attica for a few days (Hdt.VIII.113). The army might have been employed building a mole to Salamis to attack the Greeks with the army. For whatever reason, the attempt was discontinued (Hdt.VIII.97). Since it was late in the campaigning season, Xerxes's advisors urged his return to Asia. Whatever the rationale, Xerxes agreed. Themistocles urged a Greek attack on the Hellespont to destroy the Persian bridges. Eurybiades refused. Themistocles then urged that the Athenian contingent to sail alone, but Aristides claimed it was unwise (Hdt.VIII.108–109; Plut.*Them*.16; Plut.*Arist*.9.3–4). Whatever its merits, the Greeks did not sail north. Perhaps the presence of the Persian army, the still sizable Persian fleet, and the damage sustained to the Greek fleet prevented the attempt. The story is told by Herodotus and seconded by Thucydides that Themistocles sent a messenger to the Persians informing them that the Greek fleet would not pursue them and that Themistocles was responsible for the decision. Themistocles was performing a favor for Xerxes (Hdt.VIII.110; Thuc.I.137.4). After his banishment from Athens, Themistocles used this favor as a bargaining chip with Artaxerxes I when he was seeking asylum in the 460s.

In early October Xerxes retreated with the fleet and the army to Thessaly. The best contingents of the army would remain in Thessaly under the command of Mardonius. The balance of the army, commanded by Artabazus, and fleet retreated with Xerxes. Forty-five days later Xerxes reached the Hellespont. Upon his arrival, the bridges across the Hellespont had been destroyed by a storm. The army was transported to Asia by the fleet and marched to Sardis. Although Herodotus and Aeschylus claimed that the march eastward was filled with hardship due to hunger, thirst, and disease, this claim is dubious.

The supply depots were still in existence. The natives of Macedonia and Thrace remained peaceful as the army marched. After Xerxes had returned safely to Asia, Artabazus led his soldiers back to rejoin Mardonius (Hdt.VIII.115–117; Aeschylus.*Persians*.480–514). The Greek fleet pursued the Persians to the island of Andros. Failing to sight the enemy, Eurybiades called off the chase. The Greeks besieged the island of Andros but failed to capture it. On the return voyage, they sacked Carystus on the island of Euboea for medizing. Then the fleet returned to Salamis. The campaigning season was now over.

Though victorious at Salamis, the Hellenes were not masters of the sea. The Persian navy, though probably demoralized, was still formidable. Through its control of the Greek islands, Persia was still master of the Aegean. The Greeks had no safe harbor in these islands to station their fleet. The Persian fleet could return once rebuilt. The Greeks expected to fight at sea again.

Once the fleet returned to Salamis, it was time to honor the gods and reward those Hellenes who displayed great valor and leadership. The Delphic oracle to the Athenians proved correct:

Yet Zeus the all-seeing grants to Athena's prayer
That the wooden wall only shall not fall, but help you
and your children.

But await not the host of horse and foot coming from
Asia,

Nor, be still, but turn your back and withdraw from
the foe.

Truly a day will come when you will meet him face to
face.

Divine Salamis, you will bring death to women's
sons

When the corn is scattered, or the harvest gathered
in. (Hdt.VII.141)¹⁴³

Three Phoenician triremes were dedicated to the gods—Poseidon on the isthmus, Athena at Sunium, and Ajax on Salamis. Delphian Apollo received a bronze statue of a man holding a ship. The Aeginetans were awarded the first prize for valor (Hdt.VIII.93). They dedicated a bronze mast with three gold stars at Delphi. The Athenians won the second prize. Persian booty from Salamis was dedicated at Delphi (Hdt.VIII.82; VIII.121–124). The Spartans awarded Themistocles a chariot for his leadership, and Eurybiades received an olive crown. Neither man would be selected for command positions in 479. Themistocles would continue to play a prominent role in Athenian politics in the 470s. Whatever Eurybiades's fate, we are told no more from the sources.

The Impact of Salamis

Although victorious, it was not immediately obvious to the Hellenes that Salamis was a decisive victory or the turning point in the war. Herodotus, Aeschylus, nor any other contemporary source, provides a casualty list for Salamis for either combatant fleet. Diodorus tells us that the Greeks lost forty ships and the Persians two hundred ships (Diod.XI.19.3). Whether these figures are accurate or not, they are plausible. Without hard numbers to evaluate, through battle and storms the Persian fleet probably lost a third of its ships and their crews. The executions of some fleet officers probably left a leadership gap that could not be easily replaced. The destruction suffered by the Phoenician contingent would take time to replace. They were the core and elite of the Persian fleet. The demoralization of the rest of the fleet probably rendered it useless since no offensive campaign was launched in 479. We know little about the activities of the Persian fleet until its destruction at Mycale by the Greeks.

Despite the Greek victory, the Persians were still masters on land north of the isthmus. The Greeks from Boeotia northward had medized. The Persian army was not defeated. Persian cavalry and infantry were excellent fighting forces. The army outnumbered the Greeks. With contingents from Macedonia, Thrace, and the medized Greeks, Mardonius had well over fifty thousand infantry and cavalry to renew the offensive in the spring. Provisions were adequate. One part of the Persian hammer was damaged, but the other end could still strike with incredible force. The Greek anvil of freedom would have to absorb another hard blow before it could claim that it was the immovable object.

Few military events in human history are transformative. The military victory of the Hellenes at Salamis is one of them. It reminds one of the American naval victory at Midway in the Second World War.¹⁴⁴ Before Salamis, the Hellenes were never victorious against Xerxes. After Salamis, they were never defeated. Persia could afford to lose the war. The Hellenes could not. For Persia, failure to conquer Hellas would not threaten the Persian Empire. For Hellas, failure meant conquest. Victory at Salamis allowed the Greeks to fight another day. Themistocles's strategy ensured the place of battle. However, the courage of all the Greek allies earned the victory. History has assigned the Athenians the lion's share of credit for the victory. However, without the other Greeks, victory would not have happened. Salamis is a reward for the Hellenic unity displayed in an hour of peril. The Persians would not renew the naval offensive in 479. Persian victory would now rest on the shoulders of the army. For the Athenians, Salamis indicated their power would rest with the hulls of the fleet and mastery of the sea. The sea would become the base of

Athenian power and prosperity. Democracy, the fleet, and eventually empire would go hand in hand. However, before the Athenians could build their future empire, the army of Mardonius needed to be eliminated. How did the Athenians and Spartans lead the Hellenes to victory in 479?

Spring Preparations

After Xerxes's safe return to Asia, Artabazus retraced his steps across Thrace and Macedonia to connect with Mardonius in Thessaly. Xerxes's withdrawal did not lead to a revolt by the subjugated people of the Balkan region. Only the *polis* of Potidaea on the Pallene peninsula in the Chalcidice region revolted. It withstood a three-month siege. With spring approaching, Artabazus lifted the siege and joined Mardonius (Hdt.VIII.125–129).

In the spring the Persian fleet of three hundred triremes mustered at Samos but made no offensive move. Based at Samos, they could attack Ionia if it revolted or meet the Greek fleet if it came eastward. The Peloponnesian contingent of 110 ships assembled at Aegina. It was commanded by the Spartan king Leotychidas. Some Chians arrived at Sparta urging the Greeks to sail east to encourage a rebellion in Ionia. These envoys were sent to Leotychidas to plead their case. Intrigued but not willing to commit, Leotychidas took the Peloponnesians to Delos but no farther. Unsure of the size or location of the Persian fleet, Leotychidas remained cautious (Hdt.VIII.130–135). Without the Athenians, the Peloponnesians would not go on the offensive. Consequently, neither fleet was willing to engage the other.

After wintering in Thessaly, Mardonius made preparations to move south. Before he marched, Mardonius sent King Alexander I of Macedon to Athens to encourage them to defect from the Hellenic League. The addition of the Athenian fleet to Persia would minimize the Greek naval threat to the Persian army. It would also reduce the Hellenic alliance to the Peloponnesian *poleis*. The land war would then be confined to the Greek defense of the Peloponnese. Command of the sea would allow Mardonius to attack through the isthmus or launch an amphibious assault on the Peloponnese. An Athenian defection would encourage other states to medize. Perhaps even Sparta would submit without a fight.

In March the Athenians elected new generals, probably from their refuge on Salamis. The new board of *strategoí* included Aristides, who would lead the hoplite force at Plataea, and Xanthippus, who commanded the Athenian fleet at Mycale. Themistocles was not reelected. We do not know why. Diodorus says the Athenians were resentful that Themistocles accepted gifts from Sparta (Diod.XI.27.3).

If true, perhaps there was Athenian resentment that Sparta did not do enough to prevent the sack of Athens. There is no information that Themistocles even served as a private soldier in 479 (Hdt.VIII.131; Plut.*Arist.*11).

Diplomatic Overtures

When Alexander I arrived sometime in early spring, he relayed the terms of Mardonius. If the Athenians submitted, the Persians would help them rebuild their city, expand their territory within Hellas, and grant them autonomy to live by their own laws. Alexander gave his personal opinion that Persia was too strong to be defeated and Attica would suffer further destruction as a battleground. Herodotus states that Spartan envoys were present to hear Alexander's words. The Athenians used Alexander's mission as a bargaining chip to leverage the Spartans to leave their fortifications on the isthmus to defend Attica. Sparta feared that Athens might defect. The Athenian reply to Alexander was that they valued freedom rather than submission. They would continue the fight (Hdt.VIII.136; VIII.140–144; Plut.*Arist.*10).

Up to this point, the Athenians had kept their fleet in home waters near Salamis and the Piraeus. It is probable that some Athenians had returned to Attica after Xerxes's withdrawal to view the destruction and begin to rebuild. Farmers probably wanted to plant new crops. It was not guaranteed that Mardonius would return to Attica. If the Hellenic army marched north, Attica might not be ravaged again. Thus, the fleet remained nearby to protect the refugees as well as those who returned home. If the Persians returned, the fleet could assist another evacuation.

Unable to destroy the Hellenic alliance through diplomacy, Mardonius marched south from Thessaly. By the end of June he reoccupied Athens in preparation to attack the isthmus. The army was dispatched throughout Attica to observe the Greeks and prepare to enter the isthmus. Again the Athenians fled before the Persians arrived. Mardonius sent a second embassy to Salamis to urge Athenian surrender. Again they refused (Hdt.IX.1–5). This may not have been a hopeless venture. The failure of the Peloponnesian army to leave the isthmus to defend Attica probably angered many Athenians, especially those who had returned and now had to flee a second time.

The Athenians sent envoys to Sparta, led by the *strategoi* Xanthippus and Myronides, to stress the urgency of the situation and threaten to abandon the Greeks if the Peloponnesians refused to leave the isthmus. Megara and other states in the Persian path probably had envoys at Sparta urging them to come to their defense. As we continue

to encounter in the Persian wars, the Spartans were celebrating another religious festival. This was the Hyacinthia, which honored Hyacinthus, the Dorian god of Amyclae. The Spartan ephors delayed their reply to the Athenian request to march for ten days. Meanwhile, the Athenian delegation was reinforced with the arrival of Aristides to add pressure to the Spartans. Angered, the Athenians returned a last time and threatened to leave and ally with Persia. The envoys were informed by the ephors that the Spartan army was on the march and had left before dawn. Disbelieving the ephors, the Athenians were eventually convinced. When the Athenian envoys left, they were accompanied by five thousand Lacedaemonian perioeci. The Spartan army contained five thousand Spartiates and thirty-five thousand light-armed helots. It was commanded by Pausanias, the cousin and regent for Leonidas's young son, Pleistarchus. Cleombrotus, the brother of Leonidas, who commanded the Spartans in the fall, had died. Euryanax was chosen as a colleague, but we are not told what role he performed (Hdt.IX.6–11; Plut.*Arist.*10).

Herodotus says the Spartans were moved to march by Chileus, an Arcadian from Tegea. This is dubious. Tegea was a major ally of Sparta, and Arcadian opinion was important. However, as an ally, Athens was more important than Tegea. It is also claimed that the Spartans waited until the fortifications on the isthmus were completed. This too is doubtful. For a year the fortifications were built. They must have been complete by now. Spartan piety played a role in the delay. The Spartans always obeyed the gods. The main reason for the Spartan delay was to keep their preparations secret. The Spartans wanted to prevent Argos from stirring up trouble in the Peloponnese and warn the Persians of the army's departure. The ephors were sending the bulk of the army to confront Mardonius. The remaining three thousand Spartiates were older and the home guard to defend Laconia.

Road to Plataea

At some point prior to the Spartan decision to march, the Persians invaded the Megarid in an attempt to bring the Peloponnesians out from their fortifications. The Peloponnesians did not take the bait (Hdt.IX.14). Thus, the Persian army ravaged the land and approached Megara. It refused to surrender. The Persian fleet was not present to protect the army from an amphibious assault by the Greek fleet. Therefore, Mardonius advanced no further and returned to Attica.

Warned by an Argive that the Greek army was marching, Mardonius retreated from Attica to Boeotia. The Boeotian plains were

more suitable for the use of his cavalry. Mardonius retreated to the vicinity of Thebes. Thebes would be his base of operations. Positioning his forces north of the Asopus River and south of Thebes, his scouts could observe all the passes that the Greeks might take as they marched into Boeotia. Here a stockade was built encompassing two square kilometers to contain the entire army. This position also provided adequate food and water for the men and horses (Hdt.IX.15).

Herodotus claims that Mardonius army had three hundred thousand combat troops from Asia and fifty thousand Greeks. Diodorus states two hundred thousand troops for Mardonius (Hdt.VIII.113; IX.32; Diod.XI.28.3–4). Since Herodotus does not quantify the individual contingents for Mardonius's army, multiple figures have been suggested. The size of the stockade would allow for an army of fifty thousand to seventy thousand men, including the cavalry.¹⁴⁵ It is probable that the stockade would not contain all the troops. It is doubtful that the Persians were at a numerical disadvantage to the Greeks. An army of seventy thousand soldiers could be supplied but probably with some difficulty as Herodotus implies.

Prior to the leaving isthmus, the Regent Pausanias made the traditional sacrifices to the gods. Receiving favorable omens, he marched north. Marching through the Peloponnese and isthmus, Pausanias gathered the troops of the Hellenic League. At Eleusis, he was joined by eight thousand Athenian hoplites commanded by Aristides that had been brought over from Salamis. After Aristides joined Pausanias, the Athenian fleet sailed to Delos to join the Peloponnesians. Additional troops would join as they marched into Boeotia. Marching into Boeotia over the pass of Mount Cithaeron, Pausanias brought the Greeks up to the south bank of the Asopus River. They camped on the foothills of Mount Cithaeron overlooking the Persian position. This rugged terrain protected the army from the Persian cavalry (Hdt.IX.19; Plut.*Arist.*11.1–2). The united Hellenic army of 110,000 men comprised 38,700 hoplites and 71,300 light-armed troops (Hdt.IX.28–30). As agreed by the Hellenic League council, the Spartan general commanded the entire army. Thus, Pausanias decided the course of battle. The Spartan contingent with five thousand Spartiates, five thousand perioeci, and 35,000 helots was the largest in the army. The Athenian contingent was the second largest. Since many light-armed troops were probably assigned to guard the supply route from Megara, the Greek army may not have had a numerical superiority against the Persians.

Although these Greek forces were considerable, there was disunity among the Greeks. Persian diplomacy, the Persian reoccupation of Attica, the unwillingness of the Peloponnesians to

leave the isthmus, and different tactical and strategic objectives among the allies were a few of the issues dividing the Greeks. To create a unity of purpose within the army, an oath was sworn by all the contingents that pledged their devotion to the Greek cause. The Greeks promised to value freedom above one's life, not to abandon each other in battle, punish Thebes, and forever protect Sparta, Athens, and Plataea. The inscription of the "Oath of Plataea" was discovered on a mid-fourth century BC marble stela from Acharnae in Attica. Its terms were supplemented in the literary evidence by Diodorus and the Athenian orator, Lycurgus (Diod.XI.29.3; Lyc.*Leocr.*81). The oath reads as follows:

I shall fight while I live, and I shall not put life before being free, and I shall not desert the taxiarch nor the enomotarch, neither while they live nor when they are dead, and I shall not depart unless the leaders lead the way, and I shall do whatever the generals command, and I shall bury in the same place the dead of those who were allied, and I shall leave no one unburied.

And when I have been victorious fighting against the barbarians, I shall (totally destroy and) dedicate a tenth of the city of the Thebans, and I shall not raise Athens or Sparta or Plataea or any of the other cities that were allied, and I shall not overlook those who are oppressed by hunger and I shall not keep them from running water, whether they are friends or enemies.

And if I keep true to what has been written in the oath may my city be free from sickness, if not, may it be sick; and may my city be unravaged, but if not may it be ravaged; and my (land) bear, but if not, may it be barren; and may the women bear children like their parents, but if not, monsters; and may the animals bear young like the animals, but if not, monsters. (R&O 88)¹⁴⁶

What the exact wording of the oath was in the fifth century is unknown. Historians still debate whether this inscription accurately reflects a fifth-century oath. When this oath was issued is subject to debate. However, on the eve of battle at Plataea, when most of the army was assembled, seems reasonable.¹⁴⁷ The oath demonstrates that questions remained about Greek unity. However, in the different engagements around Plataea, all Greek contingents fought well.

Prior to the Greek army leaving the isthmus, Aristides sent a messenger to Delphi enquiring when the Greeks should fight the

Persians. The Athenians wanted to engage the Persians in Attica. The response from Delphi was that the Greeks should engage the Persians near Eleusis in Attica. A problem was created. By the time Aristides received this response, the Greeks were already opposite Mardonius in Boeotia. How could Greek strategy be reconciled with divine guidance? To solve the dilemma, Arimnestus, a Plataean general, claimed that there was sacred temple similar to Eleusinian Demeter and Core near Plataea. Consequently, the Plataeans removed the boundary stones with Attica. The land was now part of Attica. Therefore, in compliance with the oracle, the Greeks would now fight on Attic soil (Plut.*Arist.* 11). Problem solved!

If this episode is true, we may find this solution strange. However, let us not minimize its significance. Just as humans today appeal for divine guidance at critical times, the Greeks were extremely nervous to take actions that violated divine advice. Army morale would be weakened if the soldiers knew they were fighting where the gods disapproved. Successful human actions must correspond with the divine order in nature. This reconciliation of divine guidance with military strategy boosted Greek confidence in victory. What was that strategy?

Plataea – Preliminary Moves

Intending to fight to their strength, Pausanias wanted a hoplite battle while Mardonius trusted a cavalry engagement. The north bank of the Asopus River was conducive to cavalry maneuvers. The rugged terrain south of the river was conducive to infantry movements. Thus, the original position Pausanias chose for the army was along the low hills of Mount Cithaeron. Each army wanted the other to take the offensive.

There would be multiple engagements before the decisive battle occurred. The date of the battle at Plataea has never been satisfactorily determined. The ancient sources give different dates, which modern scholars have not been able to reconcile.¹⁴⁸ The best guess is that sometime in late August or September 479 the Greeks emerged victorious.

After the arrival of the Hellenic army, both armies observed each other. Each unwilling to leave their positions. The time frame is uncertain when Mardonius initiated the action with a cavalry assault against the Greeks. Probably within a couple of days of the Greek arrival, Mardonius ordered Masistius, his cavalry commander, to probe the Greek line. Whether this was meant to be a minor raid or a reconnaissance in force cannot be determined. The assault escalated

into a major engagement. At dawn Masistius attacked the Greeks. He focused on the three thousand Megarians who were more exposed to the archery of the cavalry. The Megarians requested aid. Pausanias ordered the Athenians to aid the Megarians. A select force of three hundred men, probably light-armed archers, came to the rescue. These men countered the Persian horse archers. During the engagement, Masistius's horse was killed and he was thrown to the ground. The weight of his armor prevented him from getting up. He was killed when a Greek pierced his eye with his spear. A battle ensued over the body, and the Persians were unable to recover. Eventually the Persian cavalry withdrew from the battlefield. The Persians lamented Masistius while the Greeks paraded his dead body before their lines to raise their morale (Hdt.IX.20–25; Plut.*Arist.*14). Although this engagement did not alter the strategic situation, both sides became more cautious and refused to fight without favorable conditions.

A day or two later, this stalemate was altered when Pausanias decided to shift the army westwards from Erythrae toward Plataea via Hysiae to improve the logistical position for the Greeks. Marching along the lower hills of Cithaeron, the army came to rest closer to the plain near the Asopus River in the territory of Plataea. The Hellenic camp was positioned between the spring of Gargaphia on the Greek right wing, where the Spartans were stationed, and the Asopus River, where the Athenians were assigned the left wing. The men of Tegea, Sparta's oldest ally, were next to the Lacedaemonians. The Plataeans, Athens loyal ally, were next to the Athenians. The remaining allies were assigned the center of the line (Hdt.IX.28–30). From this position the Greeks had an adequate water supply. However, the Greek supply lines, which stretched from Megara across the passes of Mount Cithaeron, were more exposed to enemy raids. The supply lines were protected by the light-armed troops.

Despite this shift in position, both sides continued to watch and wait for the other to make a move. Citing unfavorable omens from the gods neither side moved (Hdt.IX.36–38). During this period of calm, Plutarch claims that among the Athenians, a conspiracy developed to overthrow the democracy. Learning of the plot, Aristides arrested eight conspirators. Rather than try them, two conspirators fled the camp while the others were released (Plut.*Arist.*13). Whether the conspiracy was real or idle talk, the lack of punishment suggests that there was a morale issue among the Athenians if not also among the other allies.

After eight days of idleness, Mardonius decided to act. To weaken the Greek position, he ordered his cavalry to attack their supply lines. At night the Persians intercepted a supply convoy of five hundred carts. The guards, teamsters, and animals were killed. The captured

supplies were taken to the Persian camp (Hdt.IX.39). Pausanias probably reinforced the passes with more light-armed men. For reasons unknown, the Persians did not follow up on this raid.

Plataea – The Main Battle

For the next three days the Persian launched cavalry assaults along the Asopus River to tempt the Greeks to attack. None of these sorties led to a major engagement. Frustrated, Mardonius called a conference of his commanders. Artabazus and the Thebans advised Mardonius to retreat within the confines of Thebes where there were adequate supplies for the army and horses. Rather than fight, Mardonius should use Persian gold to sow the seeds of disunity among the Greeks. With patience and money, Greek unity will cease. Mardonius rejected the advice claiming that the Persian army was stronger. Perhaps he feared getting weaker while the Greeks grew stronger. He might have promised Xerxes a military victory in this campaign. He ordered his commanders to prepare for battle the next day despite unfavorable omens (Hdt.IX.41–43).¹⁴⁹ If Artabazus advice was sound, the Persians had supply problems. Whether it was logistics problems, army morale, Greek strategy, the lateness of the season, impatience, or other reasons, Mardonius wanted a victory in battle. Mardonius believed he had the means to achieve it. Victory at Plataea would remove the stain of defeat at Salamis. It is reasonable to believe that Mardonius wanted glory or death before he returned home.

That night after dark, Alexander I appeared before the Athenian lines and asked to speak to Aristides. He warned of the impending Persian attack. He advised them not to retreat since Persian supplies were low, which would force the Persians to withdraw. If the Greeks were victorious, he expected a generous reward (Hdt.IX.44–46; Plut.*Arist.*15). Was Alexander warning the Greeks on his own initiative? Was Alexander sent by Mardonius to sow dissension among the Greek commanders? Was Alexander playing a double game by hedging his bet on the victor? We cannot be sure. Alexander had been a loyal ally of Persia. Alexander's kingdom had prospered under Persian rule, and its territory was expanded. Like his father, he medized fifteen years earlier. Understanding Persian strength and resources, Alexander probably bet on a Persian victory and followed the instructions of Mardonius when he approached the Athenians.

It is likely that Mardonius sent him on this mission to keep the Greeks in place for his attack. Mardonius knew the placement of the Greek army. His battle plans were set accordingly. He would place his troops to take advantage of the Greek dispositions. He probably had concerns that his troop movements would encourage the Greeks to

withdraw to the hills to avoid his cavalry. Alexander's warning about Persian troop movements could be interpreted by the Greeks as a withdrawal. To people who have studied the battle in detail there still remain more questions than answers.

Whatever the purpose of Alexander's mission, it contributed to the fog of war for the Greek commanders. The Athenians reported Alexander's message to Pausanias. For an unknown reason, Pausanias ordered the Athenians to exchange positions with the Spartans. This order was then countermanded when the Persians were observed changing their troop dispositions. Thus, the Athenians remained on the left wing and the Lacedaemonians on the right wing. Why Pausanias issued these orders is unclear.

When the battle began the Persians were opposite the Spartans, and the medized Greeks faced the Athenians. The Persians launched the attack with their horse archers. All this day the Greeks would hold their position but suffered from the arrows of the cavalry. The center might have suffered the worst. Sometime during the day, some Persians managed to contaminate the Gargaphian spring. The Greeks lost their main source for water. Holding their positions, the Greeks conducted a council of war. Unable to challenge the Persian cavalry, and running low on food and water, the commanders agreed to withdraw at nightfall. They would march west toward Plataea to improve their water supply. For the rest of the day, the Greeks withstood the assaults of the cavalry (Hdt.IX.47–51; Plut.*Arist.*16).

After dark the Greeks marched west. The center left first. It contained the smaller contingents of the army under multiple commanders. During the march, they lost their way. In disorder, these contingents arrived piecemeal before the walls of Plataea. Near the temple of Hera, they camped at random to wait for their compatriots. In the morning the Athenians and Spartans were still in their original locations. Herodotus states that the Spartans did not move because of the insubordination of the Spartan regimental commander Amompharetus, who refused to withdraw from the battlefield claiming that the withdrawal was an act of cowardice. Since the Spartans did not move, the Athenians held their position until the Spartans retreated. This account by Herodotus is highly suspicious. Spartan discipline would not allow a regiment commander to refuse the order of the army commander. Since the Spartans were indoctrinated to respect authority, this disobedience would have violated their concept of *peitharchia* (obedience to authority).

A more realistic explanation for the failure of the Spartan withdrawal relies on the awareness by Pausanias of the disorganization of the center of the army. The center was the weak link in the chain. Therefore, he would combine his two wings to oppose the

Persians the next day. Unwilling to be caught on open ground at daybreak, Pausanias probably ordered the Athenians to close ranks with Spartans. When the Spartans began the withdrawal, the Athenians did the same. The Spartans marched along rough terrain while the Athenians were marching in the plain along the Asopus River. The contingent of Amompharetus acted as a rear guard. This retreat was by design to lure the Persians forward thinking the Greeks were in disarray.

Seeing the separation of the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, Mardonius launched the cavalry against the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans. The cavalry, followed by the Persian infantry, crossed the Asopus River to destroy the Spartan wing. The heavy assault by the Persians induced Pausanias to request the Athenians to alter their march and come to his aid. Marching to aid the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians were blocked by the cavalry and infantry of the medizing Greeks. The Macedonians, Thessalians, and Boeotians probably were the opposition. The Athenians went on the defensive. The Lacedaemonians faced the elite troops of the Persian army, the Persians and Medes. This engagement now became a hoplite battle. The eight thousand Athenians and 11,500 Lacedaemonians and Tegeans confronted the bulk of the Persian army. The battle became a slugfest and was an unusually long engagement.¹⁵⁰ As the battle raged, the Greek center arrived from Plataea to aid the Athenians. Eventually the Spartans got the better of the Persians. Mardonius was killed. His head crushed by a rock from a Spartan. The Persians now retreated to the stockade for defense. Pausanias's forces pursued and overran the stockade. The Persians were slaughtered. The Athenians pursued the Thebans to the walls of Thebes. Returning to the battlefield, the Athenians struggled with the remaining Persian forces. The forces of Artabazus, which were held back as the Persian reserve, never engaged in the fight. Why? We are not told. They retreated and headed for the Hellespont. They were pursued by contingents of the Greek center. The victory was complete (Hdt.IX.53–70; Plut.*Arist.*17–19).

Casualties for both sides are difficult to determine. Herodotus claims that the Persian army was annihilated except for the forty thousand troops that escaped with Artabazus and three thousand battlefield survivors. This would mean over two hundred thousand dead! The Spartans suffered ninety-one dead, the Athenians fifty-two, and the Tegeans seventeen (Hdt.IX.70). Plutarch states Greek casualties at 1,360 men (Plut.*Arist.*19.4). These would be hoplites only. Diodorus reports the Greeks casualties exceeded ten thousand (Diod.XI.33.1). There is no mention of light-armed troops by any source. Nor is their mention of casualties from the preliminary

engagements of both sides. Actual Persian numbers are unknown. However, if the Persian army had between fifty thousand and seventy thousand men, we subtract the forty thousand men that escaped with Artabazus along with the three thousand survivors, the Persian casualties probably exceeded ten thousand. This figure is reasonable but still a guess!¹⁵¹

After the battle Pausanias refused to punish the Persian survivors. Camp followers were left unharmed. Mardonius's body was not mutilated in retaliation for Leonidas at Thermopylae (Hdt.IX.78–79). Mardonius's body disappeared. Who took it or where it was buried was never discovered. The Greeks were forbidden to loot the Persian camp. The helots were ordered to gather all the booty from the camp as well as the dead. Part of the booty was dedicated to Apollo at Delphi, Zeus at Olympia, and Poseidon at the isthmus. The tripod, dedicated at Delphi, contained the list of the thirty-one *poleis* that fought at Plataea. Another part was distributed to the soldiers. A tenth of all booty was assigned to Pausanias. Awards were granted to individuals who demonstrated great valor. The Plataeans were given eighty talents, and they rebuilt their temple to Athena. The Spartans buried their dead in three tombs. One tomb was for those Spartiates between the age of twenty and thirty. These men were always assigned to the front ranks of the phalanx. The second tomb was for the remainder of the Spartiates. The third tomb was for the helots. All the contingents of the army buried their dead in separate tombs (Hdt.IX.80–85; Plut.*Arist.*20.1–3).

For ten days the Hellenic army remained at Plataea. Artabazus was left to flee unhindered. During this period, contingents arrived from Mantinea and Elis. When these men returned home, the generals were banished by their cities because the citizens were ashamed by their late arrival (Hdt.IX.77). In a war council, the Greek commanders agreed to attack Thebes to demand the surrender of those leaders who medized, especially Timagenidas and Attaginus. This action was in compliance with the policy created by the political leaders of the Hellenic League to punish those Greeks who medized (Hdt.VII.132). On the eleventh day the army marched against Thebes. For nineteen days the Thebans withstood the siege. Then Timagenidas and others surrendered. Attaginus fled. A new government friendly to the Greeks was installed at Thebes and probably in other *poleis* of Boeotia that supported Thebes. It was now late September or early October. The campaign season was nearing an end. Thus, Pausanias led the army home and dismissed the contingents along the way. Rather than let the Theban prisoners stand trial before the Hellenic League, Pausanias ordered them executed at Corinth (Hdt.IX.86–88).

Mycale – The Finale

Allegedly fought in the afternoon of the same day as Plataea (Hdt.IX.100–101), this battle was a combined land and sea assault by the Greek fleet under the commands of King Leotychidas II of Sparta and Xanthippus of Athens. This engagement was fought near Miletus in Asia Minor. This was the final major battle in the war with Xerxes. The destruction of the Persian fleet and army in Asia eliminated the last immediate reserves that Xerxes could use to threaten Hellas. How did this campaign occur?

As mentioned earlier, King Leotychidas was approached by Chian envoys encouraging the Greek fleet to sail to Asia to stir up a revolt. Without the Athenian fleet, Leotychidas was unwilling to undertake this venture. By midsummer circumstances had changed. Arriving at Delos, three opponents of the Samian tyrant Theomaster pleaded for Greek aid to overthrow the tyrant. Hegistratus, Athenodorus, and Lampon argued that the Ionians were ready to revolt. They claimed that the Persian forces were demoralized, their fleet un-seaworthy; and the Samians prepared to revolt. Thus, the Greek fleet would encounter weak opposition upon their arrival. By this time the Athenian contingent, commanded by Xanthippus, had joined the fleet at Delos. Therefore, Leotychidas was more willing to intervene in Asia. Since Leotychidas received favorable omens from the gods, he ordered the fleet of 250 triremes to sail east (Hdt.IX.90–95; Diod.XI.34.2).

Upon the arrival of the Greek fleet at Samos, the Persian admirals withdrew their fleet to the mainland near Miletus. The fleet had probably been reduced to one hundred ships with the dismissal of the Phoenicians (Hdt.IX.96). If the Samians were restless, Persian morale was poor, and the fleet reduced in size; this retreat makes military sense. Since the fleet was smaller than the Greeks, it could not fight in open water. The retreat from Samos to the Mycale peninsula was only a couple of miles. Here the fleet would be supported by the army. Rather than fight at sea, the Persians beached their ships along the southern shore of the Mycale peninsula. They built a fence to protect the ships. The mariners joined the army, commanded by Tigranes. Despite Herodotus claim that the Persian forces were sixty thousand men, the Persians probably numbered about ten thousand soldiers and marines.¹⁵²

In a council of war, the Greeks probably debated whether to sail to the Hellespont to incite a revolt and block Mardonius's supply route to Asia, return to Delos to protect the mainland from a Persian naval attack, or attack the Persians in their encampment. If victorious, they would be masters of the sea and then encourage the Asiatic Greeks to revolt. Leotychidas and Xanthippus agreed to attack the Persians.

The Greek fleet approached the coast hoping to entice the

Persian fleet to put out to sea. Since the Persians refused, Leotychidas sailed near the shore urging the Ionians not to fight. In fear of treachery, the Persians disarmed the Samians and sent the Milesians to the rear. Allegedly learning of the victory at Plataea, the Greeks landed and attacked with enthusiasm. The Athenians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, and Troezenians made a direct attack along the beach against the Persian palisade. The Lacedaemonians marched through the hills to attack the Persian rear. The attack went according to plan. Believing that the Greeks were vulnerable, the Persians left their fortifications and attacked the Greeks on the beach. The attack failed. Forced to retreat to their stronghold, the Persians could not withstand the assault. The Greeks broke into the camp. The Persian admiral Mardontes and Tigranes were killed in the fighting. The Lacedaemonians arrived when the battle was almost over. Many Persian refugees were slain by the Milesians when they fled to the hills. Other Ionians in the Persian army also defected and killed Persians that came within their grasp (Hdt.IX.98–104). The victory was complete. The Persian army disintegrated. A few survivors did reach Sardis.

The Hellenes gathered the Persian booty. The fortifications were burnt. The Athenians were awarded the first prize for valor. They were followed by the Peloponnesians who were part of the beach assault. Returning to Samos, a council of war was conducted to determine the fate of the Ionians. The Peloponnesians urged that the Ionians abandon Asia. The Athenians supported the Ionians to retain their homes. The issue was left unresolved. The islands of Samos, Chios, and Lesbos were allowed to join the Hellenic alliance (Hdt.IX.107).

The Greeks sailed to the Hellespont to destroy the bridges to block the Persian retreat to Asia. Finding the bridges already destroyed by the weather, Leotychidas and the Peloponnesians sailed home. It was now late in the campaigning season. Xanthippus and the Athenians ships stayed to carry on the war and encourage the Greeks in the area to revolt. The Athenians besieged Sestus on the European side of the Hellespont. Late in the fall the Persians, suffering from starvation, escaped. The gates were open to the Athenians. The satrap Artayctes was caught and crucified by the Greeks (Hdt.IX.114–122). After gathering some remnants of the destroyed bridges, to be dedicated to the gods, the Athenians sailed home.

Xerxes's invasion was a failure. After two years of war, the Hellenic League emerged victorious. No formal peace would be negotiated. Unwilling to continue the war in Asia, Sparta and the Peloponnesians would abandon the war effort in 478. The Athenians would form the Delian League to carry the war to Persia. Future battles between Persia and Athens would be confined to Asia. Within a few

years, the Persian satrapy in the Balkans would be abandoned. The Macedonians and Thracians were left to develop their kingdoms. The Athenians established themselves as the masters of the Aegean. By mid-century, the Delian League would become the Athenian Empire. The age of Pericles had arrived.

Plataea's Significance

Plataea was the last battle to occur on the Hellenic mainland. Time would show that the Persians would never return. Defeated on land and sea, Xerxes never again tried to subjugate the Hellenes. No formal peace would occur in Xerxes's lifetime. The Athenians would continue the war without the Peloponnesians. The formation of the Delian League in 378, under Athenian leadership, was designed to liberate the islands and Ionian Greeks from Persian control. In 449 some type of peace (Peace of Callias?) occurred between Athens and Artaxerxes I. The Spartans would not fight the Persians again until the 390s, and this would be in Asia. Persia was unable to interfere in Hellenic affairs in any significant way until requested by Sparta and Athens in the last decade of the fifth century during the last phase of the Peloponnesian War.

Athenian and Spartan prestige grew. Spartan reputation as the supreme military power in Hellas was further enhanced. However, the Athenians were now given equal recognition in the Greek alliance. Despite the disunity among the members of the Hellenic League, the alliance remained strong enough to defy the centrifugal forces pulling it apart. Corinth, Aegina, Megara, Chalcis, and others fought with dignity. The Persian menace forced the Greeks to remain united to maintain their liberty. Unfortunately, this unity rested on a razor's edge. A year later, the Peloponnesians withdrew from the war. Athens carried the torch at the behest of the islanders and those Greeks located along the shore of the Aegean. On paper the Hellenic League was probably not officially dissolved until the 450s. Although Sparta and Athens were the leaders, the victory over Persia resulted because thirty-one members put aside their differences long enough to achieve a mutual end. These thirty-one members were less than 4 percent of the Hellenic world!¹⁵³

The debate still rages whether Greek leadership, strategy, or courage won the battle. Regardless, the battle was won. Plataea secured the course of Hellenic history and Western civilization. The classical age would not have arrived without a Greek victory. Plataea and Salamis secured Hellenic freedom from Persia. Sparta and Athens would be the dominant powers in Hellas during the fifth century. The classical age began. This heritage would pass to the Romans, the

Byzantines, the Renaissance Italians, northern Europe, and finally the new world of the western hemisphere. Western civilization with its concepts of freedom, autonomy, individuality, and self-government, practiced in politics, art, science, and philosophy would not have occurred as we know them. Decisions and actions taken long ago by a few Hellenic *poleis* impact us today!

The Persian War – Postmortem

Although it was not known at the time, these Greek victories were so decisive that Persia never again attempted an invasion of the Hellenic mainland. Athens and Sparta emerged with great prestige. Athens and Sparta were the leading *poleis* of Hellas. The thirty-one *poleis* of the Hellenic League took great pride in their miraculous achievement. The shrines of Hellas originally discouraged their struggle for freedom. Eventually, their oracles provided hope if correctly interpreted. With great celebration and piety, the Greeks honored the shrines at Delphi and Olympia for their victory. The other gods were not neglected, in particular Poseidon and Athena. Many temples became wealthier from the booty dedicated as thank offerings. The union of the *polis* with the gods was strengthened. Liberty, autonomy, and self-government were defended on the secular and sacred level. The union between the citizen, *polis*, and gods was enhanced. Commemoration festivals would be annually celebrated to honor the achievements of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea.

An epigram written by the poet Simonides to commemorate the Athenian achievement at Salamis can be applied to the achievement of the Hellenic League. It says,

The valour of these men shall beget glory for ever
undiminished,

So long as the gods allot reward for courage.

For on foot and on their swift-moving ships they kept

All Greece from seeing the dawn of slavery. (M&L

26)¹⁵⁴

Some islands, central Greece, and Attica suffered much destruction. Attica and Athens were twice ravaged. There was much death and destruction. Cities, villages, temples, farms, and businesses were devastated. Rebuilding Hellas would take time. However, that rebuilding did occur. Greater economic prosperity spread throughout the Greek world. Spartan and Athenian prestige was enhanced. Sparta was still acknowledged as the preeminent power in the Greek world. Although the city of Athens was destroyed, their triumph gave the Athenian people great hope for the future. The glorification of their

defense of Hellas stimulated Athenian politics, art, and literature for the next fifty years.

Herodotus considered Athens as the savior of Greece (Hdt.VII.139). We must remember that he was relating his history to an Athenian audience in the 450s when Athens was at war with Sparta and the Peloponnesians. We respectively disagree with his summation. Sparta provided the rallying point. Sparta was the acknowledged military power. Sparta had an anti-Persian policy before Xerxes's invasion. In conjunction with Athens, Sparta led the Hellenic League. Spartan leaders were the supreme commanders of the allies. At Salamis, the Athenians provided the bulk of the fleet. At Plataea, the Spartans provided the bulk of the army. The leadership provided by Themistocles, Aristides, Eurybiades, Leonidas, Pausanias, Leotychidas II, Xanthippus, and unrecorded others enabled Greek forces to be victorious. Both cities get an equal share as the leaders of the Hellenic League.

Few events in human history are transformative. The military victory of the Hellenes in the Persian War is one of them. The names of Marathon, Thermopylae, Salamis, and Plataea still resonate with significance today. Books are written about them. Movies are made. Games are invented to refight these battles. The human imagination is stimulated by these events. Their names symbolize freedom, independence, courage, self-government, and the fight of the underdog against overwhelming odds. The classical age of Hellas was the result. Athenian democracy and empire would arise. Hellenic culture would bloom under a bright new sun. Athens would become the School of Hellas. From the Black Sea to the Straits of Gibraltar, the Greeks would travel and spread new ideas. Greek economic prosperity would grow throughout the fifth and fourth century. From Hellas through Rome, Western civilization has derived its ideological heritage. All thanks to the thirty-one *poleis* that withstood the greatest empire then known.

Unfortunately, the political, economic, military, and cultural growth of Athens caused friction with Sparta and the Peloponnesians. Sparta abandoned the leadership baton against Persia. The Athenians picked up that baton. They united many *poleis* to defend Hellas against Persia. When Persia was no longer viewed as a threat, the Greeks came to resent the domination of Athens. Athens' allies became subjects. Their contributions became tribute. Voluntary acquiescence became mandatory. This resentment, by many Hellenes, would eventually be an underlying cause of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta. The story of the fifth century would be the rivalry between these two *poleis* and their division of the Hellenic world. How did the

two major allies against Xerxes turn into bitter enemies? How did this rivalry subjugate much of the Greek world to their ambitions?

We will pick up the story in chapter 7. Next we must tell the story of the conflict between the Greeks of Sicily and Carthage. We will then set the social and economic foundation for the classical Greeks. Then we can tell the story of the rivalry between Athens and Sparta.

116 (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988), 334–346. Ostwald provides a solid review of the institution of ostracism.

117 (Kagan 1991), 17.

118 (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988), 336–337. Ostraca are potsherds used for writing the names of the candidates for ostracism.

119 This measure would eventually result in a vast expansion of the power of the government. Naval power required a large amount of revenue and organization to build, man, and sustain the fleet. A building program was also required. New dockyards and ship sheds were needed to build, maintain, and store the ships. Thus, the port of Piraeus was developed after Xerxes's defeat.

120 This is a famous phrase used by the nineteenth-century German chancellor Otto von Bismarck when he claimed that major affairs of state are settled by war.

121 Some scholars dismiss "The Decree of Themistocles" as a fourth-century forgery. Scholars that accept it as a fourth-century copy of the original decree have different views as to its date. For a September 481 date, see Hammond in (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988), 558–563. See Inscription number 23 in (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 48–52. They date the decree between the evacuation of the Greek army from Tempe in the spring of 480 and the battle of Artemisium in the fall of 480.

122 Plutarch states that after Plataea, Aristides proposed a decree in the Hellenic assembly that the allies meet on an annual basis at Plataea and levy a Hellenic army from the alliance (Plut.*Aris*.21). The decree was passed. If true, the implication is that an assembly of the Hellenes could issue binding decrees on the member states. Since Herodotus does not mention this event, many historians doubt its authenticity.

123 See Hammond in (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988), 533–534. Hammond provides an analysis of the composition of Xerxes's army.

124 (Green 1996), 60–62. The functions and actions of all warships and transports cannot be accounted for in Xerxes's campaign.

125 Today the pass is well inland from the coast due to geological changes.

126 This was the normal size of the royal bodyguard. On this occasion, bodyguards without a living son could not participate.

127 Were they helots or perioeci? Hammond argues for helots in (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988), 549. (Burn 1962), 378–379. Burn agrees with Hammond. Cartledge agrees with Diodorus (Diod.XI.4.5) that they were perioeci. (Cartledge 2006), 132.

128 (Cartledge 2006), 142. Cartledge dates the battle from August 17–19. (Burn 1962), 378. Burn agrees. Herodotus states that the first engagement at Artemisium was midsummer (Hdt.VIII.12).

129 (Cartledge 2004), 131.

130 (Morrison and Williams 1968), 161.

131 (Cartledge 2006), 150. Cartledge accepts Herodotus's casualty figure for the Persian dead.

132 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 48–52. Inscription number 23 is a fourth-century

- reproduction of the original decree of 480 BC. Besides evacuation of the inhabitants, it called for the recall of the ostracized citizens. The date of the decree may be early summer.
- 133 (Strauss 2004), 104. Strauss claims that the Persians only had about seven hundred triremes at Salamis. (N. Hammond 1986), 242. Hammond accepts the number of Aeschylus. Other scholars suggest the Persian fleet barely outnumbered the Greeks.
- 134 Aeschylus tells us that the size of the Greek fleet at Salamis was 310 triremes (Aeschylus.*Persians*.338). He excluded the seventy ships assigned to protect the Greek rear?
- 135 (Strauss 2004), Strauss dates the battle of Salamis to September 25. Thus, he dates the evening of September 24/25 for these war councils.
- 136 (Hale 2009), 60. Hale suggests that Themistocles got permission from Eurybiades for Sicinnus's mission.
- 137 (Strauss 2004), 134. Strauss argues that the Egyptians did not sail around Salamis but stayed with the main fleet. (Hale 2009), 62. Hale says some ships did sail around Salamis to block the Greeks. (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988), 576–577. Hammond agrees that the Persians dispatched a force around Salamis.
- 138 This was the sacred date when the Eleusinian Mysteries were celebrated to honor Demeter and Persephone at Eleusis.
- 139 (Strauss 2004), 79–80. He says the Greeks had 368 ships.
- 140 Ibid, 132. It is unlikely that the ships on both sides were fully manned. Thus, the numbers of men engaged is uncertain. It is reasonable to assume that a minimum of two hundred thousand men were engaged in this fight.
- 141 Ibid, 204–205. Strauss speculates that 12,000 died in the Persian fleet. Ariabignes, Xerxes's half brother and an admiral, was killed in the battle.
- 142 (Aeschylus 1961), 134.
- 143 (Herodotus 1954), 461.
- 144 At Midway in June 1942, the American navy was smaller. It had fewer aircraft carriers, planes, pilots, and experienced commanders. Yet it emerged victorious. Prior to Midway, the American fleet in the Pacific was on the defensive. After Midway, the navy was on the offensive for the remainder of the war. Midway did not end the war but it turned the tide of Japanese invincibility.
- 145 For a Persian force of fifty thousand, see (Green 1996), 249. (Burn 1962), 511. A force of sixty to seventy thousand men is suggested by Burn. Also Barron in (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988), 594. (Cartledge 2013), 107. Cartledge suggests a Persian force of seventy to one hundred thousand men.
- 146 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 440–449. Inscription number 88 provides the entire text with a critique regarding its authenticity. The critique leaves the authenticity open to debate. (Burn 1962), Pp.513–515. (Cartledge 2013), 4; 28–30. Cartledge believes some type of oath occurred but not the oath recorded in the inscription. (Meiggs 1975), 155–156. Meiggs considers the inscription a forgery although some clauses may be true.
- 147 The isthmus, before the army marched (Diod.XI.29.2), or at Eleusis after the Athenians joined the army, are the two alternative places suggested where the army swore the oath. (Green 1996), 239–241. Green suggests that the army took the oath at Eleusis.
- 148 Plutarch says the decisive battle occurred on the 4th of Boedromion by the Athenian calendar and the 27th of Panemus by the Boeotian calendar (Plut.*Arist*.19.7). The problem arises because the different *poleis* began their calendars at different times. Scholars claim that the 27th of Panemus may be

- September 19th. The 4th of Boedromion may be early September. Herodotus gives a general sequence but does not mention specific dates.
- 149 (Green 1996), 255–260. Green gives a good analysis of Mardonius’s decision.
- 150 (Cartledge 2013), 113–120. Cartledge provides a very good critique of the issues and difficulties reconstructing the battle.
- 151 Ibid, 117. Cartledge suggests that the Persians lost ten thousand men from a possible force of one hundred thousand men.
- 152 (Green 1996), 278. See footnote.
- 153 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 53. It is argued that 862 poleis existed in the year 400 BC. If we assume that about eight hundred Hellenic *poleis* existed around 480, than the thirty-one *poleis* at Plataea represented less than 4 percent of all *poleis*.
- 154 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 54–57. For a review see inscription number 26. Also see Barron in (Boardman, Hammond and Lewis, et al. 1988), 619.

Sicily, Italy, and Carthage

The Year 500 BC – Sicily and Italy

Before we continue with our story of the Aegean world, we must survey the western Hellenic world. Our primary sources are Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus, a native of Sicily. Herodotus's information is sketchy because the affairs of the western Greeks were not central to his story. Although Diodorus wrote about western affairs, he lived in the first century BC. His history is a compilation of earlier historians such as Timaeus and Ephorus. He combines events, and his chronology is often inaccurate. Thus, the literary sources must be used with care. Unfortunately, the events in Italy are less well known than that of Sicily. We can mention a few events, but no continuous story can be told. Our story of the western Greeks will illustrate a series of snapshots, but we cannot view the motion picture.

During the age of migrations, in the eighth through sixth centuries BC, the emigrants from the Hellenic mainland and Asia Minor colonized Sicily and Italy.¹⁵⁵ In Sicily the Greeks initially established colonies on the eastern and northern parts of the island. Naxos (735), Syracuse (733), Megara (728), Zancle (730), later renamed Messene/Messana in 488/487, and Gela (689) were a few of the new settlements. Later Selinus (651), Camarina (598), Agragas (580), and others were founded by these early Greek colonies.¹⁵⁶ Preceding the Greeks, the Phoenicians arrived in the eighth century to trade with the native inhabitants.¹⁵⁷ Later they concentrated their settlements on the western part of the island. These settlements developed into the Punic colonies of Motya, Eryx, Panormus, and later Lilybaeum (Thuc.VI.2.6). Through most of the classical period the Halycus River was the border between the Greeks and Carthaginians. The native Sicans, Sicels, and Elymians occupied territory and towns in the central, northern, and western part of Sicily.¹⁵⁸ From the fifth century to the defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War (264–241 BC) by Rome, Carthage and Syracuse would vie for control of the island. The first chapter in this rivalry would culminate with the victory of the Greeks led by the Syracusan tyrant Gelon at the battle of Himera in 480.

In Italy, often referred to as Magna Graecia (Great Greece), the Greeks established colonies from the Bay of Naples southward around

the toe and heel of Italy.¹⁵⁹ Sybaris (725–700), Croton (709), Taras (706) (Tarentum), Rhegium (late eighth century), and Metapontum (630) grew and prospered along the southern shore. Cyme (Cumae) (750–725), Poseidonia (Paestum) (600?), and Neapolis (Naples) (470) developed near the Bay of Naples. Greek expansion in Italy was checked by the native Bruttians and Lucanians in the south and the Etruscans in the north. Like the Greeks, the Etruscans lived in city-states and had a common culture and language. Their homeland of Etruria (modern Tuscany) was bordered between the Mediterranean Sea and the Tiber and Arno Rivers.¹⁶⁰ They formed a loose confederation of twelve cities but rarely acted as a single political entity.¹⁶¹ Prior to the rise of Rome, the Etruscans dominated Italy from Campania to the Po River.

To check Greek expansion in the west, the Etruscans allied with the Carthaginians to oppose the Phocaeans at the naval battle of Alalia off the east coast of Corsica in 535 (Hdt.I.165–166). Although the Greeks were victorious, it was a Pyrrhic victory. The Phocaeans abandoned their colony of Alalia on Corsica, founded about 560, and settled at Elea on the west coast of southern Italy. This defeat preserved the economic dominance in the western Mediterranean for Carthage and the city-states of Etruria. However, the Phocaeans colony of Massilia (Marseilles) founded about six hundred on the south coast of France near the Rhone River survived and prospered.¹⁶²

Agriculture, industry, and trade were the major occupations of these colonists. The fertile soil and abundant rainfall allowed Sicily to become a bread basket for the Greek and later Roman world.¹⁶³ Corinth and other Peloponnesian *poleis* would import the grain of the west to support their growing populations in the classical period. To facilitate trade, coinage was adopted in the west. By the mid-sixth century, coinage was minted first in Italy and followed shortly afterward in Sicily. Acragas, Syracuse, Metapontum in Italy, and others grew in territorial size and population from conquest and the expansion of agriculture and trade. Sicilian and Italian prosperity is attested by the end of the sixth century with construction of some of the finest stone temples in the Hellenic World.¹⁶⁴ These temples were designed to glorify the gods and the *polis*. Enormous resources of stone, manpower, and treasure went into these constructions. The temple ruins of Acragas and Selinus are famous today for their size and beauty.

Syracuse, a colony founded by Corinth in 733, became the largest and most prosperous *polis* in the west (Thuc.VI.3.2; VII.58.4). In the classical period, the territory of Syracuse was second only to Sparta's control of Laconia and Messenia. No population figure can be given because habitation was always changing with the additions, voluntarily

or involuntarily, of populations of other cities and regions immigrating to Syracuse.¹⁶⁵ In the archaic period an aristocracy ruled Syracuse. Early in the fifth century they were overthrown by the *demos*. In the 480s the tyrant Gelon came to power. Tyranny was replaced by a democracy in the 460s. Tyranny returned with Dionysius I in 405 and remained through much of the fourth century. Regardless of their constitution, the Syracusans sided with the Peloponnesians in their conflicts with Athens in the classical period. Syracuse was always the focal point of Hellenic resistance to the expansion of Carthage in Sicily.

Prior to the fifth century we only have bits and pieces of political and military events among the western Greeks. In 524 a conflict occurred between Cumae and an alliance of Etruscans and Latin communities in which Cumae was victorious. This was followed by another conflict in 505 between Cumae and the Etruscans in Campania near Naples. The reasons for these hostilities can only be guessed. A war between Sybaris and Croton in 510 resulted in the physical destruction of Sybaris, whose wealth was legendary in the Greek world. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to trace the constitutional development of any *polis*. Oligarchies ruled in Italy and Sicily until near the end of the sixth century when tyranny supplanted them. While tyranny was disappearing in the Hellenic mainland, tyranny became the dominant form of government by the early fifth century in Sicily (Arist.*Pol.*1316a35). Tyrants existed in Acragas, Gela, and Leontini in Sicily. Anaxilas of Rhegium was tyrant on the Italian side of the Straits of Messene (or Messana).¹⁶⁶

Carthage

Carthage, located on the North African shore of modern Tunisia, was a colony of the Phoenician city of Tyre. Legend says that it was founded during the late ninth century. The earliest archaeological remains date the city to the 760s BC.¹⁶⁷ Composed of citizens from Phoenicia and the native Libyans, Carthage was founded as a trading center. Carthage grew to become a leading commercial state in the Mediterranean until its destruction by Rome in 146. Its "Great Harbor" and fertile hinterland allowed it to become a cosmopolitan trading center connecting the Phoenicians of the Levant with various Phoenician colonies and trading stations in the western Mediterranean. The Phoenicians traded with the natives of Italy, Sardinia, Corsica, southern France, and Spain.¹⁶⁸ In the eighth century the Tyreans established a colony at Gades (Cadiz), on the southwest shore of Iberia (Spain) west of the Pillars of Heracles (Straits of Gibraltar), to trade with the kingdom of Tartessus in southern Spain. Silver was the most important item of trade for the Phoenicians. Throughout antiquity

Spain was famous for its silver mines. As a Phoenician colony, Carthage would grow and prosper from this mercantile exchange throughout the Mediterranean basin. Carthage would exploit the silver and manpower of Iberia when it became an influential military power in the fifth century.

In the sixth century Carthage became an independent city-state. In 573 Carthage's mother city of Tyre fell to the Babylonians after a thirteen-year siege. The subordination of Tyre and later all Phoenicia, under the Persian Empire in the second half of the sixth century, facilitated the decline of Phoenicia. Commercial rivalry with the Greeks and Etruscans also contributed to this decline. The decline of the homeland allowed the Carthaginians to replace the Phoenician merchants. From the Levant to Iberia, the Carthaginians traded throughout the Mediterranean basin. As Carthage prospered, the citizens expanded their land holdings into the fertile valleys of the North African hinterland described by Diodorus (Diod.XX.8.2–5). From these mercantile contacts Carthage would hire the natives of the western Mediterranean as mercenaries to supply the armies and man the fleets.

Consequently, the growth of Carthaginian power and commercial interests in conjunction with Greek colonial expansion in Sicily and trade competition in the west would lead to conflict with the Hellenes. Syracuse, as the largest Greek *polis* in Sicily, became the chief rival to Carthage for control of the island. The victory at Alalia in 535 by Carthage and the Etruscans allowed the Carthaginians to increase Punic settlements on the islands of Corsica and Sardinia to exploit the natural resources and native manpower. However, the alliance with Etruria in the sixth century demonstrated that Carthage was not strong enough to oppose the Greeks alone. The growth of Punic power is demonstrated in their next engagement with the Sicilian Greeks in 480 when the Carthaginians fought alone using their own mercenaries.

Unfortunately for historians, no history of Carthage from the Punic point of view has survived from antiquity; if one ever existed. Therefore, we must rely on Greek and Roman writers for a history of Carthage. These sources were hostile to Carthage and portrayed the Carthaginians as avaricious, militaristic, and untrustworthy. However, we must remember that wars between the Greeks of Sicily and Carthage were infrequent, and the Romans did not enter the picture as enemies until the third century BC.

Aristotle wrote a treatise on the Carthaginian constitution, but it has not survived. However, there are multiple references describing its political construction in his *Politics*. Like many Greek *poleis*, Carthage was ruled by an oligarchy composed of Phoenician aristocrats. Aristotle claims that there were similarities between the Spartan and

Carthaginian constitutions. A Council of Elders (called the Hundred and Four?) existed, but neither the selection process nor the eligibility requirements are known. However, there was a minimum wealth requirement, but we do not know what it was. An assembly existed, but its composition is also unknown. The functions of these bodies and when they met are unknown (Arist.*Pol.*1272b25–1273b24). Shophets were the chief magistrates, but their selection process, quantity, and length of service are uncertain. They were probably selected by merit with no age requirements, and length of service was limited. This lack of knowledge goes for the other magistrates. The military leader was called a *basileus* (king) (Hdt.VII.166). He had no colleague in the fifth and fourth centuries.¹⁶⁹ He was also appointed based on merit. Apparently there was no time limit to this office. The *basileus* had a religious function to gain divine support for battle. He could not make war without the approval of the people. This description of the Carthaginian constitution is rudimentary at best. How and when these institutions appeared is uncertain. Despite the principle that the magistrates were selected by merit, we do know that the Magonid family dominated the Punic government throughout the fifth century. Since the lack of Punic literary sources and limited Greek sources inhibits our ability to understand the Carthaginians, Carthage remains a mystery.

By the beginning of the fifth century, Carthage and the Greeks of Sicily and Italy were expanding their areas of influence politically, militarily, and economically. Prosperity was increasing for all parties. Mercantile competition probably resulted in grievances between Greek and Punic merchants. But for the general population, these grievances would have been minor. Until now Carthage concentrated on mercantile expansion in the western Mediterranean. Economic dominance, not military expansion, was the primary Punic objective. Outside of North Africa, Carthage ruled no subject people. The Phoenician colonies in the western Mediterranean were self-governing. No major issues seemed to be on the horizon to bring about conflict with the western Greeks. Within the next twenty years Sicily would become the battleground between these cultures. How did this happen?

Sicilian Tyranny

Tyranny developed in the late sixth century throughout Sicily. At the beginning of the fifth century, we find the tyrants Theron of Acragas, Hippocrates of Gela, Terillus of Himera, and others in power. Their rise to power is uncertain, but political and social conflict between the ruling oligarchs and the masses might have been an

underlying cause. This conflict would plague the Sicilian Greeks throughout the classical period. Like a revolving door, oligarchy, tyranny, and democracy would be implemented by the Sicilian Greeks. Whatever their means to power, the tyrants hired mercenaries to maintain themselves in power.

In the 490s we find them expanding their power at the expense of the other Greek *poleis* on the island. In 505 tyranny began at Gela under the rule of Cleandrus. Upon his death in 498, his brother Hippocrates usurped power and ruled for the next seven years (Hdt.VII.154). Hippocrates expanded the territory of Gela northward and captured the *poleis* of Leontini, Naxos, and then Zancle by 494/493. Then he looked eastward toward Syracuse. At the Helorus River, south of Syracuse, in 492 he defeated the Syracusans (Diod.X.28.1). A treaty was made between Hippocrates and Syracuse in which Hippocrates received the *polis* of Camarina in exchange for his Syracusan prisoners (Thuc.VI.5.3). In 491 he died in a military campaign against other *poleis*. Attempting to regain their freedom, the Geloans were defeated by Hippocrates's cavalry commander Gelon. With the support of the mercenaries, Gelon made himself tyrant of Gela in 491/490 (Hdt.VII.155).

Theron made himself tyrant of Acragas by 489. Shortly afterwards he made a political alliance with Gelon through the marriage of his daughter Demarete to Gelon while he married the daughter of Polyzalus, Gelon's brother. This alliance allowed both tyrants to expand at the expense of the Sicels and Greeks of the island. Taking advantage of *stasis* in Syracuse between the short-lived democracy and exiled oligarchs (the *Gamoroí*), Gelon attacked Syracuse in 485. The Syracusans surrendered. Gelon restored the oligarchic exiles but made himself tyrant of Syracuse. He appointed his brother Hieron tyrant of Gela. Gelon ruled Syracuse until his death in 478.

Gelon initiated the policy of transplanting populations to increase the population and territory of Syracuse. The people of Camarina were the first transplants, and they were made Syracusan citizens. After a siege, the wealthy citizens of Megara Hyblae were made citizens while the masses were enslaved. Finally, the *polis* of Euboea suffered the same fate as Megara Hyblae (Hdt.VII.156). Gelon also moved the wealthy population of Gela to Syracuse. By 483 Gelon and Theron controlled the bulk of Sicily.

Prelude to Himera

At Himera, on the northern side of the island, Terillus was the tyrant. For reasons unknown, Terillus was hostile to Theron. For self-defense, Terillus had friendly relations with Hamilcar, the Magonid

ruler of Carthage, and gave his daughter in marriage to Anaxilas of Rhegium. By 482 Theron had forced Terillus from Himera (Hdt.VII.165). Terillus appealed to Hamilcar and Anaxilas for aid. Anaxilas supported Terillus's request. Rhegium, across the Straits of Messene from Zancle (Messene/Messana), could be attacked by Gelon and Theron. Were they interested in conquering the entire island? It is plausible, but the answer is speculative.

In control of Himera and Zancle, the mercantile traffic through the Straits of Messene could be interrupted by Gelon and Theron. Thus, Carthaginian trade could be damaged. With these two allies controlling about two-thirds of the island, the Punic settlements on the west coast were threatened. Thus, for mercantile and military reasons, the Carthaginians decided it was time to check the Greek advance. For these reasons, Diodorus's claim that Carthage and Persia made a pact to attack the Greeks simultaneously is highly unlikely (Diod.XI.1.4–5; XI.20.1). Herodotus implies that Carthage attacked Sicily to restore Terillus (Hdt.VII.165). Miles suggests that the invasion by Hamilcar was a private venture based on the guest-friend relationship with Terillus as stated by Herodotus.¹⁷⁰ Thus, the war was not state sponsored. This may be true, but the explanation is too simplistic. Through their Phoenician contacts, the Carthaginians were probably aware of Xerxes's preparations to attack the Hellenic mainland. They might have decided to attack while the Sicilian Greeks could not get aid from the mainland. As mentioned earlier, by the end of the sixth century Carthage was replacing the Phoenician city-states in control of western trade. Perhaps now the Carthaginians were becoming more militarily aggressive to protect their commercial interests. Thus, Carthaginian and Greek expansion led to a trial of strength. There is no evidence to suggest that Carthage or Persia believed that they needed the support of the other to attain their objectives. Their spheres of interest in the western and eastern Mediterranean were different.

In the summer of 480 Hamilcar launched the Punic forces against Sicily. The Punic fleet had two hundred warships and numerous transports. The fleet encountered a storm crossing to Sicily and lost numerous transports carrying their cavalry. Landing his army at Panormus, Hamilcar made preparations to attack Himera. He marched overland with the army while the fleet sailed along the coast to Himera. Despite the exaggeration of three hundred thousand men by Herodotus, the combined Punic forces (fleet and army) might have numbered about one hundred thousand men recruited from Sardinia, Corsica, Iberia, Liguria, and North Africa (Hdt.VII.165).¹⁷¹ If the Carthaginians lost their cavalry support at sea, then their army relied on the strength of the infantry.

Hamilcar established two separate camps for the fleet and army

west of Himera. He attacked Himera, defended by Theron, and defeated the Greeks. Theron requested aid from Gelon. Gelon supposedly arrived with fifty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. These numbers too may be inflated. Regardless of the manpower involved, Gelon's cavalry captured some ten thousand prisoners in the countryside. We are not told how. Capturing correspondence between Hamilcar and his Sicilian ally, the *polis* of Selinus, Gelon, sent his cavalry to the Carthaginian naval camp impersonating the Selinuntines. Gaining access to the Punic camp, the cavalry created confusion and began burning the ships. Gelon then arrived with the infantry and engaged the Carthaginian army. The Greeks were victorious and routed the Carthaginians. Hamilcar was killed either by the Greek cavalry or threw himself into the sacrificial pyre when the battle was lost. We are told the Punic army was destroyed. Diodorus states that twenty Punic warships, still at sea, picked up survivors and sailed for Carthage. However, they were lost in storm. Only a few survivors returned to Carthage to tell the tale of defeat (Hdt.VII.166–167; Diod.XI.20–24).

The victory by Gelon was complete. Apparently Carthage had no reserve forces to continue the war. The Carthaginians paid two thousand talents in indemnity and built two temples in Sicily to house the peace treaties. As a token of gratitude, the Carthaginians gave Demarete, Gelon's wife, a gold crown (Diod.XI.26.2–3). As an offering of thanks, Gelon donated a gold tripod and statue of Nike (victory) at Delphi. Gelon donated a statue of Zeus and three breastplates in the Syracusan Treasury at Olympia (Diod.XI.26.7; Paus.VI.19.7; M&L 28).¹⁷² Diodorus claims that that the battle of Himera occurred at the time Leonidas was fighting at Thermopylae (Diod.XI.24.1). Herodotus says the battle occurred on the day of Salamis (September). Aristotle denies that Himera occurred on either date (Arist.*Poet.*1459a24–28). Whatever its exact date, the Greeks acknowledged Himera as a significant accomplishment ranking with Salamis and Plataea.

Though not as significant for the long-term implications for Western civilization as Salamis and Plataea, Himera was vital as it contributed to the Hellenic autonomy in the west and led to the dominance of Syracuse over the other Greek *poleis* of Sicily. Acragas would grow and achieve economic prosperity to rival Syracuse. With Athens and Sparta, Syracuse now ranked as a leading *poleis* in the Hellenic world. Victory ensured that the Deinomenid tyranny would endure into the 460s. Gelon would die peacefully in his bed two years later. The island remained divided at the Halycus River between Punic and Greek cities.

In Carthage there was no desire for a war of revenge. Apparently the defeat was not considered a disaster because monuments were

setup honoring Hamilcar. Later Punic commanders would be disgraced and executed or commit suicide when defeated.¹⁷³ Except for the Punic officers, the lost soldiers and sailors were mostly mercenaries. Thus, Carthage suffered few citizen casualties. The Magonid family of Hamilcar remained in power. Until the last decade of the fifth century, the Carthaginians remained quiet.

Punic energy was again directed at the expansion of their mercantile empire. Trade was now the foundation of their relationship with the Greek world.¹⁷⁴ After increased Punic investment, Sardinia became a major source of trade and agricultural surplus for Carthage. Iberia continued to supply silver for Carthaginian trade to the eastern Mediterranean. The Carthaginians also followed a policy of expansion in North Africa (modern Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya). Eventually Carthage controlled the other Phoenician settlements in North Africa. Carthaginian prosperity benefitted by peace with the Hellenes.

The Deinomenid Tyranny in Syracuse

Peace reigned in Sicily. Selinus and Rhegium came to terms with Syracuse. Anaxilas retained his power in Rhegium and married his daughter to Hieron, brother of Gelon. Gelon consolidated his power in Syracuse and made peace with those Sicilian cities that still opposed him. Part of the booty was donated to the temples of Syracuse and Himera. The remainder of the booty and captives were divided among the allies. Diodorus claims that the Acragantines used some captives as slaves to mine stone to beautify the city and build required infrastructure. Other slaves were used to expand agriculture among the estates of its citizens. Despite his violent rise to power, destruction of cities, and transplantation of populations, after Himera, Gelon walked about town unarmed and unharmed. When Gelon died in 478, he was popular and honored with a public funeral (Diod.XI.25.2–26.6).

Hieron became tyrant of Syracuse after Gelon's death. There was no opposition. Hieron would rule Syracuse for the next ten years. To consolidate his rule, Hieron had his brother Polyzalus marry Gelon's widow Demarete. Polyzalus's daughter was married to Theron. Thus, the alliance between Syracuse and Acragas continued. Hieron installed Polyzalus as governor of Gela since Gela was a subject of Syracuse (Diod.XII.48.2).

Whatever the cause, hostility developed between Hieron and Polyzalus. Diodorus says that Polyzalus was popular with the Syracusans. Hieron sent Polyzalus to Italy to support Sybaris in a war with Croton. Returning home victorious, Polyzalus took refuge with Theron. War with Hieron was on the horizon. Whatever the grievances

were between Theron and Hieron, war appeared likely. In Himera the people were rebellious because of the harsh rule of Theron's son Thrasydaeus. Envoys appealed to Hieron for support. They offered to give him control of Himera. Refusing their request, Hieron reported their intrigues to Theron. Theron suppressed the rebellion and the leaders were executed or exiled. Whatever the terms of agreement, Theron and Hieron reconciled their differences. Polyxalus was restored to Gela (Diod.XI.48).

Hieron followed the policy of Gelon in Sicily. He destroyed the *poleis* of Naxos and Catana. He transplanted their populations to Leontini. In 476 he resettled Catana with five thousand immigrants from the Peloponnese and five thousand Syracusans and renamed it Aetna. Land was confiscated from the native Sicels and Catanians and redistributed to these new settlers. Aetna was allied to Syracuse. Deinomenes, Hieron's son, was placed in charge of Aetna. In this same year, Theron likewise added new settlers to Himera to replace those dispossessed (Diod.XI.49; Pind.*Pyth.*1.58–60).

Sometime in 476 Anaxilas of Rhegium died after a sixteen-year reign. Micythus was appointed regent for Anaxilas's young sons. After Himera, Anaxilas remained in control of Rhegium and Zancle. Therefore, he controlled the Straits of Messene. Hieron supported Micythus until Anaxilas's sons came of age in 469/468. Micythus then retired honorably to Tegea in Arcadia. Apparently Anaxilas's death left a power vacuum among the Greeks of Magna Graecia. In 474 envoys arrived at Syracuse from Cyme (Cumae) seeking aid against the Etruscans. Which Etruscan city-states we are not told. The reasons for this Greco-Etruscan conflict are unknown, but perhaps the Etruscans were protecting their trade relationships in Italy and the western Mediterranean. Seeing an opportunity to expand his influence in the Tyrrhenian Sea and central Italy, Hieron sent a fleet to support Cumae. In a naval battle the Greeks defeated the Etruscans. Hieron dedicated three bronze helmets at Olympia in honor of his victory (M&L 27).¹⁷⁵ Syracuse was at the peak of its power under the Deinomenids. Most of Sicily and now the Greeks of Magna Graecia looked to Syracuse for protection (Hdt.VII.170; Diod.XI.51; Pind.*Pyth.*1.71).

In 472 Theron of Acragas died. Like Gelon, Theron was popular and was buried with honors. Within a year Thrasydaeus united the mercenary forces of Himera and Acragas, some twenty thousand men, and attacked the forces of Hieron. Hieron emerged victorious at a site near the Acragas River. Some two thousand Syracusan mercenaries died against four thousand for Acragas. Thrasydaeus was overthrown by the Acragantines who established a democracy in 471. Thrasydaeus was condemned and died at Megara in the Peloponnese. Hieron made peace with Acragas and allowed the new government to

remain (Diod.XI.53.1–5). Himera and Gela soon followed as liberated *poleis*.

In 467 Hieron died after a ten-year reign. Hieron ruled harshly. The Syracusans were tired of tyranny. Thrasybulus, brother of Gelon and Hieron, succeeded to rule.¹⁷⁶ However, after only ten months, his unpopular rule was ended when the Syracusans revolted. Supported by the soldiers and ships from Acragas, Himera, Gela, Selinus and the Sicels, the Syracusans besieged him in Syracuse when he occupied the Achradina area and the island of Ortygia. Suffering a defeat against this coalition, Thrasybulus negotiated a surrender. He went into exile to Locri in Italy. The Syracusans established a democracy that lasted the next sixty years until overthrown by the tyranny of Dionysius I (Diod.XI.67–68; Arist.*Pol.*1316a32–33). The Deinomenid tyranny lasted less than twenty years (Arist.*Pol.*1315b34–38). However, in that short period it left a lasting legacy. Syracuse emerged as the major *polis* in Sicily and now began the rivalry with Carthage, which lasted until their conquest by Rome.

The fall of the Deinomenids ended tyrannical government in Sicily. Not until the next war with Carthage in the last decade of the century would Sicily witness the return of tyranny to Syracuse. The independence of these *poleis* did not bring peace among the Greeks. These states would argue among themselves. Their political divisions brought the intervention of Athens into Sicilian affairs in the Peloponnesian War (431–404). The defeat of Athens' Sicilian Expedition (415–413) led to its defeat and the end of the Athenian Empire. Eclipsed in Greek political affairs with the demise of tyranny, the Hellenes of Sicily would be minor players in the rivalry between Sparta and Athens during much of the fifth century.

Though our story of the western Greeks is sketchy, they would benefit from the general economic prosperity throughout the Hellenic world in the fifth century. This prosperity brought forth an increase in population, urban growth, economic expansion, and increased revenue for the political, military, religious, and cultural affairs of many *polis*. This Hellenic prosperity would allow Athens to finance its war with Persia and challenge Sparta for hegemony in the Greek world. In the next chapter we will examine the economic conditions of the Greek world before we return to the rivalry between Athens and Sparta.

¹⁵⁵ (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 172. The Greeks named the island *Sicilia* after the emigrants from Italy (Hdt.V.46; Thuc.I.12.4). Previously the island was called Sicania from the Sican inhabitants. The Greeks of Sicily are called Siciliotes.

¹⁵⁶ All foundation dates for Sicily and Italy are based on literary and archeological evidence.

- 157 (Herm 1975), 138.
- 158 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 172. The Sicans were early inhabitants who were driven out of Iberia (Spain) by the Ligurians (Thuc.VI.2.2). The Sicels were later emigrants from Italy who defeated the Sicans (Thuc.VI.2.4). Sicily got its name from these Sicels, which replaced the earlier name of Sicania derived from the Sicans. The Elymians were emigrants from Troy (Thuc.VI.2.3).
- 159 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 247–251. The Greeks of the classical period identified *Italia* (Italy) as those poleis that occupied the territory along the south coast of Italy from Rhegium to Taras (Tarentum) (Hdt.VI.127; Arist.*Pol.*1274a24). These Greeks were called Italiotes. The various Greek cities located around the Bay of Naples were not included in Italia. The term *Megale Hellas* (Magna Graecia/ Greater Greece) was first used extensively by Polybius in the second century BC (Polyb.II.39.1). The Romans identified all the Greeks of the Italian peninsula as Magna Graecia.
- 160 (Scullard 1967), 58.
- 161 Ibid, 231–236. Scullard provides an analysis of this Etruscan League.
- 162 For a list of all the colonies founded in the age of migration, see Graham in (Boardman and Hammond 1982), 160–162.
- 163 See Morris in (Scheidel, Morris and Saller 2007), 239.
- 164 See Osborne in (Scheidel, Morris and Saller 2007), 287–288.
- 165 The Deinomenid tyrants of the fifth century and Dionysius I, in the fourth century, forcibly transplanted the inhabitants of conquered territories to Syracuse. Wars and *stasis* often reduced the population. (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 225–227. At least nineteen cases of stasis are known from the Archaic and classical periods. The *polis* of Messene (or Messana and formerly called Zancle) located on the Straits of Messene, was resettled by mercenaries after their expulsion from Syracuse and other *poleis* in the mid-fifth century (Diod.XI.76.5).
- 166 Today it is known as the Straits of Messina.
- 167 (Miles 2010), 61. (Boardman, Edwards, et al. 1991), 492.
- 168 See Morris in (Scheidel, Morris and Saller 2007). 245–248.
- 169 See Picard in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 365–367.
- 170 (Miles 2010), 114–115.
- 171 (N. Hammond 1986), 269.
- 172 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 60–61.
- 173 (Plut.*Tim.*22.8). Defeated by Timoleon in the 340s, Mago returned home and committed suicide.
- 174 (Miles 2010), 120–121.
- 175 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 62.
- 176 Aristotle suggests that the Deinomenid regime suffered from internal dissension (Arist.*Pol.*1312b10–11).

The Economy of the Classical Period

Introduction

In our review of the Greek *polis* in chapter 1, we had a brief review of the economy of the *polis*. In this chapter, we want to investigate the Hellenic economy in greater detail. What was the quality of life for a Greek man, woman, and child? We often equate the quality of life with an improvement in the standard of living, improved health, a safety net in the welfare state, and a general economic improvement for all people. We live in an industrial or perhaps a post-industrial world in the twenty-first century. Antiquity was a preindustrial world. There was no electricity, nuclear power plants, motors, generators, cars, planes, television, computers, etc. People did not go to the mall to shop for a plethora of consumer goods. People did not go to the grocery store to purchase foods from around the world. Although maritime *poleis* gathered much food from the sea, most Greeks attained food from their farms or the local farmers' market. Things we take for granted today were nonexistent. How did the Greeks of the classical period earn a living?

This chapter is meant to be an introduction to the economy of the Greek world. There are more questions than answers in a review of the ancient economy. The ancient Greeks did not write about the economy as defined by economists today. Data is rare to quantify the ancient economy. Modern economic terminology did not exist in the Greek language. Aristotle mentions a few economic items in his *Politics* as it pertains to the *polis*, but no economic treatise was written by him or his students that we know of. The fourth century historian Xenophon wrote a treatise titled *Oikonomikos* (*Oeconomicus*) on managing a household but is more about living a virtuous life as a gentleman farmer.¹⁷⁷ The Greeks used the term *oikos*, which refers to the management of the household. It was used to describe the family household as well as a commercial business. Family does not mean the immediate nuclear family but the entire kin relationship as controlled by the *patria potestas* (*paterfamilias* in Latin) where the head of the family controls the wife, sons, daughters-in-law, and grandchildren, etc. All property (land, slaves, money, etc.) is controlled by the "head" of household.¹⁷⁸ Financial decisions were made to

protect the property of the household, not necessarily in terms of financial gain or loss. Thus, the study of economics as a science did not exist in the Greek world.

Hellenic Agriculture

In antiquity the foundation of the economy was agriculture. Prosperity rested on the success of the annual crops to support the family and general population. Many people lived at a subsistence level. A minimum size farm for a subsistence living might have been ten acres (four hectares).¹⁷⁹ Therefore, there was a fine line between starvation and an adequate diet.¹⁸⁰ The fertility of the soil, the amount of land under cultivation, the type of crops sown, and an adequate rainfall determined the success of agricultural production. Over the centuries, the success of food production allowed for the growth of population, cities, and the diversification of labor into other productive areas such as commerce and industry. What was the basis of Greek agriculture in the classical age?

The first element for success was a hospitable climate. The weather of the Mediterranean basin consists of hot dry summers (May to September) and cool, wet winters. This weather pattern has been consistent since about 3000 BC. Rainfall can often be inconsistent, which can lead to years of bounty or drought. The average temperatures were about the same as today.¹⁸¹ Despite this general weather pattern, it must be remembered that local variations existed. Bounty and/or famine could exist simultaneously contingent on the annual weather pattern.

The “Mediterranean Triad” of crops (grain, olives, and grapes) was common throughout the Hellenic world. Grain in the form of emmer wheat and barley were grown in the Hellenic mainland. Barley is less nutritious but grows better in areas with limited rainfall and light soil. Barley was the common crop grown in Attica and the Spartans probably ate barley in their common messes.¹⁸² Fruits (almonds, figs, apples, pears, etc.) and vegetables (peas, beans, lentils, etc.) were grown to supplement the Greek diet. However, wheat and barley might have supplied 70–75 percent of the calories in the Greek diet.¹⁸³ Unlike Mesopotamia, where irrigation was critical for farming, the Greeks practiced dry farming. Therefore, annual rainfall was critical to agricultural success. Since cereal cultivation was labor intensive, agriculture required the greatest amount of labor. Population growth and crop failure required the larger *poleis* (Athens and Corinth) of the mainland to import grain by the fifth century if not earlier. The Black Sea area, Sicily, Italy, Carthage, Egypt, Cyrene, and other areas were sources of grain for the mainland.

In contrast to cereal production, the cultivation of the grape and olive was less labor intensive and bountiful enough for export. The caloric value of the olive is higher than grain. Thus, it was a good cash crop. Olive trees grow well in dry conditions but need to grow ten years before they become productive. However, they only produce a good crop every other year. In the dry season, the olive develops its oil content. It then requires a cool, but not cold, season to rest. Olive trees do not grow above 2,600 feet (800 meters) altitude.¹⁸⁴ Thus, Greece, Sicily, and Italy were ideal areas for olive cultivation.

The cultivation of the grape was widespread throughout the Mediterranean and grew in the harsher climate of northern Europe when introduced by the Romans. Wine was popular in the Hellenic world. By the fifth century, wine consumption spread from the aristocratic class to the masses. Grape cultivation can be labor intensive, but population growth and increase in slavery provided the labor to bring more land under cultivation to meet increased demand. Wine from Chios, Lesbos, and Thasos was highly prized. Wine production apparently met local demand and became a cash crop for export. "In other words, wine and olive oil were consumed in prodigious quantities not so much because they were widely available, but because they were made widely available."¹⁸⁵

This last statement implies that a market existed for these goods. In the classical period, the concept of a market as an institution or physical space for the exchange of goods certainly existed. Prices were set based on the concept of supply and demand. Standards in weights, measures, and coinage were established to determine exchange rates for goods and services. Local magistrates were often assigned to monitor the marketplace to ensure that the standards for exchange and market prices were adhered to. In Athens, officials were assigned to the marketplace in the city and the Piraeus (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*51). A physical market could be the *agora* of the urban center of the local *polis*, a place of exchange in a foreign country, or anywhere people agree to exchange goods. The *agora* originally meant a place to talk or assemble. However, by the classical period, the term evolved to mean a place for economic exchange. An *emporion* (marketplace), such as Naucratis in Egypt or the Piraeus at Athens, was a designated area where trade with foreigners occurred. The Piraeus was similar to our Wall Street. The difference being that instead of stocks, bonds, and mutual funds traded electronically for profit, physical items were exchanged such as grain, minerals, and textiles for coin. Isocrates described the Piraeus as a market where almost anything could be purchased (Isoc.IV.42).

Utilizing these food sources, the Greeks used the cultivable land, and any surplus was designated for the marketplace.¹⁸⁶ To ensure

adequate grain supplies, the produce from the hinterland was often banned from export. The literary sources only relate that grain was imported to the Hellenic mainland. Aristotle claims that Cimon, the political rival of Pericles, fed the members of his deme from his own estate if the food supply was short (*Arist.Ath.Pol.*27.3). Thus, he earned political support from the people. It is likely that other Greek nobles did the same within their *poleis* for similar reasons. For most Greek *poleis*, their hinterland produced enough food to support the local population, but any interruption in the grain harvest jeopardized the entire community.¹⁸⁷

How did they use the uncultivable land? The hillsides, mountains, marshland, etc., constitute the untilled lands. These areas were used for the grazing of sheep, goats, and cattle. The timber (cypress, oak, cedar, etc.) could be used for energy, building, pitch, etc. Nuts and herbs could be gathered for food or medicinal purposes. Salt could be gathered from marshlands. Stone and minerals could be mined. Clay was used for pottery. Hunting for game (deer, hare, and boar) provided a tiny portion of the diet. Thus, there were multiple uses for the uncultivable land. Population growth and agricultural expansion turned previous unusable soils into productive use by draining marshes, terracing hillsides, cutting down forests, etc. In summation, by the fifth century, the lands of the Hellenic world were more fruitful than they had ever been.

Demographics

Population growth and agricultural expansion went hand in hand. Population growth increased the demand for food. Increased agricultural productivity allowed population growth. However, there was always a balance. If the population outpaced agricultural production, starvation resulted. If soil fertility declined or drought occurred, starvation resulted. Although surplus food could be stored, there was limited storage capacity as well as limited storage time before food spoiled. Scheidel states, "It is worth remembering that 'overpopulation' is independent of population size *per se* but reflects average well-being relative to the subsistence level."¹⁸⁸ Thus, population and agricultural growth are interdependent. Both expand or contract together unless there is some technological or scientific advance in the means of production to sustain a larger population. This did not occur in antiquity.

In agriculture there was little technological innovation to increase production and efficiency. Human or animal muscle power was used for farming. Oxen were used to plow the fields, pull the farmer's cart, and grind the grain in a grain mill. Otherwise, human power was used

to hoe the soil. A sickle or scythe was used to harvest the crops. Men, women, and children used their muscles to harvest cereals, fruits, and vegetables. The butchering of animals, such as sheep, goats, pigs, and cattle was done by hand. However, animals were too valuable and scarce to use for food. Meat was not a major element in the Greek diet. Cattle were usually butchered for community festivals or religious sacrifice (private and public).¹⁸⁹ Unlike modern farming, hybrid seeds did not exist to apply to different soils or the length of the growing season.¹⁹⁰ On large estates, slaves provided the labor to expand production. Thus, with little technological innovation, the rate of population growth and agricultural expansion was limited.

Until the nineteenth century, most societies had a high birth (fertility) and death (mortality) rate. The Greek world was no exception. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (famine, war, pestilence, and death) prevailed. In addition to these factors, poor nutrition, poor medical care, poor sanitation, and child exposure among others can be added that prevented people living to old age by twenty-first-century standards. Urban areas had a higher death rate than rural areas, but it is difficult to quantify these conclusions. Literary evidence, tombstone analysis, and medical analysis of ancient skeletons are pieces of evidence used by demographers to reach their conclusions. However, the sample sizes for all these categories are small. The average lifespan at birth was somewhere between twenty and forty years of age for men and women.¹⁹¹ Because of the high mortality rates, to maintain the population without growth, women would have to give birth to 4.5 to 6.5 children.¹⁹² Thus, women spent much of their adult life in various stages of child-rearing. Poor medical understanding resulted in early deaths for many of these women at childbirth. Although there were people who lived to old age comparable to the modern world, the vast majority, regardless of social and economic status, died young by modern standards.

Industry

Industry existed in antiquity but not in form that we understand after the Industrial Revolution begun in the mid-eighteenth century. Like agriculture, industry relied primarily on human or animal muscle power. Water power was sometimes used for grain mills if they were built along a river as mentioned in Roman times. There is no evidence that wind power was used except for shipping. Thermal energy for cooking, smelting of ore, forging of weapons and tools, molding bricks, etc., derived from wood or charcoal. Charcoal burned hotter and cleaner than wood. Therefore, it was better for processes that required

high temperatures like forging and smelting.

What types of industry existed? Timber production (i.e., construction and energy), bronze casting (i.e., art and weaponry), iron working (i.e., tools and weaponry), textiles (i.e., linen and wool), pottery manufacturing (i.e., eating utensils and shipping containers), ore and stone mining (i.e., iron, gold, silver, copper, marble, limestone), shipbuilding (i.e., commercial transport and warships), minting (i.e., coin and bullion), bakers (i.e., bread), etc., were industrial occupations. Free or slave labor was used to produce these goods. The hazards of mining usually meant that criminals and slaves were employed in the classical period (Plut.*Nic.*4.2). Men, women, and children could be employed.

In classical Greece there were no “factories” with a designated hierarchy and division of labor, employing hundreds of people, located within an “industrial” zone in an urban center, subject to safety regulations, highly mechanized, etc. There is no word for “factory” in the ancient Greek language. The Greeks used the term *ergasterion*, which means workplace, and employed perhaps tens of people maximum. However, the workplace could also be the home, especially in textile production. There was little specialization of labor in these workshops. The workers were craftsmen who made one product from beginning to end. Using tools, rather than machines, the products were individualized. There was no standardization of the manufacturing process regardless of the employee producing the product. For example, a potter made a bowl by mixing the clay, forming it, painting it, firing it, etc. There were no labor unions or guilds to organize the workers into specific divisions of labor. In textiles, women usually made the goods at home and delivered them to an assigned place. The Greeks did not make a clear distinction between the *ergasterion* (workplace) and the *oikos* (household) as places of business.¹⁹³

These workplaces were commercial ventures designed to produce nonagricultural goods for the marketplace. They were privately owned, supervised by a manager(s), employing free or slave labor in small numbers, producing specific products and quantities. In comparison to the modern social-welfare state, there was little regulation of these enterprises and no state support except in providing contracts for required state goods. It is estimated that no more than one-eighth of the population was occupied in non-agrarian occupations such as industry and commerce.¹⁹⁴

Aristotle lists other nonagricultural occupations in his *Politics*. These include fishing (Byzantium and Taras), ferrying (Tenedos), naval rowers (Athens), commerce (Chios and Aegina), arts and crafts, and general laborers (Arist.*Pol.*1291b22–25). Painters, stone sculptors, wood carvers, etc., were employed in most *poleis* to beautify

temples, government and residential buildings, water fountains, etc. The lowest class of unskilled workers did whatever menial tasks they could find such as dockworkers, harvesters, rowers, etc.

Commerce

The other major area of the economy is commerce. Commerce not only entailed the exchange of goods between the city and its hinterland but also trade between *poleis* and foreign countries. Here we will discuss interstate commerce. As noted earlier in our story of the *polis*, some *poleis* were important commercial centers for the exchange of goods throughout the Mediterranean basin and Middle East. Corinth, Miletus, Aegina, Athens, and others were major players in the classical period. Corinth had long been a center of trade between the western Greeks and the Aegean basin. By the fifth century, if not earlier, Athens supplanted Corinth as the chief commercial center of the Hellenic world. Athens became the keystone that linked commerce throughout the eastern Mediterranean.

In the Greek and Roman world, aristocratic bias prevented them from participating in commerce. Finley argues that their value system and social status prevented their participation in commerce. Wealth and social status were usually based on the possession of land. Supervision of their landed estates and participation in politics, as an obligation of citizenship, were the occupations of the nobility.¹⁹⁵ Although there is truth in Finley's argument, as in all societies, ideology often gives way to reality. There were aristocrats and other people of means who participated in commerce either directly or by financing commercial activities through surrogates. Finley acknowledges this. Unfortunately, to what extent aristocratic participation in commerce occurred is unknown. Lack of evidence prevents us from quantifying aristocratic participation in commerce.

In the Greek *polis*, metics (resident foreigners), nonresident foreigners, and the lower social classes participated in commerce. Metics as noncitizens could not own land or intermarry with citizens in the *polis*. Thus, they were excluded from agriculture. Therefore, the economic opportunities for metics and other foreigners were restricted to industry, commerce, or labor. Metics could be Greek or non-Greek. They probably existed in most of the larger *poleis* where economic opportunity was greatest.¹⁹⁶

Items of commerce include food, metals, minerals, timber, and luxury items. Commerce was conducted by private business. The Greeks of Asia Minor traded throughout the Mediterranean basin and the Persian Empire. Until the Peloponnesian War, Corinth had strong commercial ties with the western Greeks and areas of the Adriatic Sea.

Most *poleis* located near the sea participated to some degree in maritime trade. Through the Delian League and Empire, Athens dominated trade throughout the Aegean basin and the Black Sea. The Piraeus became a major port for the disembarkation of goods by international traders. Carthage, Tyre, Egypt, the Etruscan cities, and others sent traders to Athens, Corinth, Syracuse and other ports of call. Greek trade was not necessarily carried in Greek bottoms. Greek trade was international in character.

The Athenians relied on grain imports from the Black Sea to supplement home-grown grain. In the 350s Demosthenes says the Athenians imported four hundred thousand bushels of grain annually from the Black Sea and were the largest consumers in the Hellenic world (Dem.XX.31–33; XVIII.87).¹⁹⁷ By the time of the Peloponnesian War, control of the sea-lanes to the Black Sea to protect the grain fleets was critical to Athens' survival.¹⁹⁸ Thus, Athenian naval strategy was impacted by the need to feed the population. In the last decade of the Peloponnesian War, all the major naval battles occurred in the area of the Hellespont. It was imperative that the Athenians secured the sea-lanes to the Black Sea. Lysander's capture of the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami in 405 forced the Athenians to surrender from starvation. Sixty years later Philip II threatened Athens' lifeline when he sought control of the Hellespont.

The production of pottery was a major industry throughout the Mediterranean. The amphora jars, found by archaeologists throughout the Mediterranean, were the "shipping containers" of their day. Wine, olive oil, grain, fish, perfumes, salt, etc., were items widely dispensed in these clay containers. These amphora were easy to move and good for storage. Items, properly sealed, could survive for a considerable period of time in transit and storage.

Commerce was primarily moved by water since land transportation was limited, slow, and expensive. The commercial centers were located with easy access to the sea. Ships were privately owned and not licensed by the *polis*. No Greek *polis* had the equivalent of a modern-day merchant marine. Ships were not licensed or regulated by the *polis*. Their crews may range from local mariners to a multinational force. Trade was conducted by private individuals from many states. These traders often took their goods to the market that offered the best price. Capital investment combined with the inherent risks of trade necessitated that traders maximize their profits.

Although water-borne commerce was cheaper and more efficient, it was not risk-free. Ships for commerce were designed and built differently from warships.¹⁹⁹ Commercial ships were larger and moved by sail. A *holkas* (freighter) was a deep draft vessel with a large hold.²⁰⁰ Its hull could be sheathed in lead to prevent rotting. These

heavy ships were much slower and less maneuverable. However, they could sail on the open sea for days. These commercial ships rarely sailed during the winter season because of the hazardous weather for navigation.²⁰¹ In time of war, these commercial ships could not be converted into warships because of their design. Possessing limited crews, these freighters were vulnerable to hostile vessels.²⁰²

Piracy and privateering were also a risk of the sea (Thuc.1.13.5).²⁰³ Piracy was the unauthorized seizure of vessels by violent and illegal means. Privateering could be the enterprise of individuals or state sponsored in time of war. In a friendly port, pirates would sell the ship, cargo, sailors, and passengers for ransom. If people were not ransomed, they could be sold into slavery.

The concept of *katagein* (cargo seizure) was practiced by Greek *poleis* in times of need or crisis. In time of war or shortages (especially the food supply), state officials seized ships on the high sea or in port to provide for the requirements of its citizens.²⁰⁴ This was an acceptable practice to the Greeks. The officials may or may not reimburse the owners of the seized ships. Reimbursement may not have been at market price. To prevent seizures at sea, states would send out naval vessels to protect the ships. Plutarch mentions that Pericles had sixty triremes on regular patrol to practice their naval skills (Plut.*Per*.11.4). Presumably they were policing the sea-lanes. However, there were no permanent patrols of the sea-lanes. In winter, only the most daring mariners went to sea. In antiquity there was no international law acknowledging and protecting the freedom of the seas.

To provide facilities for the storage and repair of ships, the storage of commercial goods, as well as a refuge in bad weather, the commercial *poleis* improved and maintained their harbor facilities. The Piraeus became a commercial center, but it was first built as a naval base by Themistocles for the new navy built prior to the Persian War.²⁰⁵ The Great Harbor of Syracuse was developed in the fifth century for commercial purposes but also became a naval base under Dionysius I. What the quantity of commercial vessels sailing the Mediterranean was we do not know. Dating from the Bronze Age to the end of the Roman Empire, the Mediterranean is dotted with shipwrecks explored by underwater archaeologists. The literary sources report the number of warships engaged in battle and destroyed by storms. However, no figures exist for the quantity of commercial vessels plying the Mediterranean, Black, or the “wine-dark” sea of Homer’s Aegean.

Land transportation existed for local markets but was extremely costly. The oxen, mule, or donkey that pulled the carts required food and water. The size of the carts, often small two-wheeled vehicles, limited the amount of cargo that could be transported. There were few

roads and rarely paved with gravel. Roads were poorly maintained. Roads were built for military usage, not commercial activity. Since banditry was a scourge for overland transportation, protection money or travel in groups was required. There were no police forces to patrol the roads, but some *poleis* tried. Thucydides tells us that Corinth protected the land and sea trade through its territory (Thuc.I.13.5). The Athenians had officials responsible for the maintenance of roads. They used slave labor for that purpose (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*54.1). However, these roads were probably predominantly urban.

Labor

By the modern definition of economics, all resources are scarce. This applies to human labor as well. Despite the existence of a leisure class among the nobility or the professional army of the Spartans, it must be acknowledged that most men, women, and children worked long hours at hard physical labor to earn a living. As previously mentioned, the limited technology in agriculture and industry forced people to rely on the muscle power of their animals or themselves to produce crops and goods for themselves or the market. Thus, all items were manually produced. The production process ceased when the craftsman left the workbench, potters' wheel, the forge, etc. In between the planting and harvesting season, crops still needed to be tended for pest and weed control, watered in times of low rainfall, or perhaps guarded against natural predation. Livestock needed to be maintained. Women and children would be involved in domestic chores, such as food production, textile and wool production, and attend the crops when needed.

Labor existed in many forms within the *polis*. Labor could be men, women, children, free, serf, slave, citizen, noncitizen, resident alien, or transient. All could work in agriculture, industry, or commerce. Labor could be skilled (i.e., sculptor, metal worker, bookkeeper) or unskilled (i.e., miner, teamster, dockworker).²⁰⁶ People worked the land as a free owner, renter, and as compulsory labor (i.e., debt bondsmen, helotage, serf, or slave). In agriculture, industry, and commerce, an owner may work alongside or supervise a citizen, noncitizen, slave, or resident alien, etc. Workers required for public works (roads, temples, government buildings, etc.) were in competition with private demands.

There were many social, economic, and legal restrictions to the use of free labor in the Greek world.²⁰⁷ Voluntary subordination to the commands of another person, except in the military, and sharing the fruits of one's labor was considered a form of slavery.²⁰⁸ Xenophon suggests that a wage laborer is only better than a beggar

(Xen.*Mem.*II.8.1–5). Transient labor was also restricted because of the lack of political and legal protections in other *poleis* for noncitizens. To weaken these restrictions, the concept of the metic was recognized in Athens and other *poleis*. The resident alien was granted limited legal protections in exchange for the economic benefits provided to the *poleis*. Despite the monetization of the Hellenic world by the fifth century, there might have been a coin shortage to pay wages. Coinage was primarily minted for the commercial exchange of goods, pay for mercenaries, and rowers in the fleets of the major commercial *poleis* such as Athens and Corinth. Athens introduced pay in the fleet in the fifth century to entice the poor to provide the required manpower.

Since free labor and leisure time was scarce, the Athenians adopted pay for the lower classes to encourage them to participate in political affairs and the law courts in the last half of the fifth century (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*62.2). Pay was also provided for public works under Pericles.

Slavery was an integral part of the ancient economy. Slavery was not a moral dilemma in antiquity. Aristotle said slavery was natural. Men were by nature either free or slave (Arist.*Pol.*1254b.1–1255a2). There was no debate whether slavery was economically beneficial or profitable. Slavery was part of the economy. Slaves varied from chattel slaves living in horrid conditions to domestic slaves living in the home or business that were treated as friends or relatives. Whether slaves were owned by the state, temple, or privately, there was no political, cultural, religious, or philosophical opposition in any *polis*. Slavery existed in most societies since the dawn of history in the fourth millennium BC. To the Greeks, by definition, any person who was not Greek was a barbarian and, therefore, was less civilized. Any person who lived under monarchy was defined as a slave. Like the Romans, the Greeks freed some slaves. However, unlike the Romans, the Greeks did not emancipate slaves in large numbers nor incorporate them into the citizen body of the *polis*. Thus, a slave could attain freedom but never political participation in the *polis*. Emancipated slaves were not expelled from the *polis*, but their social position might have been similar to metics.²⁰⁹

Besides foreign slaves, there were Greek slaves. Greeks could fall into slavery from debt bondage. Greek law allowed a person's body to be used as security for a loan. Failure to pay the loan could force a person into bondage for a period of time until the debt was paid. This practice was curtailed in Attica in the sixth century after the reforms of Solon (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*VI.1; Plut.*Sol.*15.3–5). Greeks were also enslaved as war booty. The slave trade provided slaves to meet demand. Children of the poor could be sold in slavery. Children born to slaves remained slaves. Thus, slavery remained a perpetual institution.

Due to the scarcity of free labor and easy access to slave labor, slavery expanded in the classical period as the economy expanded. Households may use only a few slaves while the large agricultural estates used a few hundred. Slaves often were employed as overseers of the estate or a business while the owners dedicated themselves to the affairs of state. Mines employed many slaves because of the hazards of mining (Plut.*Nic.*4.2). An adult slave might have cost up to two hundred drachma.²¹⁰ Thus, as property, slave owners could have a considerable amount of wealth invested in their slaves.

Revenue

How did the *polis* fund itself? By definition, the *politeia* means the citizen and the constitution. The government was the citizens whether an oligarchy or democracy. Therefore, in theory, there was little distinction between private and public interest in certain areas. Public revenue that benefitted the state also benefitted the individual. There were no income taxes or property taxes on the individual or the business community to fund the state as exists in the modern world. Taxation fell on the citizens who met a minimum social and economic standard defined by the constitution. Taxation was imposed on commercial transactions. Revenue was raised by farming out public contracts such as mining. Revenue was also generated by renting public land.

The wealthy citizens were expected to use their resources to benefit the *polis*. For the provision of these public benefactions, the Greeks used the term *leitourgia* (liturgy). The provider was called a liturgist. The wealthy provided voluntary contributions to support the state in war or peace. The wealthy funded public works, temple construction, community festivals, the grain supply, military requirements, etc.²¹¹ The amount of the benefaction was determined by the liturgist. If the nobility did not voluntarily supply funds, they could be requisitioned to do so by *epidoseis* (special subscription/public benefaction).²¹² This occurred frequently in Athens during the fourth century. Lysias tells of an Athenian noble, during the last decade of the Peloponnesian War, who provided funds for the chorus for community festivals as well as the funding of a trireme for many years (Lys.XXI.1–5). If the account is true, the noble contributed over nine talents to community affairs.²¹³ Multiply this contribution by other nobles, we can see that the savings to the public treasury was considerable. Whether these contributions were voluntary or not, we must remember that after twenty years of war, the Athenian treasury was almost depleted. The ability of the Athenians to tax themselves, collect revenue from trade, and collect tribute from the empire was severely reduced. Thus, these

benefactions from the wealthy went a long way to sustain the *polis* in war. What is known of the Athenian nobles can be applied to the wealthy in other states. The Greeks relied on the wealthy as benefactors to their *polis*. What war or peace time expenditures might have been can only be speculated. To compensate the wealthy for their benefactions, the *polis* often would not tax the liturgist.

The largest asset and the main source of wealth of the nobility was land. However, by Greek law and custom, the land could not be taxed except in an emergency such as war. The Greeks viewed a tax on land as a form of tyranny (Dem.XXII.54–55).²¹⁴ Without a property tax on land, where did the revenue to sustain the *polis* come from?

One source of income was harbor and market dues. A fixed rate tax was applied to imports and exports.²¹⁵ Citizens and noncitizens paid the same tax rate. This tax fell on those engaged in commerce. Thus, the items taxed were industrial, agricultural, foreign, and domestic. In Athens, the metics would have supplied much of the revenue. Thus, citizens and foreigners contributed to the revenue of the *polis*.

Although mines were usually state owned, their daily operations were privately run. The *polis* contracted out these operations. In exchange for an agreed sum of money to the government, private contractors operated the mines with little oversight. Any profit above their costs belonged to the contractors. Thus, revenue was generated by the state without expanding the bureaucracy.

Tribute was another source of income. Athens received the “*phoros*” (tribute) from the allies, later as subjects, in the Athenian Empire. At the peak of prosperity, Athens received about six hundred talents annually from the empire (Thuc.II.13.3). Sparta received a part of this tribute in the fourth century after the defeat of Athens. In the fourth century, Athens received the *syntaxeis* (contributions) from the allies of the Second Athenian League. This revenue was smaller and less consistent than under the empire.

Court fines, confiscation of property (i.e., treason), rents of public land, poll tax, and war booty were other state sources of revenue. After the defeat of Xerxes, the Hellenic League members divided up the spoils after Plataea. After the defeat of Carthage, Syracuse received two thousand talents from the Carthaginians. Temple treasuries, accumulated through public and private contributions, could be used by the *polis* in emergencies as stated by Pericles (Thuc.II.13.4–5). Gold and silver in the form of coinage, bullion, and artifacts were stored in temples. These items were the property of the gods and their use was a sacrilege under normal circumstances. In the mid-fourth century the treasures at Delphi were stolen by the Phocians to support their armies against the Amphictyonic league in the Third Sacred War.

Emergency funds could be raised in war by the implementation of the *eisphora*.²¹⁶ This was a tax on wealth for military purposes only. This tax was implemented by many *poleis*. Aristotle mentions the tax in Sparta when he complains that the state treasury lacks money from poor management but leaves the citizens rich (Arist.*Pol.*1271b11–18). In Athens it was a tax on citizens and metics. This war tax is mentioned in the decree of Callias in 434/433 (M&L 58).²¹⁷ Thucydides states that Athens implemented it in 428 (Thuc.III.19). It was used periodically in the Peloponnesian War. How much revenue was generated by any *polis* is unknown.

One tax that was never implemented was a poll tax on the individual citizen. Nor was a personal income tax ever utilized. The Greeks assessed the wealth of individuals but never their income. In the fourth century Athens implemented an assessment of about six thousand talents on the “declared” wealth of its citizens in 378/377 and 354 (Polyb.II.62.7; Dem.XIV.19.30).²¹⁸ A tax on the citizen was viewed as a form of slavery (Dem.XXII.54–55). However, the metics of Athens were levied a poll tax. This tax symbolized their second-class status in Athenian society. In Athens, a male metic paid twelve drachmas annually while a female paid six drachmas.²¹⁹ Lacking the political rights of a citizen, metics could not appeal the tax unless they were granted special privileges. What the poll tax on metics in other *poleis* was is unknown. However, it is reasonable to assume that they paid a tax to supplement the public treasury.²²⁰

Although the *polis* had no annual budget and revenues could be uncertain, the Greek officials had a good idea what annual expenditures could be. Many states had magistrates to collect, spend, and be accountable for public funds. However, the actual collection of taxes was farmed out to private contractors. Inductive understanding of past revenue allowed government officials to project annual expenditures. Unlike modern governments operating under deficit spending and borrowing money to fund operations, the Greek *polis* only spent the revenue it collected. A shortfall in revenue meant that spending was halted whether for food, public construction, military requirements, etc. In its time, the Hellenic *polis* was a sophisticated and complicated system. Hellenic magistrates understood state finance.

All sources of revenue were exactly that. Revenue was designed to meet expenditures. Taxation was not used to protect agriculture, industry, and commerce from competition. There was no separate tax rate for domestic versus foreign goods. Taxation was not used to stimulate the economy or redistribute wealth as in the modern welfare state. Outside of maintaining the food supply and providing benefits for families of veterans, there was no social safety net for the poor. Health

care, shelter, education, public transportation, etc., was not provided for the populace. The lower classes were provided with a minimum amount of support to prevent *stasis* within the *polis*. The *polis* was the citizen body, which meant people with a minimum amount of wealth. The poor had little social standing because they could provide little benefit to the *polis*. Armies and fleets were mothballed if revenue could not finance the undertaking. Revenue did not prevent war, social conflict, or imperial ambition but it did limit what the citizens of the *polis* strived to achieve.

Wealth

How was wealth used in the Greek economy?²²¹ Wealth can be used in three ways; consumption, distribution, and production of goods and services. Wealth can be land, money, livestock, buildings, technology, jewelry, precious metals, ships, slaves, etc. Here we will talk about the liquid form of wealth, which means the money supply of coinage or bullion. How was money used? The people exchanged money for necessities, luxury items, loans, taxes, rent, etc. Money was used by the *polis*'s officials to pay for soldiers, sailors, public works, temple construction, public laborers, war indemnities, etc. Public and private money was donated to the gods for religious purposes and offerings of thanksgiving for victory and other benefits rendered to the individual or the *polis*. When not used, money was hoarded and buried by its owners. Archaeologists continue to discover these hoards. According to Meikle, this was a rational use of money when not needed.

The ancient monetary system provided a medium of circulation, not a means for the settlement of credit transactions. So the Greeks were a very long way from developing productive credit, and the hoarding of exchange value as coin, gold, or silver was simply the most useful and sensible thing to do with it.²²²

Was there an adequate amount of money in circulation to meet the demands of the economy? The answer is probably yes but quantitative evidence is lacking. We cannot measure the demand requirements. The rate of circulation of money is unknown. Therefore, we cannot determine with certainty if the money supply was adequate. If the money supply was inadequate, barter was an alternate form of exchange. Although gold coinage existed, most coinage was issued in silver in the form of some type of drachma (i.e., drachma, stater, and tetradrachma). Beginning with the fifth century, smaller denominations were issued in bronze for exchange. Whatever the demand, the money supply increased throughout the classical period. The expansion of

silver and gold mining and the adoption of coinage as a regular means of exchange encouraged this increase. Many *poleis* issued coinage even if they were not mercantile states. The Spartans retained their use of iron bars as money for their agricultural economy in the fifth century. Thus, their participation in the expansion of the Hellenic economy was restricted until they adopted coinage in the fourth century.²²³

What were the sources of increase? The expansion of mines made more metals available. Athens received silver from the mines at Laurium in Attica. A rich vein discovered in the 480s financed the new fleet. Carthage distributed silver from Spain throughout the Mediterranean. New mines in the Chalcidice region, Thrace, and Illyria were opened that provided gold and silver. Philip II would exploit the mines of Mount Pangaeum, near Amphipolis, and Damastium in Illyria in the middle of the fourth century to finance the rise of Macedonia. How much gold and silver was mined and its rate of entrance into the economy cannot be quantified to any degree of confidence.

-
- 177 (Finley 1973), 17–18.
- 178 (Finley 1973), 18–19. (Saller 2007), 90.
- 179 (Van Wees 2013), 230–231. He suggests that a prosperous “middling farmer” of the *zeugitai* class in Attica may have possessed between 34.5 acres (13.8 hectares) and 52.5 acres (21 hectares).
- 180 (Garnsey 1993), 8–16. Garnsey argues that food shortages were often but famine was rare.
- 181 (Sallares 2007), 17–18.
- 182 Ibid, 31.
- 183 (Davies 2007), 342.
- 184 (Von Reden 2007), 391–392.
- 185 Ibid, 391.
- 186 (Van Wees 2013), 230. Van Wees suggests that the average male adult required 7.6 measures (*medimnoi*) of grain and 2.5 measures (*metretai*) of wine annually for most of his diet. “A *medimnos* of barley or wheat weighed 27.5 and 33 kilograms, respectively; a *metretes* of wine or oil contained 38.88 liters.”
- 187 Athens and Corinth were probable exceptions. They may have imported grain as early as the sixth century BC.
- 188 (Scheidel 2007), 64.
- 189 (Von Reden 2007), 394–395.
- 190 (Garnsey 1993), 50. Garnsey mentions ancient authors who were aware of various types of seed adapted to different growing conditions. Thus farmers had choices for seed but they were limited.
- 191 (Scheidel 2007), 39. Scheidel argues for twenty to thirty years. (Ober 2015), 88–89. Ober argues that life expectancy was forty years for men and thirty-six years for women.
- 192 (Scheidel 2007), 41.
- 193 (Davies 2007), 347.
- 194 (Scheidel 2007), 80.
- 195 (Finley 1973), 46–51.
- 196 (De Ste. Croix 1972), 393.
- 197 Demosthenes figure is the lone piece of evidence in ancient literary sources that quantifies Athenian grain imports. Although a fourth-century statement, this figure has been inferred to apply to fifth-century Athens also.
- 198 (Garnsey 1993), 123. By this time, the population of Athens outstripped the food supply of Attica.
- 199 (De Ste. Croix 1972), 393–396.
- 200 (Hale 2009), XXV.
- 201 (Andocides 1968), Vol.1, 443. In *On the Mysteries*, Andocides, who was an Athenian merchant and owned multiple ships, states that a winter voyage was extremely hazardous (Andoc.1.137). Andocides lived during the late fifth to early fourth century.
- 202 Warships had sails but primarily relied on its rowers and steersmen for navigation. Naval ships were long, narrow, and smaller with shallow drafts. Warships were primarily designed for island hopping or hugging the coast rather than sailing across the open sea. The hazards of wind, current, weather, limited navigational instruments, and limited carrying capacity for food and water forced naval vessels to stay close to land.
- 203 (Ormerod 1978), 57–74. In his classic study, Ormerod analyzes the difference between piracy and privateering.

- 204 (Garnsey 1993), 143; 162. (Möller 2007), 382. (De Ste. Croix 1972), 47.
- 205 (Hale 2009), 112. The Athenian harbor at Phalerum was too small to handle an expanded war fleet. The Piraeus had three harbors. The smaller harbors of Zea and Munychia were for the navy only. Cantharus harbor on the west was for naval and commercial ships.
- 206 Plutarch lists the types of labor involved in the building program at Athens under Pericles (Plut.*Per.*12.6–7).
- 207 Free labor is defined as a person working for “oneself or family.” An individual’s labor is a commodity that is voluntarily exchanged for a wage (in kind, coin, or both) between the buyer and seller. (Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology* 1980), 67–69.
- 208 (Finley 1980), 72–77; and (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996), 1415. Slavery entails three fundamental characteristics. (1) A slave is “property” that originated from outside the society that one was introduced to. (2) A slave has no control over his body and is subject to the demands of the owner. (3) A slave is kinless. There is no legal prohibition that prevents the slave from being separated from a father, mother, mate or offspring. All offspring and succeeding generations are automatically slaves.
- 209 (Rhodes 2010), 204.
- 210 (Davies 2007), 354.
- 211 (Osborne 2002), 125. Liturgists in Athens provided one hundred thousand drachmas in a normal year.
- 212 (Garnsey 1993), 155–156. See Austin in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 549–550.
- 213 (Finley 1973), 150–151.
- 214 (Ober 1989), 226–230.
- 215 (Andocides 1968), 439. A 2 percent custom duty was imposed in Athens after the Peloponnesian War. Also, the collection of taxes was farmed out to tax collectors (Andoc.1.133). Harbor dues in the ports of the Chersonese earned two hundred talents in the fourth century (Dem.XXIII.110).
- 216 The *eisphora* may have been first introduced in Athens in 427 (Thuc.III.19.1).
- 217 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 154–161. Inscription number 58 mentions the *eisphora*. See Austin in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 541–548.
- 218 See Austin in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994). 547. This assessment relied on the integrity of the citizens reporting their wealth. The assessment was levied at a flat rate of 1–2 percent.
- 219 (Möller 2007), 378.
- 220 (Salmon 1984), 161–164. Salmon provides a discussion of the role of metics in Corinth but does not discuss their financial obligations to Corinth.
- 221 Wealth is separate from capital. Capital is defined as the use of present wealth to invest in opportunities to increase future wealth. Investment is the denial of immediate gain in exchange for potential greater future gain.
- 222 (Meikle 2002), 241.
- 223 One indication of the economic weakness of Sparta was the decline in citizenship. Many Spartans were disqualified from citizenship because of their inability to provide the material requirements for their *phheiditia* (common mess). The Spartan army consisted of about 8,000 citizens in 480 but was only about a thousand citizens in 371 at the battle of Leuctra.

The Rivalry

Hellas after Xerxes

In 478 the combined leadership provided by Sparta and Athens within the Hellenic League forced Persia from Hellas. Sparta enhanced its reputation as the leading land power while Athens emerged as the leading naval power. Sacked by Xerxes, Athens would need to be rebuilt. Suffering from the ravages and occupation of the Persian army, Boeotia, Phocis, and Thessaly needed time to repair the damage. Sparta and the Peloponnese were untouched by the ravages of war. Sparta was positioned to continue as the hegemon of the Hellenic League and continue the war against Xerxes. However, by the end of the year, Sparta passed the baton to Athens to continue the war. Athens accepted. From cooperation to suspicion to hostility, Athens and Sparta drifted apart. Athens' formation of the Delian League in 478/477, to continue the conflict with Persia, evolved into an empire in the following decades. The growth of this empire gave Athens the political, military, and economic base to challenge Sparta and the Peloponnesian League for hegemony in the Greek world. By 460 and then 431 their rivalry led to open warfare. In 404 the fifth century struggle for supremacy ended with the Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War. This twenty-seven-year conflict ended in the subordination of Athens to Sparta.

After 478 Sparta surrendered its leadership of the Hellenic League since it was unwilling to continue the war in Asia. The battleground of the war was transferred to the eastern Aegean and Asia Minor with the withdrawal of all Persian forces from Europe after Plataea. Following its refusal to aid the Asiatic Greeks during the Ionian Revolt (499–493), Sparta again refused to interfere in Asiatic affairs. Spartan embarrassment by the Regent Pausanias, with his arrogant leadership of the Greek fleet in 478, forced his recall and trial for his dictatorial methods and possible medism. The failed mission of King Leotychidas II to punish Thessaly and his exile for bribery spelled further distrust within Sparta of the monarchs' behavior. This behavior strengthened the Spartan ephors' resolve to avoid overseas adventures that may corrupt other Spartans (Thuc.I.95.3–6; I.130). Thus, Sparta had little desire to involve itself in Greek affairs outside

the mainland. The Spartans were content to adopt a policy of isolationism within the Peloponnese. They also did not know at the time that the Persians would not return again. Ten years had elapsed between Marathon and Xerxes's invasion in 480. Spartan leadership was willing to fight in Hellas but not Asia Minor. How and why did Sparta surrender leadership of the Hellenic alliance? Let us begin the story.

Foundation of the Delian League

During the winter of 479/478 the Athenians returned a second time to their devastated city. Under the guidance of Themistocles, the Athenians began to build new walls to protect their city. Sparta and the Peloponnesian allies initially opposed these new walls. Whether from fear of a renewed attack by Persia or suspicion of Athens' intentions, the Spartans requested that the walls not be built. Themistocles went to Sparta to allay Spartan fears about the walls. Thucydides says that he delayed meeting with the Spartan ephors to allow time to build the walls to a defensible level. However, the negotiations proceeded, the Spartans ultimately did nothing to prevent the construction of these walls and accepted Themistocles argument that the Athenians had a right to protect themselves. With the Persian menace still hanging over their heads, the Spartans were unwilling to sever the alliance. The Athenians were now prepared to defend their city by land and sea against a renewed Persian assault. Thucydides states that the walls were built in haste. This suggests that the construction was for defense against Persia rather than as a challenge to Spartan hegemony. Upon completion of these walls, the fortification of the Piraeus was renewed to protect the fleet and develop the harbor (Thuc.I.89.3–93.8; Plut. *Them.* 19.1–2; Diod.XI.39–43).

In the spring of 478 the Spartan ephors assigned Pausanias to replace King Leotychidas as commander of the Greek fleet. Leotychidas was assigned a campaign against Thessaly to punish the Thessalians for their medism (Hdt.VI.72). Accompanied by twenty ships from the Peloponnese, thirty ships from Athens, and ships from other *poleis*, Pausanias would continue the offensive against Persia in the eastern Aegean. Since the size of the fleet was much smaller than the previous year, its principal aim was probably to encourage further revolts against Persia. After Mycale, the remnant of the Persian fleet was no longer a major threat. The Greeks sailed for Cyprus to liberate the Greek *poleis* on the island. Next they sailed for Byzantium and liberated it from the Persian garrison still stationed there (Thuc.I.94). The control of Byzantium blocked the Bosphorus and Hellespont as access points for a renewed Persian assault on Hellas. It also secured

the sea-lanes to the Black Sea.

At Byzantium, for reasons unknown, Pausanias developed an arrogant attitude and alienated the allies (Plut.*Arist.*23.2–4). The allies voiced their grievances in Sparta and the ephors recalled Pausanias to explain his actions. Rumors were circulating that Pausanias had made secret overtures to the Persians. Thucydides suggests that the rumors were true. However, this is doubtful. Pausanias was not in Byzantium long to begin a correspondence. Besides, his prestige after Plataea was too great to believe that he made overtures with Persia. Pro-Persian accusations against Pausanias and Themistocles years later might have convinced Thucydides of Pausanias guilt at this time.²²⁴ Put on trial in Sparta, Pausanias was acquitted of all charges. Although acquitted, Spartan suspicions remained. Pausanias was not assigned another command. As his replacement, the Spartans sent Dorcis with a small contingent to the fleet. However, he was not accepted as commander by the allies and returned to Sparta (Thuc.1.95; Diod.XI.44). Sparta sent no further replacements. By now the Spartans knew that the allies had requested the Athenians to take over the leadership of the alliance. Thucydides claims that Sparta wanted to abandon the war against Persia but at what time they made this decision, we are not told. Was it before or after the formation of the Delian League?

Alienated by the behavior of Pausanias, Thucydides and Plutarch state that the allies, but probably excluding the Peloponnesians, approached Aristides, the commander of the Athenian contingent, to request that the Athenians assume command of the alliance. Herodotus and Aristotle claim that the initiative was with the Athenians (Thuc.1.95.1; Hdt.VIII.3; *Arist.AthPol.*23.4–5; Plut.*Arist.*23.4–24.3). Regardless of whose initiative, negotiations between Aristides and the allies probably occurred in late summer or early fall of 478. Since Chios, Lesbos, and Samos represented the largest contingents in the fleet, excluding Athens, it is reasonable to suggest that the commanders of these contingents conducted the initial negotiations. After a preliminary agreement, envoys were sent to other Greek *poleis* inviting them to join the alliance. Headquartered at Delos in the Cyclades, under the protection of Apollo, the alliance would, thus, have the sanction of the gods. In the spring of 477 the members of this new Delian League met at Delos to swear an oath of alliance.

How large the original membership was is unknown. Thucydides does not say. Thucydides limits his discussion of the League to two brief sections (Thuc.1.96–97.1). In addition to Lesbos, Chios, and Samos, the league probably included Naxos (north Aegean), Byzantium (the Bosphorus), some Chalcidian *poleis* (bordering Macedonia), the *poleis* of Lindus, Camirus, and Ialysus (on Rhodes),

the islanders of the Cyclades, and some *poleis* along the coast of Asia Minor. Thucydides says that the members were assessed 460 talents as tribute (*phoros*) to finance the League activities. The larger *poleis* provided ships while others gave money. When and if this assessment was collected is subject to debate. It is doubtful that this assessment was completed and collected in 477. It is probable that initially the allies funded the ships, manpower, and supplies from their own resources until the assessment process was completed.²²⁵ Aristides was assigned the assessment of the allies (Plut.*Arist.*24.1–2). Plutarch, ever the moralist, emphasizes the altruistic spirit of Aristides to prove his reputation for justice. We can be more skeptical and claim that Aristides's decisions were the result of his skill as a politician and diplomat. He was an Athenian first and a Greek second.

At some point the Athenians assigned ten *hellenotamiai* (Hellenic treasurers) to oversee the collection of the funds. The money would be stored in the temple of Apollo at Delos. The allies were autonomous and the alliance was a *symmachia* (offensive/defensive alliance) against Persia. An oath was sworn to have “the same enemies and friends” which gave a religious sanction to the alliance (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*23.5). The allies took the oath individually, and Aristides swore on behalf of Athens. Metal ingots were tossed into the sea signifying the alliance was for perpetuity (Plut.*Arist.*24.4–25.1). The oath might have originally contained a clause that members could not withdraw from the alliance (M&L 40).²²⁶

Historians call this alliance the Delian League. To the Hellenes it was the “The Athenians and their Allies.” How did it function? It was a dual alliance similar to the Peloponnesian League. Athens was the acknowledged hegemon of the League. The commanders of the League were appointed by Athens. League policy was determined in meetings by all members. Meetings were initially held in the temple of Apollo on Delos. We are not told when they met or how often. It is reasonable to suggest that regular meetings were scheduled, perhaps in the spring, prior to the campaigning season. All members were equal with one vote each (Thuc.III.10.4–5). Majority vote determined league actions. As hegemon, Athens might have had veto power over League actions, but this is uncertain. Likewise, it is doubtful that Athens initially pursued policies that the league members disapproved. The League council was unicameral, unlike the bicameral council of the fourth century league.²²⁷ The procedural process for conducting and voting in League meetings is unknown. As the limited evidence demonstrates, our understanding of the formation of the Delian league leaves us with more questions than answers.

Athenian-Spartan Friendship

Although Athens was now the acknowledged leader of a new alliance, Sparta remained hegemon of the Peloponnesian League and Hellenic League since the Greeks were still at war with Persia. The goodwill, established during Xerxes's invasion, continued for the next fifteen years between these two powers. Despite disagreements, leadership by both states worked to maintain the goodwill created in the Hellenic alliance against Persia. The other twenty-nine members of the Hellenic League eventually chose sides between Athens and Sparta, but for now they were content to allow peace to return to the homeland.

The Athenians, with a newfound confidence born from Marathon, Salamis, Mycale, and the new democracy of Cleisthenes, had a political and social harmony not seen before. Aristocrats, hoplites, and *thetes* participated in this victory. All social groups continued to share in the burdens of war against Persia in the eastern Aegean. The nobility still guided the *polis* through control of the Areopagus and the magistracies. They were the archons and generals (*strategoí*) who guided policy and gave commands in battle. However, without the hoplites for the infantry and the *thetes* to row the ships, Athenian leadership would not have been able to guide the new alliance. The Council of Five Hundred and the Assembly required the participation of all the social classes throughout Attica. With this new spirit, the citizens wanted to rebuild Athens to a level not witnessed before. The generation of Pericles that brought the golden age of Athens was built upon the accomplishments of this generation.

Sparta, secure in the accomplishments from Thermopylae, Plataea, and Mycale, remained content to dominate the Peloponnese. Dreams of expansion and empire were not part of the Spartan agenda. A land-based power, Sparta wished to remain so. Its political constitution of two kings, five ephors, a *Gerousia* of thirty members (twenty-eight elders and the two kings), and an Assembly of Spartiates was derived from its political development through the sixth century. The *Gerousia* determined policy that was then approved by the Assembly and finally implemented by the kings and ephors. The Lycurgan constitution remained unaltered.²²⁸ The conservative leadership in Sparta would not look beyond the horizon of the Peloponnese.

The immediate experience of Spartan corruption and abuse of power, by its citizens abroad in the aftermath of Xerxes retreat, confirmed for the political leaders that they should focus on their control of the Peloponnese. The accusation and exile for bribery of King Leotychidas after his failed Thessalian campaign discredited his leadership. The trial of the Regent Pausanias, although acquitted,

provided evidence that his leadership skills of the Greeks were in dire need of improvement. The poor performance of Leotychidas and Pausanias convinced the Spartan political leaders to fear outside temptations and the possible threat to their constitution and way of life. With the return to isolationism, the Spartans would not fight the Persians again until the campaigns in the 390s.

The Growth of Athenian Power

With the acceptance of the leadership of the Delian League, Athens led the Greeks to multiple victories throughout the Aegean in the coming years. The early activities of the alliance are scantily known. Thucydides records only a few items and none in detail for intra-league relations. Documenting the fifty years prior to the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides provides a PowerPoint presentation illustrating the growth of Athenian power. We get little analysis, few dates, and a debatable sequence of events. From Plutarch, Diodorus, inscriptions, and bits and pieces of information by other authors, we gather further snapshots of what happened. However, we still cannot produce a motion picture that tells the story of the development of the Delian League and its relation to the Greek world or Persia. The events and dates related are hotly debated among historians with few issues resolved. Therefore, the story related here is not written in stone. More questions than answers remain.

In 476/475 the alliance, under the leadership of Cimon, captured the Persian base at Eion in Thrace, and the island of Scyros, a haven for pirates, off the east coast of Euboea. Colonists were sent to Scyros, presumably from Athens. Colonists may also have been sent to settle along the Strymon River north of Eion (Plut.*Cim.*7.3).²²⁹ This area was known for timber and the gold and silver mines near Mt Pangaeum. These resources would have provided an economic asset to Athens and the League. These mines were expanded in the fourth century under Philip II of Macedon. If the colony existed, it was destroyed by the natives at an unknown date. The Athenians recolonized the area in 437 when they founded Amphipolis (Thuc.IV.102.2–4). Sometime within the next five years, Carystus, on Euboea, was forced to join the Delian League (Thuc.I.98.1–3; Plut.*Cim.*7–8.5). Control of these sites added to the security of the grain route from Athens to the Black Sea, which followed the north Aegean coastline.

Athenian suppression of the island of Naxos in the central Aegean, when it revolted in 469, strengthened its control of the alliance (Thuc.I.98.4). Why the Naxians revolted, we are not told. However, Thucydides provides a clue when he says that the allies eventually

were unwilling to provide their share of tribute and military contributions. They were also resentful of Athenian leadership (Thuc.I.99.2). Their grievances are not stated. Whether the Athenians were enforcing the oath of the League or not, they sent a message to all members that secession from the alliance would not be tolerated. Thucydides states that the Athenians enslaved the populace of Naxos (Thuc.I.98.4). The meaning of this is unclear. It is unlikely that the entire populace was enslaved. It probably means that the Naxians were reduced from equal allies in the League to subject status of Athens. The terms of surrender for the Naxians are not recorded. Naxos was the first *polis* to suffer this fate. It was not the last.

The next event recorded by Thucydides was the Athenian victory at the Eurymedon River in southwest Asia Minor sometime between 469 and 466. This victory under Cimon's leadership over the Persians removed the latest threat to the Aegean. This was the last great battle between Persia and the Greeks under Xerxes's reign. Like Mycale, it was a combined land and fleet operation. What the origin of this engagement was is open to speculation. We are not informed of military campaigns by the League or Persia in the preceding years. Were the Athenians conducting offensive operations along the coast of Asia Minor to recruit new members to the alliance? Were the Persians preparing a counteroffensive or resisting Greek aggression? What were Cimon's objectives in this particular campaign? The answers remain speculative. We are not told what Cimon's mission was before he sailed to the Eurymedon. Nor was there a follow up to the Greek victory. Informed that the Persians were building a fleet, Cimon sailed with a fleet of at least two hundred triremes to Asia Minor and then to Pamphylia.²³⁰ At the Eurymedon, he encountered the Persian fleet, which had better than three hundred ships. How the battle was fought is unknown. The Persian fleet lost two hundred triremes. After defeating the Persian fleet, Cimon landed his forces and defeated the Persian army. He followed this up with the capture of another eighty Phoenician triremes that arrived after the battle (Thuc.I.100.1; Plut.*Cim.*12–13.4; Diod.XI.60–61). Greek casualties are unknown, but the sources suggest that the battle was hard fought. If casualties were severe, it could be an explanation why the victory was not exploited in nearby Cyprus, with its substantial Greek population, or some other location. Much booty was captured, and Cimon used part of the booty to rebuild the south wall of the Acropolis (Plut.*Cim.*13.6).

In 465/464 the people of Thasos revolted due to an economic dispute with Athens over trading posts and a mine that the Thasians operated on the Thracian coast. Thasos was a large and prosperous island in the north Aegean and one of the stronger powers within the alliance. Trade with the people in Thrace was an important part of the

economy. The extent of the commerce cannot be quantified. The mine, though not specified, was probably a gold or silver one. What compelled Athens to interfere with the affairs of Thasos? Thrace was known for its gold and silver mines. Was Athens now striving for economic domination as well as military domination of the Aegean coast? Or was Athens trying to reduce the Persian base at Doriscus by controlling the Thracian coast opposite Thasos? Prior to the revolt, Cimon campaigned in the Chersonese area against the Persians.²³¹ Persia still had a base at Doriscus, east of Thasos, on the Hebrus River. After the revolt began, Athens sent ten thousand colonists composed of Athenians and league members to Nine Ways on the Strymon River. Was this colony planned before or after the revolt of Thasos? We do not know. If before the revolt, this colony might have factored in the Thasians decision to abandon the alliance. Whatever the reasons, the Thasians revolted and were subsequently defeated at sea by the Athenians. After the defeat at sea, the Thasians were besieged by the Athenians (Thuc.I.100.2–3; Plut.*Cim.*14.1–2).

Thasos appealed to Sparta for support, which was initially granted. However, a major earthquake occurred at Sparta in 464. The loss of life and destruction that resulted prevented Spartan aid to Thasos. The Messenian helots launched a revolt against Sparta. Suppression of this revolt required all of Sparta's resources. After three years of resistance, Thasos surrendered in 463/462. The terms of surrender required the Thasians to tear down their city walls, surrender their triremes, abandon their trading posts and mine, and become a tribute paying member of the Delian League (Thuc.I.101–102). Like Naxos, Thasos was reduced to subject status with the loss of the walls, navy, and commercial relations with Thrace. Hellenic political theory viewed the loss of city walls and a reduction of hinterland as symbols of the loss of independence of the *polis*.²³²

The reduction of Thasos concludes the story of the first fifteen years of the Delian League. Beginning as an alliance of equals under the leadership of Athens with the purpose of opposing Persia, the League was successful in removing the Persian threat. Except for Doriscus, the Persians were eliminated along the Aegean coast of Thrace, the Hellespont and Bosphorus up to Byzantium was liberated, and the coast of Asia Minor to Caria was under control of the Delian League. While fighting Persia, the internal structure of the league changed. More states became tributary rather than supply ships and manpower. The islands of Scyros, Naxos, and Thasos were reduced to subject status under the control of Athens. Finally, Athens emerged as the dominant partner rather than the first among equals. The military power of Athens, through the fleet, grew while that of the allies declined. The years from 478 to 460 witnessed the growth of Athenian

power in the Aegean. In the 450s Athens would attempt expansion in the southern Mediterranean (Egypt) and the Greek mainland. However, before we describe these events, we must look at events that occurred on the Hellenic mainland in the aftermath of the Persian defeat.

The Athenian Home Front

On the home front Themistocles urged the Athenians to secure themselves against interference from Sparta with the rebuilding of their city walls in 478. Sparta's initial objections turned to acceptance once the walls were completed. Themistocles next convinced the Athenians to fortify the Piraeus to secure the base for the fleet (Plut.*Them.*19.2–3). The Piraeus and the fleet were more important to Athenian security than the city itself (Thuc.1.93.7). About this time, at a meeting of the Amphictyonic League, the Spartans proposed a measure to ban those Greek states that medized from membership in the League council. Themistocles successfully opposed this measure to prevent the extension of Spartan influence in the League and central Greece to the detriment of Athens (Plut.*Them.*20.3).²³³ With the security of the city and port completed, the Athenians began to rebuild the city. This reconstruction process would take decades and would only end in the 430s when war with Sparta appeared imminent.

What was the political scene? The internal political scene witnessed a rivalry between Cimon, the son of Miltiades, and Themistocles. Unfortunately, apart from general statements, we have little evidence of Themistocles's activities. Cimon, representing the nobility, wanted to continue the friendly policy toward Sparta that was forged in the war with Xerxes.²³⁴ He also advocated a continuance of the war against Persia. Themistocles encouraged the Athenians to be more aggressive in the leadership of Hellas. He probably minimized the Persian threat after the defeat of Xerxes. Themistocles was not necessarily anti-Spartan but pro-Athenian while encouraging the expansion of Athenian power.²³⁵ He viewed Sparta as an impediment to the growth of Athenian power. Annually elected a *strategos* from 476, Cimon repeatedly led the League forces until his ostracism in 461. Aristides, who rivaled Themistocles in the 480s, appears to fade into the background after the foundation of the Delian League. Occasionally he is mentioned as a supporter of Themistocles (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*23.3–24). However, neither Aristides nor Themistocles was appointed commander of League forces.²³⁶ Xanthippus, who commanded the Athenians at Mycale, is not heard of again. He probably died at some date prior to 472 when his son Pericles became the *choregos* for the performance of Aeschylus's play *Persae* (The

Persians).²³⁷ The rivalry between Cimon and Themistocles lasted until the ostracism of Themistocles in 472/471. The continuous military leadership of Cimon demonstrates that his pro-Spartan policy predominated. Unfortunately for Hellas, this policy ended when Cimon was ostracized in 461.

Despite the emphasis of the rivalry, the literary sources mention little of the policy debates or the intensity of the rivalry. While Cimon was annually elected to the office of *strategos*, Themistocles held no major office. Themistocles last recorded action is that of *choregos* for Phrynichus's play in 476 (Plut.*Them.*5.4). We are told that Themistocles was honored for his service against Xerxes. Cimon's popularity now overshadowed Themistocles's past service. In time, the Athenians grew tired of Themistocles's actions when he continuously reminded them of his service to the *polis* (Plut.*Them.*22). After his ostracism, Themistocles went in exile to Argos. A few years later while residing in Argos, he was accused of medism by the Spartans in complicity with the disgraced Pausanias, who recently died. The charge might have been false, but the Athenians agreed to arrest him to stand trial for treason. Unwilling to defend himself, Themistocles fled and eventually arrived in Asia where he was granted asylum by the Great King Artaxerxes I in 465. He was given an estate to live on and died in exile at Magnesia at age sixty-five (Thuc.1.135–138; Plut.*Them.*22–31; Diod.XI.54).

Cimon and his allies in the nobility dominated Athenian politics. However, his dominance was challenged in the 460s by Ephialtes and his supporter Pericles (Plut.*Per.*7.5–6). Though little is known about Ephialtes, he was acclaimed a spokesman for the *demos*. Aside from his reform, there is no mention of Ephialtes's prior actions in the political arena. However, he might have served as a *strategos* since Plutarch states that he led a fleet of thirty ships to the southeastern area of Asia Minor (Plut.*Cim.*13.5). He wanted to expand the participation of the lower classes in the government. His reform of the Areopagus in 462/461 issued in a major constitutional change. This reform brought about the direct democracy that we identify with Athens from Pericles to Demosthenes. What was this reform?

The council of the Areopagus was composed of all the ex-archons. This council, which existed before the time of Solon, had administrative and legislative responsibilities. It was the "guardian of the laws" (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*4.4). The nine archons, annually selected, were the supreme magistrates of Athens and this magistracy was restricted to the nobility. The Athenian calendar year was named after the eponymous (chief) archon. Themistocles and Aristides were archons in the 490s. After the reforms of Cleisthenes, many legislative responsibilities were given to the Council of Five Hundred and the

Assembly. However, the Areopagus continued to oversee the magistrates and their performance in government. If they misbehaved, the magistrates could be tried before the Areopagus. The Areopagus also had judicial powers over private citizens in criminal and civil cases. Aristotle states that the prestige of the Areopagus was high after the Persian wars (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*23.1).²³⁸ Since the membership was composed of the nobility, it was perceived to be a check on the will of the *demos*. Also, the *stratego*i had now replaced the archons as the chief magistrates of the *polis*. The office of *strategos* had evolved from a military position to a political/military position and leaders could be reelected annually. Themistocles, Aristides, and Cimon served as a *strategos*.

The growth of Athenian power was based on the power of the fleet (Arist.*Pol.*1291b20–24; 1304a20–24). The rowers of the fleet were free men of the *thetes* class. They were the backbone of the fleet.²³⁹ Their skills learned in battle could not easily be replaced. Rowing a trireme was a difficult exercise and required much training. Athens did not employ slave labor as rowers. A fleet of one hundred ships required 17,000 rowers. The three upper classes served as hoplites or cavalry.²⁴⁰ Their combined manpower was insufficient to man the ships if the *thetes* were excluded. The generals commanded the army and the fleet. Ephialtes was the spokesman for these men who rowed the triremes. The reform of the Areopagus enhanced the power of the *thetes* by weakening the power of the nobility (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*27.1).

The reform of Ephialtes is open to much debate. No literary source discusses the exact nature of the reforms. Nor has a contemporary inscription been discovered that might shed light on the subject. Aristotle states that many judicial powers and government oversight, that the members of the Areopagus performed, were removed and divided between the Council of Five Hundred and the Assembly (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*25). However the reform was passed, it occurred during the absence of Cimon, while he was on campaign in the Peloponnese (Plut.*Cim.*15; *Per.*9.3–4). The absence of the four thousand hoplites with Cimon might have removed a conservative obstacle within the Assembly to Ephialtes's reform. Aristotle states that prior to the reform, Ephialtes was prosecuting members of the Areopagus for their actions as archons. These trials might have occurred prior to their entrance into the Areopagus and over a period of years prior to 462. In 463 Pericles, in his first recorded political action representing the *demos*, prosecuted Cimon unsuccessfully for bribery by the Macedonian king while he campaigned in Thrace (Plut.*Cim.*14.2–4).²⁴¹

The powers transferred to the Council of Five Hundred and the

Assembly might have centered about the concept of *eisangelia* (impeachment/ treason).²⁴² In the early sixth century, under Solon, the Areopagus reviewed magistrates (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*8.2). Later the magistrates were subject to review before, during, and after their term of office. Trial for an impeachable offense went before the Areopagus. What was an impeachable offense? Was it a threat to establish a tyranny, accepting bribes, ignoring the wishes of the people, not enforcing a law of the people, etc.? The answers are debatable. Whatever powers were removed, the end result was the transference of judicial and supervisory functions to the legislative bodies and the courts.

The result was the weakening of the nobility and the strengthening of the *demos* to conduct affairs of state. Policies of state, magisterial actions, military affairs, judicial review, etc., were answerable to the people in the Assembly. Archons and other officials now answered directly to the people. Within five years, the *zeugitai* were eligible for the archonship (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*26.2).²⁴³ At an unknown date, but perhaps after 461, a law was passed authorizing pay for jurors (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*27.4–5).²⁴⁴ Payment of jurors subsidized their income while performing their civic duty in the various courts (*dikasteria*) of the *Heliaia* (or Heliaea).²⁴⁵ By mid-century, six thousand citizens were annually selected to be jurors. Jury size ranged from fifty-one to 1,501 citizens contingent on the type of case adjudicated. The verdict was decided by majority vote.²⁴⁶ The bottom line is that the judicial powers of the Areopagus were reduced to a few crimes, which included murder. The people in the *Heliaia*, not the nobility, would be the “guardian of the laws.”

When Cimon returned to Athens, he tried to get the reform overturned. He failed (Plut.*Cim.*15.). The political animosity stirred by this reform must have been high. Shortly afterwards, Ephialtes was murdered by Aristodicus of Tanagra according to Aristotle. The assailant was never identified according to other writers. How, when, and why he was killed is unknown. The assumption is that he was murdered for political reasons (Plut.*Per.*10.7). Although the people would continue to elect nobles to the office of *strategos* until the end of the century, through the power of judicial review, the people were now supreme. As will be seen, shortly after this reform, Cimon was ostracized for his pro-Spartan policy. The 450s would see a more aggressive Athens in the First Peloponnesian War. The Delian League would become the empire. Before we examine these events, we must look at the internal affairs of Sparta.

Spartan Problems in the Peloponnese

While the Athenians were rebuilding their city and enlarging the Delian League, the Spartans, despite internal disenchantment with the growth of Athenian power, did little to prevent it (Thuc.I.92; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*23.2; Diod.XI.50.5–8). The Spartans were occupied with political developments within the Peloponnese. Conflicts with Elis, Tegea, Mantinea, and Argos are recorded. Tegea and Mantinea had a history of independent actions from Sparta. The *synoikismos* (synoecism) of the villages of Elis into a *polis* about 471/470 consolidated their political and military positions (Diod.XI.54.1).²⁴⁷ Though the Eleans did not fortify the city, they incorporated some border territory with Arcadia into their new *polis*. Whatever their viewpoint, the Spartans undertook no hostile actions against Elis. The synoecism of Elis may not have been viewed as a threat by Sparta. Whether Mantinea, like Elis, formed a *polis* now or earlier, the Mantineans built a wall to protect the city and assert their independence from Spartan interference. This assertion of independence by the Mantineans must have caused some political discussion in Sparta. However, Sparta took no hostile action against Mantinea.

At an uncertain date between 473/469 a battle at Dipaea between Sparta and the Arcadians, except Mantinea, is recorded. Also, Tegea and Argos fought a battle against Sparta at Tegea within this timeframe (Paus.III.11.7–8). The origins and details of these engagements are unknown. Perhaps Argos was again challenging Spartan supremacy in the Peloponnese. A new generation of Argives had grown up since the last engagement in 494 at Sepea. The Spartans emerged victorious in these encounters. After these events, despite the earthquake and the Helot Revolt in 465/464, no Peloponnesian state threatened Spartan hegemony. The events outlined are basically unknown except for a few literary fragments. Again we have snapshots but cannot create the motion picture of Spartan problems in the Peloponnese.

Internally Sparta dealt with the problem of Pausanias. Although he was acquitted in 478 for his behavior leading the Greek fleet, Pausanias was an ambitious person. Sparta never again sent him out in an official capacity. Consequently, he left Sparta as a private citizen and sailed to Byzantium. His private adventures are recorded by Thucydides but not dated. Perhaps a decade occurred for the following events to play out. His escapades include controlling Byzantium until expelled by the Athenians in 470 and then living in the Troad at Colongae. He is alleged to have continued his contact with the Persian Artabazus to become master of Hellas. Informed of his suspicious behavior, Sparta recalled him under threat of war if he did not comply. Pausanias returned and was jailed by the ephors. Eventually he was

released to stand trial before the *Gerousia*. The evidence against him was not definitive to convict a member of the royal house. His behavior confirmed to the officials that he did not want to live by Spartan customs. Eventually he was suspected of encouraging a helot revolt to gain power. Helot informers still could not convince the authorities of Pausanias's guilt. The last piece of evidence occurred when Argilus, Pausanias's confidant, provided evidence of his continued correspondence with Artabazus. Informed of his imminent arrest, Pausanias fled to the temple of Athena of the Brazen House in Sparta.²⁴⁸ He was imprisoned in the temple and starved until near death. To avoid sacrilege, he was removed from the temple by the Spartan authorities prior to death. He died immediately upon removal from the temple and was eventually buried near the temple (Thuc.I.128.3–134). His death in 466 was basically an execution. Aside from an accusation of cowardice in battle, his medism and plot to encourage a helot revolution were probably the ultimate violations of Spartan values.

Immediately after the death of Pausanias, the Spartans informed the Athenians of accusations against Themistocles. Like Pausanias, Themistocles was accused of conspiring with Persia against Hellas. What evidence was provided is unknown. Thucydides does not say. The Athenians agreed to arrest and punish Themistocles. Athens and Sparta demanded that Argos surrender Themistocles. Believing that Argos would comply, Themistocles fled Hellas and eventually settled in Asia Minor with an endowment granted from the King Artaxerxes I. Thucydides says that he died a natural death although there were rumors that he committed suicide (Thuc.I.135–138). Despite their deeds against Xerxes, these two heroes of Hellas were condemned by their fellow citizens.

Themistocles and Pausanias

Despite the ultimate fate of Pausanias and Themistocles, Thucydides says that they were the most distinguished Greeks of their day (Thuc.I.138.6). Themistocles, the hero of Salamis, fought at Marathon and Salamis against Persia. In 482 he convinced the Athenians to use the silver at Laurium to build a fleet rather than reward themselves with a few drachma each (Hdt.VII.144; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*23.1–2). This fleet brought victory over Persia and became the foundation for the empire. After Xerxes's defeat, he secured the new fortification walls around Athens and the Piraeus. He encouraged the development of the Piraeus as the naval base for the fleet. The fleet replaced the army as the basis of Athenian power. The

rowers of the fleet came from the *thetes*. Their empowerment led to their eventual participation as full citizens of the *polis* through the power of the Assembly. Consequently, the democracy of Pericles entailed the participation of all Athenian citizens. As the father of the Athenian navy, Themistocles contributed to the development of the democracy. Despite these accomplishments, Themistocles wore out his welcome in Athens with his desire for power, influence, and honors. At his death, Athens was still at war with Persia. Themistocles secured Athenian freedom but was not allowed to die peacefully in Athens as an honored hero. Thucydides later eulogized Themistocles as a man of genius, vision, action, and resolution (Thuc.1.138.2–3).

Without studying a subject in advance or deliberating over it later, but using simply the intelligence that was his by nature, he had the power to reach the right conclusion in matters that have to be settled on the spur of the moment and do not admit of long discussion, and in estimating what was likely to happen, his forecasts of the future were always more reliable than those of others.²⁴⁹

Pausanias, the victor of Plataea, was a joint savior of Hellas with Themistocles. His ability to lead the Hellenic alliance to victory over the Persian army secured for the Hellenes the independence they craved. His regency for the son of King Leonidas enhanced the prestige of Spartan arms. Pausanias was hailed a great commander. Apparently his lust for honors and power alienated the allies and his fellow Spartiates. Why he ultimately made overtures to Persia remains a mystery. For whatever reason, the *polis* of Sparta was too small for his ambition. Forced to return to Sparta a second time for suspicious activities, the Spartan authorities were convinced of Pausanias's guilt for medism and revolution. He died alienated and disgraced from his fellow citizens. He would not be the last Spartan to succumb to ambition and the desire for power. The words of Hecuba, bemoaning her fate and that of Troy in *The Women of Troy* by Euripides, apply to the fortunes of these two men.

Good fortune means Nothing; call no man happy till the day he dies.²⁵⁰

The fate of these two men foreshadowed the fate of their respective cities. Their lust for fame and power and their ultimate destruction was a precursor to the demise of both cities in the fourth century. The saviors of Sparta, Athens, and Hellas—they were buried without any memorials in their native land. The *hubris* of man, mentioned multiple times by the Athenian tragedians, was ultimately demonstrated by these two men.²⁵¹ Their pride, ambition, and perhaps arrogance were likely reasons for their self-destruction. Few Hellenes

mourned their passing. Their lives were metaphors of the imperial attitude of Athens and Sparta when their empires were extinct.

The Breakdown of the Spartan-Athenian Alliance

Despite tension between Athens and Sparta, political relations remained cooperative until 461. Then things changed. In 464 an earthquake occurred at Sparta that caused great destruction and loss of life. Diodorus claims twenty thousand Lacedaemonians died (Diod.XI.63.1–3). Whatever the casualties were, many Spartiates are presumed to have been killed. The social, economic, and political upheaval from this natural disaster gave the helots of Messenia the incentive to revolt (Thuc.I.101.2–3; Diod.XI.63.4–5). The Messenians created a stronghold on Mount Ithome. Unable to end the revolt with their own resources, the Spartans appealed to Athens for assistance in 462. The Athenians had developed a reputation for capturing fortified positions. The Spartans hoped to use their skill to capture Mount Ithome. Despite the opposition of Ephialtes, the Athenian Assembly agreed with Cimon and assigned Cimon the military command to assist Sparta. During this expedition, Spartan suspicions of Athenian sympathy for the Messenians led to their request for the Athenians to go home using the excuse that Spartan forces were now adequate to defeat the Messenians. Cimon agreed to leave but the Athenians were insulted (Thuc.I.102; Diod.XI.63; Plut.*Cim.*16.4–17.2). This rejection by Sparta caused great animosity in Athens and was one of the factors that led to Cimon's ostracism in 461. Because of this insult, Thucydides states Athens created an alliance with Argos and Thessaly (Thuc.I.102.4) at some date between 462 and 461. Whether these alliances were defensive or part of an expansionist program by Athens, they certainly reflect an anti-Spartan attitude.²⁵² About 456 after a ten-year struggle, the Spartans allowed the Messenians to leave Mount Ithome. With the help of the Athenians, they settled in Naupactus on the north shore of the Corinthian Gulf (Thuc.I.103.1–3; Diod.XI.64.4).

Sparta's rejection of Athenian assistance, combined with Cimon's ostracism, ended the cooperation between Sparta and Athens that had begun forty years earlier. Consequently, the year 461 is the probable official demise of the Hellenic League that formed against Xerxes. Cimon's pro-Spartan policy was discredited. Like Themistocles, the Athenians rejected his leadership and sent him packing. The military success of the past twenty years along with the reform of Ephialtes inspired the Athenians to larger adventures. Sparta was weakened by the political, social, and economic aftershocks from the earthquake. The Athenians recognized an opportunity to expand the Delian League from the Aegean and Asia Minor to the Hellenic mainland. As Cimon's

sun set, Pericles's sun rose. For the next half century Athens and Sparta were either in a hot or cold war with each other. This rule of the people (democracy) versus the rule of the few (oligarchy) increased the political, cultural, and ideological divide between the Delian and Peloponnesian Leagues. The balance of the Greek world was caught in the middle. In time, most Greeks would be forced to choose between Athena and Apollo.²⁵³ Either choice brought forth Ares.

The First Peloponnesian War (460/459–446 BC) – The First Stage

With the demise of the Spartan alliance, the Athenians embarked in a new expansionist direction. Until now the growth of the Delian League occurred in the Aegean basin. In 460 Athens embarked on foreign adventures against Persia in Cyprus and Egypt. Athens also interfered in Peloponnesian affairs through the alliance with Megara, which was in conflict with Corinth, and an invasion of Aegina in 460/459. Both *polis* were probably members of the Peloponnesian League. The alliance with Thessaly and support for Phocis against Doris involved Athens in the affairs of central Greece, which brought opposition from Sparta and Boeotia, primarily Thebes. Could the city of Athena be successful against multiple foes?

In 460/459 the Athenians dispatched a fleet of two hundred triremes to Cyprus to continue their war against Persia. Their mission was probably the enrollment of the Greek cities into the Delian League. Delayed by the revolt of Thasos in 465, this enterprise might have been a continuation of the Eurymedon campaign. Inaros, a Libyan from the western delta, began an Egyptian revolt from Persian rule in 463.²⁵⁴ Looking for allies, he sent envoys to the Greek fleet at Cyprus (Thuc.I.104.1).²⁵⁵ Whatever incentives were offered by Inaros, the Athenian commanders might have seen a strategic opportunity. If the Persians were defeated in Egypt, perhaps the island of Cyprus could be taken with little Persian resistance. Alliance with an independent Egypt and control of Cyprus could give the Athenians control of the eastern Mediterranean.²⁵⁶ Also the grain from Egypt could provide another food source to supplement the grain ships from the Black Sea. Whatever agreement was made, the Athenian fleet sailed to Egypt.

Arriving in Egypt, the League fleet defeated a small Persian fleet in the Nile River. In control of the Nile, the fleet attacked Memphis, the last major Persian stronghold in Egypt. Gaining control of the town, the Athenians besieged the Persian garrison in the fort called the White Fortress (Thuc.I.104.2; Diod.XI.74–75).²⁵⁷ The White Fortress did not succumb. From here the fighting in Egypt becomes sketchy for the next years. Other fighting occurred but where and when cannot be

determined. Despite initial success, Athenian victory remained elusive.

While besieging the Persians, part of the Athenian fleet was dispatched to conduct a raid on Phoenicia (M&L 33).²⁵⁸ Whatever occurred is not recorded. Over the next few years, fighting continued in the eastern Mediterranean. Unfortunately, little is known about these campaigns. It is reasonable to assume that the Athenians rotated the League forces in Egypt. In the years 456 to 454 the Persians launched a major attack under the command of Megabxyus. He defeated the army of Inaros, broke the siege of Memphis, and turned the table by besieging the Athenian forces on the island of Prosopitis in the Nile River. The siege lasted eighteen months. It ended when the Persians rerouted the river and attacked the fort by land. After their surrender, some Athenian survivors were allowed to leave. The six-year Athenian campaign ended in total defeat and the reconquest of Egypt by Persia (Thuc.I.109.1-I.110.1; Diod.XI.77.1-5). Whatever the ultimate casualties in men, ships, and treasure, Thucydides states the losses were severe.²⁵⁹ As the fighting in Egypt began, the Athenians became embroiled in the Greek mainland with the Peloponnesian League. Engaged on two fronts, Athenian ambitions were greater than the resources available to achieve them. Egypt was a failure. Were they more successful on the mainland?

By 462/461 Megara was in a conflict with Corinth over borders (Thuc.I.103.4). Corinth was the aggressor and winning. Apparently receiving no support from Sparta, still occupied with the Messenian Revolt, Megara made an alliance with Athens. Athens assisted Megara to secure Pegae, Megara's port on the Corinthian Gulf, and build the long walls to the port of Nisaea on the Saronic Gulf. An Athenian force garrisoned Pegae to support Megara.

In the first year of the First Peloponnesian War in 460/459, the Athenians landed a force at Halieis in the Argolid. This force was defeated by the combined troops of Corinth and Epidaurus. Shortly afterwards, a naval engagement occurred between Athens and some Peloponnesians, perhaps Aegina and Epidaurus, at Cecryphalea in the Saronic Gulf. Athens was victorious. War now broke out between Athens and Aegina. The Athenians defeated a large Aeginetan and Peloponnesian fleet and captured seventy vessels. Under the command of Leocrates, the Athenians landed an invasion force on Aegina and besieged the city. A relief force of three hundred Peloponnesian hoplites failed to break the siege (Thuc.I.105.1-3). Hoping to lure the Athenians from Aegina, the Corinthians occupied the heights of Geranea, north of Megara, to block Athenian access to Megara. The Athenians sent a reserve relief force and fought the Corinthians to a draw.²⁶⁰ In a follow-up engagement twelve days later, when the Corinthians attempted to set up a victory trophy, the

Athenians were again victorious (Thuc.I.105.-106.2). By the end of the first year, the Athenians preserved Megara as a member of their alliance, blocked a Peloponnesian invasion route to Attica via the Megarid, achieved naval mastery of the Saronic Gulf, put Aegina under siege, and inflicted a major defeat on the Peloponnesian *poleis* led by Corinth. In none of these engagements did Sparta participate. Along with victories in Egypt, it was a very good year for the Athenians. Would success continue?

In 458 the Spartans, apparently satisfied with the domestic front, involved themselves in central Greece when they sent an army of 1,500 Lacedaemonians and ten thousand allies under the command of Nicomedes, regent for the young king Pleistoanax, against the Phocians, who invaded Doris, the reputed homeland of the Dorians of Sparta.²⁶¹ Forcing the Phocians to return home, the Spartans made peace with the Phocians. Marching home, the Spartans found the route through the Megarid blocked by the Athenians. Unwilling to engage the Athenians, Nicomedes settled down in Boeotia (Thuc.I.107.1–3). It is probable that he sent a messenger to Sparta for instructions to guide his next course of operations.

While in Boeotia Nicomedes received overtures by some Athenians to replace the new democracy of Ephialtes and tear down the long walls now under construction (Thuc.I.107.4).²⁶² The foundation of these walls had been laid by Cimon sometime in the 460s (Plut.*Cim.*13.7). Apparently learning of the conspiracy, the Athenians marched to Tanagra in Boeotia with 14,000 men, including one thousand Argives, and were later joined by some Thessalian cavalry. In a two-day engagement, the Athenians were defeated after the Thessalians deserted to Sparta. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. Thucydides does not mention it, but Diodorus says a four-month truce was concluded (Diod.XI.80.6).²⁶³ The Spartans agreed to the Thebans' request for aid to establish their hegemony over Boeotia as a counterweight to Athenian ambitions. After securing the fortification of Thebes, the Lacedaemonians returned home through the Megarid unmolested (Thuc.I.107.4–108.2; Diod.XI.80–81; M&L 35 & 36).²⁶⁴

Athenian ambitions were temporarily checked. Two months later the Athenians, under the command of Myronides, returned to Boeotia and defeated the Boeotians at Oenophyta. The ambition of the Thebans to dominate Boeotia was checked. The Athenians tore down the walls of Tanagra, subjugated parts of Boeotia and Phocis, and took one hundred Opuntian Locrian nobles as hostages (Thuc.I.108.3; Diod.XI.82–83). The defeat at Tanagra was avenged. Athens apparently made allies of the subjugated *poleis* since they later joined an Athenian expedition against Thessaly (Thuc.I.111.1). Athens now held an influential position in central Hellas.

In their next operation the Athenians forced the surrender of Aegina. The Aeginetans were forced to tear down their walls, surrender their triremes, and pay tribute (Thuc.I.108.4). These terms imply that Aegina was forced to join the Delian League. The subjugation of Aegina and parts of central Greece demonstrate that 458 was another successful year for the Athenian ambitions.

Thucydides does not mention the campaigns of the belligerents for 457, but it is doubtful that it was a quiet year. His narrative continues in 456 when the Athenian fleet, led by Tolmides, sailed around the Peloponnese. Diodorus says four thousand hoplites accompanied the fleet of fifty triremes. This was a major naval expedition. During their voyage, the Athenians attacked and burned the Spartan port of Gytheum in southern Laconia. They then landed at the islands of Cephallenia and Zacynthus in the Ionian Sea.²⁶⁵ Next they captured the city of Chalcis, a colony of Corinth, along the northwest coast of the Corinthian Gulf. Despite the silence of Thucydides, Diodorus claims that Tolmides seized Naupactus on the north shore of the Corinthian Gulf. It was Tolmides who agreed to settle the Messenian refugees from Mount Ithome at Naupactus. This ended the ten-year Helot Revolt against Sparta. Lastly, the Athenians attacked Sicyon (Thuc.I.108.5; Diod.XI.84). Although victorious, the Athenian assault might have been a minor raid on Sicyonian territory. We hear of no major consequences from the attack. Since we are not informed of any naval engagements, Corinth and the other Peloponnesian coastal cities were unwilling to challenge Athens' naval supremacy.

Athens was mistress of the Corinthian Gulf. If Naupactus became a naval base, the Athenian fleet could prevent the Peloponnesians from sailing across the Gulf and landing an army in central Greece. A fleet could also block the sea-lanes to hinder Corinthian trade with its western colonies, Sicily and Italy. The Athenians could also interdict grain ships sailing from Sicily through the gulf to Corinth. Like Athens, Corinth was probably importing grain to feed the population. Naupactus was used for these purposes in the war with Sparta twenty years later. With this naval control of the Corinthian Gulf, Athenian success in the war continued.

Except for the campaign that led to Tanagra in 458, Sparta was not actively engaged in the conflict. The war was between Athens and Sparta's allies. With the termination of the Helot Revolt, would the Spartans decide to take a more aggressive policy against Athens to support their allies?

In 455 or 454 the Athenians sent a force to Thessaly to punish the Thessalians for their desertion at Tanagra. Also they responded to the request of Orestes, the *basileus* (king) of Pharsalus who was

banished, for restoration to power. Accompanied by Phocians and Boeotians, the Athenians probably marched to Pharsalus. Unable to secure the countryside against the Thessalian cavalry, the Athenian expedition failed and the men returned home (Thuc.I.111.1).

After this failure Pericles took the fleet, accompanied by a thousand hoplites, into the Corinthian Gulf.²⁶⁶ Pericles sailed from the Megara's Corinthian Gulf port of Pegae. Disembarking at Sicyon, he defeated an army of the Sicyonians in a minor engagement. Embarking some Achaean troops, he sailed to Acarnania and besieged the Oeniadae but failed to capture the city. What the objective of the attack was, we are not told. Perhaps Pericles was assisting the Achaeans in their conflict with the Acarnanians to recruit them as allies. As allies, the Achaeans could provide a base for the Athenians in the Peloponnese. From Acarnania, Pericles returned to Pegae (Thuc.I.111.2–3; Plut.*Per.*19.3–4). These offensive actions by the Athenians illustrate that their expansionist ambitions were still the policy of the state.

The year 454 was the turning point in the war. This was the year the Egyptian expedition failed. Athenian expeditions to Thessaly and Acarnania ended in failure. The Peloponnesians were exhausted by the war. After the Spartan offensive in 458, Sparta remained on the defensive in the Peloponnese. Spartan suppression of the Messenians in 456 did not encourage its leaders to take a more active part on behalf of its allies. The Corinthian and Aeginetan fleets were destroyed. Aegina was a subject of Athens. Athenian troops occupied parts of the Megarid. The trade of Corinth, Megara, and Aegina suffered. With western commerce interrupted, it is reasonable to assume that Corinth might have suffered the most. As the war progressed, we hear less of Corinthian activities. Athenian trade probably did not suffer much since the Athenian fleets controlled the sea. However, Athenian expenditures were large to keep their fleets in continuous operation. Athenian ships operated in Hellas, Egypt, Cyprus, Phoenicia, and the coast of Asia Minor. It was more costly to support fleets than hoplite armies.²⁶⁷ It cost a talent per month to operate a trireme.²⁶⁸ Much treasure, resources, and manpower by all combatants were lost. After the Egyptian disaster, the Athenians realized that they could not continue a two front war. The war aims shifted into a different direction. Preservation, not expansion, became Athens' policy.

The First Peloponnesian War (460/459–446 BC) – The Second Stage

After the Egyptian failure Athens removed the treasury of the

Delian League from Delos to Athens in 454. Despite Athens' contention that the removal was to protect treasury from Persia, this action suggests that the Athenians wanted greater control over the finances of the League (Plut.*Per.*12.1–4). According to the assessments displayed in the Athenian Tribute Lists in the next few years, the revenue stream was sporadic and suggests that some members revolted from the Delian League.²⁶⁹ Miletus and Erythrae in Asia Minor revolted. They were probably brought back into the League by 451/450. Other *poleis* in Ionia and Caria probably followed their example, but the evidence is suggestive rather than a confirmation. Therefore, over the next few years, League resources were used by Athens to restore membership.

Between 454 and 451 Thucydides makes no mention of conflict between Athens and the Peloponnesians. In 451, a five-year truce was agreed upon between Sparta and Athens. Since the truce coincides with the return of Cimon from his ostracism, Plutarch and Diodorus say his mediation brought forth the truce (Plut.*Cim.*18.1; Diod.XI.86.1). Thucydides states that the Athenians refrained from war with the Greeks, which must imply the allies of Sparta. After this truce was concluded, Athens sent the fleet under Cimon to Cyprus. The mission was probably designed to reassert Athenian dominance in the eastern Mediterranean. During the siege of Citium, Cimon died. However, on their way home in 450 the Athenians defeated a coalition of Phoenicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians in a land and naval battle at Salamis in Cyprus (Thuc.I.112; Diod.XII.3; Plut.*Cim.*18–19.1). This was the last battle between Athens and the subjects of Persia.

In 451 a Thirty Years Peace was agreed to between Sparta and Argos (Thuc.V.14.4). Argos renounced the alliance with Athens.²⁷⁰ Athenian interference in the Peloponnese was ended. A decade of fighting ended in the *status quo ante*. By 450 the Peloponnese was quiet. Athens failed to weaken Spartan control of the Peloponnese.

Coinciding with these events, Pericles introduced a new citizenship bill in Athens that restricted the franchise to children born to an Athenian mother and father (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*26.4; Plut.*Per.*37.3–4). The purpose of the law is debated. Was it a concession to the *demos* to protect their privileges from the immigration of noncitizens? Or was it a concession to Cimon and the nobility to restrict the franchise?²⁷¹ Did this law promote domestic harmony? Did it enhance the value of Athenian citizenship to the Athenians? Whatever its purpose, this law was considered a major development in the constitution of the democracy by the ancient writers. Plutarch says that a little less than five thousand citizens were removed from the citizenship roster while 14,040 citizens passed the review.

During the truce the only dispute between Athens and Sparta that

we hear about is the sacred war over Delphi sometime prior to 447. For reasons unknown, the Sparta, as a member of the Amphictyonic alliance, liberated Delphi from Phocian control. This might have been an anti-Athenian action since Phocis was an ally of Athens after the battle of Oenophyta ten years earlier. Mission accomplished, the Spartans returned home. However, shortly afterwards the Athenians restored Phocian control of the sacred precinct (Thuc.I.112.5; Plut.*Per*.21.2–3).

After the truce Pericles began strengthening Athenian control of the empire through the establishment of cleruchies. He sent five hundred settlers to Naxos, 250 to Andros, one thousand to Thrace, and another one thousand settlers to secure the Chersonese (Plut.*Per*.11.5; 19.1–2). Pericles's campaign and colonization in the Chersonese in 447 was designed to provide security for the Greek inhabitants, who suffered from continuous raids by the Thracians and pirates. Security of the Chersonese was imperative to protect the trade route to the Black Sea. Plutarch says that the colonists settled in the existing *poleis*. Some type of fortification was also built across the neck of the Chersonese to hinder the raids.²⁷²

The last major battle of this war occurred in 446 at Coronea in Boeotia. By this time the exiled oligarchs of Orchomenus, Chaeronea, and other Boeotian *poleis* had regained control of these cities from Athenian domination. Despite the opposition of Pericles, the Athenians assigned Tolmides to take one thousand Athenian hoplites with an allied force to restore Athenian control of Boeotia. After recapturing Chaeronea and enslaving the population, the Athenian army was attacked on the march to Coronea. The Athenians were defeated and Tolmides killed by a coalition of oligarchs from Boeotia, Euboea, and Locris. A peace treaty was concluded with the Boeotians. In exchange for the return of Athenian prisoners, Athens evacuated Boeotia (Thuc.I.113; Plut.*Per*.18.2–3; Diod.XII.6). Athens' short-lived control of central Hellas ended.

Shortly afterwards a few *poleis* of Euboea revolted from the Delian League. Pericles led an expedition to Euboea to restore control. While in Euboea Pericles received word that Megara revolted from the League and the Athenian garrison was killed except for those who escaped to the port of Nisaea. Returning from Euboea, Pericles prepared the Athenian defenses. Diodorus says that an Athenian relief force, commanded by Andocides, defeated some Megarians and secured the port of Pegae (Diod.XII.5; M&L 51).²⁷³ A Peloponnesian force led by the Spartan king Pleistoanax invaded and ravaged Attica to Eleusis.²⁷⁴ After a bribe from Pericles, Pleistoanax withdrew the Peloponnesians. The Spartans fined Pleistoanax for this failure. Unable to pay the fine, the disgraced Pleistoanax went into exile

(Thuc.I.114.1–2; II.21.1; Plut.*Per.*22). Apparently accepting a bribe also, Cleandridas, the Spartan ephor who accompanied the king, went into voluntary exile. The Spartans condemned him to death in absentia.²⁷⁵ Like Pausanias and Leotychidas, corruption claimed another Spartan king. Or did it? Is it reasonable to speculate that Pleistoanax and Cleandridas represented a peace faction within Sparta? We have no evidence regarding the internal politics of Sparta. Bribery might have been the official excuse to hide dissension within Sparta regarding its hostile policy to Athens. Regardless of the political situation inside Sparta, the supporters of peace prevailed. Sparta did not launch another invasion of Attica.

After the Spartan withdrawal, Pericles returned to Euboea with fifty ships and five thousand hoplites and subdued the revolt. The revolt was short-lived. Apparently the withdrawal of the Peloponnesians from Attica discouraged the insurgents. With no hope for assistance, the insurgents made peace with Pericles. We hear of no sieges or battles against the Euboeans. The population of Hestiaeaea was expelled and resettled by Athenian cleruchs. Perhaps the severity of the punishment resulted from the Hestiaeans massacring the crew of an Athenian trireme. The *hippobotai*, the nobility of Chalcis who probably favored oligarchy, were expelled (Thuc.I.114.3; Plut.*Per.*23; Diod.XII.22.2). Presumably a democracy was installed or reinstated. The men of Chalcis, eligible for the military, were forced to swear a loyalty oath to Athens (M&L 52).²⁷⁶ Refusal to swear loyalty meant the loss of political rights. The *poleis* of Euboea were now subjects of Athens.

After the submission of Euboea, a Thirty Years Peace was agreed to between Sparta and Athens in 446/445. Callias, who arranged a peace with Persia, was one of the negotiators for Athens (Diod.XII.7). Troezen, Achaean, and the Megarian ports of Pegae and Nisaea were restored to the Peloponnesians (Thuc.I.115.1; IV.21.3). Neither side was to resort to arms if one party agreed to arbitration (Thuc.VII.18.2). As the future would demonstrate, the treaty left many issues unanswered. The Aeginetans later claimed that they were not granted the autonomy stipulated by the treaty (Thuc.I.67.2). The loss of Boeotia and the Megarid ended Athens' expansionist hopes on the mainland. Attica was vulnerable to a land attack by a hostile Boeotia. On the flip side, Sparta and the Peloponnesians could not compete with the Athenian navy. The Delian League, evolving into the empire, was secure for Athens. Peace was wanted by Sparta, Athens, and all of their allies. No opposition to peace is mentioned in the literary sources. In Hellas the *status quo* had returned. Both sides were exhausted but not defeated. Neither side was satisfied with the results of this war. Peace with Sparta and Persia set up the golden age of

Pericles. What was the peace with Persia?

Peace with Persia

In 449 the war ended with Persia with the alleged Peace of Callias. This peace was later known in the fourth century by Isocrates and inferred in his oration against the Peace of Antalcidas of 386 (Isoc.IV.120). Whether a formal treaty with Persia was actually concluded is still a major dispute among historians.²⁷⁷ Thucydides and Herodotus make no mention of a formal peace agreement. Their silence is deafening but not conclusive. Diodorus mentions Callias as an Athenian ambassador and lists the terms of the peace (Diod.XII.4.4–5). The terms stated that the Greeks of Asia were autonomous; Persian satraps could not appear within three days journey of the sea; and no Persian warship could sail west of Phaselis in Pamphylia or past the Blue Rocks in the Black Sea. In exchange, the Athenians would not send troops to lands controlled by the Great King.²⁷⁸ There is no literary or inscriptional evidence from the fifth century to confirm a treaty. The peace terms are uncertain. Various peace terms have been recorded by later writers. The terms listed by Diodorus are accepted by historians who accept the peace as genuine.

In contrast to the lack of evidence for a treaty, no hostile actions are recorded between Athens and the Persian Empire after 450 until the last decade of the fifth century. Persia did not interfere in Athenian expansion in the northern Aegean after the Thirty Years Peace. The Great King did not support Samos during the revolt against Athens in 440. There is no record of Persian interference with the Greek states in Asia Minor. The Athenian Tribute Lists indicate a decline in the collections immediately after 449. Perhaps some League members wished to end their contributions if peace was concluded. It seems unlikely that the Athenian building program, begun in the 440s, would have superseded military requirements against Persia. This building program appears to be a celebration of Athenian victory and greatness as later proclaimed by Pericles. Although no date is offered, Plutarch says Pericles called a Hellenic conference to discuss the rebuilding of all Greek temples destroyed in the Persian war. No conference occurred due to Spartan opposition (Plut.*Per*.17). Thus, the peace with Persia occurred prior to the conclusion of the Thirty Years Peace. With the evidence currently available, no definitive argument can be made regarding the authenticity of the Peace of Callias. However, it seems likely that a formal peace agreement occurred between Athens and Persia.

Cimon, Ephialtes, and Pericles – A Summary

The last thirty years witnessed the replacement of the Persian War leadership with a new generation of leaders. In Athens, Themistocles, Aristides, and Xanthippus were either dead or removed from power by the end of the 470s. In Sparta, King Leotychidas II died in exile.²⁷⁹ The hubris of Pausanias led to his disgrace and death by 465. Shortly afterwards, Themistocles, ostracized in 471, was forced to flee Hellas when he was accused of medism with Pausanias. He also died an exile in Asia Minor, a subject of the Great King. These men preserved the freedom of Hellas but did not carry the torch of freedom forward.

Aristides laid the foundation for the Delian League, but it was Cimon who led the offensive against Persia. Cimon, who fought as a rower on a trireme at Salamis, was annually elected *strategos* from 476 to 461 until ostracized. Under his leadership, the power and membership of the Delian League was expanded. The offensive against Persia went forward culminating in his victory at the Eurymedon River in the mid-460s. His suppression of the revolts at Naxos and Thasos prevented the dismemberment of the League. Despite animosity between Athens and Sparta, Cimon's pro-Spartan policies prevented a hot war until his ostracism. Cimon, a Philaid noble, was the primary spokesman for the upper class in the political debates within Athens. Like Aristides, Cimon accepted the democracy but believed the nobles should guide it. He opposed the reform of the Areopagus by Ephialtes that gave the *thetes* political enfranchisement. However, he remained respected until Athenian pride was insulted by the Spartans during the Messenian rebellion. Only after Cimon's ostracism did the Athenians challenge the Peloponnesians for dominance within Hellas. The challenge failed. Returning from ostracism, Cimon died in honor while providing a final service to his fellow citizens. We first encounter Cimon serving Athens at Salamis against Xerxes. Thirty years later, we last encounter Cimon serving Athens at Cyprus against Artaxerxes I. Pericles would pick up the torch as the dominant political leader upon Cimon's death.

Ephialtes and Pericles represented a new generation of leaders who wished to give the *demos* a larger voice in the affairs of state. Ephialtes's reform in 462, supported by Pericles, gave the Council of Five Hundred and the Assembly the ultimate powers to supervise the magistrates and determine the political affairs of Athens. Finally, the *thetes*, the rowers of the fleet, could determine when they would put their lives on the line to glorify Athena. After Ephialtes's murder, Pericles, an Alcmaeonid noble, assumed the role of spokesman for the people. He accepted the franchise for all Athenian males regardless of their property status. Pericles's law in 451 that restricted citizenship to those born to an Athenian father and mother enhanced the value of

that citizenship and infused greater pride in the citizens. The failure against Persia and Sparta in the First Peloponnesian War did not diminish Athenian ambition. Pericles altered his policy of aggrandizement of Athenian power to a consolidation of that power. Peace allowed the Athenians to finalize the conversion of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire. Under Pericles, the beautification of Athens would reflect the wealth, power, and prosperity of the citizens.

The First Peloponnesian War was fought to a draw. By the time of the Thirty Years Peace, Athens and the Delian League had evolved from a *hegemonia* (leader of a league of equals) to an *archê* (empire of subject allies). The non-democratic governments of the *poleis* who revolted were replaced with democracies obedient to Athens. Athens and its subjects were now identified with democracy. Sparta and the Peloponnesian League retained their oligarchies. The balance of power remained intact. Hopefully the Thirty Years Peace would inaugurate a period of peace and greater prosperity for all Hellas. Although we know little of the internal affairs of Sparta and the other Greek states, the next fifteen years are known as the golden age of Athens under the leadership of its “first citizen.” Could *eunomia* (harmony) come to Hellas? Would peace or war prevail?

224 (Rhodes 1970), 387–390. (Meiggs 1975), 39.

225 (Meiggs 1975), 50–67. Meiggs discusses the debate about membership and the original tribute assessment. For further discussion of the assessments, see Rhodes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 38.

226 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 89–94. (Meiggs 1975), 45. (J. A. Larsen 1940), 187–188.

227 (Meiggs 1975), 46–49. See Rhodes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 38–39. (J. A. Larsen 1940), 194–196. (N. Hammond 1986), 256–257. (N. Hammond 1967), 41–61. Hammond suggests that the League council was bicameral. Each chamber, Athens and a Synod of the Allies, had veto power. League action only occurred when both sides agreed.

228 For the development of the Lycurgan Constitution see Hammond. (N. Hammond 1986), 103–105.

229 See Rhodes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 41–42.

230 In the Eurymedon campaign, Plutarch states that Cimon made a design change to the structure of the trireme to allow more hoplites aboard. These ships were converted from fast battleships to slower troop transports to allow a stronger force for amphibious operations (Plut.*Cim.*12.2).

231 Today the Chersonese is known as the Gallipoli Peninsula.

232 (M. H. Hansen 2006), 57; 95–96. Thucydides states that walls are symbol of military strength (Thuc.1.91.4–6).

233 (Meiggs 1975), 299.

234 Plutarch called the nobility the party of the “Good and True” (Plut.*Per.*7.3).

235 (De Ste. Croix 1972), 173–178. De Ste. Croix argues that Themistocles pursued an aggressive anti-Spartan policy. Themistocles wanted peace with Persia and opposed the formation of the Delian League.

236 Herodotus and Plutarch say that Themistocles became unpopular with the Greek allies when he tried to collect money from the islanders after Salamis

- (Hdt.VIII.111; Plut.Them.21).
- 237 A *choregos* was the “leader of a chorus.” He recruited, trained, and organized the chorus for the play that was submitted for competition at a community festival. (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996), 323.
- 238 The members of the Areopagus probably used their private funds to donate eight drachmae per man to the rowers of the fleet to purchase provisions while stationed at Salamis. The Areopagus was named after the “Hill of Ares” where they met. The Assembly met on the Pnyx.
- 239 (Hale 2009), XXVI–XXVII.
- 240 Cimon persuaded the nobles to be rowers at Salamis (Plut.*Cim*.5.1–3).
- 241 (Kagan 1991), 44. Kagan says that Pericles was a “junior partner” to Ephialtes at this stage of his career.
- 242 For a discussion of the reforms, see Rhodes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 69–74; (M. Hansen 1980), 89–95; (N. Hammond 1986), 288–289.
- 243 This was the third social (hoplite) class still acknowledged from the constitution of Solon.
- 244 See Rhodes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 76.
- 245 The Assembly was called the *Heliaia* when performing judicial functions. (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996), 520–521.
- 246 Unless punishment was prescribed by law, the jury decided the punishment. The plaintiff and defendant each suggested a punishment and the jury decided between the two proposals. It could not give an alternate punishment. Consequently, jury decisions could vary greatly.
- 247 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 117. Hansen suggests that Elis was already a *polis* but it was enhanced at this time with the addition of new inhabitants.
- 248 Athena, like Apollo, was a patron deity of Sparta.
- 249 (Thucydides 1954), 90. This was high praise from Thucydides, who wrote a generation after Themistocles. History may have justified Themistocles’s view of Sparta as the enemy. However, this was not obvious to his contemporaries. It was not the generation that fought Persia that saw Sparta as the primary enemy. It was the next generation that converted the Delian League into the Athenian Empire.
- 250 (Euripides 1954), 107. (Euripides 1966), Vol.1, 395. See lines number 509–510.
- 251 Hubris refers to man seeking more than his allotted share in life authorized by the divine order. Excess pride, ambition, arrogance, power, greed, etc., are examples of *hubris* displayed in Greek literature. For an analysis of the concept of *hubris*, see (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996), 732–733.
- 252 (De Ste. Croix 1972), 186–183. He argues the alliances were for defensive purposes. Argos and Thessaly could provide hoplites and cavalry to strengthen Athens’ land forces. The addition of Megara to the Athenian alliance provided a means to block Spartan entrance into central Greece.
- 253 Athena was the patron goddess of Athens. Apollo was the patron god of Sparta. Ares was the god of war.
- 254 In 465 Xerxes was assassinated and succeeded by his son Artaxerxes I (Diod.XI.69). Inaros had defeated the Persian army of occupation at Papremis in 460. The Persian satrap, Achaemenes, was killed (Hdt.III.12; V11.7).
- 255 See Rhodes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 52.
- 256 (Meiggs 1975), 93–95.

- 257 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 76–77. Inscription number 34 indicates the Samians captured 15 ships near Memphis.
- 258 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 73–76. Inscription number 33 lists Athenian casualties in Phoenicia.
- 259 (Meiggs 1975), 104–110. Meiggs suggests total casualties may have been less than ten thousand, but he accepts the basic argument of Thucydides regarding the severity of the losses.
- 260 Thucydides says the Athenian relief force consisted of the young and old. This probably means men under twenty and over sixty years of age (Thuc.I.105.4).
- 261 Plutarch says that Delphi, not Doris, was attacked by the Phocians and liberated by the Spartans (Plut.*Cim.*17.4). Why Archidamus II, the other king, did not lead the army we are not told. (Kagan 1991), 77–78. Kagan suggests that he opposed the war.
- 262 These were two parallel walls designed to secure the land route from the city to the Piraeus.
- 263 (Kagan 1991), 83–84. Kagan accepts Plutarch's story that Cimon negotiated the four month truce and temporarily returned to Athens after Tanagra (Plut.*Cim.*17.4–7; *Per.*10.1–3; *Nepos.*3.3). For a different viewpoint, see Rhodes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 75. Rhodes does not think Cimon was recalled to Athens. However, on page 115, Lewis accepts the recall of Cimon. This author doubts Cimon's recall and subsequent return to exile but accepts its plausibility.
- 264 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 77–79. Inscription number 35 lists the Argive dead at Tanagra and inscription number 36 is the victory stela the Spartans dedicated at Olympia for their victory at Tanagra.
- 265 (Hale 2009), 107. There was a lake on Zacynthus that provided tar that protected the ships' hulls from rotting. Tar was better than pitch from pine trees.
- 266 Although Thucydides gives no figure, Plutarch says the fleet had one hundred ships (Plut.*Per.*19.2–3). Diodorus says the fleet was fifty ships (Diod.XI.85.1).
- 267 (Hale 2009), 20–28. Hale discusses the resources and processes required to build a trireme and train the crew.
- 268 *Ibid.*, 127.
- 269 (Meiggs 1975), 109–124. Meiggs gives an assessment of the Athenian Tribute Lists between 453 and 449 and the *poleis* that probably revolted.
- 270 Although the sequence of events is uncertain, the peace between Sparta and Argos probably followed the truce with Athens. Without the Athenian alliance, the Argives were probably unwilling to challenge Sparta.
- 271 (Kagan 1969), 103–104. Kagan suggests this measure was a concession to both sides. The irony is that during the later Peloponnesian War, after the death of his sons Xanthippus and Paralus from his first Athenian wife, Pericles requested an exemption from the law to make Pericles, his illegitimate son with the Milesian courtesan Aspasia, a citizen of Athens (Plut.*Per.*37).
- 272 (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 127–129. See Lewis for a discussion of the dates of these cleruchies.
- 273 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 137–138. Inscription number 51 supports Diodorus statement that an Athenian counterattack was launched against Megara.
- 274 The size of this Peloponnesian army is unknown. It must have been a major expedition since it was led by a king.
- 275 Cleandridas was the father of Gylippus, who was appointed in 414 to conduct the defense of Syracuse during Athens' Sicilian expedition from 415–413.
- 276 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 138–144. See inscription number 22 for a discussion of the terms.

- 277 (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 121–127. See Lewis for a review of the debate about the authenticity of the Peace of Callias. (Meiggs 1975), 487–495. In Appendix 8, Meiggs gives a history of the arguments for and against the Peace from the nineteenth century to the 1960s.
- 278 Plutarch lists similar terms but suggests that the Peace of Callias was made in the 460s after the battle of the Eurymedon (Plut.Cim.13.4–6). He also says that the historian Callisthenes denied that a peace was made. Persia refrained from further war out of fear of another Greek victory. Plutarch concluded that a decree collected by Craterus proved the existence of a peace.
- 279 Leotychidas was probably exiled in 476/475 and died in 469. The Eurypontid throne might have remained vacant until Archidamus II, Leotychidas's grandson, succeeded in 469 when he reached adulthood.

Interwar Years

The Beautification of Athens

After the Persian sack of Athens, many public, private, and sacred buildings needed to be renovated or rebuilt. The first priority of the Athenians was to fortify the city and the Piraeus. Themistocles guided the reconstruction of the walls protecting Athens and the Piraeus. He encouraged the Athenians to relocate to the Piraeus for protection against Persia, but the populace refused to abandon the city. Consequently, the people began to rebuild their homes, businesses, and farms within the city and countryside. Public buildings were renovated for the government to function. In the 460s and 450s, the walls of the Acropolis were repaired, and the long walls connecting Athens to the Piraeus and Phalerum were built for defense against the Peloponnesians. Despite all this construction, the temples were not rebuilt. Money, labor, and material resources were prioritized for the needs of the secular world. Only after the conclusion of peace with Persia in 449 and the Peloponnesians by 446 did the Athenians, under the guidance of Pericles, look to restore their sacred buildings.

The fifteen-year period after 446, which witnessed the consolidation and prosperity of the Athenian Empire, allowed the Athenians to utilize the resources of the empire to beautify the city. The removal of the treasury of the Delian League from Delos to Athens in 454/453 is viewed as a major transition point in the status of the League of autonomous allies to subjects of an empire. All the allies, except Samos, Chios, and Lesbos, were now providing tribute rather than ships. Resources not needed to defend the empire were now directed to the glorification of Athena's city.

A major portion of the tribute was used for the building program and developing a reserve fund. It appears that the *hellenotamiai* (Hellenic treasurers) of the Delian League became the Treasurers of Athena. A decree of Pericles might have been issued in 449 authorizing the use of League funds for Athenian purposes rather than the military affairs of the League.²⁸⁰ Plutarch tells us that this policy was greeted with opposition by Thucydides, son of Melesias, who was a spokesman for the nobility (Plut.*Per.*6.2; 11.1–2; 14).²⁸¹ Thucydides claimed that the policy to beautify Athens was a moral and financial

insult to the Greeks and violated the purpose of the empire.²⁸² Plutarch relates Thucydides claimed that

And surely Hellas is insulted with a dire insult and manifestly subjected to tyranny when she sees that, with her own enforced contributions for the war, we are gilding and bedizening our city, which for all the world like a wanton woman, adds to her wardrobe precious stones and costly statues and temples worth their millions.²⁸³ (Plut.*Per.*12.2)

The Athenians designated five thousand talents from the League treasury to begin the building program.²⁸⁴ Another two hundred talents annually would be appropriated annually for the next fifteen years to sustain the building program. This building activity began about 447 and continued to 432, the eve of the Peloponnesian War. The Acropolis was transformed from a fortress of defense to a glorification of the gods and a symbol of civic pride. Phidias was assigned the role of general manager to oversee the construction of the various buildings (Plut.*Per.*13.4). His giant bronze statue of Athena Promachos was erected on the Acropolis by 460.²⁸⁵ The construction of the Parthenon (temple of Athena), Propylaea (entrance to the Acropolis), and Hephaestum (temple of Hephaestus and Athena) near the Agora, were a tribute to the gods and the Athenian people for their contributions that made their *polis* the envy of Hellas.²⁸⁶ The Erechtheum was constructed on the Acropolis in the 420s after Pericles's death. Aside from these temples to the Olympian deities, other public buildings located near the Agora were renovated or rebuilt to higher aesthetic standards. The Odeum was a square hall near the theater to support the choruses for the theatrical competitions. The gold and ivory statue of Athena, created by Phidias, standing inside the Parthenon overseeing the Saronic Gulf, witnessed the people and trade of the Mediterranean entering the port of the Piraeus (M&L 54).²⁸⁷ The Parthenon became the symbol of Athens' grandeur (M&L 59).²⁸⁸ From limestone to Pentelic marble, these new buildings glimmered under the Aegean sun.

Plutarch states that the building program provided work and an income for the people to prevent idleness among the lower class who were not engaged as rowers in the fleet (Plut.*Per.*12.5). Though economic benefits certainly accrued, the mission of this building program was not a stimulation program to create jobs or an early version of the modern welfare state. It was designed to honor the gods, glorify the *polis*, and instill civic virtue in the citizens through art. However, as a by-product, it was a patronage program by Pericles to keep the *demos* loyal to his policies. Cimon had his own patronage policy in his heyday (Plut.*Cim.*10.1–2). The provision of economic

benefits was a typical policy by the nobility throughout history to develop a loyal clientele. As state policy, the future emperors of Rome used their building programs to provide a living for the populace to maintain a peaceful social order in Rome and other cities throughout the empire.

Periclean Athens was not yet the “School of Hellas.” This reputation would originate in the fourth century with the formation of Plato’s Academy and Aristotle’s Lyceum. Pericles’s policy advocated that art would glorify Athena’s city. Art was portrayed in the form of architecture, statuary, painting, narrative literature, and poetry, especially tragedy. Through art, the secular and sacred order of the Athenians would be honored. Pericles’s building program was suspended with the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. However, these artistic accomplishments have ensured that the Periclean legacy has lasted for twenty-five hundred years.

Picture 4 -This is a personal picture of the Parthenon.

Picture 4—The Parthenon



Picture 5 – This is a personal picture of the Erechtheum.

Picture 5—The Erechtheum



The Consolidation of the Athenian Empire

During the First Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had sent out cleruchies to consolidate their control of the empire. In 450 cleruchies were established on Naxos, Andros, and in the Chersonese (Plut.*Per.*11.5). Cleruchs were settled near Chalcis and Eretria in 446. These settlers retained their Athenian citizenship and could form a garrison in time of trouble. Thus, their civilian presence acted as a deterrent to further political upheaval. The use of these cleruchs was one method the Athenians used to strengthen their control over the empire. Besides serving a political and military purpose, these cleruchs also contributed to the Athenian economic control of the empire. Their presence influenced local agricultural, industrial, and commercial development.

With peace restored to Hellas, the Athenians, under the guidance of Pericles, concentrated on strengthening their control over the empire and expanding Athenian influence throughout the Hellenic world. In 446/445 the Athenians, responding to an appeal from the exiled citizens of the recently refounded Sybaris in Italy, which was again destroyed by Croton, sent colonists from Athens and other Greek cities to strengthen the new foundation.²⁸⁹ This Panhellenic colony at Sybaris was renamed Thurii and provided with a democratic constitution (Diod.XII.10–11). As the sponsor of this Panhellenic colony, the Athenians might have hoped to use this colony as a political and economic springboard for the further expansion of their influence among the western Greeks.²⁹⁰

In 443/442 an early reassessment of the tribute for the empire was completed. This reassessment was a year early. This appears to be an important administrative reform.²⁹¹ Who sponsored the reassessment and what its purpose was is unknown. Did Pericles sponsor this measure as a peace overture to ease tensions by the member states or respond to domestic criticism? Was the reform aimed to deflect criticism of the use of tribute for the building program? The answer cannot be definitively determined. For the first time, the empire was divided into five districts on the stone tribute lists. These districts were the Hellespont, Thrace, Ionia, Caria, and the Islands. In addition to the secretary, for the first time a member of the *hellenotamiai* and an assistant secretary were also recorded on the stele of the assessed amounts.²⁹² This assistant secretary served for two years. The implication may be that the reform required two years to complete. Whatever the objective of the reassessment, in some cases the tribute was substantially reduced. However, in most cases the adjustment, whether an increase or decrease, was modest. Although the number of contributors varied over the years from the mid-450s to the 420s, in 442/441, over 170 cities contributed funds.²⁹³

In 437/436 the Athenians established a colony at Amphipolis in Thrace composed of Athenians and the local population (Thuc.IV.102.3–4; Diod.XII.32.3). Located on the upper Strymon River, the colony grew rapidly and prospered from its strategic location. Amphipolis provided access to the local gold and silver mines, the timber in the interior for export, and the local food surplus.²⁹⁴ It also provided Athens with control over the land route from Macedonia to Thrace. With a naval station at Eion, near the mouth of the Strymon, Athens strengthened its control of the north Aegean and the sea-lanes to the Hellespont. Although allies, the foundation of Amphipolis on the eastern Macedonian border, made King Perdiccas II of Macedon fearful of future Athenian ambitions. He would later ally with Sparta. After Amphipolis's foundation, Plutarch reports that Pericles also sent six hundred colonists to Sinope on the Black Sea sometime after 436 (Plut.*Per.*20.1–2).

The revolt of Samos in 440, followed by Byzantium, was the only major threat to the stability of the empire. This episode began as a local conflict between Miletus and Samos over the possession of the *polis* of Priene. Losing the conflict, the Milesians, supported by the Samian democrats who opposed the ruling oligarchy, appealed to Athens for support. What exactly motivated Athenian intervention is unknown. All three *poleis* were members of the empire. Perhaps Pericles and the Athenians decided to rule with an iron fist to prevent war between member states of the empire. Did Aspasia, the mistress of Pericles and a native Milesian, influence his decision to intervene as

Plutarch hints (Plut.*Per.*24)? Since the Samian oligarchs rejected Athenian arbitration, Pericles led a strong force of forty ships to suppress the revolt (Thuc.I.115.2–5; Plut.*Per.*25.1). The Athenians set up a democracy and removed one hundred oligarchic hostages to the island of Lemnos. The Athenians posted a garrison on Samos and sailed home. They did not disband the Samian fleet, which was still a powerful contingent in the imperial fleet.

Some oligarchic hostages fled to the mainland and received the support of the Persian satrap Pissuthnes. Gaining Persian support, the oligarchs hired mercenaries and were restored to power. The remaining oligarchs on Lemnos were liberated. Learning of the turmoil, Pericles launched a new fleet of sixty ships. He dispatched sixteen triremes to Caria to watch for a Phoenician fleet. With the remaining forty-four ships, Pericles defeated the Samian fleet of seventy ships. Reinforced by twenty-five ships from Chios and Lesbos and another forty ships from Athens, the Athenians besieged the city. Learning of the approach of a Phoenician fleet, Pericles sailed with sixty ships to intercept this fleet. While Pericles was gone, the Samians attacked the besieging Athenians and defeated them. For two weeks the Samians controlled the sea. Pericles returned without engaging the Phoenicians. Another reinforcement of sixty ships from Athens and thirty from Chios and Lesbos restored the Athenian blockade of the island. After a nine-month siege, the Samians surrendered by May 439. The Samians surrendered their fleet, gave hostages, tore down their walls, and paid the cost of the war in installments.²⁹⁵ Democracy might have replaced the oligarchy.²⁹⁶ Byzantium ended its revolt soon after the suppression of Samos (Thuc.I.116–117; Plut.*Per.*25–28).

Whatever happened to Persian support for Samos? We are not told. Was Pissuthnes, probably acting on his own initiative, ordered by Artaxerxes to stay out of the war? Or did the overwhelming force gathered by the Athenians give the Persians second thoughts? Regardless of the reason, Athens and Persia avoided hostilities until the last decade of the century. No further disturbances are known in the empire until the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War.

During these revolts the Lacedaemonians and the other Peloponnesian states remained quiet. Without a strong fleet, the Peloponnesians were in no position to interfere in the maritime subjects of Athens. Disputes, that could upset the peace, were kept under wrap by Athens and Sparta. This would change with the political and social conflict in Corcyra in 435.

Prior to the Corcyraean conflict, Pericles last act was his showing the flag excursion into the Black Sea in 436. The length and mission of the voyage are speculative. He assisted the Greek *poleis* who had conflicts with the native populations. The issues of these conflicts are

unknown. Perhaps pirates were attacking the merchant ships. Was the grain fleet threatened? No disturbances of the grain supply are mentioned until Athens' defeat at Aegospotami in 405. Whatever the objectives, the demonstration of Athenian power was the medicine required. Before he returned home, Pericles left a squadron of thirteen triremes, under the command of Lamachus, at Sinope on the southern shore of the Black Sea, to aid the populace to overthrow the tyrant Timesileos. After the overthrow, six hundred Athenian settlers volunteered to settle at Sinope (Plut.*Per.*20.1–2).

Administration of the Empire

As mentioned previously, to facilitate the collection of tribute from the empire, the Athenians created five administrative districts. These were the Hellespont, Islands, Caria, Ionia, and Thraceward.²⁹⁷ Based on the Athenian tribute lists, the names of 330 members are preserved.²⁹⁸ There was no administrative center or governor established in these regions. The local magistrates of these *poleis* were expected to collect the annual tribute and deliver it every spring to Athens during the celebration of the Great Dionysia. However, there were some garrisons established throughout the empire. The first documented garrisons occurred in the 450s at Erythrae and Miletus after they had revolted (M&L 40).²⁹⁹ At Erythrae a *phourarchos* was appointed to command the garrison. He may also have had a political function to observe the populace for signs of trouble.³⁰⁰ However, this official is not mentioned again in surviving documents.

Rather than control the empire by force, the Athenians originally followed a policy of political toleration. At the formation of the Delian League, various political constitutions existed among the allies. In time the Athenian policy evolved to favor democracies in the subject *poleis*. However, oligarchies were allowed if they caused no trouble for Athens. Under the leadership of Cimon, the Athenians probably left oligarchies alone.³⁰¹ Samos was an oligarchy in 440. Oligarchs governed Mytilene on the island of Lesbos until the Mytileneans revolted in 428. Other states were democracies from the beginning. The *poleis* of Asia Minor were democracies from the peace settlement by Persia after the Ionian Revolt (Hdt.VI.43). Perhaps after the suppression of the revolts in the late 450s, the Athenians pursued a more vigorous pro-democracy policy within the empire. With the League Treasury now relocated to Athens and the Athenian navy stronger than all the allies combined, the Athenians were in a position to be more aggressive imposing democracies to maintain internal security within the empire. This aggressiveness was more demonstrable during the Peloponnesian War.

The collection of tribute, next to maintaining security, was probably the most important function carried out by Athenian officials. The *hellenotamiai* (Hellenic treasurers) were assigned to collect the tribute at the Delian League's foundation (Thuc.I.96.2). They were the treasurers for Delian Apollo. What the qualifications for office were is uncertain. Originally they might have come from the Athenian noble class as the other leaders of Athens were. Their term of office probably lasted one year.³⁰² They entered office on the twenty-eighth of Hekatombaion (July/August) at the beginning of the calendar year. Like other Athenian officials, they were probably held accountable for the funds collected and their actions in office when their term expired. They probably answered to the Athenian Assembly rather than the League Council. Since the funds were originally kept at Delos, their term of office was served there. They informed the League Council of the status of League funds when they were in session.

With the removal of the treasury from Delos to Athens in 454, the treasurers became treasurers for Athena rather than Delian Apollo. The Athenian Tribute Lists that survive were discovered in Athens and date from the removal of the treasury to Athens. These lists were recorded on stone. No records have been discovered on Delos. It is presumed that the records were maintained on some perishable material, probably wood. The original one-sixtieth of the tribute dedicated to Apollo now went to Athena. The Old Oligarch states that the tribute was assessed every fourth year and paid annually in the spring at the Great Dionysia ([Xen.] *Ath.Pol.*III.5).³⁰³

At the foundation of the Delian League, all the allies were autonomous in their judicial affairs. As the Athenians eventually came to interfere in political affairs, they also began to interfere in the judicial system of the subject *poleis*. After the initial trial in the member *polis*, in judicial cases where the penalties (not the crime) were severe, the right of appeal was to be heard in an Athenian court.³⁰⁴ The right of appeal probably applied to the prosecution as well as the defendant. In the courts of the *polis*, there was no prosecuting attorney representing the state or defense attorney representing the individual. Charges were brought by officials or private citizens. Consequently, the official or citizen either represented themselves or hired somebody to speak for them. This right of appeal is stated in the settlement with Chalcis after the revolt in 446 (M&L 52).³⁰⁵ Eventually, the Athenians asserted their claim to interfere in "cases involving the death sentence, exile, and loss of rights."³⁰⁶ Whether a criminal or civil case occurred between an Athenian and a citizen of another *polis*, an Athenian citizen could not force a citizen of another *polis* to be tried in an Athenian court. Thus, despite the Athenian claim of judicial interference, not all cases came to Athens for review. Although judicial interference by the

Athenians was limited, the allies resented this interference in their internal affairs.

However, the ability to interfere in the judicial affairs of the subject states stroked the ego of the Athenian citizen. The citizens of the subject states had to patronize all Athenian citizens to gain a favorable hearing in the courts. The Old Oligarch states ([Xen.]*Ath.Pol.*I.18):

In addition, were the allies not to go away for judicial proceedings, they would honor only those of the Athenians who sail out from the city, namely generals, trierarchs, and ambassadors. As it is now, each one of the allies is compelled to flatter the Athenian populace from the realization that judicial action for anyone who comes to Athens is in the hands of none other than the populace (this indeed is the law in Athens); in the courts he is obliged to entreat whoever comes in and to grasp him by the hand. In this way the allies have become instead slaves of the Athenian people.³⁰⁷

Consequently, the average Athenian probably had great pride in the empire because of the dignity and respect granted them by the subjects.

In the economic sphere, the Athenians attempted to integrate the empire into a standard financial system. For political and administrative purposes, a standard currency would simplify the collection of revenue (tribute, taxes, duties, etc.). However, we cannot discount the probability that the economic prosperity of the Hellenic world might have encouraged the Athenians to integrate the economy of the empire into a common market.³⁰⁸ Tentatively dated to 450/446, the Athenians passed a decree to standardize the weights, measures, and coinage used by all members of the empire (M&L 45).³⁰⁹ This decree was recorded and exhibited in the *agora* of each member city. The Attic coinage replaced other currencies. Banned currencies were to be melted down by the Athenian mint and replaced with Athenian coins. What the exchange rate between the various currencies was is uncertain. Enforcement of these standards was assigned to Athenian officials. These officials were located in Athens, the Piraeus, and various cities throughout the empire.³¹⁰

The trade of the empire was protected by the Athenian navy. However, that same navy could restrict the trade of a particular *polis* if that *polis* fell into disfavor with the Athenians. The Old Oligarch gives a brief description of the Athenians ability to interfere with the trade of the Aegean ([Xen.]*Ath.Pol.*II.3):

Of the Athenians' subject cities on the mainland, some which are large are ruled because of fear, and

some small are ruled because of actual need; for there is no city which does not have to import or export, and these activities will be impossible for a city unless it is subject to the rulers of the sea.³¹¹

By methods of blockade, confiscation, rerouting of merchant ships to another port, etc., the Athenian navy could interfere in the commerce of another *polis*.

Through political, judicial, economic, administrative, and military means, the Athenians, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, had taken numerous actions to integrate and strengthen their control of the empire. As demonstrated by the various revolts, there was disenchantment among some *poleis*. However, the vast majority of *poleis* remained quiet. Since most members remained quiet in 431 when war began again, the assumption is that either the benefits of membership in the empire outweighed the costs or the members were too weak to challenge the fleet of Athena.

The Corcyraean Crisis (435–433 BC)

The great conflict that would engulf the Greek world did not originate with the major protagonists. The match was ignited in 435 with the conflict between Corcyra, an island in the Ionian Sea, and its mother city, Corinth, over the *polis* of Epidamnus, on the Illyrian coast. The dispute between Corcyra and Epidamnus, a joint colony of Corcyra and Corinth, began when the democrats of Epidamnus overthrew the oligarchs in an internal revolution. The exiled oligarchs, with barbarian allies, returned to besiege Epidamnus. The democrats appealed to Corcyra for aid, but the Corcyraeans refused. Next, they appealed to Corinth. The Corinthians sent settlers and a garrison to Epidamnus to support the democrats. The Corcyraeans objected and besieged Epidamnus. Gaining the support of various Peloponnesian states, the Corinthians organized a relief force for Epidamnus. Learning of these preparations, the Corcyraeans sent an embassy to Corinth. These Corcyraean envoys were supported by envoys from Sicyon and Sparta. The Corcyraean envoys offered arbitration of the dispute if the Corinthians would withdraw their forces from Epidamnus. The Corinthians refused the terms (Thuc.I.24–28).

A Peloponnesian fleet of seventy-five triremes and two thousand hoplites, under Corinthian leadership, sailed against Corcyra. Responding to the threat, the Corcyraeans launched their fleet of eighty ships and defeated the Peloponnesians in a naval battle at Leucimne. The Peloponnesians lost fifteen ships. Immediately after this Corinthian defeat, Epidamnus surrendered and the captured Corinthians were held as hostages by Corcyra (Thuc.I.29).

Through 434/433 Corinth built a new fleet for revenge. In 433 Corcyra appealed to Athens for protection. After listening to the envoys from Corcyra and Corinth in the Assembly, the Athenians agreed to an *epimachia* (defensive alliance) with Corcyra to avoid violating the peace with Sparta.³¹² The strategic location of Corcyra, off the northwest coast of the mainland that straddled the sea-lanes to the west, and the size of the Corcyraean fleet were also factors that favored an alliance (Thuc.I.44). The Athenians sent a small force of ten ships, under the command of Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, and Diotimus with orders to act in a defensive manner only and avoid breaking the peace with Sparta (Thuc.I.45.3).³¹³

Without Spartan support, the Corinthians launched another allied fleet of 150 triremes with the Corinthians supplying ninety ships.³¹⁴ In August 433 the Corinthian fleet engaged the Corcyraean fleet of 110 triremes near the island of Sybota.³¹⁵ The ten Athenian ships were posted on the right wing opposite the Corinthians. Thucydides states that little naval skill was used by either side. The ships collided with each other, and the hoplites on board fought for control of the vessels. As the battle raged, the Athenians maneuvered defensively to protect the Corcyraean ships when the Corinthians began to gain an edge. Although defeated on their right wing, the Corinthian left wing emerged victorious and forced the Corcyraeans to beach their ships. The Athenian commanders decided to intervene to defend their allies. After recovering their damaged ships and the dead, the Corinthians reorganized their forces to destroy the balance of the Corcyraean fleet. Now late in the day, the Corinthians suddenly back watered when they spotted the approach of a relief force of twenty Athenian triremes. The next day the opposing fleets formed for battle, but the Corinthians refused to attack. The Corinthians sent an envoy in a small boat to the Athenians to chastise them and determine the intentions of the Athenians. The Athenians declared their intentions were defensive only. The Corinthians could sail anywhere except against Corcyra. Thus, the Peloponnesians could either fight or sail home unmolested. With battle avoided, each side set up a trophy of victory on the island of Sybota. The Corinthian fleet sailed home carrying a giant grudge against Athens (Thuc.I.45–55).³¹⁶ The war match was lit and the fuse ignited.

Decrees of Callias (434/433 BC)

An interesting set of financial decrees discovered in Athens have been dated to the year 434/433. Sponsored in the Assembly by a man named Callias, these decrees ordered the treasures of the other gods,

located in temples throughout Attica, be deposited on the Acropolis (M&L 58).³¹⁷ A new set of treasurers were to be elected to gather, inventory, and disburse these resources. This financial reserve was separate from the treasure that belonged to Athena and controlled by the treasurers of Athena. Money borrowed from these treasures was to be repaid to these gods. Any financial surplus would be dedicated to the repair of dockyards and walls.

If these decrees were passed by the spring of 433, as argued by Meiggs and Lewis, this was prior to the acceptance of a defensive alliance with Corcyra. These decrees would then support the statements of Thucydides and Plutarch that the Athenians thought war with the Peloponnesians was inevitable (Thuc.I.44.2; I.127.3; Plut.*Per.*VIII.5). If this is true, a defensive alliance with Corcyra, to prevent the Peloponnesian capture of the Corcyraean fleet, would be in the self-interest of Athens. Therefore, the Corcyraean alliance was an act of self-defense. Although the Athenians were probably not seeking war when they allied with Corcyra, neither were they avoiding it. The consolidation of all the treasures of the gods on the Acropolis, now protected by the long walls and the fleet, clearly indicates that Athens made preparations against a future invasion of Attica by Sparta.³¹⁸ The fuse might have been lit at Corcyra, but its ignition was foreseen by Pericles and the Athenians.

Revolt of Potidaea (432 BC)

The fuse was burning when the Potidaean revolt began in the spring of 432. Potidaea was a colony of Corinth and kept close ties with the mother city. Potidaea was also a tribute paying member of the empire located in the vital northeast sector of Hellas known as the Chalcidice. If Potidaea was in hostile hands, enemy forces had the potential to interfere in the vital sea-lanes to the Hellespont. They could possibly hinder the grain shipments to Athens. Any threat to the sea-lanes was a strategic concern to Athens.

Fearing a revolt after the battle of Sybota, in the winter of 433/432 Potidaea was ordered by Athens to tear down part of its walls, surrender hostages, and except no future magistrates from Corinth. What provoked Athens to issue this ultimatum at this time? It is reasonable to suggest that the close ties with Corinth and the intrigue of King Perdiccas II caused concern among the Athenians. The Potidaeans appealed to Athens to moderate the terms. The Athenians refused. The Potidaeans also sent envoys to Sparta and Corinth seeking support if the Athenians did not moderate their ultimatum. Perdiccas was hostile to Athens because the Athenians supported his brother Philip and nephew Derdas, who were attempting to usurp the

throne. To distract the Athenians from involvement in Macedonian affairs, Perdiccas was encouraging the Chalcidians and others to revolt. He also sent envoys to encourage the Spartans and Corinthians to support a revolt. Perdiccas succeeded in raising a revolt among the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans. Many inhabitants abandoned their coastal cities, which were vulnerable to attack by Athens. They settled inland at the Olynthus, a more defensible position. Perdiccas also granted them Macedonian territory to settle. Responding to this threat, the Athenians sent thirty ships and one thousand hoplites, commanded by Archestratus and others, to aid the Macedonian usurpers. They were also assigned the mission to enforce the ultimatum against Potidaea. Failing to arrive in time to prevent the revolt of Potidaea, Archestratus and the Athenian fleet attacked Macedonia to support Philip (Thuc.I.56–59).

To avoid the accusation of provoking a war, the Corinthians raised an unofficial mercenary Peloponnesian relief force of 1,600 hoplites and four hundred light-armed troops, under the command of Aristeus, to defend Potidaea. Probably by the end of May they reached Potidaea. To counter these forces, the Athenians sent another forty ships and two thousand hoplites, under the command of Callias. Finding their fellow citizens besieging Pydna, they joined the siege. Reaching an agreement and alliance with Perdiccas, the Athenians moved against Potidaea. Playing a double game, Perdiccas revoked his alliance and joined the Peloponnesians to defend Potidaea. The Athenians defeated the Peloponnesians outside Potidaea and laid siege to the city in the summer of 432. However, the force was not strong enough to block the Pallene side of Potidaea. Consequently, the Athenians sent another force of 1,600 hoplites, under the command of Phormio, to strengthen the besiegers. By midsummer Potidaea was isolated. With the Pallene side now secured, Phormio proceeded against the other Chalcidian rebels. Potidaea would remain besieged until its fall in 430/429 (Thuc.I.60–66). The fuse was rapidly approaching the powder keg.

War Debate in Sparta

Alarmed by the rising tension between Corinth and Athens, the Spartan ephors called a meeting of the Spartan Assembly in July of 432 to discuss the growing crisis. Besides Corcyra and Potidaea, a third dispute, outlined by Thucydides, concerned the conflict between Athens and Megara that centered on the Megarian Decree issued in 433/432.³¹⁹ In the Assembly of the Spartans in 432, the grievances of Corinth, Aegina, and Megara were heard. Aegina complained about Athenian interference in its autonomy.³²⁰ Megara complained that it

was excluded from the Athenian *agora* and the harbors of the empire by the Athenian decree. This loss of trade caused great economic hardship. It is doubtful that this ban was a retaliatory trade embargo imposed on Megara. More likely, the decree was a response to the Megarian cultivation of some sacred land near Eleusis and the harboring of runaway slaves (Thuc.I.139.1–2; Ar.Ach.515–539; Andoc.III.8). Whatever the truth of the charge, the Megarians, supported by Corinth, claimed economic hardship from the ban.³²¹ Sparta later listed the Megarian complaint in her grievances against Athens.

Corinth, the strongest ally in the Peloponnesian League, blamed Sparta for allowing the growth of Athenian power with its policy of restraint. Sparta must act now or risk dissolution of the League alliance. The Corinthians accused the Spartans of failing to protect the allies. Consequently, they were suffering political, military, and economic hardship from Athenian actions. The Athenian actions were reducing the Hellenes to slavery. The Corinthians insisted that the Spartans repudiate their passive policy toward Athens and take an aggressive stance to reduce Athenian power before it is too late (Thuc.I.67–71).

What was Corinth's policy toward Athens prior to this time? Despite complaining about Sparta's lack of aggression, Corinth, except for hostility during the First Peloponnesian war, had maintained friendly relations with Athens throughout the fifth century. During the war with Aegina in the 490s, Corinth provided Athens with ships. At Salamis, the Corinthians fought well. Since Corinth's commerce was primarily with the western Greeks, we hear of no major commercial or political dispute with Athens. Only in the First Peloponnesian War, when Megara joined the Athenian alliance, did Athens and Corinth engage in hostility (Thuc.I.103.4). During this conflict, Athenian naval activities in the Saronic and Corinthian Gulf did harm to Corinthian interests. With the restoration of Megara to the Peloponnesian League in 446, Corinth returned to a neutral, if not peaceful, attitude toward Athens. In 440 the Corinthians opposed Spartan interference in the Samian Revolt (Thuc.1.41.1–2). Beginning with the Corcyraean conflict, Corinth again became implacably hostile to Athens. This animosity continued until they became allies in the Corinthian War forty years later. Thus, the Corinthian envoy was a bit hypocritical criticizing Spartan complaisance.

Thucydides claims that an Athenian embassy, allegedly, happened to be in Sparta on other business, asked to respond to the accusations of the Peloponnesians. Were these envoys here to observe the debate? Did they have authority to speak for the Athenian people? Though uncertain, the implication in Thucydides is that they

did. However, Thucydides does not describe the mission of the delegation or give the names of the members. Addressing the Assembly, the spokesman defended the growth of Athenian power. The first topic was a defense based on Sparta's surrender of the leadership after the Persian War. Athens led the alliance to a successful conclusion against Persia. The second topic stated that the empire arose from fear, then by honor, and finally by self-interest (Thuc.I.75.3—4). Thucydides states,

It was the actual course of events which first compelled us to increase our power to its present extent: fear of Persia was our chief motive, though afterwards we thought, too, of our own honour and our own interest. Finally there came a time when we were surrounded by enemies, when we had already crushed some revolts, when you had lost the friendly feelings that you used to have for us and had turned against us and begun to arouse our suspicion: at this point it was clearly no longer safe for us to risk letting our empire go, especially as any allies that left would go over to you.³²²

The third topic claimed that under similar circumstances, the Spartans would have done likewise.

The fourth topic claimed that the Athenian allies were not treated unfairly but allied envy of Athenian power created their disenchantment with Athenian rule. In the last topic, the Athenians claim that Sparta will suffer the same resentment if they defeat Athens and maintain the empire. The last statement probably derived from Thucydides's observation of Spartan behavior after 404. Finally, the Athenian envoy offered arbitration of differences based on the terms of the Thirty Years Peace (Thuc.I.72—78). What the exact terms of arbitration were is uncertain. It may be that neither party would resort to military force if either side agreed to arbitration of a dispute (Thuc.VII.18.2).

Responding to the Athenians, King Archidamus II urged moderation.³²³ He warns that a war will be lengthy. He states the military difficulties to defeat Athens. Sparta is a land power while Athens is a sea power. Sparta has no fleet to attack Athens' allies. Sparta lacks the financial reserves to carry on a long war. Therefore, Sparta should prepare for a future war, perhaps in a couple of years, but arbitrate the differences now (Thuc.I.80—85). Archidamus preferred peace and questioned the need for war now. The ephor Sthenelaidas spoke for the hawks and encouraged war (Thuc.I.86). A vote was taken in the Assembly, and war was accepted. Thucydides finally states that the Spartans voted for war because they feared the increasing power of Athens (Thuc.I.87—88). This may be true as the

ultimate reason for war. However, Thucydides speaks as a citizen of Athens. We have no account of the events mentioned from the Spartan perspective. Why was war declared now? Combined with Spartan suspicion, fear, pride, confidence in victory, etc., it appears that the body of evidence over the past year convinced the majority of Spartans that war seemed necessary at this point in time. This explanation may not seem satisfactory, but wars often start for poor reasons. Wars are not inevitable but often unavoidable. All that was left was for each side was to justify the coming war.

Diplomatic Overtures

To validate their declaration of war, the Spartan ephors consulted Delphi seeking Apollo's approval for war. The oracle declared that victory would come if they entered the war with a firm commitment to use all their resources (Thuc.I.118). Next the ephors summoned a meeting of the Peloponnesian League in August. Corinth lobbied the allies for support prior to the meeting. At the League meeting, a majority of the allies favored war. Corinth was the chief protagonist. With war approved, preparations were under way by the Peloponnesians (Thuc.I.119–125.1).

While war preparations were begun, a propaganda campaign by Sparta and Athens was undertaken to justify their actions. Sparta requested an expulsion of the Alcmaeonidae based on an ancient religious violation.³²⁴ Pericles was an Alcmaeonidae. Athens countered and claimed that the Spartans had the bloodstain of helots and Pausanias on their conscience (Thuc.I.127–134). Spartan envoys, sent to Athens in the winter of 432/431, offered peace if Athens withdrew from Potidaea, rescinded the Megarian Decree, gave Aegina its independence, and granted the Hellenes their autonomy (Thuc.I.139.1–3). In the Athenian Assembly, Pericles spoke in favor of war claiming that Athens should not submit to the Spartan terms for peace. Sparta's ultimate objective was the enslavement of the Athenians (Thuc.I.141.1). Athens had superior resources. Athens must fight a defensive war. A war of attrition would lead to an Athenian victory. Athens must rely on the empire and the navy for victory (Thuc.I.140–145).

As it is we must try to think of ourselves as islanders; we must abandon our land and our homes, and safeguard the sea and the city.
(Thuc.I.143.5)³²⁵

The people agreed. After a final embassy by Sparta requesting the autonomy of the Hellenes, Pericles countered the Spartan demand by claiming that Athens would comply if Sparta granted autonomy too

all subordinate inhabitants within the Peloponnese. The Spartans refused. The Assemblies of each belligerent had voted for war. The gods gave their blessing. Apollo challenged Athena. The burning fuse reached the end of the line. The powder keg exploded. It would become the “Great War” of the Hellenic world.³²⁶ From the Bosphorus to Sicily, the Hellenes were forced to choose sides. No mercy would be shown by the protagonists!

Was War Inevitable?

The main thesis of Thucydides history was that the war was “inevitable” because of Spartan fear of the growth of Athenian power. His thesis has been a hot topic of debate by modern historians.³²⁷ Thucydides only provides a political and military explanation of the conflict. Social, economic, and ideological developments are not revealed. Thucydides had no interest in these issues that interest us today. Other ancient authors also reveal little about these issues. Like it or not, Thucydides’s history established the paradigm for discussion of the war. All discussion centers on agreement or disagreement with Thucydides’s thesis.

It appears that Sparta and Athens were initially reluctant to go to war. Archidamus spoke for a peace faction in Sparta. The ephor Sthenelaidas spoke for the war faction. Pericles initially wanted peace but accepted the inevitability of war. Only after an accumulation of incidents and decisions, Corcyra, Potidaea, the Megarian Decree, diplomatic failures, Corinthian agitation, the rise of war factions in Sparta and Athens, political and military strategies, etc., did the peace end. Political miscalculations and threats by the Corinthians, Spartans, and Athenians hardened internal support for the war factions. Thucydides does not mention the names of the war faction in Athens. Nor does he mention the proponents and their arguments for peace in the Athenian Assembly when Pericles argued that the war could not be avoided. Fortunately, we have an inscription that suggests the Athenians were setting money aside for war perhaps as early as 434 (M&L 58).³²⁸ As any modern historian does, Thucydides provided evidence that supported his thesis. However, sometimes his evidence is incomplete. Can we accept his thesis?

For fifty years the Spartans witnessed the growth of Athenian power. An attempt to check that power in the First Peloponnesian War ended in a stalemate. Sparta, Athens, and their allies accepted a Thirty Years Peace that left the Greek world divided between two power blocks. The peace held for fifteen years. Was the war inevitable? The answer is no. Was Spartan fear of the growth of Athenian power the primary cause for war? The answer is probably yes.³²⁹ At the end of

-
- 280 (Kagan 1969), 115–116.
- 281 This is not Thucydides, son of Olorus, the historian. We know little about this Thucydides, but he became a prominent opponent of Pericles. He succeeded Cimon as the leader of the nobility. He was ostracized in 443. His ostracism allowed Pericles to be the dominant politician in Athens in the 430s.
- 282 (Perlman 1976), 17. Perlman argues that Thucydides, like Pericles, was an imperialist. He disagreed with Pericles's objective to spend Empire revenue on a building program.
- 283 (Plutarch 1967-1970), Vol.III, 37.
- 284 The weight of an Attic talent is approximately 57 pounds or 27 kilograms. The talent could be gold or silver. The gold talent had greater value as a means of exchange.
- 285 Pericles's enemies later accused Pheidias of embezzlement in 438. Although acquitted, he was later accused of impiety for his depictions on the shield of Athena of Pericles and himself. He died in prison (Plut.*Per.*31.2–5).
- 286 The architects of the Parthenon were Ictinus and Callicrates. Mnesicles designed the Propylaea (Plut.*Per.*13). In Athens, Athena was worshipped as Athena Promachos (first-rank fighter), Athena Polios (protector), and Athena Parthenos (virgin).
- 287 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 146–149. Inscription number 54 suggests that the statue of Athena by Phidias cost at least seven hundred talents.
- 288 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 162–165. Inscription number 59 indicates the Parthenon may have cost seven hundred to eight hundred talents.
- 289 Initially founded about 720, Sybaris was destroyed multiple times in its conflicts with the neighboring *polis* of Croton.
- 290 (Kagan 1991), 127–28. Kagan argues that Thurii was a Panhellenic colony sponsored by Pericles to demonstrate that Athens had no further ambition to expand the Empire. (Perlman 1976), 16–17. Perlman argues that Thurii was an Athenian attempt to expand the empire in the west.
- 291 (Kagan 1969), 148–149.
- 292 (Meiggs 1975), 243–246. The member of the *hellenotamiai* may have been the chairman of the board. This year the chairman was Sophocles, the tragedian. Meiggs suggests the reform was political rather than economic.
- 293 *Ibid.*, 540–561. See the tables in Meiggs for the member contributions between 453 and 420.
- 294 In 424 Athens would lose control of Amphipolis to the Spartans under Brasidas. Athens never again gained control. Amphipolis became a major issue of dispute with Philip II in the fourth century.
- 295 Diodorus states that an indemnity of two hundred talents was imposed (Diod.XII.28.3). (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 151–154. Inscription number 56 provides the oath sworn by Athens and Samos to secure the peace. Plutarch mentions a report by Duris of Samos that some Samians were crucified and then clubbed to death (Plut.*Per.*28.1–3). He denies its validity since neither Thucydides, Ephorus, nor Aristotle mention it. (Kagan 1991), 277. Kagan agrees the story has no merit. (Meiggs 1975), 191–192. Meiggs disagrees and believes the story may be true.
- 296 Thucydides does not say what the government was after the revolt. Diodorus claims that democracy was established (Diod.XII.28.4). (Meiggs 1975), 193–194. Meiggs believes a democracy was installed. (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 144. Lewis claims that it is uncertain that a democracy was installed.
- 297 (Meiggs 1975). See Map 1 (Key Map) and the five subset maps at the end of the

- book that illustrate the districts.
- 298 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 111. See footnote 1 for an analysis. Not all members
were *poleis* nor members at the same time.
- 299 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 89–94. See inscription number 40 for a discussion of
Athenian control of Erythrae
- 300 (Meiggs 1975), 212.
- 301 *Ibid*, 209.
- 302 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 205–217. The term of office is inferred from Inscription
number 72 since the loans to Athens from the treasury were on an annual basis.
- 303 (Meiggs 1975), 237. This is pseudo-Xenophon commonly known as the “Old
Oligarch.”
- 304 (De Ste Croix 1961), 270.
- 305 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 138–144. Inscription number 52 describes the political
settlement of Chalcis as well as the Athenians prerogative to interfere in
particular judicial cases.
- 306 (Meiggs 1975), 226–227.
- 307 (Xenophon 1971), Vol. VII, 485–487.
- 308 (Ober 2015). 203–206. Ober argues that this prosperity encouraged innovation in
thought, finance, the arts, military power, and economic efficiency. Prosperity
would increase with further economic integration.
- 309 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 111–117. Inscription number 45 lists the terms. The
decree may have applied only to tributary states at this time. The ship providing
states of Chios, Lesbos, and Samos may have been exempt. Chios minted
through most of the fifth century and used electrum in some of its coinage. The
date of the decree is still debated. An alternative date is the late 420s.
- 310 Officials responsible for the enforcement of weights and measures were called
metronomoi in Athens (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*51.2).
- 311 (Xenophon 1971), Vol. VII, 489.
- 312 A *symmachia* (symmachy) was an offensive and defensive alliance. (Kagan
1991), 198–202. Kagan argues that this defensive alliance was a compromise
proposal by Pericles to those Athenians who advocated a confrontational policy
with the Peloponnesians. He argues that Pericles wanted to maintain peace with
the Spartans. Pericles did not believe that war with Sparta was inevitable. Kagan
also suggests that Sparta did not want this conflict to escalate into a war with
Athens.
- 313 Lacedaemonius may have been assigned the mission as a symbol to the
Peloponnesians that the Athenians wanted to maintain his father's pro-Spartan
friendship. Cimon had named his son in honor of the Lacedaemonians
(Plut.*Cim.*16.1).
- 314 (Salmon 1984), 167. Salmon doubts that Corinth could man more than forty
triremes with only Corinthian manpower.
- 315 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 167–168. This date is accepted by most scholars,
Inscription number 61 provides the expenditure for the 30 Athenian ships
eventually sent to Corcyra.
- 316 (Hale 2009), 139–143. Hale provides a detailed discussion of the battle.
- 317 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 154–161. See inscription number 58 and an analysis of
its significance. (Meiggs 1975), 519–523. In Appendix number 2, Meiggs
defends the date of 434/433 for the decrees.

- 318 This action resembles the removal of the Delian League treasury from Delos to the Acropolis in the 454. Instead of protecting the treasure of Apollo from Persia, the treasures of the other gods were now protected from Sparta.
- 319 (Meiggs 1975), 430–431. Although the date of the Megarian Decree is uncertain, the consensus among historians is that the decree occurred between the battle of Sybota (late 433) and the meeting of the Spartan Assembly in the summer of 432.
- 320 It is debatable whether Aegina was granted autonomy in the Thirty Years Peace.
- 321 (De Ste. Croix 1972), 251–261. He argues the decree was not an economic hardship to Megara. Nor was it a political or strategic move to seduce Megara from the Spartan alliance. The decree was a minor response to Megara's cultivation of sacred ground near Eleusis. It was not intended to provoke Sparta. Pericles wanted peace. The decree was a propaganda tool by Sparta to accuse Athens of provoking war. (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 376–378. Lewis disputes this argument. He argues that there were economic ramifications to the Megarian Decree. Thucydides, Aristophanes, Andocides, and other ancient sources emphasize the importance of Megara as a cause for war.
- 322 (Thucydides 1954), 55.
- 323 Pausanias, the son of the exiled Pleistoanax, the other king, was still a minor. He was not allowed to speak by law since he was not a Spartiate yet.
- 324 In the seventh century, Cylon attempted to become tyrant of Athens during a religious festival. His supporters were killed despite a promise that they would suffer no harm. The Alcmaeonidae encouraged the massacre. Thus there was a curse on the family for violating the rule of supplication in a temple (Thuc.I.126).
- 325 (Thucydides 1954), 95.
- 326 The term used to describe World War 1. The devastation led to the fall of the Houses of Romanov (Russia), Hohenzollern (Germany), and Hapsburg (Austria-Hungary) in Europe. The Ottoman Empire was destroyed in the Middle East. The price of victory was high with the victors (Great Britain, France, and Italy) weaker than before the war.
- 327 (Kagan 1969), 357–374; Adcock in (Bury, Cook and Adcock 1935), 191–191. Lewis in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 370–380. Lewis believes the war was inevitable.
- 328 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 154–161. See the analysis for the date of Inscription number 58. (Meiggs 1975), 519–523. Meiggs provides a further justification for the date of 434/433.
- 329 (Cartledge 2004), 164.

Panhellenic Festivals

Origins

In the classical period there were four major Panhellenic festivals. In order of priority and age by the Greeks these were the Olympian, Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean Games. Identified as the “Sacred and Crown Games,” these games were originally designed as festivals to honor the gods. Their origins are shrouded in the foundation myths about the gods and heroes. However, by the beginning of the sixth century, the structure of the games was in place. The opening ceremonies for each festival began with a sacrifice to the patron deity. Organized around musical festivities and athletic contests, the celebrants honored Zeus at Olympia, Apollo at Delphi, Poseidon at the Isthmus, and Zeus at Nemea. Only Hellenes could participate in these festivities.³³⁰ Although the Hellenes remained politically divided, for centuries these events performed the function of uniting the Greeks culturally by celebrating their common religion and heritage. Although these festivals did not prevent recurring warfare, in honor of the gods, participants, and spectators, the Hellenes usually accepted a period of truce before and after these festivals.³³¹

The Olympian Games occurred near Elis in the Peloponnese and were the oldest dating to 776 BC.³³² The Eleans conducted the games, which occurred every four years, during the months of August or September. A victors list was maintained at Olympia recording all the winners over the centuries. Later Greek writers dated events according to the period of the Olympiad that they occurred within.³³³ Originally, only one athletic contest occurred. That was a foot race called the *stadion*, which was about two hundred meters (over six hundred yards) in length.³³⁴ It might have involved a race to light the sacrificial torch at the altar of Zeus. Over the centuries, other events involving men and horses were included. These games, which survived until officially disbanded by the Emperor Theodosius I in AD 393, always remained preeminent in the Greek world.

The Pythian Games occurred every four years at Delphi and began two years after each Olympiad. These games also occurred during the summer months of August or September in the third year

after the last Olympiad. The games derived from an original musical festival. The Amphictyonic League administered the games and musical competitions. By 582 the dating of Pythiads began. Although the Pythian Games always played second fiddle to Olympia, Delphi was the first violin as a Panhellenic religious shrine. Though Zeus was consulted at Olympia, Apollo's shrine remained the principle oracle consulted by the Hellenes in times of turmoil.

Unlike the Olympian and Pythian Games, the Isthmian and Nemean Games occurred every two years. The Isthmian Games were held near the temple of Poseidon near Corinth. The Corinthians conducted the games that occurred during April or May and probably date to 582. The Isthmian Games were the only games not conducted during the hot and dry summer months.

The Nemean Games might have begun about 575/573 and occurred in July. Administered by the people of Cleonae in the Argolid, these games were the least important of the four major Panhellenic festivals. Although the origins of Argos' involvement in these games is unknown, by the fifth century Argos, as the dominant polis in the Argolid, probably had some supervisory role over the games.

In the athletic competitions, the participants were initially restricted to men. In time, contests were created for boys. Eligibility for boys was based on physical maturity rather than age. By the sixth century the athletes competed in the nude. The origins of nudity are unknown. The athletic competitions in Homer show that the competitors were clothed. In the gymnasias, the Greeks exercised in the nude. In Sparta, men and women exercised in the nude. The Hellenes understood that nudity was culturally unique to them. By the beginning of the seventh century, sculptures were appearing unclothed.³³⁵ Art and athletics simultaneously seemed to embrace nudity as a natural aspect of humanity. For centuries the Greek athletic competitions entailed nudity. As a result, for cultural reasons and Elean law, women were not allowed to be spectators at these competitions (Paus.V.6.7). Although the evidence is inconclusive, Pausanias states that unmarried women could watch the athletic competitions (Paus.VI.20.9). Since they were ineligible for athletic competition, women participated in the musical festivities with their song and dance competitions.



Map 5 – The four Panhellenic sites.

Map 5—The Four Panhellenic Sites

Olympia

The oldest and most prestigious games were at Olympia. Conducted by the Eleans to honor Zeus, the games lasted five days in the fifth century (Pind.*O.I.V.6*). There were three requirements to participate in the games. An athlete must be a Hellene. He must be a citizen of a Greek state. Finally, his community must accept the sacred truce proclaimed.³³⁶ The victors in all competitions received a crown of wild olive leaves. Statues were often erected at Olympia depicting their triumphs. Although the rewards were modest at the games, upon their return to their home cities, the victors were honored as heroes. Bringing glory to their native *polis* or *ethnos*, the victors would often be rewarded with monetary awards and special privileges. The great poets of the fifth century—Pindar, Simonides, and Bacchylides—wrote odes in their honor equating their accomplishments to the heroes of Homer. Their odes, written in a metrical format, were meant to be sung (not read) with the accompaniment of a musical instrument. Pindar writes,

O Zeus most high, whose chariot is the tireless footed thundercloud! on thee I call; for it is thine Hours that, in their circling dance to the varied notes of the lyre's minstrelsy, sent me to bear witness to the most exalted of all contests; and, when friends are victorious, forthwith the heart of the noble leapeth up with gladness at the sweet tidings.
(Pind.*O.I.IV.1–9*)³³⁷

Prior to the games, the Eleans sent six heralds, called the *theoroi*, throughout Hellas to announce the commencement of the games.³³⁸ A truce was proclaimed a month prior to the games. The truce was designed to allow the athletes and spectators to travel to Olympia in

safety. The athletes would then proceed to Elis to prepare and train for the games. The *poleis*, represented by the athletes, sent sacred envoys, also called *theoroi*, to conduct rituals in the temples of Olympia to honor the gods in the name of the individual *polis*. After the synoecism of Elis into a *polis* in the 470s, the city was laid out to accommodate these competitors. Pausanias tells us that various training grounds were built for the various events. Separate grounds were established to conduct speeches and listen to literary performances (Paus.VI.23.1–7). The Eleans also completed the temple of Zeus at Olympia in the 450s from spoils taken from captured Pisa, located on the border with Arcadia (Paus.V.10.2).

To conduct the games, a board of *hellenodikai* (judges) from Elis oversaw the planning of the games and the maintenance of the facilities at Olympia and Elis.³³⁹ Olympia was about sixty-four kilometers (forty miles) from Elis. One or two judges initially sufficed for these responsibilities. By the fifth century, after the expansion of the number of events and participants, the judges were expanded to ten. These judges were called *diaitateres* prior to the Persian wars. Afterwards, a judge was called a *hellenodikas* by Pindar. He mentions this in his ode to Theron of Acragas who won the chariot race in 476 (Pind.*Ol*.III.12).³⁴⁰

These judges determined the qualifications of the athletes and what contests they were eligible for. With limited space and time at the games, only the most qualified athletes were allowed to participate.³⁴¹ They enforced strict rules to prevent cheating at the games. Those convicted of violating the rules were identified as *mianteres* (defilers). They were punished with fines, beatings, banishment from future games, removal of their victorious statues, and identified on stone as cheaters for future generations to observe.³⁴² Consequently, this disgrace was associated with the violators forever. They were often shunned at home because of the disgrace brought upon their community. These *mianteres* not only disgraced themselves in the secular world but also the sacred world. Cheating violated the oath to Zeus that the athletes swore to. They dishonored the patron deity, and thus, the religious connotation of the games was reinforced.

To travel the distance from Elis to Olympia, the official procession, consisting of priests, judges, officials from the various participating *poleis*, athletes, and spectators, left Elis four days prior to the beginning of the games. It was a two-day journey. Upon arrival at Olympia, sacrifices were performed to Zeus and Pelops on the third day. An oath was sworn to Zeus by the athletes, their fathers, brothers, and coaches, that they would not defile the integrity of the games (Paus.V.24.9–10). In the afternoon of this third day, the contests for boys were probably conducted. On the fourth day, all the contests for

men were conducted. The pentathlon appears to have occurred on the third day from 472 onwards. The remainder of the contests occurred during the final two days. On the fifth day, the awards were passed out to the victors in a celebration of their accomplishments and the divine favor of Zeus. The crown of olive leaves was placed on the head of each victor in front of the statue of Zeus Olympios.³⁴³



Picture 6—The Stadium at Olympia

Picture 6 – A personal picture of the stadium at Olympia.



Picture 7—Statuary Base at Olympia

Picture 7 – A personal picture of a stone base with an inscription at Olympia.



Picture 8 – A personal picture of the shrine of Philip II at Olympia.

Picture 8—The Shrine of Philip II at Olympia

The current stadium at Olympia was rebuilt in the fourth century. It exists further from the temple of Zeus than the original stadiums. Most of the events occurred within the stadium. From the initial stadion foot race, the games by the fifth century included the *stadion* (one lap race), *diaulos* (two lap race), and the *dolichos* (seven lap race). The combat sports included the *pankration* (combination of boxing and wrestling), wrestling, and boxing. The *pentathlon* (stadion, discuss, long jump, javelin throw, and wrestling) tested multiple skills of the athlete. The *hoplitodromos* (foot race wearing armor) tested one's endurance. Added to events were multiple horse races.³⁴⁴ They were the *keles* (one lap race), *kalpe* (multiple lap race), and *tethrippon* (four horse chariot race of twelve laps).³⁴⁵ A mule race called the *apene* existed by the fifth century. Professional jockeys and chariot drivers rode or drove the horses. However, the olive crown went to the owner of the horse or chariot. Usually conducted under hot, dry, and dusty conditions, these were grueling tests that challenged man and beast to the limit.³⁴⁶

The *pankration* and boxing were the most dangerous competitions.³⁴⁷ Broken bones, facial distortion, concussion, and internal organ damage often resulted. Some contestants died in the competitions. Multiple contests in these events occurred during the same day. Consequently, the victorious athlete might compete from dawn to dusk. By the end of the day, he was probably a bloody mess. Whether a contestant or a spectator, these contests were certainly not for the faint of heart. Thus, the assigned name of “combat” sport

seems highly appropriate.

As difficult as the conditions were for the competitors, the hardships borne by the spectators were probably just as great. There were no hotels, restaurants, air conditioning, medical facilities, etc. Spectators camped in open spaces and slept under the stars. They cooked or purchased their food and collected their water supply from local rivers or wells. Hygiene and sanitary conditions were primitive. Designated areas existed for bodily functions. Heat exhaustion, disease, odor, flies, etc., would test the endurance of the hardiest fans. Thus, attending the games was a test of willpower for athletes and spectators. Though not for the faint of heart, the prestige of these games made attendance bearable for most people.

Picture 9 – A personal picture from Delphi of a four horse chariot.

Picture 9—Drawing of a Four-Horse Chariot at Delphi



Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean Games

The athletic contests at these games followed the pattern set at Olympia. Training year around, the athletes made the competitive circuit by traveling throughout Hellas and participating in all these games. Like some modern Olympic athletes, these competitors performed for many years. In off years, the competitors would meet in local festivals such as the Panathenaea in Athens. The rules and events were similar for all games.

Like Olympia, the rewards for victory at the games were symbolic only. The Pythian victor received a crown of bay (laurel) leaves, the Isthmian a crown of dry celery, and the Nemean a crown of fresh celery. At Delphi, the *Hieromnemes* of the Amphictyonic League supervised the games as well as the maintenance of the sacred grounds.³⁴⁸ Like Olympia, the judges at the Nemean games were also referred to as *hellenodikai*.

Each of these games had individual characteristics. At Delphi, the

musical contests remained an important element of the festivities. Music was always important honoring Apollo. Singing by the chorus and playing the flute or cithara were the main contests. Since the existing stadium at Delphi was probably not built before the end of the fourth century, the athletic competition was probably held in the plain of Crisa below Delphi. At the Isthmian Games, the musical contests did not begin before the third century. Dedicated to Poseidon, the patron god of horses as well as the sea, the chariot and horse races held a special importance at the Isthmus. Smaller than the other games with fewer events and participants, the Nemean games were probably a one-day affair. What the opening ceremonies might have been is open to speculation.

Picture 10—Amphitheater at Delphi

Picture 10 – A personal picture of the amphitheater at Delphi.



Cultural Significance

While the games at Olympia were held during Xerxes's invasion, Herodotus tells a story, probably apocryphal, of Persian surprise that men competed for glory only (Hdt.VIII.26). The real surprise is that the games continued as Xerxes approached. The Peloponnesian War did not disrupt the quadrennial gathering. Conflicts with Carthage or Etruria did not prevent the western Greeks from attending. Regardless of the circumstances, the "Sacred and Crown Games" went on to honor the gods as well as the athletes. These festivals, centered on the great shrines of Hellas, were the cultural unifier of the Hellenes. Despite their political disunity, the popularity of these festivals

demonstrated Greek cultural ties were ultimately stronger.

In addition to the participants and spectators of the athletic and musical competitions, the leading political figures, philosophers, orators, poets, and writers would attend to expound their thoughts and writings to the attendees. Themistocles received an ovation from the crowd when he entered the Olympic stadium in 472 (Plut.*Them.*17.2). Herodotus might have recited part of his history at Olympia. The short odes of the Pindar were probably composed at the games. Longer odes were composed afterwards when the poets were commissioned by the victors to honor their achievements. Pindar's odes commemorated victors in all four major games. Victors in the boys' contests were also honored (Pind.*Ol.*11). The long life of Simonides (536–438) and Pindar (518–443) allowed each to praise the victors over a span of fifty years each.

Picture 11 – A personal picture of the stadium at Delphi

Picture 11—Stadium at Delphi



Athenian Festivals.

In addition to the four Panhellenic festivals, many local festivals gained stature in the sixth century and prospered through the fifth. The best documented local festivals were those of Athens. Although Athens had multiple festivals, three achieved special prominence. The first was the Panathenaea, which occurred on the twenty-eighth of Hekatombaion (July/August) at the beginning of the Attic calendar

year. This festival celebrated the gods of the Acropolis, in particular Erechtheus, the mythological king associated with Poseidon and the patron goddess Athena. A procession of the representatives of the people marched to the Acropolis to perform sacrifices. They shared the sacrificial meat with the people. An annual cleansing of the temple of Athena also occurred. Every four years from the mid-sixth century (562?), the celebration became the Great Panathenaea, which involved musical and athletic competitions.³⁴⁹ By the 440s, the subject states of the Athenian Empire were required to participate in the festival.³⁵⁰

The second festival was the Eleusinian Mysteries in the fall month of Boedromion (September/October). This two-day event was a secret and sacred ceremony involving the celebrants marching to the temple of Demeter and Persephone in Eleusis. The ceremonies of the initiates into the cult are unknown. The mysteries were open to any Hellene who wished to be initiated (Hdt.VIII.65). The Athenian magistrates conducted the procession that began on the nineteenth of Boedromion. The procession was led by priestesses carrying sacred objects while the celebrants voiced sacred chants. Arriving at Eleusis, the ceremonies were conducted after dark. When the ceremonies were completed the people returned to Athens.³⁵¹

Although the origin date is unknown, in the fourth century Isocrates states the Greek *poleis* were required to donate their first fruits of harvest to the goddesses (Isoc.IV.31). Those *poleis* that did not were admonished by Delphi. Did a scolding by Delphi have repercussions? There is no evidence one way or the other. The donations were probably used for offerings and sacrifices by the priestesses. The quantity of these contributions is unknown. However, a stele found at Athens and possibly dated to 422 lists Athenian and allied contributions under the empire (M&L 73).³⁵² The Athenians and allies are to donate 1/600th of barley and 1/200th of wheat as their offerings.³⁵³ The stele does not state what the contributions of other Greek states were. How long these contributions continued is unknown. Regardless of the quantity, the Greeks submitted their first fruits annually at least into the late fourth century.

The third festival was the Great (City) Dionysia, which occurred in the spring month of Elphebolion (March/April).³⁵⁴ This was a celebration of the god Dionysus. This festival was first introduced in the mid-sixth century by the tyrant Pisistratus. The event began with a procession that brought the statue of Dionysus to the theater, south of the Acropolis. Sacrifices were performed to the god on the tenth. The most famous aspect of the festival was the performances of plays from the eleventh to the fourteenth. Three writers of tragedy were selected for the competition. Each provided three tragedies and a satyr play.

Five writers of comedy followed. Performing the role of liturgist, a noble was assigned the role of *choregos* for each writer. They provided the chorus for these plays at their own expense.³⁵⁵ The best tragic and comedic performance won a first prize for the author. There was also a choral competition by men and boys with each of the ten tribes providing a chorus in each category. The classic plays, that have survived to the present day, occurred in the fifth century with the arrival of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides for tragedy and Aristophanes for comedy. This competition became the supreme annual cultural event in the Hellenic world. Like New York or London today, the plays performed here would be performed in other cities throughout the Hellenic world. The authors were as famous as the athletes and their lyrics would be memorized by many.

In virtually every month of the year, the Athenians celebrated some type of festival. The Thesmophoria, which occurred in the month of Pyanepsion, was a festival exclusive to women to honor Artemis and acknowledge their journey in life from youth to old age. To commemorate their victories over Xerxes, the Athenians established festivals to celebrate Marathon on the sixth of Boedromion, Salamis on the sixteenth of Munichion, and Plataea on the third of Boedromion. New festivals were continuously added. In 420 the cult of Asclepius, the god of healing, was incorporated into the Athenian calendar. Thus, the Athenians, like all Hellenes, were constantly celebrating various deities to maintain harmony between the sacred and secular world. Athena was the patron goddess of Athens, but all the gods required proper propitiation to maintain the well-being of the *polis*.

Spartan Festivals

The celebrations of the Athenians applied to all Hellenes. The festivals throughout the Hellenic world were a celebration of the deities. In Sparta, the three major festivals honored Apollo in his various forms. These were the Hyacinthia, Carneia, and Gymnopaedia. All were composed of music, dance, and choral competitions. The Spartans were famous for their love of music. They were also famous for their piety. It was the celebration of the Carneia that delayed their arrival at Marathon and forced Leonidas to defend Thermopylae with only three hundred Spartiates.

The Hyacinthia, held at Amyclae, was three-day festival celebrating Apollo Hyacinthus in the Sparta month of Hecatombeus (October).³⁵⁶ The festival was a symbol of the union of the conquering Dorians and the native Achaean population of Amyclae. It also represented the Spartan educational system (Agoge) with the close relationship between the youths and their older mentors. The festival

was also important for the women and girls because Apollo was the revered deity of all Dorians.

The Carneia celebrated Apollo Carneius. It was celebrated during the sacred Dorian month of Carneios (August/September). This was a nine-day festival. All Spartans participated. The details of the celebration are little known.

The Gymnopaedia occurred during the heat of summer. This festival was often a showcase for foreign guests visiting Sparta. Despite the Spartan love of rigorous exercise and military training, none of these festivals were centered on athletic competition.

Miscellaneous Hellenic Festivals

Unfortunately, aside from Athens, we know few details about the various festivals in the other *poleis* throughout Hellas. We can mention the names of some festivals and which deities they honored. In some cases we know the dates when they were celebrated. However, we can provide little data regarding the length of the celebrations, what athletic or choral events occurred, what rituals were practiced, who participated, what the rules were, etc.

On the small Ionian island of Delos, the Ionian Greeks celebrated an annual summer festival in honor of Delian Apollo at the sacred sanctuary. The celebration included choral music, dance, and athletic completion. The festival was run by officials assigned to maintain the sanctuary and the temple treasures.

On the island of Cyprus, in Athens, Corinth, and other cities, an annual festival to Aphrodite Pandemos occurred in which the celebrants marched in a procession to honor the goddess, purify her sanctuary, and cleanse the image of the goddess. In Cyprus, participants were initiated into the Mysteries of Aphrodite. In Athens, the festival occurred in midsummer. In Syracuse, after the end of the tyranny in the 460s, an annual festival of *eleutheria* (freedom) was dedicated to Zeus Eleutherius. In Ephesus, the Dionysia and Artemisia were festivals dedicated to Dionysus and Artemis. These festivals often occurred on an annual basis and were celebrated by the local or regional inhabitants.

Most *poleis* throughout the Hellenic world worshipped the Olympian gods in their local variations. Some festivals celebrated deities unique to the region. Regardless of whether the festivals were for the Olympian or local gods, all contained some combination of religious ritual, athletic competition, and music, dance, and oral competitions. The Hellenes never lost their competitive nature in sport or the arts.

participate.

- 331 In 412 the Corinthians refused to participate in the naval campaign against Athens until the truce for the Isthmian Games had expired. King Agis of Sparta agreed to honor the truce and excused the Corinthians (Thuc.VIII.9.1–2). In 428 at Olympia, the Spartans and allies discussed the revolt of Mytilene after the festival was complete (Thuc.III.8).
- 332 (Spivey 2012), 239–240. Based on archaeological evidence, the games began sometime during the eighth century.
- 333 An example from Diodorus is “Calliades was archon in Athens, and the Romans made Spurius Cassius and Proculus Verginius Tricostus consuls, and the Eleans celebrated the Seventy-fifth Olympiad, that in which Astylus of Syracuse won the ‘stadion.’” (Diod.XI.1.2)
- 334 (Spivey 2012), 115–116. The race was the length of the stadium. At Olympia, it was 192 meters. The stadium at Delphi is 177 meters.
- 335 (Spivey 2012), 125–126.
- 336 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 107. In the 420s Sparta was banned because it violated the sacred truce (Thuc.V.49.1).
- 337 (Pindar 1968), 43. Pindar calls the chariot race “the most exalted” contest. This ode is dedicated to the victory of Psumis of Camarina, in Sicily, in the chariot race of 452 BC.
- 338 (Potter 2011), 57–58. (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 107–108.
- 339 (Potter 2011), 57–58.
- 340 The winners of the chariot races were not the drivers but the owners. Chariot races were the province of the nobility because they had the resources to maintain horses, chariots, and drivers.
- 341 (Potter 2011), 65. Potter suggests that forty-eight contestants were the optimum allowed in the combat sports and 110 contestants in the running events.
- 342 See Richardson in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 229–230.
- 343 (Spivey 2012), 134. This is not the ivory and gold statue made by Pheidias, completed about 435, which was called the *Nikephoros* (victory bearing).
- 344 Chariot races began about 680. The boys’ events were included by 632.
- 345 (Potter 2011), 67–76; (Spivey 2012), 87–120. Potter and Spivey discuss the characteristics for each event.
- 346 (Sophocles 1953), 89–91. (Miller 2012), 54–55. In his *Electra*, Sophocles describes how Orestes was killed in a chariot race at Delphi in the Pythian Games.
- 347 (Poliakoff 1995), 54–63; 85–87.
- 348 (Ehrenberg 1964), 111–112.
- 349 See Burkert in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 251–252.
- 350 (Meiggs 1975), 292–293.
- 351 See Burkert in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 264–265.
- 352 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 217–223. The date of the inscription is not certain. The decree was not in force in the fourth century. A record of contributions is dated to 329/328 (223).
- 353 (Meiggs 1975), 302–304.
- 354 There was a rural Dionysia celebrated in the towns of Attica during the month of Posideon (December/January).
- 355 Pericles was a *choregos* for Aeschylus’s play the *Persae* (The Persians) in 472.
- 356 (Cartledge 2004), 57–58. Amyclae was one of the five towns that composed of Sparta. This festival honored Apollo and his lover, Hyacinthus, who was accidentally killed by Apollo. The soldiers of Amyclae were allowed to return to Sparta to celebrate the festival when they were on campaign.

The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC)

Introduction

Unknown at the time, this conflict in various stages would last the next twenty-seven years. The war would be fought in the Hellenic mainland, Macedonia, Thrace, Sicily, Anatolia and the islands in the Aegean and Ionian seas. The first ten years would be known as the Archidamian War. The Peace of Nicias would follow in 421. It was a peace in name only. A major land battle would be fought at Mantinea in 418 by a coalition of Peloponnesian states, sponsored by Athens, against Sparta. Sparta emerged the victor. In 415 Athens launched the Sicilian expedition against Syracuse, which ended disastrously in 413. The final stage of the conflict identified as the Deceleian War, which reintroduced Persia into Greek affairs, lasted until 404 with the surrender of Athens. At the beginning of his narrative Thucydides states his reason for writing his history:

He began the task at the very outset of the war, in the belief that it would be great and noteworthy above all the wars that had gone before, inferring this from the fact that both powers were then at their best in preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides with one state or the other, some at once, others planning to do so. (Thuc.I.1.1)³⁵⁷

Following the paradigm established by Thucydides, the conflict is treated as an organic whole. Thucydides never called the conflict the Peloponnesian War. Modern historians gave it that name. In the first sentence of his history, Thucydides identifies the war between “the Peloponnesians and the Athenians” (Thuc.I.1.1).³⁵⁸ Some historians argue that this war was a mere continuation of the First Peloponnesian War. The Thirty Years Peace (446/445) like the later Peace of Nicias (421) was a mere interlude in the hot/cold war between the Athenian Empire and the Peloponnesian League.³⁵⁹ This is a reasonable concept. However, we cannot unlock the shackles of Thucydides paradigm. This war stands on its own merits. Like Herodotus for the Persian wars, a study of the Peloponnesian War begins with Thucydides. All other historical information is used either to fill in the

blanks of his narrative or verify the information he provides. Thucydides does not identify his sources. His famous speeches probably represent the core issues, but they were created in his brain according to his philosophy of history, political theory, and the nature of man. No other surviving author from antiquity wrote a history of the war as complete as Thucydides. However, from the modern perspective, Thucydides had one major weakness. Thucydides narrates the events but often does not put the events into a context. For example, his narrative of the Pentecontaetia is an outline of events with little explanation as to when, how, and why they occurred.³⁶⁰ We also get little biographical information of the major characters involved. This is regrettable. However, this was not the purpose of Thucydides's history. From the fourth century BC to the present, all subsequent authors have followed the path blazed by Thucydides. We must remember that Thucydides died before his work was completed. Therefore, historians still debate which parts of his history were complete and which were a work in process.

When Thucydides story ends, we primarily rely on the contemporary narrative of Xenophon's *Hellenica*.³⁶¹ His information is supplemented by an unknown author that modern historians identify as the Oxyrhynchus Historian. The fragments of his work are called the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.³⁶² The other major literary sources, Diodorus and Plutarch, wrote centuries after the war ended. Their work relies on early authors whose histories have not survived or survive only in fragments. None of these sources compare to Thucydides. Their information helps fill in the blanks or provides an alternative view to Thucydides. Some contemporary inscriptions survive to supplement the literary sources. In this Great War, what were the resources and objectives of the belligerents?

Resources

What were the resources of the belligerents? The first was an alliance system. Sparta was supported by the Peloponnesian League and independent allies. Athens had the empire and independent allies. The foundation of Spartan power was the army. The foundation of Athenian power was the navy. Athenian financial resources derived from tribute from the empire, taxes on trade, and internal taxation. Unlike the treasury for the Delian League with assessed contributions, the Peloponnesian League never developed a permanent treasury. Sparta financed its own army through taxation of its citizens and requisitions from helot labor. Whether soldiers or ships, the Peloponnesian allies financed their own contingents through taxes. Revenue in the form of captured booty was utilized, but this was an

irregular source at best.

What resources did Sparta bring to the table? First and foremost was manpower. The Spartan army was the best trained in Hellas. No source quantifies Spartan manpower in 431. However, Spartan manpower declined through the course of the fifth century. War, losses in the great earthquake of 464, and decline in economic status are some of the suggestions to account for the decline in citizens. Though numbers are speculative, perhaps three thousand to four thousand Spartiates comprised the army.³⁶³ The Spartiates were supplemented by perioeci who could serve as hoplites. The helots could provide light-armed troops and serve as logistical support.³⁶⁴

What manpower did the Peloponnesian League possess? The allies of Sparta included all the Peloponnesians except Argos and Achaia.³⁶⁵ The Boeotians, Locrians, and Phocians were from central Greece. The Ambraciots, Leucadians, and Anactorians were from western Greece. Hoplites, light infantry, cavalry, and ships would be provided (Thuc.II.9.2–3). Although not specified, Sparta requested ships from the allies in Italy and Sicily (Thuc.II.7.2). Unfortunately, without hard figures from the literary sources, the available manpower is open to speculation.

Emergency financial funds could be gathered by loans from the shrines of Olympia, Delphi, and other temples (Thuc.I.121.3). Booty could be captured in war. Revenue also derived from the ransom of prisoners, ships, cargo, etc. Most of the allies were self-sufficient in agriculture. Corinth and possibly Megara were exceptions. Grain could be imported from Italy and Sicily in case of damage or poor harvests. Thucydides does not quantify the material resources for Sparta as he does for Athens. Thus, an analysis of the resources of the Spartan alliance is generic at best!³⁶⁶

What expenditures did the Peloponnesians incur? Since each ally funded their own contingent, it was less expensive to supply an army in the field. Food and water could be gathered on campaign to supplement the provisions stocked for the campaign. Draft animals to carry supplies were requisitioned from the farmers. Land campaigns were usually of short duration between the planting and harvesting periods. The citizen soldiers of the allies needed to return home to gather the harvest and run their small businesses. During the Archidamian war, the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica varied from forty days in 430 to fifteen days in 425 (Thuc.II.57; IV.6). The fleet of the Peloponnesians was smaller and the campaigns were shorter. During the Archidamian war, they operated primarily in the Saronic and Corinthian Gulf. Corinth, with ports on both gulfs, was the chief maritime state. The Peloponnesians conducted no long-term siege operations. Like revenue, there is no evidence citing Spartan or

Peloponnesian expenditures. Consequently, an analysis of expenditures is also generic at best.

What resources did Athens possess? Beside the members of the empire, the allies of Athens included the Plataeans, Messenians in Naupactus, the western islanders of Corcyra and Zacynthus, and the Acarnanians. All supplied manpower and/or revenue. The islands of Corcyra, Chios, and Lesbos still provided ships (Thuc.II.9.4–6).

What was the quantity of these contributions? Thucydides reports that the Athenians had 13,000 hoplites for the field army, 16,000 reserves (young, old, and metics) for guard and garrison duty, 1,200 cavalry, and 1,600 archers (Thuc.II.13.6–8).³⁶⁷ No figures exist for the allies. These land forces could oppose a Peloponnesian invasion force.

Regarding the navy, three hundred Athenian triremes were available. Fully manned, these ships would require another sixty thousand men of which 51,000 would be rowers. Between Corcyra, Lesbos and Chios, a minimum of one hundred triremes were available. Citizens and mercenaries probably comprised the rowers. Early in the war Athens launched no more than a hundred triremes on a major campaign. Corcyra contributed fifty ships to the Athenian campaign in western waters in 431 (Thuc.II.25.1). Lesbos and Chios contributed fifty ships to the campaign in the Saronic Gulf in 430 (Thuc.II.56.2). Other ships were patrolling the sea-lanes, serving as scouts, and assisting in siege operations (Potidaea). Since the Athenians avoided a land engagement with the Peloponnesians, the hoplites served on the ships as marines or were transported in troop ships for larger amphibious operations.

What were the financial resources of Athens? Thucydides listed state and temple treasures that were available according to Pericles (Thuc.II.13.2–5). Thucydides says,

Here Pericles encouraged confidence, pointing out that, apart from all other sources of revenue, the average yearly contribution from the allies to Athens amounted to six hundred talents; then there still remained in the Acropolis a sum of six thousand talents of coined silver. In addition to this there was the uncoined gold and silver in offerings made either by individuals or by the state; there were the sacred vessels and furniture used in the processions and in the games; there were the spoils taken from the Persians, and other resources of one kind or another, all of which would amount to no less than five hundred talents. To this he added the money in other temples which might be used and which came

to a considerable sum, and said that, if they were really reduced to absolute extremities, they could even use the gold on the statue of Athene herself.³⁶⁸

Although we may question the accuracy of this financial statement, Athens had considerable financial reserves. Thus, Athens was well positioned financially to conduct the war.

Were Athenian resources superior to Sparta? The answer is yes. However, Athenian expenditures would have been greater because of the requirements to maintain a fleet. It cost a talent a month to operate a trireme (Thuc.VI.8.1). Naval campaigns were often longer than land campaigns. Triremes, transport ships, men, food, water, fodder for horses, siege equipment, and replacement parts for the ships were a few of the items necessary to provision a fleet.³⁶⁹ Thus, large sums of money were required for fleet operations. The Athenians would conduct siege operations at Potidaea, Mytilene, Chios, etc., during the war. At Potidaea, a hoplite was paid a drachma per day. At least three thousand hoplites were engaged in the siege (Thuc.III.17.3–4). When Potidaea surrendered in 430, the cost of the siege was two thousand talents (Thuc.II.70.2).³⁷⁰

The Athenian navy and garrisons were required to collect tribute from the allies and neutrals. They also protected the sea-lanes to safeguard commerce and the food supply from the enemy and piracy (i.e., the Hellespont). The growth of the Athenian population in the fifth century meant that the agricultural produce of Attica was insufficient to feed the population. The population probably expanded considerably after mid-century when the beautification program attracted foreign workers. These metics were an asset since Athenian skilled labor was likely insufficient to meet the requirements of the building program. Perhaps ten thousand metics eventually lived in Athens.³⁷¹ To feed the population, Athens primarily imported grain from the Black Sea area. Egypt was a secondary supplier. With the loss of the agricultural productivity in Attica during the Peloponnesian invasions, the Athenians were even more dependent on imported food. Thus, the cost to purchase this extra food was a drain on the treasury. We can conclude that although Athens had large financial resources than Sparta, it also had large expenditures.

War Objectives

The destruction of Athenian power was the objective of Sparta and the Peloponnesian allies. As the belligerent that declared war, Spartan operations and strategy would be an offensive one. They proclaimed themselves to be the liberators of Hellas (Thuc.II.8.4). Sparta would appeal to Persia for an alliance (Thuc.IV.50). Spartan

envoys would encourage revolts within the empire. A Peloponnesian army would invade Attica, destroy the countryside, lure out the Athenian army, and destroy it in a set piece battle. With a Spartan victory, the Athenians would sue for peace.³⁷² Thus, there would be a short war (Thuc.IV.85.2; V.14.3). If this strategy failed, the Corinthians were optimistic that a Peloponnesian fleet could challenge Athenian control of the sea and encourage revolt among the subjects of Athens (Thuc.I.121–122.1).

The Athenians, as stated by Pericles, would adopt a defensive posture. There would be no expansion of the empire as tried in the 450s. With their superior financial resources, manpower, fleet, and defensive walls, the Athenians would fight a war of attrition (Thuc.II.13.2–9; II.65.7). The Athenians would stay behind their long walls, avoid a hoplite battle, subdue the small Peloponnesian naval forces, and conduct hit and run tactics on the Peloponnese to weaken Peloponnesian morale. They would guard the empire and the searoutes to protect trade, the food supply, and tribute collection.³⁷³ Rebellion by any member would be suppressed. Thus, the fleet would be the guardian of Athens. Pericles, like Themistocles, put Athens future in the hands of the “wooden walls.” Thucydides does not discuss alternative strategic viewpoints. These appeared in the course of the war through the actions of others.

Like a chameleon, King Perdiccas II of Macedon (452–413) alternated his alliance with each belligerent contingent on his perception of his interests. His successor Archelaus (413–399) was more pro-Athenian. In the beginning, Perdiccas was hostile toward Athens and supported Potidaea. Later he became hostile to Sparta, when a Spartan army seized Amphipolis and did not serve his interests. Persia was neutral until the last decade of the war. In Sicily and Italy, Sparta requested some Greek states to provide ships when the war began (Thuc.II.7.2). However, their support was minimal to the Peloponnesian war effort. In the west, the friends of Athens also provided little support to the Athenian war effort.

Neither belligerent expected a long war. Unfortunately, a long war was what they received. The objectives of mortals were no match for the gods. Zeus, Apollo, Athena, and the rest wanted pain, suffering, hardship, and death. The gods would achieve their objectives.

The Archidamian War (431–421 BC) – The First Phase (431–426)

In the spring of 431 the war began when the Thebans, under the leadership of the Boeotarchs Pythangelus and Diemporus, attacked Plataea, the only ally of Athens in Boeotia.³⁷⁴ The attack failed. The

Plataeans killed the 180 Theban captives. Plataea appealed to Athens for support. Athens sent a relief force. The Plataean women and children were sent to Athens. The remaining Plataeans and the Athenians stayed to defend the city (Thuc.II.2–6) The Athenians viewed this attack as a violation of the Thirty Years Peace and prepared for war (Thuc.II.7.1). The Lacedaemonians followed. War was on.

King Archidamus II and the Peloponnesians, along with the Boeotians, launched an invasion of Attica. Simultaneously the Boeotians began a siege of Plataea (Thuc.II.12.4–5). Upon the urging of Pericles, many residents of Attica withdrew to Athens (Thuc.II.14). Archidamus undertook a slow march toward Attica in hope that Athens would agree to some settlement to prevent the war (Thuc.II.18). Receiving no peace overture, the Peloponnesians proceeded to ravage the land to draw out the Athenians to fight a hoplite battle. Despite anxiety in the city, Pericles prevented the Athenians from challenging the Peloponnesians (Thuc.II.22). After ravaging Attica, the Peloponnesians withdrew. As citizen soldiers, many of the Peloponnesians would need to return home by the end of summer to reap their own harvests. Also they could only live off a ravaged land for a short period of time. This pattern would be repeated in the ensuing years.

While the Lacedaemonians were in Attica, Pericles launched a fleet of one hundred ships against the Peloponnese and western Greece (Thuc.II.23.). Reinforced by fifty ships from Corcyra, the Athenians proceeded to ravage parts of Laconia and Elis and sailed to the western coast. They raided Acarnania and captured the island of Cephallenia. After these accomplishments, they sailed home. Another force was sent against Locris. A third action was the expulsion of the population from Aegina during the summer. They were replaced with settlers from Athens. This action pacified Aegina but cost the treasury thirty talents in tribute provided by the Aeginetans.³⁷⁵ Through diplomatic activity, Athens allied with King Sitalces in Thrace and reconciled with Perdiccas in Macedonia. In the fall the Athenians invaded the Megarid and ravaged the land (Thuc.II.25–31). This first year demonstrated the difference between the reach of Sparta versus Athens. Peloponnesian land forces could only invade Attica. Athenian naval forces ranged from the Peloponnese to western Greece to Thrace.

This first year of war set the strategy that would be followed for the next decade. The Peloponnesians would invade and ravage Attica. After they withdrew, the Athenians would raid the Megarid. The Athenians would use naval forces to raid and ravage the coastal lands of the Peloponnese. The remainder of the fleet would be used to

maintain control of the empire and take advantage of opportunities as they arose. In preparation for an emergency, the Athenians set aside one thousand talents and one hundred triremes (Thuc.II.24.1–2). Although many land and sea battles would occur, none would prove decisive to force a peace. No major hoplite battle occurred between Athens and Sparta. The Athenians and Thebans would fight one at Delium in 424. Despite many minor naval victories and raids in the Peloponnese, not until the Athenian victory at Pylos in Messenia in 425 would a major victory over Spartan forces occur. Although both sides would make peace overtures after some reverse of fortune, neither side would agree to a peace until 421.

In 430 while Archidamus led another invasion of Attica, Pericles led an expedition of 150 triremes, four thousand hoplites, and three hundred cavalry against the Peloponnesian *poleis* of Epidaurus, Troezen, Hermione, and others. After pillaging the land, Pericles returned to an Athens now ravaged by plague (Thuc.II.47–56). This campaign, combined with the occupation of Aegina in 431, provided Athens complete mastery of the Saronic Gulf to restrict access to the Peloponnesian ports.

Despite their proximity near Athens, the plague did not ravage the Peloponnesian army upon their return home. However, after Pericles return, Athenian reinforcements sent to Potidaea did carry the disease to the besiegers. Consequently, about 1,050 of the four thousand hoplites perished within forty days (Thuc.II.58). Pericles died from the plague in the autumn of 429 (Thuc.II.65.6; Plut.*Per*.38). The plague returned in 427 and lasted into 426 and then ended (Thuc.III.87). The Athenians lost 4,400 hoplites and three hundred cavalry. Athens began the war with 13,000 hoplites and 1,200 cavalry (Thuc.II.13.6–8). The Athenians lost a third of their land forces. The loss to the civilian population can only be guessed. This unforeseen disaster severely curtailed the Athenian ability to carry on the war. This population loss may rank with the great earthquake in Sparta in 464 (Diod.XI.63.1–3.).³⁷⁶

During the winter of 430/429 the Athenians forced Potidaea to surrender. The inhabitants were allowed to leave. Athens sent settlers to recolonize the place (Thuc.II.90). This siege, which lasted two years and cost the Athenian treasury two thousand talents, was a major drain on the financial reserves accumulated before the war. The revolt of other cities in the area continued. King Perdiccas remained an unreliable ally of Athens. Despite promises made to the Potidaeans prior to their revolt, Sparta sent no forces to the Chalcidice until the campaign by Brasidas in 424.

In 429 the campaign season again took place in the west and the Corinthian Gulf. Ambracia requested Peloponnesian support in an

invasion of Acarnania. An attack by Peloponnesian forces against Stratus failed and they withdrew (Thuc.II.80–82). Athenian naval superiority was confirmed when a fleet of twenty ships, led by Phormio, defeated the Corinthian fleet of forty-seven vessels in the Gulf of Patras, just outside the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf (Thuc.II.83–84). In a second battle, the Peloponnesian fleet of seventy-seven ships, commanded by the Spartan admiral Cnemus, was again defeated near Naupactus by Phormio and his small fleet (Thuc.II.85–92).³⁷⁷ Athenian control of the Corinthian Gulf with its access to the west was secure by the end of summer.

In 428 a major threat occurred to Athens' Empire with the revolt of Mytilene and other cities, except Methymna, on the island of Lesbos. Lesbos at this time still provided ships for the fleet rather than pay the tribute. The loss of Lesbos and its fleet would be a major strategic blow to Athens control of the eastern Aegean. From their *proxenoi* on Lesbos, Athens was informed of the plans for rebellion.³⁷⁸ Athens sent a fleet of forty triremes to prevent the revolt. The preparations for revolt were incomplete. Upon the arrival of the Athenian fleet at Mitylene, the Mityleneans appealed to Athens to withdraw the fleet in exchange for continued membership in the empire. Negotiations failed. Mitylene revolted and was besieged by the fleet (Thuc.III.2–6). Unable to prevent the Mityleneans from controlling the hinterland, in the autumn Athens sent a second force of one thousand hoplites under Paches to strengthen the siege (Thuc.III.18.3). Sparta promised aid. The siege continued into the summer of 427.

With the expenditures of the first three years of war larger than expected, the Athenians were using up the financial reserves faster than planned. Consequently, the Athenians imposed the first war tax (*eisphora*) on themselves by the end of summer 428 (Thuc.III.19.1). Who sponsored the measure before the Assembly is unknown. It might have been Cleon.³⁷⁹ This tax fell upon the wealthy and raised two hundred talents for the treasury. Simultaneously, the Athenians dispatched twelve ships to collect tribute from the allies. Money was becoming a problem.

To increase the pressure on Athens, by early summer of 427 the Peloponnesians, commanded by Cleomenes, regent for the young king Pleistoanax, invaded Attica and pillaged the land severely. A Peloponnesian fleet of forty ships was dispatched under the command of Alcidas to aid Lesbos. Alcidas sailed slowly and arrived a week after Mytilene surrendered. Exhausted from starvation, the Mityleneans surrendered and put themselves at the mercy of the Athenian people. After the failure to rescue Mytilene, Alcidas did little to retrieve situation. Chased by the Athenian fleet under Paches, Alcidas sailed back to the Peloponnese. Paches returned to Lesbos and captured

two cities still in revolt. The rebellion now ended. Paches sent most of the army and the Lesbian prisoners, imprisoned on Tenedos, back to Athens (Thuc.III.25–35).

The fate of the Mityleneans was debated in the Athenian Assembly. Seeking revenge, the Athenians, urged on by Cleon, voted for *andrapodismos*. All the men would be killed and the women and children enslaved. A trireme was sent to Paches at Mitylene to carry out the sentence (Thuc.III.36.2–3). The next day the Assembly reconsidered the punishment and despite the urging of Cleon rescinded the death sentence. A second ship was sent out to stop the original punishment. Paches received the new orders just in time. However, despite a partial clemency, the Athenians, again urged by Cleon, executed the thousand men previously sent to Athens by Paches. To punish Mytilene, the walls were torn down. The fleet was confiscated. No indemnity was imposed but the land of Lesbos, except for Methymna, was confiscated and divided into three thousand allotments for settlement with another three hundred assigned to the gods. Athens then sent out cleruchs to settle Lesbos (Thuc.III.49–50). Eventually the Lesbians were allowed to rent the land from the Athenians, who were probably acting more as a garrison than settlers.³⁸⁰ This punishment of Lesbos was a message to the rest of Hellas. Defy Athens at your peril. Athens tightened the noose on the empire. After each revolt, Athens was taking a harder line against rebels.

Besieged by the Peloponnesians since 429, Plataea surrendered in 427. Thebes wanted revenge. Sparta showed little sympathy for Plataea. Therefore, at least two hundred Plataeans and twenty-five Athenians were killed and the remaining women enslaved (Thuc.II.71–78; III.52–68). In 426 Plataea was razed by the Thebans. It remained unoccupied until after the King's Peace in 386. Since 519 Plataea had been a loyal ally of Athens. Its destruction removed Athens' only ally in Boeotia.

Since mid-century Athens had an interest in the affairs of Sicily and Italy. In 433/432 Athens renewed an alliance with Rhegium in Italy and Leontini in Sicily.³⁸¹ In 427 Athens involved itself in the conflict between Syracuse and Leontini. Syracuse and other Dorian cities in the west supported the Peloponnesians although they had sent no military aid. Leontini had the support of the Chalcidian cities of Sicily. Leontini sent the sophist Gorgias to Athens to seek aid (Diod.XII.53). To prevent food exports to the Peloponnese and determine the viability of intervention in Sicilian affairs, the Athenians sent twenty ships under Laches and Charoeades in late summer to support Leontini. With the support of Rhegium, the Athenians attacked some islands friendly to Syracuse (Thuc.III.86; 88). Since Thucydides provides very little

information about this western campaign, we cannot evaluate the actions of the belligerents. As we know now, this support for Athens western allies was a precursor to the Sicilian expedition in 415.

The year 427 witnessed the final conflagration in Corcyra. The civil war, that began to simmer in 435, ended this year in a bloodbath. Athens supported the democrats while Corinth and Sparta the oligarchs. The Peloponnesian fleet commanded by Alcidas defeated the Corcyraeans and Athenians under Nicostratus. Alcidas did not proceed to attack the city but only ravaged the hinterland. However, he withdrew when a larger Athenian fleet, under Eurymedon, approached. With the Athenian fleet present, the democrats killed the opposition over a seven-day stretch. The Athenians did not interfere (Thuc.III.70–81). After the bloodbath, the Athenians sailed away. The survivors of the massacre settled on the mainland opposite the island. In his summation, Thucydides moralizes that this civil war set the precedent for the mutual destruction between democrats and oligarchs for the rest of the war (Thuc.III.82–85). He says,

Then, with the ordinary conventions of civilized life thrown into confusion, human nature, always ready to offend even where laws exist, showed itself proudly in its true colours, as something incapable of controlling passion, insubordinate to the idea of justice, the enemy to anything superior to itself; for, if it had not been for the pernicious power of envy, men would not so have exalted vengeance above innocence and profit above justice. (Thuc.III.84.2)³⁸²

The year 427 witnessed a downward turn in the war. Death now became the end game for each event. The revolt in Lesbos and the siege of Plataea ended in death for those besieged. The civil war in Corcyra resulted in the slaughter of the losing side. The allies and foes of Sparta and Athens could expect no mercy. Clemency was now in short supply.

In 426 Athens continued the conflict in Sicily. After the death of Charoeades in battle against Syracuse, Laches used the Athenian forces to capture Messene, opposite the Straits from Rhegium, and then attacked Italian Locris. Upon the fleet's return to Rhegium, the Athenians discovered that Pythodorus had been sent out by Athens to replace Laches. Pythodorus received a reinforcement squadron in the spring of 425 (Thuc.III.90; 99; 115).

In the summer Nicias, commanding an Athenian force of sixty ships and two thousand hoplites, sailed for the island of Melos. The objective was to force the Melians to join the empire. Although the Athenians ravaged the hinterland, the Melians did not submit. Unable to stay to besiege the city, the fleet sailed to Oropus in Boeotia. The

hoplites landed and marched to Tanagra. Here they were joined by the army marching from Athens under the command of Hipponicus and Eurymedon. What the objective was, Thucydides does not say. Aside from the Plataean episode, this is the first Athenian attack on Boeotia. After defeating a small force of Tanagrans and Thebans, the main army returned to Athens and Nicias' hoplites returned to the fleet. The fleet then ravaged some land in Locris and returned home (Thuc.III.91). Was the objective accomplished? We cannot say.³⁸³

Sailing from Naupactus, Athenian forces under Demosthenes and Procles attacked the island of Leucas. With the encouragement of the Messenians in Naupactus, Demosthenes then invaded Aetolia with an allied force of western Greeks. If Aetolia could be subdued, Athens could threaten Boeotia from the west. The Acarnanians and Corcyraeans disagreed with Demosthenes's plan and returned home. The invasion failed. The Athenians were attacked at Aegitium by the light-armed forces of the Aetolians. The hoplite forces were worn down and Procles was killed. Demosthenes extracted the survivors with difficulty. After a truce to retrieve the dead, the remnant returned to Naupactus and then to Athens. Fearing punishment in Athens, Demosthenes remained at Naupactus (Thuc.III.94.3–98.5).

Further fighting continued at Naupactus in the fall. The Aetolians appealed to Sparta for aid. Eurylochus led a Peloponnesian force of three thousand hoplites against Naupactus. Demosthenes successfully defended Naupactus with the assistance of one thousand Acarnanians. While supporting the Ambraciots, the Peloponnesians were ambushed and defeated by the Acarnanians and the Athenians near Amphilocheian Argos. Eurylochus was killed in battle. After an agreement with Demosthenes, the Peloponnesians were secretly allowed to leave. Demosthenes agreed to the terms to create distrust by the western Greeks against Sparta. Some Ambraciots were killed as the Peloponnesians retreated. A relief force from Ambracia was ambushed and defeated with the loss of a thousand casualties by the forces of Demosthenes. Demosthenes and the Athenians retreated after the disbursement of booty taken from the dead. The Acarnanians, Amphlochiens, and Ambraciots made a treaty of alliance to last a hundred years. None of the belligerents were to support Athens or Sparta in the future (Thuc.III.100; 105–114). This success now redeemed Demosthenes's reputation in Athens. He could return home.

The Archidamian War (431–421 BC) – The Second Phase (425–421)

From the Spartan perspective the year 425 witnessed the great disaster of the war. The year began with the annual spring invasion of

Attica by the Peloponnesians under the leadership of Agis II, the son of King Archidamus II. Under the command of Sophocles and Eurymedon the Athenians launched the relief expedition headed for Sicily. Demosthenes accompanied the expedition and was granted permission to use the fleet in the west if an opportunity arrived. As the fleet sailed along the west coast of Messenia, a storm arose and they sought refuge at Pylos. Here was located a bay and the island of Sphacteria that protected the bay from the open sea. A channel to the north and a larger channel to the south separated the island from the mainland. Before the fleet sailed on to Sicily, Demosthenes urged the commanders of the fleet and army to build a fort here to as an operational base to raid the Peloponnese. They refused. However, unable to sail due to bad weather, the commanders decided to build a fort to keep the men occupied. The fort was built on the mainland opposite the north end of the island. The fleet left Demosthenes with a few men and five ships to defend the place. The fleet sailed on to Corcyra to intervene in the civil war (Thuc.IV.2–5).

Bad weather, lack of supplies, an unripe harvest in Attica, and the news from Pylos encouraged Agis to end the invasion early and return to Sparta (Thuc.IV.6). A Peloponnesian army was sent to Pylos. The sixty Peloponnesian ships currently at Corcyra, in support of the oligarchs, were recalled to Pylos. To avoid the Athenian fleet, the Peloponnesians hauled their ships across the isthmus at Leucas. Demosthenes summoned the return of the Athenian fleet after the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet. To prevent the Athenian fleet from entering the bay, the Peloponnesians occupied the island of Sphacteria and various places on the mainland. The Lacedaemonians on Sphacteria numbered 420 hoplites plus their helots. The Spartiate contingent numbered at least 150 men, and many were from prominent families (Thuc.V.15.1). The rugged and timbered terrain hid the Lacedaemonians from the view of the Athenians at the fort. The fleet was assigned to block both channels. This strategy was designed to isolate Demosthenes and prevent a relief effort by the Athenian fleet (Thuc.IV.7–9).

Before the arrival of the Athenian fleet, the Peloponnesians launched an assault by land and sea against the Athenian fort but failed to capture it. The failure to secure the channels allowed the Athenian fleet to enter the harbor and defeat the Peloponnesian fleet. With control of the harbor, the Athenians had isolated the Peloponnesians on the island. A truce was arranged at Pylos. The Peloponnesian fleet at Pylos, along with other ships in Laconia, was to be surrendered. Sixty ships were surrendered. Under Athenian supervision the Spartans could provision the men on Sphacteria. The Athenians would patrol the bay but not land on the island

(Thuc.IV.16.1–2). The Spartan peace embassy sent to Athens failed. Cleon urged the Assembly to refuse the peace (Thuc.IV.11–23). The truce was ended and fighting renewed. Sparta demanded the return of its ships, but the Athenians refused claiming violations of the truce.³⁸⁴

After political wrangling and Cleon's attack on the generals, Nicias maneuvered the Athenian Assembly to appoint Cleon to capture the island of Sphacteria. Unable to avoid the command, Cleon promised a quick victory. Cleon selected Demosthenes to be his associate in command. By mid-July Cleon sailed only with troops from Lemnos, Imbros, and four hundred archers from Aenos (Thuc.IV.26–28; Plut.*Nic.*6–7).

Upon arrival, Cleon discovered that the Athenians were prepared to assault the island. A final overture was made to the Spartans on the mainland to surrender. They refused. Two days later the Athenians launched a surprise dawn attack on the harbor side of the island with eight hundred hoplites. The landing secured, a force of eight hundred archers, an equal amount of peltasts, and the rowers of the fleet followed the hoplites. An earlier fire on the island cleared much of the brush and timber. The Lacedaemonians were visible. Forced back to the high ground on the north end of the island, the Lacedaemonians were surrounded after another landing of Messenians in their rear. Suffering heavy casualties and the death of their commander Epitadas, the Lacedaemonians surrendered. Rather than massacre the Lacedaemonians, Cleon and Demosthenes decided that the prisoners would be more valuable as hostages in peace talks. The Lacedaemonian casualty list was 128 dead and 292 prisoners after seventy-two days on the island. The prisoners were transported to Athens. The prisoners included 120 Spartiates. Within twenty days of his departure from Athens, Cleon returned having fulfilled his promise (Thuc.IV.29–39). Thucydides does not say, but Cleon probably was hailed a hero (Plut.*Nic.*8).

All prisoners were held as hostages until peace occurred. If Sparta invaded Attica, the Athenians threatened to execute the 120 Spartiates. Athens kept the fort at Pylos and garrisoned it with Messenians from Naupactus. Sparta attempted to recover the prisoners with new peace embassies but was rebuffed by the Athenians. Thucydides states that this defeat was a great shock to the Hellenic world. Spartans were expected to die in battle rather than surrender (Thuc.IV.40–41). This was the worst defeat Sparta would encounter in the Archidamian War. The loss of manpower as well as prestige would impact their strategic operations until the Peace of Nicias four years later. To add insult to injury, the Spartan captives were from the finest families. Thus, they were from the political hierarchy. This explains why the Spartan leaders wanted the sons of

Sparta returned regardless of the political cost.

Why was this defeat so bitter for Sparta? Sparta had lost battles before. Casualties had been higher. Thucydides gives one explanation.

The Spartans had had no previous experience of this type of guerilla warfare and, as the helots began to desert, they feared the spread of revolution in their country and became exceedingly uneasy about it. (Thuc.IV.41.3)³⁸⁵

A helot insurrection was the Spartans greatest fear. Their constitution, army, and social/economic system were based on helot labor. The Messenians revolted after the Great Earthquake in 465/464. This insurrection took ten years to suppress with little outside aid to the Messenians. If the Messenians revolted and joined the Athenian alliance, would Sparta have the resources to subdue them? If not, Spartan failure to subdue Messenia may lead to a revolt of the helots in Laconia. Would the members of the Peloponnesian League help Sparta restore control? Would Spartan domination of the Peloponnese dissolve? These are all hypothetical questions. Despite a few desertions, the helots remained quiet. There was no insurrection. Spartan control of Messenia remained secure. However, the psychological fears were real. Internal security outweighed opposition to Athenian power. Therefore, Sparta sued for peace but was repulsed (Thuc.IV.41.4).

We have no evidence from Sparta that describes the internal debates. Nor does Thucydides reveal his source for this explanation. However, it seems reasonable to accept the view of Thucydides. Thucydides explanation may not tell the whole story, but other explanations would be speculative. Not all Spartans supported peace since Sparta did not accept the harsh peace terms offered. The war continued!

After Pylos the Athenian fleet returned to Corcyra. Their mission was to aid the democrats against the remaining oligarchs in the civil war. The oligarchs had just received help from a Peloponnesian fleet but were unable to defeat the democrats (Thuc.IV.2.3). Athenian intervention was successful. The Athenians captured and imprisoned the oligarchs for transport to Athens. Their fate would be determined by the Athenian Assembly. The Corcyraean democrats did not want their opponents to get away. The Athenians provided little defense of the prisoners. In the building housing the prisoners, the democrats tore off the roof and shot them down. This massacre ended the civil war (Thuc.IV.46–48). Corcyra was now a democracy. Unfortunately, this

blood bath would be repeated in other areas of Hellas.

Athenian involvement in Sicilian affairs was expanded in the autumn of 425 with arrival of the promised reinforcement fleet of forty ships under Sophocles and Eurymedon (Thuc.IV.2.2). Earlier in the year the Athenian forces at Rhegium prevented the Syracusans from capturing Messene (Thuc.IV.24–25). The late arrival of the fleet precluded much help to their allies. However, it might have been a stimulus for peace. Apparently tired of war, the Sicilian Greeks gathered at Gela in the summer of 424 for a peace conference. Under the leadership of the Syracusan Hermocrates, the Greeks concluded a peace with each city keeping what it currently possessed (Thuc.IV.65.1–2). The allies of Athens told the Athenian generals that they must abide by the peace. The generals acquiesced. Upon their return to Athens, Pythodorus and Sophocles were exiled and Eurymedon fined based on allegations of bribery (Thuc.IV.58–65). The war in Sicily ended.

What was the Athenian objective? Was it a defense of the allies against Syracuse as initially claimed or a prelude to possible conquest? The scarcity of information about the campaign does not reveal the military and political objectives. Thucydides implies the generals were punished because they did not meet the expectations of the Athenian Assembly (Thuc.IV.65.4). Whatever the initial objective, expectations were probably enhanced by the successes of 425. Some type of material gain was expected in Sicily. However, the Athenians received little benefit for the resources spent. The Sicilian allies never became tribute paying members of the empire. Athens had no influence in the peace settlement. Athens received no financial indemnity. Consequently, disappointment by the Athenian Assembly required a scapegoat. The generals were punished as an example to encourage future commanders to be more aggressive in their campaigns. Despite the meager results, the Athenian dream of dominance in Sicily and Italy did not end. Within a decade the Athenians were back.

Expecting to exploit the victory at Pylos, Athens sent Nicias with eighty ships, two thousand hoplites, and two hundred cavalry against Corinth. They defeated Corinth in battle at Solgea. Then they proceeded to Methana, located between Troezen and Epidaurus, and established a fort to raid the local area (Thuc.IV.42–45). From Pylos the Messenians, who were assigned the garrison duty, could raid the western Peloponnese. From Methana the Athenians could raid the eastern Peloponnese. The eastern and western regions of the Peloponnese were now vulnerable to depredation. The fortunes of Sparta and the allies were at low tide.

In 425 the Athenians reassessed the tribute for the empire (M&L

69).³⁸⁶ A substantial increase was demanded for 424. Tribute was assessed on members and non-members of the Athenian Empire. Appeals of the assessment would be heard in Athens in the month of Posideon (January/February) 424. Prior to the war, the highest number of cities assessed tribute was 180. Now a minimum of 380 cities were assessed.³⁸⁷ The new assessment, if paid in full, would collect a minimum of 1460 talents. Many *poleis* from the Black Sea were assessed for the first time. Most *poleis* had their assessment increased. Were the assessments reasonable or were the Athenians imposing higher amounts due to arrogance from their recent successes in the war? The question probably cannot be answered.

A problem with the assessment is that it lacks context. The assessment for the immediate years is uncertain. Therefore, it is uncertain if this was a substantial increase or more graduated. There is no evidence about inflation or valuation changes in money.³⁸⁸ It is reasonable to suggest that the assessment was a substantial one due to the great costs of the war. However, it is questionable if the money was fully collected. Thucydides makes no mention of this financial measure but does mention that Athenian ships were sent out during the winter of 425/424 to collect revenue (Thuc.IV.50.1).

The year 425 was the high point of Athenian success. However, the next year the wheel of fortune was reversed. The turning points would occur in Boeotia, Thrace, and the Chalcidice. The year began favorably when Nicias commanded the Athenian fleet of sixty ships and two thousand hoplites and captured the island of Cythera off the Laconian coast. A few inhabitants were taken as hostages to Athens. They established a garrison at Scandeia on Cythera to raid Laconia. The voyage continued, and they attacked Epidaurus Limera in Laconia. Next, the Athenians raided Thyrea on the border between Laconia and the Argolid. Here the Spartans had settled the Aeginetan refugees after the capture of the island by Athens in 431. Outnumbered, a small Spartan garrison refused to defend Thyrea and withdrew to high ground. The Athenians defeated the Aeginetans. The survivors were transported to Athens. They were executed by order of the Assembly. An assessment of four talents was also imposed on the people of Cythera (Thuc.IV.53–57).

Annual invasions of the Megarid by Athenian forces and raids from the oligarchic exiles at Pegae persuaded the democratic rulers, if they wanted to retain power, to betray Megara to Athens. The democratic leaders made overtures to Demosthenes and Hippocrates seeking Athenian protection. One summer night Hippocrates landed a force of six hundred hoplites and captured a section of Megara's long walls and defeated the Peloponnesian garrison at Nisaea. Demosthenes led a small force of Plataean allies into the Megarid.

However, the conspirators inside Megara were unable to open the gates to the city. An Athenian army of four thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry joined the forces of Hippocrates. For two days the forces of Hippocrates built a wall to isolate the garrison at Nisaea, Megara's port on the Saronic Gulf. Short of food, with little hope of relief, the Peloponnesians surrendered Nisaea. The Peloponnesians secured their liberty by paying a ransom. However, the fate of the Spartans in the garrison was left to the discretion of the Athenians (Thuc.IV.66–69).

Stationed between Corinth and Sicyon, the Spartan Brasidas learned of the attack. He requested aid from the Boeotians. He led a Peloponnesian army of four thousand hoplites to prevent an Athenian occupation of Megara. Unable to rescue Nisaea, he did prevent the surrender of Megara. After the arrival of the Boeotians with 2,200 hoplites and six hundred cavalry, the belligerents prepared for battle. After a cavalry engagement between the Boeotians and Athenians, Brasidas offered battle before the long walls. The Athenian generals refused to risk a hoplite engagement. In possession of Nisaea, they withdrew. Megara opened the gates to Brasidas. After the withdrawal of both armies, the democratic leaders secretly fled. The oligarchic exiles returned. An extreme oligarchy was established. The oligarchs executed about a hundred opponents (Thuc.IV.70–74). Megara was secured for the Spartan alliance. Nisaea remained in Athenian control. However, Peloponnesian control of Megara and the other port of Pegae, kept the Megarid open as an avenue of invasion into Attica. Athenian objectives toward Megara were checked.

The major loss for Athens occurred when Amphipolis, its colony in Thrace on the Strymon River, was captured by the Peloponnesians under the command of Brasidas. Thucydides mentions him multiple times in his history and implies that he was a hawk who favored an aggressive war against Athens. After the rescue of Megara, Brasidas returned to Corinth and made preparations to lead a force north to Thrace (Thuc.IV.74.1). Sparta had received secret overtures from the Chalcidians seeking support if they revolted from Athens. The ephors assigned Brasidas the command.³⁸⁹ The mission was to encourage Athenian allies to revolt. The situation in the Chalcidice had changed little since the surrender of Potidaea in 430/429. With a force of 1,700 hoplite volunteers, which included seven hundred helots, he marched north through central Greece and Thessaly (Thuc.IV.80.5).³⁹⁰ Although the Thessalians were allies of Athens, Brasidas encountered minimal opposition. After a fall out with the King Perdiccas, who wanted Spartan support to defeat a rival, Brasidas marched into the Chalcidice. At Acanthus Brasidas pronounced that he had come as a liberator and encouraged them to revolt. They did (Thuc.IV.78–88).

During the winter of 424/423 Brasidas led his forces into Thrace against Amphipolis. Amphipolis was in a strategically located to utilize the timber and gold mines in the area. The Athenians had been campaigning in this area since the 470s to control the natural resources and establish settlements. After he offered generous terms of surrender, Amphipolis opened the gates to Brasidas and revolted from Athens.³⁹¹ Despite hazardous sailing in winter, Athens sent out forces to garrison the remaining allies in the area. Brasidas appealed for reinforcements from Sparta. None were sent. Brasidas continued his winter offensive and captured Torone on the middle peninsula of Sithonia. This success ended his winter campaign (Thuc.IV.102–108; 110–116).

In November occurred the Athenian failure in Boeotia. Some Boeotian democrats plotted with the Athenians to gain power in various Boeotian *poleis* (Thuc.IV.76.1–2).³⁹² In a joint operation, Demosthenes was assigned an invasion of Boeotia from the west with an army from Acarnania while Hippocrates would march from Attica. They failed to rendezvous at Siphae along the southwest coast of Boeotia. Demosthenes arrived early but was forced to retreat when he discovered that the area was protected by the Boeotian army. To support the democratic revolution, Hippocrates advanced into Boeotia and proceeded to fortify the temple at Delium near Tanagra. Nearing completion of the fort, Hippocrates ordered his light-armed troops home. His hoplites withdrew a short distance from Delium.

Despite the initial hesitation by the eleven Boeotarchs to attack the Athenians as they withdrew, they were persuaded to do so by the two Theban Boeotarchs, Pagondas and Arianthidas. Still at Delium, Hippocrates got word of the Boeotian preparations and recalled the hoplites. The ensuing battle would be the largest hoplite confrontation of the Archidamian War. The Boeotians had seven thousand hoplites, ten thousand light infantry, one thousand cavalry, and five hundred peltasts with Pagondas the commander for the day. Hippocrates had an equal number of hoplites, some cavalry, but no light infantry, which had departed.³⁹³ The Thebans, stationed on the right wing and twenty-five men deep, led the Boeotian phalanx. The Athenian phalanx was the traditional eight men deep with cavalry posted on the wings. On their right wing the Athenians were initially victorious, inflicting heavy casualties on the Thespians. Surprised by a Boeotian cavalry attack, the Athenians were forced to retreat. On the Boeotian right wing, the Thebans were victorious. By nightfall the Boeotians were victorious.³⁹⁴ The Athenians suffered about a thousand dead, including Hippocrates. The Boeotians numbered five hundred dead. Seventeen days later, the Boeotians captured the fort at Delium, killed a few Athenians, and captured two hundred prisoners (Thuc.IV.89–101.1–2).

The battle of Delium was a strategic defeat for Athens. The army of the Boeotian League demonstrated its superiority in the field. The Athenians never challenged the Boeotians again. Theban prestige rose to new heights within the Boeotian League. The Boeotian *poleis* maintained their oligarchic constitutions. The Athenians were unable to replace the loss of their citizen hoplites. Athenian aspirations to expand in central Hellas were ended. Athenian imperial ambitions were confined to maintaining their naval empire. This victory demonstrated that Boeotia could stand against Athens without Spartan support.

This double defeat at Delium and Amphipolis by the Athenians, combined with the defeat of Sparta at Pylos, persuaded both belligerents to conclude a truce in the spring of 423. How the armistice was agreed to, we are not informed. Sparta, Athens, and their allies would keep what they controlled and suspend offensive operations. Thucydides claims that Athens wanted time to prepare an offensive to recover the losses in the Thraceward region. Sparta hoped that the Athenians would be encouraged to make the peace permanent (Thuc.IV.117–119). This truce was undermined when Scione, on the Pallene peninsula in Chalcidice, revolted from Athens. Brasidas occupied it and proclaimed it liberated. Since the revolt occurred after the truce was sworn to, Athens protested. The Athenians demanded Scione be returned. Brasidas refused. In the Assembly Cleon introduced a motion to attack Scione and destroy it. The Athenians launched an expedition to recapture Scione. Now Mende, Scione's neighbor, also revolted from Athens (Thuc.IV.120–123). Although the war continued in the Thraceward region, the truce appears to have held elsewhere.

After the truce, Brasidas and Perdiccas marched against Arrhabaeus of Lyncestis in Upper Macedonia. They defeated him and then withdrew when the Illyrians arrived to support Arrhabaeus (Thuc.IV.124–128.). During Brasidas's absence, the Athenians recaptured Mende and besieged Scione. After a disagreement with Brasidas over strategy during the campaign against Arrhabaeus, Perdiccas, renewing his old tricks, abandoned his alliance with Sparta. He came to terms with the Athenians by winter of 423/422. Through his friends in Thessaly, Perdiccas blocked a Peloponnesian relief force from reinforcing Brasidas (Thuc.IV.129–132).

In the summer of 422 the truce expired. Another motion by Cleon in the Athenian Assembly appointed him commander of the campaign to recover Amphipolis and regain control of the Chalcidice. In late summer he sailed with 1,200 Athenian hoplites, three hundred cavalry, some allies and thirty ships. Upon arrival they recaptured Torone. The Athenians then proceeded to Eion at the mouth of the Strymon River to

begin the campaign against Amphipolis. Cleon appealed for aid from Perdiccas and Polles, king of the Odumantian Thracians. With an allied force of two thousand hoplites and various light-armed troops, Brasidas blocked his way at Amphipolis. An accidental battle occurred when Brasidas attacked an Athenian reconnaissance force under Cleon. In the encounter Brasidas and Cleon were killed (Thuc.V.10.6–9). The Athenians lost six hundred men. After the failure of this campaign, the Athenians sailed home. Brasidas was given a hero's burial in Amphipolis. Another Spartan relief force was not allowed to march through Thessaly and returned home (Thuc.V.1–3; V.6–13.1).

War weariness and the deaths of the war hawks, Brasidas and Cleon, persuaded both sides to make peace. The defeats at Delium and Amphipolis, combined with financial exhaustion, were further incentives for Athens. Spartan fear that the expiration of the Thirty Years Peace with Argos was approaching and Argive resistance to a peace renewal in 421 gave them an added incentive for peace. Recovery of the men captured at Pylos was still of paramount importance to Sparta (Thuc.V.13.2–15).

Negotiations during the winter of 422/421, between Nicias of Athens and Pleistoanax, King of Sparta, resulted in the Peace of Nicias in by spring of 421.³⁹⁵ Thucydides states that these two men represented the peace parties in their states. In a meeting of the Peloponnesian League, Sparta and a majority of allies approved the peace terms. The peace was to last fifty years. Amphipolis and some other *poleis* were to be returned to Athens. Disputes would be settled by arbitration. Various Chalcidian cities were to pay tribute to Athens but remain autonomous. All prisoners held by both side were to be returned. Athens, Sparta, and their allies would individually swear to the peace (Thuc.V.17–20; Plut.*Nic.*9–10.1). Peace came to Hellas.

Did it? As events would play out in the coming years, this peace was doomed from the beginning. A hot war became a cold war. Sparta's major allies of Corinth, Boeotia, Megara, and Elis refused to ratify the treaty (Thuc.V.17.2). The terms of the treaty would not be followed. Although at peace, Athens and Sparta would engage in battle at Mantinea in 418 in support of their allies. Athenian imperial ambitions would be renewed with the Sicilian expedition in 415. Athens' defeat in 413 began the last phase of the Peloponnesian War. The Deceleian War would end in 404 with their total defeat and submission to Sparta.³⁹⁶

Pericles, Archidamus II, Cleon, and Brasidas

By 421 many of the major protagonists mentioned by Thucydides were dead. Pericles died from the plague in autumn 429. Archidamus

He died a natural death in 427/426. Cleon and Brasidas died in battle in 422. The debate rages on whether Pericles and Archidamus wanted war. What is acknowledged is that they did not avoid war. Neither could have foreseen the severity of the conflict for their respective *polis* or the rest of Hellas. Plague is rarely mentioned in ancient sources. Its devastation was unexpected. The war was not fought with the strategy initially outlined. The Athenians did not follow the Periclean strategy to act like islanders, rely on their fleet, guard the empire, and pursue a defensive policy for victory.³⁹⁷ The plague and Athenian ambition to expand the empire on the mainland and Sicily defeated Pericles's strategy. At the height of his power, Pericles was the "first citizen" of Athens (Thuc.II.65.9). He usually persuaded the Athenians to follow his policies. In the last two years of his life, Pericles was probably an unhappy man. The lack of military success, the plague, the death of his sister and sons, and his removal from office perhaps demonstrated that his previous achievements were fleeting. Although restored to power in the summer of 429, his death in the fall prevented the restoration of his policies. What his last reflections were about his life, his city, and the future are unknown. He witnessed the rise and glory of Athens. Fortunately for him, he was not a witness to the demise of his life's work. Pericles was not an indispensable citizen, but his leadership skills were missed. His successors, though capable, never earned the respect of the Athenians that he commanded. No future leader would dominate the political landscape as he had. Cleon and his supporters urged an aggressive offensive strategy in the Peloponnese, western Hellas, Sicily, and the Thraceward region. Initially successful, that strategy ultimately failed. The Athenians would never again reach the heights of wealth, power, and prosperity achieved in the Age of Pericles.

The resolve of the Athenians to allow the Peloponnesians to ravage Attica surprised the Spartan leaders. The refusal of the Athenians to fight a traditional hoplite battle with the Peloponnesians prevented the war ending with one major engagement. Thus, the traditional Spartan strategy failed. The Spartans could encourage the subjects of Athens to revolt. However, without sea power, Sparta and the Peloponnesians could not defend them when the Athenians mobilized counterinsurgency forces. King Archidamus realized that Sparta did not have the resources to win a war of attrition. Like Pericles, his death early in the war also deprived Sparta of his leadership. Had he survived, perhaps Sparta would have accepted Athenian peace overtures early in the war when the plague demoralized the Athenians. As the war progressed, Sparta and the allies had difficulty defending the Peloponnese from Athenian amphibious assaults. Only the disaster at Pylos encouraged the

Spartans to offer peace. The Athenian refusal allowed the war hawks on both sides to continue the conflict.

Cleon and Brasidas, as portrayed by Thucydides, represented the war hawks who wanted total victory. Despite Thucydides's dislike of Cleon, he was a capable leader and patriot. There would be no compromise peace under his leadership. Brasidas was respected by Thucydides but his boldness was questioned by Spartan leaders. Not until 423 was Brasidas given an independent command. However, his army was small and composed of a large contingent of helots. His assignment in the Chalcidice and Thrace was remote from Sparta. Both men advocated offensive measures to take the war to the enemy. Cleon and his supporters took a hard line against members of the Athenian Empire who revolted. Mytilene barely escaped mass murder. After Cleon's death, Scione and Melos would suffer this fate. The Spartans, captured at Pylos, would probably have suffered this fate if Cleon had his way. Brasidas encouraged these rebellions to weaken the empire. He advocated war on land and sea. Neither man understood the concept of limited war. Brasidas accepted the Spartan motto: "Come back with your shield or on it."³⁹⁸ Cleon, like Brasidas, obeyed. Neither came home. Only with their death was the Peace of Nicias achieved.

Advocates of total war also encouraged *stasis* in many *poleis* between oligarchs and democrats. Corcyra, Lesbos, Megara, and many Boeotian and Sicilian *poleis* suffered from civil war. More would follow as the war continued. Cruelty multiplied. Mercy was often banished. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse appeared throughout the Hellenic world. Neutrality was not allowed. Confronted by the alliance system of Sparta and Athens, the Hellenes were forced to choose sides. The result of the Archidamian War was a stalemate. Although unrecognized at the time, the wounds of war were too deep for the Peace of Nicias to succeed.

The Interregnum (421–415 BC)

The peaceful hopes of Sparta were dashed immediately by the allies. Militarily and financially many allies suffered severely. Political unrest on the domestic front among the members of the Peloponnesian League was left unresolved. Corinth suffered the loss of some colonies in northwest Greece along with the trade that accompanied it (Thuc.V.30.2). Corinth was the main maritime power of the Peloponnesian League. At Sybota in 433 Corinth provided ninety triremes. However, by 421 the Corinthian navy was shattered. The territory of Megara had been constantly ravished during the war, and loss of trade hurt economically. Megara was unable to get the port of

Nisaea returned. The political divide between oligarchs and democrats resulted in an extreme oligarchy in 424. The Boeotian League, especially Thebes, would not accept the return of Plataea to Athenian control. The Boeotians won the only major hoplite battle of the war against Athens at Delium in 424. Border disputes between Elis and Arcadia were unresolved (Thuc.V.31.1–5). The peace terms gave these allies nothing for the losses incurred during the ten years of war. How could Sparta maintain the peace and control of the Peloponnesian League when the major allies refused to ratify the terms?

With the desertion of these allies, Sparta looked to Athens to help her enforce the peace. They agreed to form a fifty-year defensive alliance (Thuc.V.22–24). In response, Corinth solicited Argos to invite other autonomous *poleis* to form a defensive alliance to defend their territories against Sparta. The Argive magistrates passed a decree inviting any *polis* to join except Sparta and Athens. Argos feared a war with Sparta because the Thirty-Year Peace was about to expire. As a neutral in the Archidamian War, Argos prospered financially and the military was rebuilt with a new generation of Argives. Therefore, Argos was in a strong position to lead a new alliance. In the ensuing negotiations by the various parties, Mantinea, Elis, Corinth, and some Chalcidians in Thrace joined the Argive coalition. These *poleis* feared that the Athenian-Spartan alliance would impose their will on the recalcitrant states. (Thuc.V.27–31). Sparta claimed that members of the Peloponnesian League that did not accept the peace terms were violating their sworn oath. Corinth countered the argument by claiming that the peace with Athens violated their sworn agreement with other allies (Thuc.V.30.1–4). Boeotia and Megara remained aloof from the Argive alliance. Boeotia had a separate truce agreement with Athens that was renewed every ten days (Thuc.V.26.2). Corinth and Athens, despite no formal peace, ceased hostile activities (Thuc.V.32.5–7). By the summer of 421 the Peloponnesian League was in disarray and seriously threatened by a rejuvenated Argos.

With the Peloponnesian League in turmoil, Athens kept the agreement with Sparta and returned the Spartan prisoners. However, with Spartan inability to enforce the treaty, many territorial disputes with Athens began to arise. Consequently, Athens retained Pylos and other disputed lands until the Peloponnesians kept their end of the bargain. Sparta kept Amphipolis. The Boeotians refused to surrender the fort at Panactum and the prisoners captured at Delium (Thuc.V.35). Settlement with the other members of the Peloponnesian League was on hold.

With the peace unsettled and diplomatic negotiations under way by many of the former belligerents throughout the winter of 421/420, it

would take little to reignite the war in 420. The Spartan ephors Cleobulus and Xenares, who entered office in the fall of 421, were hostile to the peace. The peace faction in Athens was under fire. The opposition, led by Alcibiades, wanted the restoration of lost territories, prisoners, and an Argive alliance (Thuc.V.43.2; Plut.*Nic.*10.3; Plut.*Alc.*14–15.1). Spartan maneuvers to get the Boeotian League to join the Argive alliance and turn that alliance toward Sparta failed when the Boeotian Federal Council rejected the alliance (Thuc.V.38.2–3). In the end, Boeotia renewed its alliance with Sparta in late winter/early spring of 420 and began to demolish the fort at Panactum. The Boeotians surrendered the Athenian prisoners to Sparta. The Spartans then returned them to Athens. However, the Athenians were angered by the demolition of the fort at Panactum claiming it violated the peace. Fearing a restoration of the Peloponnesian League, Argos agreed to a new Fifty-Year Peace with Sparta in the spring of 420 (Thuc.V.40–42). Sparta and Boeotia were reconciled. Argos was checked. However, war was brewing between Athens and Sparta.

After the Peace of Nicias, Athens sent a force to the Chalcidice and Thrace to restore the empire and enforce the peace. During the past year the Athenians were unable to subdue Chalcidian opposition or regain Amphipolis. However, Athens had recaptured Scione in 421. The Athenians carried out the war decree of *andrapodismos* sponsored by Cleon. They executed the men and enslaved the women and children (Thuc.V.32.1). The slaughter of the war continued. Rebellion from Athens would be crushed without mercy.

By the spring of 420 the Athenian peace faction was under heavy pressure from the opposition. Refusing Spartan peace overtures, the Athenian Assembly, encouraged by Alcibiades, joined the alliance with Argos, Mantinea, and Elis. With Athens added to the alliance, the Argives could challenge Sparta for Peloponnesian dominance. Corinth, as a defensive ally of Argos, did not agree to the *symmachia* (offensive/defensive) of the coalition alliance (Thuc.V.48.1). Nor did Corinth want to join the new alliance with Athens (Thuc.V.43–48). Consequently, Corinth was moving toward a reconciliation with Sparta. Although Athens' alliance with Sparta was not voided, it was shaky at best.

During the summer the Spartans were banned by the Eleans from participation in the Olympic Games. Citing a violation of the Olympic truce, the Spartans were fined two thousand minas for sending troops against the Elean fortress of Phyrus. The Spartans denied they violated the truce because they were not informed that it was proclaimed. They further claimed that they ceased hostile operations when informed of the truce. Regardless of the explanation, the Eleans maintained their ban. Troops arrived from Argos, Mantinea, and

Athens to help the Eleans enforce the ban. Sparta honored the truce. The games went on peacefully (Thuc.V.49–50). However, this ban remained a sore spot in future relations between Sparta and Elis.

In the winter of 420/419 the Lacedaemonian forces in Heraclea Trachis were defeated by the natives and their commander was killed. Claiming misgovernment by the local Spartan commander, the Boeotians occupied Heraclea in the summer to prevent an Athenian occupation. The Spartans did not approve, but the alliance with Boeotia remained firm.

In the spring of 419 hostilities broke out in the Peloponnese. Alcibiades, now elected a *strategos*, led an allied army to Patrae, near the mouth of the Gulf of Corinth, to build long walls to the sea and build a fort near Rhium in Achaëa. Corinth and Sicyon prevented the construction of these fortifications as a threat to their trade with the west. Argos attacked Epidaurus in dispute over financial contributions by the Epidaurians to the temple of Apollo Pytheas in exchange for pasturage privileges. Argos hoped to force Epidaurus into its alliance. Sparta twice assigned forces to aid Epidaurus, but the sacrifices were not favorable.³⁹⁹ Therefore, they remained in Laconia. However, in the following winter, Lacedaemonian troops, arriving by sea, were placed in Epidaurus. In Athens Argive envoys protested Athenian inability to prevent these reinforcements arriving by sea. In response, the Athenians restored to Pylos some helots from Cephallenia and declared that the Spartans had violated the Peace of Nicias. The Argives failed to capture Epidaurus despite multiple minor engagements (Thuc.V.52–56). At some point Corinth abandoned its alliance with Argos and rejoined Sparta. The oligarchs of Corinth could not support the democratic *poleis* of Athens, Mantinea, Argos, and Elis.

In 418 the hostilities came to a head. Before the Peloponnese deteriorated into further chaos, the Spartans decided to settle affairs with Argos. In midsummer King Agis II led the Spartans, supported by Corinth, Sicyon, Megara, the Arcadians, and Boeotians, against Argos.⁴⁰⁰ The Mantineans and Eleans had joined the Argives. After outmaneuvering the Argive army, Agis was between them and the city of Argos. Approaching from Nemea, the Argives thought they had the Spartans trapped between their army and the city. Uncertain that victory could be achieved, Agis and the Argive commander Thrasyllus and the Argive *proxenos*, Alciphron, agreed to a four-month truce to settle disputes by arbitration. The armies then dispersed. When Agis returned to Sparta, he was criticized by the allies for not fighting from an advantageous position.⁴⁰¹ To placate the hostility, Agis promised that he would retrieve the situation with some action. Not satisfied, the Spartans passed a measure that dictated Agis could not lead the army

without the accompaniment of ten chosen Spartiate advisors. The Argive commander also encountered hostility in Argos for avoiding battle. Upon his arrival with Athenian reinforcements, Alcibiades convinced the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans to resume hostilities. Alcibiades then led the allies, except Argos, to attack Arcadian Orchomenus. Orchomenus capitulated without a fight. The allies next marched against Tegea. Angered that the allies did not attack Lepreum as they urged, the three thousand Elean hoplites marched home (Thuc.V.57–63).

In August, after the fall of Orchomenus, the full Lacedaemonian army, except the youngest and oldest men, marched into Arcadia. Agis was in command. The Peloponnesian and Boeotian allies were summoned but would not arrive in time for battle. With their Arcadian allies, the Lacedaemonians marched to rescue Tegea. After various maneuvers the Lacedaemonians and Arcadians opposed the Mantineans, Argives, and Athenians in battle near Mantinea. Both sides were determined to fight. The battle was a desperate affair. The Sciritae and *neodamodeis* were on the Lacedaemonian left wing. The Spartans stationed themselves in the center and right wing with the Tegeans opposite the Athenians. During the battle, the Lacedaemonians' left wing was defeated by the Mantineans and Argives. A gap opened between the left wing and the center of the Lacedaemonian line. The Spartan right wing and center were victorious against the remaining Argives and Athenians. Agis wheeled the army to aid his left wing. The Mantineans and Argives were routed. The Athenians fled when the Spartans turned on the Mantineans. Thucydides states that the allies lost about 1,100 men and the Lacedaemonians about three hundred casualties, although the Spartan losses were hard to determine (Thuc.V.64–74).⁴⁰² After the battle the Lacedaemonians returned home to celebrate the festival of Carneia. Thucydides states that this battle was the largest hoplite engagement of the entire war. It is estimated that less than ten thousand hoplites were with the allies while the Lacedaemonians and Arcadians might have been larger.⁴⁰³

The ramifications of the battle were immediate. On the hypothetical side, the following scenario could have occurred. This was a high-stakes conflict. The full flower of the Spartan army was mobilized. Had Sparta lost, it is conceivable that her dominance in the Peloponnese would end. The mystique of Spartan invincibility shattered. The Peloponnesian League might have dissolved. Argos would be the new power. Boeotia would have to make peace with Athens. Athenian power and influence in the Greek world would be greater than ever.

None of this happened. What did happen was that the mystique of the Spartan army was secured and enhanced. Sparta was victorious with the Lacedaemonians alone, except for a few Arcadians. The prestige of Agis was restored in Sparta. His leadership vindicated. The Peloponnesian alliance was restored and strengthened. Argos agreed to a fifty-year defensive alliance with Sparta. Argos renounced the alliance with Mantinea, Elis, and Athens. After a period of *stasis*, the Argives renounced their democracy and became an oligarchy in the spring of 417. Mantinea made peace and rejoined the Peloponnesian League (Thuc.V.77–81). Elis eventually made peace with Sparta. King Perdiccas renewed his alliance with Sparta. Athenian trouble making in the Peloponnese was ended. Athenian imperial expansion must look elsewhere. Though technically still in effect, the Peace of Nicias was a dead letter. Mutual hostility between Sparta, Athens, and their allies would continue. Formal war was just a matter of time.

Despite the defeat at Mantinea, Argos was unwilling to accept Spartan supremacy. By the summer of 417, with the assistance of Athens, the democracy was restored while the Spartans were celebrating their festival of the Gymnopaedia (Thuc.V.82.2). Spartan attempts to restore the oligarchy failed. In 416 the Argives renewed their alliance with Athens. Alcibiades sailed to Argos. With the support of the Argive democrats, Alcibiades seized three hundred oligarchs and removed them to the islands (Thuc.V.84.1). Argos undertook no further hostility for the remainder of the war.

In this same year the Athenians launched an expedition of thirty-eight ships and 2,700 hoplites against the neutral island of Melos (Thuc.V.84). What the purpose of the assault was, we are not told. What offense Melos might have committed from the Athenian perspective is unknown. Although originally neutral in the war, the Melians were hostile after the Athenian expedition in 426. Refusing submission, the Melians were besieged. When Melos surrendered by winter, the Athenians again applied *andrapodismos*. The men suffered execution and the women and children enslaved (Thuc.V.116.4). Athens sent five hundred settlers to Melos. The Athenians again demonstrated that resistance to their demands would result in severe punishment. Neutrality and weakness were no protection against the expansionist ambitions of the Athenians.

In the Chalcidice, Sparta, Athens, and Perdiccas tried to settle affairs in their own interest but despite all the intrigues, the settlement in the Peace of Nicias held. Perdiccas allied with Sparta again in 417 but was an ally of Athens by 414. The double game that Perdiccas played with Greek powers during his reign would end with his death in 413.

The Sicilian Expedition (415–413 BC)

Since mid-century Athens had an economic and political interest in Sicily. Sicily was an agricultural paradise. Most inhabitants on the island were engaged in agriculture. Fortunately, they could produce more than could be internally consumed. Grain was a primary export to Hellas and Carthage. Athens and Corinth, with their large populations, were grain importers to keep the people adequately fed. Athens' alliances were renewed prior to the Archidamian stage of the war.⁴⁰⁴ This allowed Athens to interfere in the war between Syracuse and Leontini in 427. Athenian influence or control of the island of Sicily would have added resources to the empire and deprived them to the Peloponnesians. Peace among the Sicilian Greeks in 424 ended that interference.

Conflict between the Sicilian *poleis* provided Athens with an opportunity to interfere again. A war broke out on the western side of the island between Egesta and Selinus. Honoring the alliance Athens renewed with Egesta in 418/417, Athens supported Egesta. Since Athenian expansion in the Peloponnese was checkmated at Mantinea, the Athenians saw another opportunity to expand the empire in Sicily. Selinus was supported by Syracuse. Expecting Egesta to provide financial support for Athenian intervention, the Athenians originally voted to send an expedition composed of sixty ships under the command of Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus (Thuc.VI.6; 8).

In the spring of 415, after a rancorous debate in the Assembly between Nicias and Alcibiades over the necessity of the mission, objectives, and resources required, Alcibiades won out. Nicias argued that Athenian interests in the Thraceward region, where rebellion was not yet suppressed, were more important than Sicily. Athens did not have the resources to rule Sicily if the mission was successful. The internal turmoil within the various Sicilian *poleis* would make them difficult to govern. He questioned why the Athenians wanted more enemies in Sicily when they had not conquered the enemies nearer home (Thuc.VI.9–14; Plut.*Nic.*12). Alcibiades countered that his leadership in conjunction with Nicias would bring a successful conclusion to the Sicilian enterprise. The turmoil within the Sicilian *poleis* would prevent them from uniting against Athens. The Sicans and Sicels would support Athens against the dominance of Syracuse. If successful, the growth of Athenian power would restrain the Peloponnesians from declaring war again (Thuc.VI.16–18). Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus were verified as the commanders.

This latest Athenian expedition was assigned three objectives. The first was to support Egesta. The second objective was to rebuild Leontini, whose population was removed by Syracuse. The third

objective was to accomplish anything else that would be in the interest of Athens (Thuc.VI.26.1). Thucydides states that Alcibiades wanted to expand the empire in Sicily and Carthage (Thuc.VI.15.2).⁴⁰⁵ The strategy to accomplish the objectives was left to the commanding generals to decide (Thuc.VI.8–26; Plut.*A/c.*18.1–2).⁴⁰⁶

Prior to sailing, during an escapade by some Athenians during the night of May 25, the stone busts of Hermes were defaced throughout the city.⁴⁰⁷ Alongside this act of impiety, charges were further introduced claiming certain individuals were observed mocking the Eleusinian Mysteries. Some of these individuals were tried and executed. Others fled and were condemned in absentia (Thuc.VI.60).⁴⁰⁸ Who mutilated the Hermae was never fully determined. Diocliides accused some three hundred participants in this act of vandalism (Andoc.I.34–37). Most of those accused were exonerated. However, Androcles, an enemy of Alcibiades and influential in the Assembly, agitated the people against Alcibiades for his alleged role in the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Despite the accusations, Alcibiades was not put on trial prior to his departure for Sicily (Thuc.VI.61.1; Plut.*A/c.*19). Public outrage was enormous for these acts of impiety. Many Athenians feared divine punishment and worried about the fate of the Sicilian expedition. Since many nobles, led by Nicias, opposed the expedition, some feared that an oligarchic revolution may be planned to stop the expedition. This rumor proved unfounded. Regardless, a cloud now hung over the expedition about to sail.

The fleet sailed by midsummer 415. The first stop was Corcyra for a rendezvous of all forces. The combined contingents at Corcyra were composed of 134 triremes, numerous transport ships, 5,100 hoplites, thirty cavalry, and seven hundred *thetes* as marines, light-armed troops, and support personnel.⁴⁰⁹ At Corcyra the armada was divided among the three generals to sail in three intervals to maintain order and logistics as the fleet sailed (Thuc.VI.30–32.2; 42–44.1). The fleet then rendezvoused at Rhegium but was not allowed inside of the city. Here the generals were informed that the finances promised by Egesta did not exist (Thuc.VI.46; Plut.*A/c.*20.1–2).

At Rhegium the generals debated the operational plan. Each had a different opinion. Nicias wanted to support Egesta, reconcile Selinus and Egesta, show the flag to the other Sicilian *poleis*, and sail home. Lamachus urged a direct attack on Syracuse while its forces were unprepared.⁴¹⁰ Alcibiades advocated the creation of alliances with the Sicilian *poleis* prior to attacking Syracuse. It was decided to accept the plan of Alcibiades. After Messene refused the diplomatic overture of Alcibiades, he returned to Rhegium. Leaving the balance of the fleet at

Rhegium, the Athenians sailed with sixty ships to Naxos, which received them into the city. Then they proceeded to Catana, which initially refused the Athenian offer of alliance. Sailing on to Syracuse, the Athenians proclaimed that they came to restore the Leontines to Leontini. Returning to Catana, the Catanians agreed to an alliance after they discovered some Athenian troops inside the city. Catana was garrisoned and made an operational base for the fleet. Some Athenians sailed to Camarina, but the Camarineans also refused an alliance (Thuc.VI.47–51; Plut.*Nic.*14.3). When the state trireme Salaminia arrived at Catana, Alcibiades was recalled to Athens to stand trial for the profanation of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Distrusting Athenian justice, Alcibiades escaped on the return voyage and eventually made his way to Sparta (Thuc.VI.53.1–2; VI.60–61; Plut.*A/c.*18.3–21).

Nicias and Lamachus divided their forces and sailed west along the north coast of Sicily toward Selinus. Stopping at Himera, the people refused to allow them in the city. Continuing the voyage, they captured the Sican town of Hyccara and sold the natives as slaves for 120 talents. Lamachus returned to Catana. Nicias sailed to Egesta, received thirty talents, and then returned to Catana without ending Egesta's war with Selinus. During the winter of 415/414 they prepared for an attack on Syracuse. Secretly sailing one night into the Great Harbor at Syracuse, the Athenians, led by Nicias, defeated the Syracusans in battle near the Olympeum on the south end of the Great Harbor. Believing his forces were insufficient to establish a base, Nicias returned to Catana to gather forces and money for the spring campaign (Thuc.VI.62–71).

During the winter the Athenians failed to capture Messene and Camarina. The Syracusans had managed to burn the Athenian camp at Catana. To defend the city, the Syracusans built a wall north of the Great Harbor facing Epipolae to resist a siege (Thuc.VI.72–75.2). After the defeat at Olympeum, the Syracusans elected Hermocrates and two other commanders to replace the fifteen generals currently in command. Aware of the Athenian preparations, the Syracusans appealed for support from Corinth and Sparta. In a conference of the Sicilian Greeks at Camarina in the winter of 415/414, Euphemus of Athens and Hermocrates of Syracuse debated the mission of Athens. Euphemus claimed that Athens came to Sicily to defend the allies because it was in the interest of their Empire. Athens deserved the empire. Athens was not apologetic for the power the Athenians earned. Hermocrates argued that defense of the allies was an Athenian smokescreen. The Athenians came on a mission of conquest to enslave the Sicilian Greeks. The people of Camarina voted to remain neutral in the war (Thuc.VI.75.4–88.2; Plut.*Nic.*16).⁴¹¹

Hearing the plea of the Syracusan envoys, the Corinthians agreed to send aid.⁴¹² The Spartans, despite initial reluctance, also agreed. Thucydides claims that a persuasive argument by Alcibiades, now in exile in Sparta, convinced Sparta to send military aid. However, it is more likely that military and economic reasons along with the encouragement from Corinth overcame Spartan reluctance. The addition of Sicilian food imports, revenue, manpower, and ships, to Athens would definitely harm Sparta if war was renewed. The ephors appointed Gylippus to lead the Peloponnesian relief force. Athens meanwhile sent reinforcements in the form of 250 cavalry, thirty archers, and three hundred talents (Thuc.VI.88.7–94).



Map 6 – Layout of Syracuse ([http://www.emersonkent.com /images/ancient_Syracuse.jpg](http://www.emersonkent.com/images/ancient_Syracuse.jpg)).

Map 6—Layout of Syracuse

In the early summer of 414 the Athenian siege of Syracuse began when the Athenians built two forts. The first one was at Labdalum. The second fort was farther south on the Epipolae plateau after a victory over the Syracusan army. The Athenians then began to build a series of walls across the plateau to counter the walls the Syracusans were building to isolate the Athenian forts. In an attack by the Syracusans against these walls, the Athenian general Lamachus was killed. Simultaneously, the Syracusans attacked the fort on Epipolae, which was successfully defended by a force led by Nicias. As these engagements were occurring, the Athenian fleet sailed into the Great Harbor and sealed off the city. Syracuse was now besieged by land and sea. The prospects of a successful defense of Syracuse appeared poor and capitulation was under consideration by the inhabitants. Overtures were made to Nicias for peace terms (Thuc.VI.96–103).

At the nadir of their fortunes, the Syracusans were encouraged by the arrival of Gylippus. Hearing that Syracuse may fall, Gylippus

initially believed that he must secure the Italian Greeks. Forced by a storm into Taras (Tarentum), he repaired his ships. Learning that Syracuse had not yet surrendered, Gylippus sailed to Rhegium, Messene, and Himera to secure the Straits of Messene. At Himera he received arms for his men who had none. Receiving reinforcements from Himera, Gela, and the Sicels, Gylippus marched overland to rescue Syracuse. Fortunately for Syracuse and Gylippus, the Corinthian captain Gongylus arrived at Syracuse with one ship just in time to prevent capitulation. He informed the Syracusans that Gylippus was near and other Corinthian ships were on the way. When Gylippus arrived, the Syracusans sent out a force to meet him. These forces then defeated the Athenians on Epipolae before they had completed their walls of circumvallation. Gylippus also captured the fort at Labdalum (Thuc.VI.104-VII.1-3).

After these defeats Nicias moved his primary base of operations from Epipolae to Plemmyrium on the south shore of the Great Harbor. He fortified the position with three forts to protect his supplies and ships. Since the land siege was unsuccessful, Nicias altered his strategy from a ground war to a naval war. Unfortunately, a lack of available fresh water and harassment by the Syracusan cavalry against Athenian foraging expeditions became major drawbacks of this position. These disadvantages harmed the soldiers' morale. In contrast, Gylippus continued the Syracusan wall on Epipolae to isolate the besiegers Nicias left there. The arrival of the remainder of the Peloponnesian reinforcements added further encouragement to the Syracusans. The successful completion of the walls on Epipolae ensured that Syracuse could not be isolated from the landward side. With Syracuse temporarily secured, Gylippus left to recruit men and supplies from the Sicilian hinterland. Simultaneously, he sent envoys home to get further aid from Corinth and Sparta. Finally, the Syracusans began to enlarge their fleet and train the men to meet the Athenians at sea (Thuc.VII.4-7). The tide was rapidly turning against the Athenians.

During the winter of 414/413, Nicias, aware that his forces were getting weaker and the Syracusans stronger, appealed to Athens to either recall or reinforce the expedition. Unwilling to accept defeat, the Athenians voted to send a relief expedition under the command of Demosthenes and Eurymedon. Shortly after the vote, with ten ships and 120 talents Eurymedon sailed that winter to Sicily to inform Nicias that reinforcements were in preparation. An Athenian fleet of twenty ships was also assigned to the Corinthian Gulf to prevent Peloponnesian reinforcements for Syracuse. Demosthenes would sail in the spring with the reinforcements. Receiving the request from Gylippus, Corinth and Sparta also made preparations to send

reinforcements. Corinth prepared a fleet of twenty-five triremes (Thuc.VII.8; 10–17).

In early spring the Peloponnesian reinforcements were ready. These consisted of six hundred helots and *neodamodeis* from Sparta, three hundred hoplites from Boeotia, two hundred hoplites from Sicyon, and five hundred Corinthian and Arcadian hoplites. The Corinthian ships prevented the Athenian ships at Naupactus from interfering with the sailing of these forces. Gylippus returned from the hinterland with men and supplies. With Syracusan confidence renewed, Gylippus attacked the Athenian forts at Plemmyrium while the Syracusan navy attacked the Athenian fleet in the Great Harbor. The Syracusan forces were successful in capturing all three forts. However, the Syracusan fleet was defeated. The loss of the forts was a major Athenian defeat since many supplies for the army and fleet were stored there. Also, supplies could no longer be safely brought through the entrance of the Great Harbor (Thuc.VII.24.2–3). Lack of success in minor naval engagements in the harbor demoralized the Athenian forces further. Their military position was becoming more tenuous (Thuc.VII.19.3–25).

After this success, envoys from Syracuse were sent to recruit more troops from the other Sicilian *poleis*. By the spring of 413 most Sicilian Greeks rallied to the aid of Syracuse. Only neutral Acragas withheld support. Nicias was informed of this recruitment drive and requested his Sicilian allies to prevent their arrival. During their march to Syracuse, these Greeks were ambushed by the Sicilians and suffered eight hundred casualties. However, some 1,500 men reached Syracuse. Additional hoplites, cavalry, and light-armed troops arrived from Camarina and Gela (Thuc.VII.32–33.1–2).

Prior to the arrival of the Athenian reinforcements, the Syracusans attacked the Athenians by land and sea again. In preparation for the naval attack, the Syracusans applied a new engineering design to their triremes (Thuc.VII.36.2–3). They reinforced the prows of their ships to make them shorter and heavier to ram the Athenian ships, which were more lightly built. On the designated day of attack, Gylippus led the Syracusan army against the Athenian wall that faced the city. As the Athenians prepared to defend the wall, the Syracusan fleet moved into the harbor to attack the Athenian fleet. In haste, the Athenians launched their ships. The fleets were about evenly matched with the Athenians having eighty triremes to seventy-five triremes for the Syracusans. After fighting most of the day, the naval battle resulted in a draw. When the Syracusan fleet withdrew, the army also withdrew from the attack on the wall. The fight was not renewed the next day. On the following day, the Syracusans launched another naval assault. In two separate engagements, morning and afternoon, the Syracusans

emerged victorious. The Athenians lost seven ships while many were damaged. The Syracusans lost a couple of ships (Thuc.VII.36–41). One was sunk by a dolphin!⁴¹³ Athenian prospects continued to spiral downwards.

The winter mission accomplished, Eurymedon returned from Sicily and rendezvoused with Demosthenes at Corcyra in the spring. From here they sailed with a force of seventy-three ships, five thousand hoplites, and some light-armed troops (Thuc.VII.42.1; Plut.*Nic.*21.1). While sailing to Corcyra, Demosthenes raided the Peloponnese and gathered additional troops from northwestern Greece. After recruiting some troops in Italy, the Athenians reached Sicily before the Peloponnesian reinforcements.

Gambling that the Syracusans would be demoralized by this large Athenian force, Demosthenes launched an attack against the Syracusan cross wall on Epipolae with siege engines. The attack failed and the siege weapons were burnt by the Syracusans. With the approval of Nicias, he then launched a surprise night attack against the wall. Initially successful, the Athenian attack lost momentum when it was checked by Boeotian reinforcements. Confusion began when the Athenians could no longer determine friend from foe in the dark. The Athenians retreated. Many were killed at daybreak by the Syracusan cavalry when they failed to get back to the Athenian camp. The Athenians suffered heavy losses. After a short period of time, with sickness entering the Athenian camp due to warmer weather and the marshy conditions along the Great Harbor, the Athenian troops along with the commanders were discouraged. Consequently, Demosthenes, supported by Eurymedon, urged Nicias to withdraw all forces while they had naval supremacy. Either they should sail home or establish a new base away from Syracuse. Demosthenes also argued that Athens could use these forces better at home rather than in Sicily. Nicias acknowledged that the Athenian position was not ideal but argued that the Syracusans were running out of money and the city might yet surrender from internal betrayal. Probably the most important reason for not withdrawing was Nicias's fear of the Athenian Assembly (Thuc.VII.33.3–6; 42–49). Withdrawal, without approval from the Assembly, would probably lead to harsh punishment or death when he returned home. He still had strong forces and the commanders were punished ten years earlier for their lack of success in Sicily.⁴¹⁴ His fear was not unfounded.

Learning that additional reinforcements arrived in Syracuse, Nicias finally agreed to withdraw from Syracuse. However, an eclipse of the moon occurred on August 27. Viewed as an ill omen by the troops, Nicias delayed their departure for almost a month. The Syracusans intended to prevent their departure. Preparing for a final

showdown, the Syracusans manned their ships and trained the crews while waiting for the Athenians to attempt their escape from the Great Harbor (Thuc.VII.50–51).

Finally, that day came. The Athenians launched eighty-six ships, under the command of Eurymedon. The Syracusans responded with seventy-six triremes. Attempting to lengthen his line on the right, Eurymedon and the right wing were separated from the main body. Isolated in a section of the Great Harbor, the right wing was annihilated and Eurymedon was killed. The main body was forced back to shore. Some ships beached outside the Athenian stockade. They were attacked by the troops of Gylippus but were repulsed by the Etruscan allies of Athens. The Syracusans captured eighteen ships and killed their crews. This victory eliminated the Athenian naval superiority. The Syracusans later launched a fire ship against the Athenian fleet, but the Athenians prevented it from approaching their ships (Thuc.VII.52–55; Plut.*Nic.*24).

To prevent the escape of the Athenians, the Syracusans blocked the entrance to the Great Harbor with triremes and various other ships. During a general council, the Athenian commanders decided a breakout must be attempted at all costs. Abandoning the heights of Epipolae, the Athenians gathered their forces near the ships. All troops, not required to defend the camp, would man the ships in the breakout. With this available manpower, the Athenians launched 110 ships. This engagement would not depend on skill and maneuverability. It would be a land battle on ships. In a second desperate battle, the Athenians were again defeated. As the Athenians tried to open the harbor entrance, the Syracusans, commanded by Sicanus, Agatharchus, and Pythen, attacked from all sides. The battle was a confused melee throughout the Great Harbor. Unable to breakout, the Athenians withdrew to the beach. Nicias and Demosthenes proposed a third engagement. They believed that they had more ships than Syracuse. However, the rank and file refused to fight a third naval engagement (Thuc.VII.59–72; Plut.*Nic.*25).

Since withdrawal by sea was impossible, Nicias and Demosthenes agreed to escape overland. Through subterfuge, Hermocrates prevented the Athenians from retreating immediately. On the third day after the naval battle, the Athenian army left the camp. The dead were left unburied. The sick and wounded also remained. How many men left with Nicias and Demosthenes is uncertain.⁴¹⁵ Marching inland toward their Sicel allies, the troops were divided in two sections with Nicias in front and Demosthenes in the rear. They marched in two hollow squares with the hoplites on the perimeter and everybody else on the inside. Pursued by the Syracusan cavalry and light-armed troops, the Athenians were harassed throughout the

march. Blocked from returning to Syracuse, the army moved forward with no clear sense of direction. Deprived of food, water, and sleep, the army became exhausted and the two divisions became separated. Demosthenes's rear guard of six thousand men were isolated and captured on the sixth day out. Demosthenes surrendered on the promise that his troops would not be killed, imprisoned, or starved (Thuc.VII.82.3). In an attempt to save his army, Nicias offered Gylippus and the Syracusans the option that Athens would pay the entire cost of the war in exchange for letting his army escape. The offer was refused. Two days after Demosthenes's surrender, at the Assinarus River Nicias and the main body capitulated after many were killed (Thuc.VII.73–85).⁴¹⁶

Despite Gylippus's plea to take them to Sparta, Nicias and Demosthenes were executed by the Syracusans. The seven thousand survivors were imprisoned in the stone quarries. Suffering from thirst and starvation many died. After seventy days, the prisoners were sold, except for the Athenians, Sicilians, and Italians who supported Athens (Thuc.VII.86–87). These men remained prisoners for at least eight months. Their ultimate fate is unknown. Plutarch claims that some were sold into slavery and branded (Plut.*Nic.*29). A few Athenians gained freedom by quoting Euripides! Two Athenian expeditions were launched with high hopes of conquest. Few returned. Their individual fates probably unknown. After 413, unknown at the time, Athens' imperial age was over.

This loss of men, ships, treasure, and prestige would prove the undoing of the empire. Although the Athenians would fight on another nine years with surprising resilience, they never had the resources to recover the empire. Although Spartan resources were also limited, Sparta would dictate the pace of the war on land and sea. However, Sparta would only do this with the assistance of an old enemy, Persia. The Great King Darius II, through his satraps and Persian gold, would become the arbitrator in Greek affairs. He was the great banker. Both adversaries would mortgage their future for his gold. Athenian tragedy told stories of the hubris of men. No tragedian left us a play about the hubris of the state. Periclean Athens would pass into the realm of legend.

The Decelean War (413–411 BC) – The Early Stage

Prior to the Athenian disaster in Sicily, in the spring of 413 the Spartans renewed the war. Led by King Agis II, the Spartans fortified Decelea, a mountainous retreat that overlooked the Attic plain. Spartan strategy was changing. Rather than conduct an annual invasion to ravage Attica, a permanent post would be established to prevent the

Athenians from sowing their fields at any time (Thuc.VII.19.1–3; Plut.*Alc.*23.2). They also would be prevented from conducting any type of land operation against central Greece. Their forces engaged in Sicily, the Athenians were unable to challenge the Spartan forces at Decelea. A Peloponnesian force remained until the end of the war. More than ever, Athens would require the resources of the empire to feed the population. Unwillingly, the Athenians were forced to adopt the strategy of Pericles and act as if Attica was an island. The fleet was their only military weapon.

By 413 the Athenians were short of money. Apparently the tribute collection was insufficient to meet expenses. Consequently, the Athenians revamped their policy toward the allies. Rather than reassess the tribute, in 413 the Athenians passed legislation eliminating the tribute. In replacement, a 5 percent duty tax was imposed on all imports and exports within the empire (Thuc.VII.28.4). Citizens and subjects alike would pay this tax. Whether this tax lasted for the duration of the war is debatable. Evidence now exists that the tribute assessment was resumed, perhaps in 410.⁴¹⁷ After the Chians revolted in 412, the Athenians released the thousand talents that were held in reserve since the beginning of the war (Thuc.VIII.15.1). Despite these measures, Athenian finances remained precarious for the duration of the war.

Realizing that the Athenians would not sue for peace after Sicily, Sparta called upon the allies during the winter of 413/412 to build a fleet of one hundred triremes to conduct a naval campaign in the Aegean to support rebellion within the empire. This fleet would be enhanced with Syracusan ships led by Hermocrates. Simultaneously, Agis II conducted a campaign in central Greece to collect money from the allied and neutral *poleis* of central Greece.

Meanwhile, the Athenians withdrew all their forces from the Peloponnese. They began to build a new fleet. To fund this fleet, the Athenians eliminated any nonessential expenditure. Finally, through their loyalist subjects, they closely observed the empire to prevent rebellion (Thuc.VIII.3–4).

During the winter or spring of 412, representatives arrived at Decelea from Euboea and Lesbos seeking support from Agis for a revolt from Athens. Agis agreed to help Euboea but changed his policy in favor of assisting Lesbos first. A garrison and governor assigned to Euboea were now assigned to Lesbos. Meanwhile envoys from Erythrae and Chios went directly to Sparta seeking support from the ephors for a revolt.⁴¹⁸ Under pressure from King Darius II to collect revenues from the Greek cities of Asia, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, the satraps of Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia respectively, also sent envoys to Sparta seeking an alliance. Athenian

support for the rebel Amorges in Caria, which violated a peace between Athens and Persia, along with their support of the Greek cities in Asia prevented tribute going to Persia. Alcibiades and Endius, his friend and ephor, encouraged Spartan support for Chios and Tissaphernes.

It appears that a disagreement over policy ensued between Agis and the ephors whether Lesbos or Chios took precedent for assistance. The ephors sent an envoy to Chios to verify the material resources the Chians claimed that they had. Upon verification, the ephors authorized forty ships to support a Chian revolt in the spring and accepted the Persian alliance. They prevailed over Agis. At a spring meeting in Corinth, the Peloponnesian League agreed with the Spartan strategy to aid Chios, Lesbos, and then the Hellespont cities in that order as they revolted from Athens. Chalcideus was assigned the command of the Peloponnesian fleet. The Peloponnesian ships, stationed in the Corinthian Gulf, were hauled overland across the isthmus to the Saronic Gulf to threaten Athens (Thuc.VIII.5–8; Andoc.III.29).

The spring offensive of 412 began with a small conflict between the two fleets in the Saronic Gulf. The Peloponnesians were forced to retreat into the harbor at Piraeum between Epidaurus and Corinth. The fleet was blockaded by the Athenians. In early summer Alcibiades, along with five ships under the command of the Spartan Chalcideus, sailed for Chios. Before the Chian Council, Alcibiades and Chalcideus announced that reinforcements were on the way. The Council then voted for rebellion. As the revolt spread throughout the Aegean, the Athenians sent a fleet to Samos and activated the one thousand talents reserved at the beginning of the war (Thuc.VIII.15.1).

In retaliation the Athenians freed the slaves of the seven Chian ships assisting them in the blockade at Piraeum. The free Chians were arrested. Then Chalcideus, accompanied by twenty Chian ships, sailed to Miletus and persuaded the Milesians to revolt. After Miletus revolted, the Spartans and Persia agreed to the first of three treaties mentioned by Thucydides. The terms were an offensive/defensive alliance against Athens, no peace settlement unless agreed by both allies, and the king was entitled to all lands and cities now held currently or by his ancestors (Thuc.VIII.18).

The balance of the year witnessed Athens preventing the revolt of the allies from spreading. During the summer, after the arrival of some Chian ships at Methymna, the Lesbians revolted. However, shortly afterwards, the arrival of twenty-five Athenian ships, commanded by Leon and Diomedon, recaptured Mytilene with little effort. Lacking Peloponnesian support, the revolt of Lesbos was quickly suppressed

(Thuc.VIII.23.6). The Athenians supported the *demos* of Samos when they rose up against the oligarchs and killed some two hundred nobles and exiled four hundred others.⁴¹⁹ Samos was reinforced with a hoplite force of one thousand Athenians, 1,500 Argives, and one thousand allies at the end of summer. Crossing over to Miletus, this force defeated the Milesians. However, the arrival of the Peloponnesian fleet with fifty-five ships commanded by Therimenes, which included twenty ships from Syracuse commanded by Hermocrates, prevented the blockade of Miletus. The Athenian general Phrynichus was unwilling to risk his fleet of forty-eight ships to engage the Peloponnesians. Given Athens' precarious military position in the Aegean, he was unwilling to risk the loss of this fleet. Therefore, Phrynichus returned to Samos. Disenchanted with the Athenians' lack of aggressiveness, the Argives returned home. They had lost three hundred men at Miletus. Samos remained the principal base of operations for Athens for the remainder of the war. After the withdrawal of Phrynichus, the Spartans ended the revolt of Amorges and turned him over to Tissaphernes (Thuc.VIII.25–28).⁴²⁰

After Miletus the Athenian forces landed on Chios and defeated the Chians in three land engagements. The Chians now remained behind their walls while the hinterland was ravaged by the Athenians (Thuc.VIII.24.3–4). Chios remained in revolt. With these affairs absorbing the energy of both sides, the Peloponnesians never sailed to the Hellespontine region to encourage rebellion. Thus, the sea-lanes remained open for the grain ships from the Black Sea bound for Athens.

The year 412 established the naval strategy implemented for the remainder of the war. The coast and islands of Asia Minor would become the battleground. Sparta would encourage rebellion from Athens. Regardless of victory or defeat, Sparta, with Persian gold, would continue to build fleets commanded by a Spartan navarch (admiral/naval commander). Asia would be the principal theater of operations. Naval engagements replaced land encounters. The Athenians scavenged every resource they had to provision new fleets in Asia. As the skill level of the Peloponnesian mariners improved, the Athenians' naval dominance was reduced to parity. The Athenian Empire was built on the supremacy of the fleet. The demise of the empire would result from the loss of this supremacy. This Spartan naval strategy ultimately produced victory.

During the winter of 412/411 Tissaphernes proposed to reduce the financial subsidy from a drachma per day per man to three obols per day. Tissaphernes was financing Sparta from his resources, not the king's. Hermocrates opposed this pay reduction. Tissaphernes agreed to pay more but still less than the original wages (Thuc.VIII.29).

During this winter, a second treaty was negotiated between Therimenes and Tissaphernes because Sparta was not satisfied with the terminology in the first agreement. The terms modified the first treaty. The Great King was responsible to pay for forces within his dominion that he summoned. Neither Persia nor Sparta would attack or levy tribute from areas controlled by the other (Thuc.VIII.37).

After the completion of this new treaty, Astyochus arrived to replace Therimenes as navarch of the fleet.⁴²¹ Astyochus refused to engage the Athenian fleet at Samos. He also refused to come to the aid of Chios despite the pleas of Pedaritus, the Spartan commander on Chios. The Athenians had established a fort on Chios but failed to reduce the city of Chios itself. During the winter, Astyochus achieved a minor naval victory at Syme and sailed to Cnidus to meet the reinforcement fleet of twenty-seven ships sent by Sparta. At Cnidus a major disagreement occurred between the Spartan Lichas and Tissaphernes over the terms of the two treaties previously negotiated. Angered, Tissaphernes left without settling the dispute. From here the Peloponnesian fleet sailed to Rhodes to support the revolt of the various *poleis* on the island (Thuc.VIII.38–44).

As these events were proceeding, Alcibiades had fallen out of favor with Sparta and was now a refugee with Tissaphernes.⁴²² He encouraged Tissaphernes to play a double game by providing minimal support to Sparta to drag out the war to weaken both sides. He suggested that Sparta, like Athens, would not support Persian interests against the Asiatic Greeks. By the late fall of 412 Alcibiades was in secret contact with supporters in the Athenian fleet at Samos. He suggested that an overthrow of the democracy in Athens and his recall would gain an alliance with Persia. Apparently there was sympathy among the trierarchs in the fleet and nobles in Athens to form an oligarchy (Thuc.VIII.47.2–48.1).⁴²³ Pisander and other envoys left Samos and arrived in Athens in early 411 to encourage the elimination of the democracy. Meanwhile, Phrynichus distrusted Alcibiades. In secret communication with Astyochus prior to his departure for Cnidus, Phrynichus revealed that Alcibiades was undermining the Spartan position with Tissaphernes. He stated that Alcibiades was encouraging Tissaphernes to support Athens. Astyochus revealed this correspondence to Alcibiades. To disgrace Phrynichus, Alcibiades revealed this secret communication of Phrynichus to the other Athenian commanders at Samos. However, Phrynichus retained the confidence of the Athenian commanders because they also distrusted the motives of Alcibiades. Later that winter, Leon and Diomedon replaced Phrynichus as commanders of the fleet. In the spring of 411 Pisander and others returned to Samos with authorization from the Athenian Assembly to negotiate with Tissaphernes. Through

Alcibiades's mediation, Tissaphernes negotiated with these Athenian envoys. However, these negotiations failed when the terms seemed unreasonable to the Athenian envoys. Consequently, Alcibiades's credibility with Tissaphernes was questioned by the Athenians (Thuc.VIII.45–56; Plut.*Alc.*24–25).

Tissaphernes departed for Caunus in Caria and concluded a third treaty between Sparta and Persia in the spring of 411. The terms of this agreement were similar to the previous treaties except that the Great King's claim to the Asiatic Greeks was more ambiguous. Also, Persian financial support to Sparta was to be regarded as loans after the arrival of the Persian fleet (Thuc.VIII.57–58). After the war, the terms of this treaty resulted in a breach between Persia and Sparta when Sparta supported the autonomy of the Asiatic Greeks and Tissaphernes claimed they were subordinate to the Great King.

During the winter, Pedaritus was killed when the Chians attempted to destroy the Athenian fort (Thuc.VIII.55.3). In the early spring the new Spartan commander Leon arrived at Chios with twelve ships. These joined the Chian fleet to challenge the Athenian blockade. In a naval battle thirty-six Chian ships opposed thirty-two Athenian vessels. The Chians emerged victorious, which weakened the blockade. The Peloponnesian fleet sailed from Rhodes to aid Chios. However, unwilling to engage the Athenian fleet shadowing their movement, Astyochus took the fleet to Miletus and the Athenians went to Samos. From Miletus Dercyllidas led a Peloponnesian force overland and secured the rebellion of Abydus and Lampsacus on the Asian side of the Hellespont. In response, the Athenians sent Strombichides with twenty-four ships to the Hellespont. He recaptured Lampsacus but failed against Abydus. To keep the sea-lanes open and check Spartan activities, Strombichides established a base at Sestus on the Chersonese side of the Hellespont opposite Abydus (Thuc.VIII.60–63.2). Rebellion within the empire was growing. Athens' military position was weakening. Persia renewed the alliance with Sparta. Many Athenians were beginning to believe radical measures were necessary to reverse Athenian fortunes.

The Athenian Revolution (411–410 BC)

As these military and diplomatic events played out during the winter and spring of 412/411, Athens had internal political turmoil. The democracy was temporarily in disgrace with the upper and middle class.⁴²⁴ The failure of Pisander to negotiate an alliance with Persia increased the pressure for change. Political assassinations began. One victim was Androcles, a leader of the *demos* and sponsor of Alcibiades's exile (Thuc.VIII.65.2; Plut.*Alc.*19). Pisander and the

oligarchic supporters in Samos conspired to create oligarchy in Athens and the *poleis* of the empire. Pisander and some of the envoys sailed to Athens establishing oligarchies in route. Other envoys sailed to the other parts of the empire to create oligarchies. An oligarchic government was created in Athens by the early summer of 411. Ten men were appointed to revamp the laws and alter the constitution. Another twenty men were later appointed to this review board (Arist.*Ath.Pol.*29.2). The original plan called for a Council of Four Hundred to replace the Council of Five Hundred with powers to appoint officials and determine affairs of state. Property qualifications would now limit the citizen body to five thousand men, which were the top three social classes. Consequently, the rowers in the fleet were excluded from political participation in the government. The Five Thousand in the Assembly would be called when necessary by the Council of Four Hundred. Except for the archons and presidents of the Council, officials would no longer get state pay. All money was to be used for the war only. Generals would be appointed rather than elected. All laws were subject to review and modification. Our two principal sources differ how this government originated. Aristotle implies a peaceful transition of power while Thucydides indicates a coup occurred (Thuc.VIII.63.3–67; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*29–33). Some aspects of the two accounts cannot be reconciled. Thucydides's narrative is the preferable account. It seems likely that the coup implemented violence and that the Council of Four Hundred was a repressive government.⁴²⁵ The Five Thousand only existed on paper to make the new constitution appear less extreme (Thuc.VIII.92.11).

Antiphon, Theramenes, and Phrynichus were among the major supporters of the oligarchy. After the Assembly disbanded itself, supporters of the oligarchy forcibly suspended the Council of Five Hundred and replaced it with the Council of Four Hundred. This Council was probably divided into four separate groups of one hundred men to handle various functions of the government. One group was assigned to perform the executive functions of the government under the guidance of the archons. Reprisals were carried out against opponents in the form of executions, imprisonment, and exile. The oligarchs sent ten representatives to the fleet in Samos to explain the purpose of the new government. Simultaneously, peace overtures were made to Agis at Decelea. Agis attempted to seize Athens by force but failed. He then allowed Athenian peace envoys to proceed to Sparta. The negotiations failed to create a peace.

The men in the fleet elected new leaders. Led by Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, the mariners refused to acknowledge the new government. An oath was sworn to support the democracy. Those officers who favored oligarchy were removed from their commands but suffered no

reprisals. The Athenians supported the *demos* of Samos who defeated an oligarchic coup. The soldiers and sailors vowed to continue the war with Sparta. They would maintain the empire and collect the tribute. The men of the fleet were now the Athenian Assembly. The envoys sent from Athens stayed at Delos rather than continue to Samos when they discovered that the fleet favored the democracy (Thuc.VIII.68–77).

Observing events in Samos and impatient with their inactivity, the men in the Peloponnesian fleet grew restless. The Syracusans were the most vocal for action. Astyochus realized that only action would restore order and morale. He sailed from Miletus to Mycale to challenge the Athenian fleet at Samos. Since the Peloponnesian fleet consisted of 112 ships to eighty-two ships for the Athenians, the Athenians initially refused to fight. After the arrival of Strombichides, the Athenians had 108 ships but now Astyochus refused battle. In need of money, Astyochus sent Clearchus, with forty ships, north to aid Pharnabazus, who promised financial support. Encountering a storm on the way, most of these ships returned to Miletus. However, ten ships continued north to Byzantium, which then revolted. Alcibiades now joined the fleet at Samos at the invitation of Thrasybulus. Alcibiades was elected a general by the fleet to secure aid from Tissaphernes.

Receiving little financial support from Tissaphernes, the Peloponnesians were more suspicious than ever of his intentions. Having accomplished nothing, Astyochus was replaced by Mindarus in the summer. Astyochus and Hermocrates, now in exile from Syracuse, sailed to Sparta to denounce Tissaphernes while envoys from Tissaphernes were sent to defend his actions. Tissaphernes supposedly went to Aspendus to bring the Phoenician fleet of 147 ships into the Aegean. For whatever reason the fleet came no further than Aspendus. Thucydides suggests that he was allowing the belligerents to exhaust their resources to weaken each other (Thuc.VIII.87.4–5). When the oligarchic envoys at Delos finally arrived at Samos to explain the new government, Alcibiades convinced the mariners not to sail against Athens but carry the war to Sparta. Alcibiades then sailed to Aspendus to get support from Tissaphernes (Thuc.VIII.78–88). Despite these activities neither fleet improved their military position.

On the domestic front the oligarchy at Athens was expanded. The failure to secure peace and the revolt of the fleet prevailed on the supporters of the Four Hundred to broaden the franchise to the promised Five Thousand to maintain government legitimacy. Theramenes and others encouraged the oligarchy to broaden the franchise. Phrynichus defended the government but was assassinated

after his peace mission to Sparta failed. Theramenes and Aristocrates, with the support of many hoplites, destroyed the Eëtionia wall under construction in the Piraeus as a refuge for the Four Hundred. The next day, the Four Hundred promised to set up the Five Thousand. Amidst this internal discord, the Peloponnesians defeated an Athenian fleet near Oropus and the Euboeans revolted. Euboea was a huge loss to the Athenians because of its strategic position and the food supplies provided to Athens.⁴²⁶ After this defeat, the Athenians met on the Pnyx and voted in the Five Thousand. All who could arm themselves as hoplites became members of the Five Thousand. Fearing reprisals, many oligarchs fled the city. The Five Thousand voted to recall Alcibiades and the fleet (Thuc.VIII.89–98; Plut.*Alc.*27.1).

Neither Thucydides nor Aristotle provides a clear picture of the government of the Five Thousand and how it operated. However, it appears that with the demise of the Four Hundred, an executive council of one hundred men, ten from each tribe, set the agenda that the Five Thousand would vote on when summoned. Three other councils of one hundred men each handled other administrative duties. Most government officials served without pay. All finances were devoted to the war effort. Whatever the government structure, we are told that internal harmony occurred, military affairs were stabilized, and the fleet at Samos was invited to return. Thucydides and Aristotle claim that the government of the Five Thousand worked well (Thuc.VIII.97.2–3; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*33.1–2). Aristotle claims that the rule of the Four Hundred lasted about four months. From September 411 to June 410, the Five Thousand ruled and then the democracy was restored. After the restoration, a decree was passed making it illegal to overthrow the democracy and any perpetrator could be killed with impunity (Andoc.I.96–98).

The Decelean War (411–404 BC) – The Defeat

With the home front stabilized, the Athenians now concentrated on military affairs and victories began to occur. All these engagements with the Peloponnesian fleet would occur in the eastern Aegean basin. Unlike the Archidamian War, Sicily, western Hellas, and the Corinthian Gulf would be military backwaters. The bank of Persia dictated this strategy for both combatants.

In the fall of 411 Mindarus sailed from Miletus north to Abydus to encourage further revolts in the Hellespont and block the passage of the grain ships from the Black Sea. Mindarus was now supported by Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. The Athenian fleet under Thrasyllus followed from Samos. When the Athenian fleet attacked Eresus, in revolt on Lesbos, Mindarus sailed on to Abydus

from Chios. The Athenians left Eresus to follow Mindarus. Off Cynossema the Athenian fleet with seventy-six ships, led by Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, engaged Mindarus's fleet of eighty-six vessels. Each side was eager for battle. Superior seamanship by the Athenians offset their numerical weakness, and they emerged victorious. The Peloponnesians found refuge at Abydos. The Athenians lost fifteen ships while the Peloponnesians lost twenty-one vessels. This victory reinvigorated the Athenians confidence. They sailed on and suppressed the revolt of Cyzicus (Thuc.VIII.99–107). Beginning with this victory, the momentum of success switched to the Athenians. The Athenians no longer followed a defensive strategy but sought to restore their mastery of the sea.⁴²⁷

During the winter, Mindarus received reinforcements from Rhodes. Returning from Aspendus in the fall, Alcibiades reinforced the Athenians with his ships. An engagement occurred at Abydos and the Athenians emerged victorious when the chance arrival of Alcibiades eighteen ships turned the tide of battle. The Peloponnesians beached their vessels and were protected by the soldiers of Pharnabazus. The Athenians captured thirty Peloponnesian ships and returned to Sestus. The Athenians kept forty ships at Sestus to protect the sea-lanes. The remainder disbursed to collect money from the subjects. Thrasyllus sailed to Athens with the news of victory and requested reinforcements. Alcibiades sailed to meet Tissaphernes, now in the Hellespont region. Tissaphernes arrested him to appease the Lacedaemonians and his king. A month later Alcibiades escaped and rejoined the fleet (Xen.*Hell.*I.1.2–10; Diod.XIII.45–47.2; Plut.*Alc.*27–28).

During the Athenian absence, Mindarus and Pharnabazus captured Cyzicus. In the spring of 410 the Athenian fleet of eighty-six ships, commanded by Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Theramenes, engaged the sixty triremes of Mindarus off Cyzicus. Mindarus's inferiority resulted when a reinforcement fleet had been destroyed by a storm near Mount Athos. This battle began in the early morning at sea and ended on land later in the day. Alcibiades's contingent approached the Spartan fleet, which was on maneuvers, and lured them farther out to sea. The ships of Thrasybulus and Theramenes rowed into the bay and cut off the retreat of Mindarus. When Alcibiades force turned on the Spartans, Mindarus realized that he was trapped. Unable to return to the harbor, he beached his ships near Kleroi. While part of Alcibiades's force attempted to haul the beached ships back to sea, Alcibiades landed his remaining archers and marines to attack Mindarus by land. On his own initiative, Thrasybulus landed his troops to aid the outnumbered force of Alcibiades. Later the hoplites of Theramenes also landed. The forces of Pharnabazus came to the aid

of the Peloponnesians. The Peloponnesians were defeated, and Mindarus killed in this amphibious assault on the ships. The battle lost, the Syracusans burned their ships to prevent capture. The Peloponnesian forces fled inland to safety with Pharnabazus. All the Peloponnesian ships were lost. The next day the Athenians captured Cyzicus, abandoned by the Peloponnesians the previous evening, and collected much needed tribute (*Xen.Hell.I.1.11–18*; *Diod.49–51*).⁴²⁸

The goddess Nike (victory) smiled on the Athenians this day. This was the great battle of Alcibiades's career. His leadership, ingenuity, and courage inspired the Athenians. This victory allowed him to eventually return home to a hero's welcome. Unfortunately for Athens, Alcibiades was unable to duplicate this feat. Disgraced later after the battle of Notium in 406, Alcibiades would end his career in exile in the Chersonese. From here he observed the Athenian disaster at Aegospotami in 405.

The three victories of Cynossema, Abydus, and Cyzicus in the last six months had multiple consequences. The Peloponnesian fleet was destroyed with the loss of 135 to 155 ships. Their land forces were in disarray in Asia. Pharnabazus provisioned the Peloponnesians and began to rebuild the fleet at Antandrus. A democratic revolution in Syracuse deposed the Syracusan generals assisting Sparta. Loyal to Syracuse, Hermocrates and the other generals remained at their post until the new commanders arrived. Hermocrates was exiled from Syracuse (*Xen.Hell.I.23–31*). The morale of the Athenians was restored. With their supremacy at sea reestablished, they would use the next few years to suppress rebellion in the north Aegean and restore their finances. The tribute assessment was reinstated in 410. The grain route was secured to the Black Sea. These defeats encouraged Spartan peace overtures. Unfortunately, the Athenians, encouraged by Cleophon, rejected the peace terms (*Diod.XIII.53.2–4*). This reversal of fortune provided the Athenians with hope that the war could still be won.⁴²⁹

Most significant in the long run was the restoration of the full democracy in Athens by the early summer of 410. How the Five Thousand disbanded and restored democracy is left unclear by our sources. The transition was apparently smooth. No reprisals against the oligarchs are recorded. By early summer the democracy was fully functional.

Since peace was rejected, in July 410 Agis led the Lacedaemonian army up to the walls of Athens but did not attack when the Athenian army under Thrasyllus was prepared to resist (*Xen.Hell.I.33–35*). For the remainder of the year, the Spartans accomplished very little.

Although Athenian prospects appeared much better in the

summer of 410, Athens' financial and military position was still weak.⁴³⁰ After the battle of Cyzicus, Alcibiades sailed into the Hellespont to collect tribute from the cities and imposed a 10 percent toll on merchant ships sailing through the Hellespont. The Athenians also raided the satrapy of Pharnabazus for booty to pay the fleet. Pharnabazus was still helping the Peloponnesians build new ships (Xen.*Hell.*I.18–26; Diod.XIII.64.2–4). Athens could carry on no offensive operations against the Peloponnesians. To restore the treasury, Athens needed to restore the empire. This was the strategy the Athenians would pursue.

From 409 to 406 there were no major naval engagements between the belligerents. Most military activities centered on the need for money. In 409 Thrasyllus sailed to Asia Minor with one thousand hoplites, one hundred cavalry, and thirty ships in search of funds. After collecting booty in Lydia, he attacked Ephesus but was defeated by the Ephesians and Persians (Xen.*Hell.*I.2.6–9). In 409 the Spartans captured Pylos and expelled the Messenians. The Megarians captured Nisaea, their port on the Saronic Gulf (Xen.*Hell.*I.2.18; Diod.XIII.64.5–7–65.1–2). In 408 Theramenes and Alcibiades campaigned in Thrace, the Chersonese, and the Bosphorus. They gained allies and the submission of Chalcedon, Selymbria, and Byzantium.⁴³¹ The Athenians granted mild terms when all these cities submitted. The Boeotian and Megarian prisoners captured at Byzantium were sent to Athens (Xen.*Hell.*I.3; Diod.XIII.66–7; Plut.*Alc.*30–31). By 406 the north Aegean states, except for Abydos, was now under their control.

During this time frame, the Lacedaemonians received financial support from Pharnabazus to maintain their presence in Asia and the Bosphorus. The game changed again in 407 when Cyrus, the young son of the Great King Darius II, arrived to replace Tissaphernes. He arrived with orders from his father to fully support Sparta. Cyrus, appointed *karanos* (viceroys) of Asia Minor, commanded all military forces and had five hundred talents to disburse.⁴³² The Spartan Lysander, recently appointed navarch of the Peloponnesian fleet, met Cyrus and developed a close bond.⁴³³ Consequently, Cyrus backed Sparta completely and generously with Persian gold. He paid the arrears owed the Peloponnesian fleet and increased their pay. Through Tissaphernes, the Athenians appealed to Cyrus for support. Their request was denied. Cyrus refused to meet the Athenian ambassadors. Under Lysander and Cyrus, the Peloponnesian fleet grew to ninety triremes now fully manned and financed (Xen.*Hell.*I.5.1–10; Diod.XIII.70.3–4; Plut.*Lys.*4).

Despite doubts by many Athenians, in 407 Alcibiades returned to Athens to acclaim by the people.⁴³⁴ In his *Frogs*, Aristophanes described the relationship between the Athenians and Alcibiades:

"They love him, they hate him, they cannot do without him" (Ar.*Frogs*.1422–1425).⁴³⁵ He was elected the commander-in-chief and exonerated of the charge of impiety. In defiance of the Spartan forces at Decelea, he led the procession for the Eleusinian Mysteries. After four months in Athens, he took the fleet of one hundred ships, 1,500 hoplites, and 150 cavalry back to Asia in the autumn. By early spring of 406 he stationed the fleet at Notium to observe Lysander at Ephesus. Alcibiades temporarily left the fleet to meet Thrasybulus at Phocaea. Alcibiades left his helmsman Antiochus in charge of the fleet with orders not to engage Lysander. Disregarding orders, Antiochus led ten ships into the harbor of Ephesus and baited Lysander to attack. Lysander took the bait. He attacked Antiochus and sank his ship and killed him. The Athenians launched their ships, but they were disorganized. The Spartan fleet launched in an orderly manner and attacked the Athenians and routed them. Plutarch says that fifteen Athenian ships were captured. However, the battle was not an overwhelming victory by Lysander. When Alcibiades returned, he tried to lure Lysander into a second battle, but Lysander refused. In disgrace with the Athenians, Alcibiades fled to his estate in Thrace. Thrasyllus and Conon took command of the fleet at Samos (Xen.*Hell.*I.4.11–5.15; Diod.XIII.68–74; Plut.*A/c.*32–36.1–3; Plut.*Lys.*5).

By early summer of 406 Callicratidas replaced Lysander as navarch of the fleet. Spartan law only allowed a person to be navarch once. Lysander, probably angered by losing his command, returned the unused funds to Cyrus. Callicratidas went to Cyrus for money but was snubbed. His Spartan pride offended, Callicratidas left without the money and vowed to fight without Persian gold. Launching his offensive with 170 ships, Callicratidas captured the Athenian base on Chios and then subdued Teus. The Peloponnesians proceeded to Lesbos and captured Methymna. Catching Conon's fleet in the harbor of Mytilene, Callicratidas attacked and captured thirty ships. Conon beached his remaining forty ships and was besieged in Mytilene. Conon was able to get word to Athens of his predicament when he ordered two ships to escape. One ship was captured, but the other eluded the pursuers and sailed to Athens.

Learning of this defeat, the Athenians, through a supreme effort at home, launched a rescue fleet by midsummer. Citizens, metics, foreigners, and slaves manned the ships. In dire need of manpower, citizenship was promised to these noncitizens. Eight of the ten *strategoí* were assigned to command the fleet. Thrasyllus was appointed to supreme command. Callicratidas left fifty ships to continue the siege of Mytilene and sailed with the balance to engage the Athenians.

At the Arginusae islands near Lesbos, the Athenian fleet of 150

ships encountered the 120 ships of the Peloponnesians. The Athenians posted their wings on the north and south side of the island with the island protecting the rear of the center. Callicratidas commanded the Peloponnesian right wing and the Boeotian Thrasondas the left wing. The Peloponnesian fleet was arranged in a single line. The Peloponnesians attacked. In the confusion, the battle resembled a land action. Since the skill level was low on the Athenian side, sophisticated maneuvers were not an option, even if they were feasible (Xen.*Hell.*I.6.31). The Athenians emerged victorious. Callicratidas was killed when he fell into sea after his ship rammed an enemy. The Peloponnesians lost over seventy ships to the twenty-five ships for the Athenians.⁴³⁶ The Athenian generals assigned forty-seven ships under Thrasybulus and Theramenes to rescue their comrades. The generals intended to take the balance of the fleet to destroy the remainder of the Peloponnesians, under the command of Eteonicus, who were besieging Mytilene. Informed of the defeat, Eteonicus lifted the siege and escaped with all his forces. Since a storm arose, the Athenians in the disabled ships at Arginusae could not be rescued (Xen.*Hell.*I.6; Diod.XIII.76.2–79; 98–100).

At Athens the victory was overshadowed by the loss of life. The twenty-five ships, with two hundred men each, meant that at least five thousand men lost their lives.⁴³⁷ Accusations and recriminations began against the commanding generals. Fearing punishment, two generals, Protomachus and Aristogenes, chose not to return. The other six—Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, and Erasinides—returned to defend their actions. The generals defended themselves on military grounds and blamed the storm's violence for the failure of the rescue. Encouraged by the accusations of Thrasybulus and Theramenes and in violation of the law, the Assembly voted to condemn all eight generals without individual trials.⁴³⁸ The six generals in Athens were executed. Each drank a vial of hemlock in their prison cell. The Assembly had remorse, but the damage was done (Xen.*Hell.*I.7; Diod.XIII.101–102). How this decision by the Assembly affected the actions of future commanders can only be speculated upon. However, it is safe to assume that future commanders might act less aggressively for fear of retribution at home.

With the defeat at Arginusae and the death of Callicratidas, Sparta sued for peace on the basis of the *status quo*. The Athenians rejected the overture. The Peloponnesian allies and Cyrus asked for the return of Lysander to command the fleet. However, Spartan law prevented the appointment of the same man twice to a naval command. To avoid violation of Spartan law, Aracus was assigned as navarch and Lysander was his *epistoleus* (secretary). The understanding was that Lysander was the actual commander.⁴³⁹

Lysander returned to Ephesus with thirty-five ships. He summoned Eteonicus to join him. Cyrus provided the money to rebuild the fleet and then left to visit his ailing father (Xen.*Hell.*II.1.6–14; Diod.XIII.104.3–4; Plut.*Lys.*7).

In 405 after preparations were complete, Lysander sailed to Caria and Rhodes. Perhaps he used this voyage as a training exercise for the fleet. His fleet might have numbered two hundred ships. In Caria he captured an ally of Athens. In late summer he sailed from Rhodes to the Hellespont to cut off the grain route to Athens and retake cities that revolted from Sparta. He captured Lampsacus, an ally of Athens. The Athenian fleet of 180 ships, under the command of Philocles and Conon, sailed to Sestus to check Lysander. Short of supplies at Sestus, the Athenians moved to Aegospotami (The Goat's Rivers) opposite Lampsacus to bring Lysander to battle. Since there was no harbor here, they beached the ships on the open shore. The first day the Athenians launched the entire fleet to entice Lysander to action. He refused, although his ships were prepared inside the harbor of Lampsacus. As the Athenians sailed back to the open beaches to make the evening meal and forage for supplies, Lysander sent out a couple of reconnaissance boats to observe the Athenian activities. Informed that the Athenians would not attack, he stood down his fleet. This pattern occurred for four days. On the fifth day as the Athenians beached their ships and scattered to forage, Lysander attacked with his full fleet and caught the Athenians unprepared.⁴⁴⁰ Conon escaped with eight ships and fled to King Evagoras in Cyprus. The state trireme *Paralus* also escaped and fled to Athens to report the disaster. The balance of the fleet and men were captured. The allies of Athens were released but three thousand Athenians and their commanders, except Adeimantus, were executed (Xen.*Hell.*II.1.15–32; Diod.XIII.104.5–106.7; Plut.*Lys.*9–11).⁴⁴¹

The Athenian naval supremacy, earned at Salamis and reinforced on multiple occasions throughout the fifth century, ended at Aegospotami. Alcibiades, in exile in Thrace, observed the Athenians exposed position at Aegospotami and warned the Athenian commanders to return to Sestus. They ignored him. Whether this report by Plutarch is true or not (Plut.*Alc.*36.5), it reflects that the judgment of the commanders was at least questionable. This engagement was not a battle at sea. Taken by surprise, the ships were caught on the beach with their crews out foraging. The navy met an inglorious end at Aegospotami.

After the victory, Lysander led the fleet against Byzantium and Chalcedon, which surrendered. He established a harmost (military governor) over both cities, oligarchic governments, and ordered all Athenian citizens to return to Athens. As he cruised along the coast of

Asia Minor, he encouraged the remaining *poleis* to revolt and expelled all Athenian citizens. In some cities, oligarchic boards of ten members (decarchy) were established in conjunction with the harmost to govern. He would follow this policy as he sailed southward throughout the Aegean. The addition of citizens fleeing to Athens would increase the Athenian inability to withstand a siege as the food supply would end that much quicker. Starvation, not military assault, would force Athens to surrender. As he sailed slowly to the Greek mainland, he informed Agis at Decelea and the Spartan government of his approach. The Spartan government sent King Pausanias with an army from the Peloponnesian League to join Agis' forces to besiege Athens (Xen.II.2.1–9).

Despite the news of Aegospotami, Athens refused to surrender. In November 405 Lysander arrived at Athens to aid the Spartan siege led by both kings. Agis rejected peace overtures and deferred to the home government. The Athenians resisted through the winter. Theramenes was sent to Lysander to negotiate and remained three months. In spring of 404 Theramenes headed a delegation to Sparta and appeared before a Congress of the Peloponnesian League at Sellasia. Despite the representatives of Thebes and Corinth urging the destruction of Athens, Sparta refused because of Athens past service to Hellas.⁴⁴² The terms imposed were a recall of all exiles, destruction of the Long Walls and the walls around the Piraeus, the surrender of all triremes except twelve, and have the same friends and enemies as Sparta (Xen.*Hell.*II.2.20). Athens was made a subordinate ally of Sparta. The war was finally over! The walls of Athens were demolished to the sound of flute players. Xenophon states that the Greeks welcomed the surrender with rejoicing (Xen.*Hell.*II.2.10–23; Diod.XIII.107; Plut.*Lys.*13–14; Andoc.III.11–12).

No Spartan successfully challenge Athens until Lysander. Trained to fight on land, Lysander mastered the sea. Under his leadership, a land power became a sea power. His personality and diplomatic skill won the friendship of the young Cyrus. This alliance provided Sparta with the wealth of Asia. His victory at Aegospotami made him the most famous Greek of his time. The irony is that the fame achieved abroad ultimately made him extremely unpopular within the Spartan government (Plut.*Lys.*21.1–3). Lysander was a man who thought outside of the box. His relationship with the Persians, in particular Cyrus, would never be emulated by his countrymen. His example of converting a land power to a sea power would be emulated and surpassed in the third century BC when Rome became mistress of the Mediterranean with the conquest of Carthage. Lysander was a new man. It was a new age. Could his fellow Spartans emulate Lysander and adapt to this “brave new world”?⁴⁴³

Athens' Postmortem Analysis

For seventy-five years Athens was the queen of the Aegean. Themistocles, Cimon, Ephialtes, Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades and many others in tandem with the *demos* built the empire, maintained the fleet, and supported the democracy. The fleet was the foundation of the empire and the democracy. The foundation of the fleet was the rowers from the *thetes* social class. Pay as rowers provided them an income. Their citizenship gave them a voice in the Assembly. Without the fleet, could the *thetes* find employment in the future? Would their voice be heard in the Assembly?

In 404 Athens was financially exhausted. The reserves were gone. Taxes, tolls, tribute, and booty acquired by the fleet in peace and war were gone. Agriculture, industry, and commerce were in disarray. Trade within the empire was disrupted. Rules for the exchange of goods and services would no longer apply. Athenian courts no longer handled the legal disputes of an empire. On the domestic front most magistrates were no longer paid. Pay for jury duty and attendance in the Council and Assembly was reduced. Internal building was minimized. The hinterland was ravaged by war. Loss of population left lands untilled. Could the hoplite class rebuild their farms and small businesses? Slaves, that maintained the great estates and the mines, fled for freedom during the war. Could the nobility rebuild their estates and regain their wealth? When the war began, Pericles praised Athens for the financial strength and the reserves the treasury had accumulated under the empire. Athens began the war with six thousand talents. In defeat, the treasury was bankrupt.

The population displacement was enormous. Loss of population due to the plague, the Sicilian disaster, and attrition in war left a hole in the economy and social structure. The forced return of Athenian citizens, cleruchs, and exiles added to the population displacement. How would they be integrated into the citizen body and economy?

The revolution in 411 showed that there was internal opposition to the democracy. Democracy failed the test of war. Sparta was an oligarchy and the Spartans imposed oligarchies on other states. The peace treaty did not specify an overthrow of the democracy in Athens, but could it survive?

Multiple times in the course of the conflict, Athens and Sparta made overtures of peace. All failed because of the vicissitudes of war. In the end, the Athenians' reach was beyond their grasp. Imperial ambitions exceeded resources. The people and their leaders could not accept the limited Periclean Empire. The downfall began with the Sicilian Expedition. However, the empire appeared close to restoration in 407. The arrival of Lysander ended the Athenian recovery. His leadership in combination with Athenian mistakes led to Aegospotami.

The Greek playwrights often wrote about the *hubris* of man as an individual. What about the *hubris* of the state? The *demos* and their leadership failed this test. However, the Athenians learned from their mistakes. Like a phoenix, Athens would arise again. Athens would again become a major power in the Hellenic world. But never again would the Athenians achieve their fifth century dominance. How did Athens rise from the ashes? The story begins in the next chapter.

The Future

Sparta went to war to liberate the Greeks from Athenian tyranny.⁴⁴⁴ Twenty-seven years later after much loss of life, property, and treasure throughout the Hellenic world, Athens' defeat was complete. The empire was gone. The treasury was bankrupt. The fleet destroyed. The viability of the democracy was questioned by the citizen body. Civilian morale reached a low point wondering what the future will bring. Spartan prestige was at a high point. Spartan military prowess was at its peak. Spartan relations with Persia were probably the best that they had ever been. The Spartan treasury was enlarged with the money sent back by Lysander from the Aegean states. Sparta's leadership and constitution proved superior in this war. Would there be a new dawn of freedom and autonomy for Hellas? Would Sparta fulfill the wartime promise? Would Sparta's allies and foes accept Spartan hegemony? Could the Hellenes repair the damage inflicted from the Great War? This chapter of Greek history was closed. What would the next chapter bring?

³⁵⁷ (Thucydides 1965-1976), 3.

³⁵⁸ (De Ste. Croix 1972), 294–295. See appendix 2 for a discussion of the origin of the name for the Peloponnesian War.

³⁵⁹ Ibid, 3.

³⁶⁰ Pentecontaetia refers to the fifty-year period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars.

³⁶¹ Thucydides and Xenophon were Athenians. Thucydides commanded a flotilla in the war. He was exiled after failing to defend Amphipolis. Xenophon was a cavalry commander after the war. He participated in the *Anabasis* of the Ten Thousand after their failure to place Cyrus on the Persian throne in 401.

³⁶² These fragments were discovered in Egypt. Their authorship has not been definitively determined.

³⁶³ (De Ste. Croix 1972), 331–332. For a manpower analysis, see appendix 16.

³⁶⁴ (Ober 2015), 349. See note number 30 for a discussion of the helot population of Laconia and Messenia. The estimated population ranges from 150,000 to 200,000 inhabitants. How many helots would be used as soldiers is speculative.

³⁶⁵ Ibid, 38. Table 2.3 suggests that there were a million inhabitants in the Peloponnesian League and 2.5 million in the Athenian Empire. How many inhabitants could be soldiers or sailors is also speculative. (Salmon 1984), 167–169. Salmon suggest that Corinth may have had a population of fifty thousand

- inhabitants and fifteen thousand were citizens.
- 366 See Lewis in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 389–390. Lewis acknowledges that there is little evidence, literary and inscriptional, on Peloponnesian financial affairs.
- 367 The young were those between eighteen and nineteen years old. The old were those between the age of forty and fifty-nine. At age twenty, men were part of the field army. Like the Spartans, men were ineligible at age sixty. Metics were activated as reserves. (N. Hammond 1986), 328–329. Hammond suggests that Athens possessed 23,000 hoplites, including 6,000 metics, from a total population of 400,000 in Attica. (Ober 2015), 205. Ober suggests that the population ranged from 250,000 to 300,000 inhabitants with 50,000 citizens. However, not all citizens would qualify for military duty for various reasons. See note number 7 above. The population of the Empire may have been 2.5 million.
- 368 (Thucydides 1954), 105.
- 369 In 430 the Athenians converted some ships to horse transports for the first time in an expedition against Epidaurus (Thuc.II.56.1–2).
- 370 (Meiggs 1975), 259.
- 371 (Meiggs 1975), 263–264.
- 372 Throughout Hellenic history, one hoplite battle ended wars. A few examples are Sepia (494), Marathon (490), Plataea (479), Coronea (446), Mantinea (418), and Chaeronea (338).
- 373 (Hale 2009), 146.
- 374 Boeotarchs were the elected leaders of the Boeotian League (*Hell.Oxy.XVI.3*). They represented the various regions in Boeotia. The Oxyrhynchus historian is our principle source for the structure of the league. (Bruce 1960), 102–109. (Moore 1975), 127–133. (P. K. McKechnie 2015), 83.
- 375 (Meiggs 1975), 311.
- 376 Despite Thucydides's description of the disease, no definitive diagnosis has been established. Measles, typhus, smallpox, and bubonic plague among others have been suggested.
- 377 (Hale 2009), 158–169. Hale analyzes the battle tactics of Phormio. A map (162) illustrates the naval maneuvers.
- 378 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 98. (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996), 1268. A proxenos by the fifth century was often hereditary. A *proxenos* is a citizen of a *polis* who represents the interests of another *polis* within his native *polis*. He was like a modern-day consul with political and diplomatic functions. An example is an Athenian citizen selected by Argos to represent Argive interests in Athens. *Proxenia* as an institution appears in the sixth century but was firmly established in the fifth.
- 379 (Meiggs 1975), 318.
- 380 Ibid, 317. Meiggs suggests these Athenian cleruchs may have returned to Athens by 425/424 when the Athenians were low on manpower.
- 381 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 171–175. Inscriptions number 63 and number 64 describe the alliances.
- 382 (Thucydides 1954), 211.
- 383 The Oxyrhynchus historian tells us that Thebes grew in size and prosperity in the war (*Hell.Oxy.17.3*). Did the Athenians hope to engage the Boeotian army as they would two years later at Delium? Were the Athenians going to support the *demos* to overthrow the ruling oligarchs in some of the Boeotian *poleis* as they attempted in 424?
- 384 The loss of these ships prevented the Peloponnesians from undertaking any naval operations for the duration of the Archidamian War.

- 385 (Thucydides 1954), 254.
- 386 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 188–201. Inscription number 69 provides a list of the tributary cities and how much they were assessed. Penalties for noncompliance were severe. A detailed analysis of the measure is provided.
- 387 (Meiggs 1975), 327.
- 388 *Ibid*, 331.
- 389 Thucydides praises the virtue and diplomatic skill of Brasidas that won over the allies of Athens (Thuc.IV.81.2).
- 390 These “Laconian” helots were promised their freedom if they volunteered. They received their freedom in 421 (Thuc.V.31.1). This new class of liberated helots was called *neodamodeis*. (Cartledge 2004), 189–190.
- 391 The capture of Amphipolis caused the exile of Thucydides, the historian, for twenty years (Thuc.V.26.5). He was a fleet commander of seven ships in Thrace and failed to arrive before its surrender (Thuc.IV.104.4–5). However, Thucydides prevented Brasidas from capturing Eion, near the mouth of the Strymon River (Thuc.IV.106.4–107.2).
- 392 (J. Larsen 1955), 48–50.
- 393 Hippocrates’s army included Athenian citizens, metics, and foreigners (Thuc.IV.90.1).
- 394 (Lendon 2005), 79–83. Lendon provides an excellent critique of the uniqueness of this battle.
- 395 After the death of King Archidamus, Pleistoanax was recalled from his twenty year banishment in 427/426 (Thuc.II.21.1; V.16.1–3). Since there is no information about the internal political affairs of Sparta, the circumstances of his recall are unknown. However, Thucydides says he was unpopular and associated with a peace faction (Thuc.V.16.1).
- 396 This stage of the war was given its name from the fort that King Agis of Sparta permanently occupied inside Attica.
- 397 (Kagan 1991), 242–245. He argues that Pericles’s strategy was a failure because he underestimated the Spartan will to resist despite facing an opponent with superior resources.
- 398 This phrase was ascribed to the Spartan princess Gorgo. This phrase refers to Spartan bravery in battle.
- 399 All Spartan commanders offered sacrifices to the gods prior to crossing the Laconian border. They could not leave Laconia if the sacrifices were not favorable.
- 400 King Agis II was the son of Archidamus II and brother to his successor Agesilaus II.
- 401 Thucydides claims that the army of Agis was the finest Hellenic army assembled (Thuc.V.60.3). Both armies condemned their commanders for avoiding battle. The Argive commander Thrasyllus barely escaped stoning, but his property was confiscated. The Spartans threatened to fine Agis ten thousand drachmas and burn his house (Thuc.V.63.2).
- 402 Two Spartan commanders were exiled after the battle for not obeying orders from Agis to cover the gap in his line (Thuc.V.72.1).
- 403 Thucydides does not give precise figures for the size of the two armies. He does say that the Lacedaemonian and Arcadian troops may have outnumbered the Argive coalition (Thuc.V.68.1–2). (Kagan 2003), 230. Kagan suggests that nine thousand men were with Agis while eight thousand were with the Argive coalition. (Cartledge 2004), 194–195. Cartledge argues that the Spartan army was a remodeled army that achieved the victory. Thus Spartan forces were stronger than their propaganda suggested.

- 404 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 171–175. See inscriptions number 63 and number 64.
405 Plutarch adds that the Athenians had ambitions in Libya and the western
Mediterranean (Plut.*Nic.*12.1–2).
- 406 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 236–240. Inscription number 78 lists numerous partial
decrees planning the expedition.
- 407 See Andrewes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 450. Andrewes
gives this date as the night of a new moon when visibility would be poor to
identify the perpetrators.
- 408 (Andocides 1968), Vol.1, 338–451. In 415 Andocides was granted immunity and
testified about these events. He admitted his participation in the mutilation of the
Hermæ. He later went in to exile and returned to Athens in 403 when a general
immunity was proclaimed. He states that Pythonicus accused Alcibiades of
profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries (Andoc.1.11). See Andocides speech *On the
Mysteries* submitted sixteen years later in 399 when he was accused of the
crime. Andocides was acquitted.
- 409 The composition of the fleet was thirty-four triremes from the allies, sixty triremes
from Athens, and forty transport vessels for the troops and horses. Only 1,500
hoplites were Athenian. The balance was allies (Argives, Mantineans, and
subjects of the Empire). The allies provided the light armed troops (Thuc.VI.31.3;
VI.43).
- 410 Thucydides later implies that Lamachus plan to attack Syracuse may have been
the wiser course (Thyc.VII.42.3).
- 411 Thucydides uses the speeches as a talking point to emphasize that the Sicilian
Expedition was a mission of conquest.
- 412 Corinth was the mother city of Syracuse in the age of colonization. In the fourth
century, Corinth would support the liberation of Syracuse from the tyrant
Dionysius II.
- 413 (Hale 2009), 196. Hale explains that a dolphin was a metal ingot suspended from
between merchant ships. When dropped on a trireme, the hull was punctured
and would sink (Thuc.VII.41.2-3).
- 414 The generals Pythodorus and Sophocles were exiled. The other general,
Eurymedon was fined on a bribery charge (Thuc.IV.65.3–4).
- 415 See Andrewes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 461. He gives a
figure of forty thousand men. Thucydides does not give a figure.
- 416 Thucydides does not provide a casualty count. Diodorus claims that 18,000 men
were killed and 7,000 taken prisoner (Diod.XIII.19.2–3). Thucydides says the
prisoner count was at least 7,000 men (Thuc.VII.87.4).
- 417 (Meiggs 1975), 369. Xenophon states that Chalcedon must pay its assessed
tribute in 409 (Xen.I.3.9). Stone tablets recovered from the Athenian Agora imply
that the tribute was assessed after 413.
- 418 Until this time, Chios, unlike Lesbos, Erythrae, and Euboea, was the only *polis*
that had not previously revolted. It still provided ships to Athens. Since the
oligarchic government always complied with Athenian requisitions, they were left
in power by Athens. Chios was a prosperous state since the Persian War
(Thuc.VIII.24.4). (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 181–184. Inscription number 67
suggests that some Chian oligarchs contributed to a Spartan war fund early in
the Archidamian War.
- 419 After the revolt of Samos in 440, a democracy was installed. However, at some
unknown time and process, by 412, the oligarchs were restored to power.
- 420 Following in the footsteps of his father, Pissuthnes, Amorges, of Caria, was in
revolt against the Great King since 414. He was supported by Athens in violation
of the treaty of 424 with Darius II.
- 421 Therimenes disappears from history. He may have died at sea on his voyage

- home (Thuc.VIII.38.1).
- 422 Alcibiades had been ordered to be killed by the Spartan government (Thuc.VIII.45.1). It was alleged that he had seduced the wife of King Agis (Plut.*A/c.*23.7–24.1–2).
- 423 A trierarch was a ship captain. Since nobles often commanded or sponsored a trireme from their wealth, ship commanders were often sympathetic to the interests of the nobility.
- 424 Some men supported a moderate oligarchy while others wanted a more extreme form. The extreme oligarchs spear headed the coup and the populace remained quiet (Thuc.VIII.66.2–3).
- 425 (Kagan 2003), 376–380.
- 426 Thucydides criticizes the Peloponnesians for not sailing into the Piraeus after their victory. Athens had no naval forces to resist the Peloponnesians (Thuc.VIII.96.4–5). They could have blockaded the Piraeus to force the fleet at Samos to rescue the city, which would have exposed the empire to the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus.
- 427 Thucydides ends his history with the battle of Cynossema and the return of Alcibiades.
- 428 (Hale 2009), 211–217. Hale provides a detailed analysis of the battle. A map (212) illustrates the position of the belligerents. This was the greatest Athenian naval victory since the war began twenty-one years earlier.
- 429 (Kagan 2003), 417–419. See Andrewes in (Lewis, Boardman and Davies, et al. 1992), 484.
- 430 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 255–260. Inscription number 84 provides the expenditures for the year 410–409, which indicates the treasury was empty.
- 431 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 267–269. Inscription number 87 lists the terms granted to the Selymbrians. Selymbria was granted autonomy, restoration of hostages, and restoration of civil rights for some citizens, etc.
- 432 (Cook 1983), 84
- 433 (Cartledge 2004), 198–200. Lysander was a *mothax*. He was a Spartan by adoption and might have had a helot mother.
- 434 Plutarch compares Alcibiades to a chameleon because of the various actions and policies he espoused throughout his career (Plut.*A/c.*23.4).
- 435 (Vickers 2008), 2. (Aristophanes 1968), Vol. 2, 429.
- 436 (Hale 2009), 224–229. Hale provides an analysis of the battle. A map (226) illustrates the positions of the fleets.
- 437 A trireme had a crew of two hundred men (Hdt.VII.184; VIII.17). The crew consisted of 170 rowers, sixteen other crew members to sail the ship, ten marines, and four archers. We have no information about the reaction of the Peloponnesians to their casualties.
- 438 Socrates, as *epistates* (president) of the assembly on the day of trial, opposed the illegal measures to condemn the generals (Xen.*Mem.*I.1.18; Plato.*Apology.*32). Xenophon and Plato mention Socrates role. Later sources, Diodorus Siculus and Diogenes Laertius, do not. Since Xenophon and Plato were students and partisans of Socrates, it is at least questionable what his role or viewpoint was.
- 439 (De Ste. Croix 1972), 156–157.
- 440 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 287–290. Inscription number 95 is a victory dedication that lists the commanders at Aegospotami. This inscription, on thirteen limestone blocks, was discovered at Delphi.
- 441 (Hale 2009), 235–242. Hale analyzes the engagement and provides an excellent map (240).

- 442 Did the Spartans also desire the preservation of Athens to act as a check against the hostile actions of the allies?
- 443 The phrase is a reference to the novel of the same name published by Aldous Huxley in 1932.
- 444 In the speech of the Athenian ambassadors to the Spartan Assembly in 432, the Athenians justified their transformation of the Delian League from a voluntary association of independent allies to an empire of subject allies ruled by the Athenians in their self-interest (Thuc.1.73–78).

A New Day Denied

Sparta Triumphant

Sparta and the allies won the war. Would the peace bring harmony and stability to the Greek world? Unfortunately, the answer would be no. Sparta's alliance system was fractured. Corinth and Thebes, the dominant member of the Boeotian League, were dissatisfied with the mildness of the peace terms Sparta granted to Athens.⁴⁴⁵ They advocated Athens' destruction. They received no compensation in land or treasure for their sacrifices. In the form of tribute, booty, tolls, etc., the spoils of war went to Sparta. Partisans of Sparta were in control of the *poleis* of the defunct Athenian Empire. Consequently, Corinthian and Theban opposition forced Sparta to form an alliance with Athens.

After the tyranny of the Thirty was removed and the democracy restored, the Athenians concentrated on rebuilding their internal political, social, and economic position to be a major player in the Greek world again. Spartan assistance in establishing the government of the Thirty increased animosity toward Sparta by the Athenians. Despite the alliance with Sparta, Athens was militarily weak and in a subordinate relationship. Athenian foreign policy was subject to Spartan control.

By the treaties of 412/411 Sparta was obligated to surrender control of the Asiatic Greeks to Persian rule. If the Spartans complied, they would lose moral credibility because this violated their wartime objective to restore the liberty and autonomy of the Greeks. If the Spartans protected the Greeks, they risked war with Persia. Lysander had established pro-Spartan oligarchies and garrisons with harmosts in many Asiatic Greek *poleis*. If these remained, it would appear that Sparta had just replaced the Athenian Empire with its own empire.

At the end of the day, Sparta failed to harmonize the Hellenic world, maintain the relationship with Persia, and establish a new day of Hellenic freedom. Ten years after the end of the Peloponnesian War, Sparta was at war with former friends and foes in the Corinthian War. Athens, Corinth, Thebes, Argos and Persia became enemies. How did this set of affairs come about?

The Spartan Dilemma

The war was won. Peace with Athens was made. The war had exposed the Spartan citizens to a larger horizon of worldly experience. The Lacedaemonians and their allies had campaigned throughout the Greek world from Italy and Sicily to Asia Minor. Peloponnesian fleets sailed the Ionian, Adriatic, and Aegean seas. From Cyprus to the Bosphorus, Spartans encountered the inhabitants of the eastern Mediterranean basin. The citizens, perioeci, and helots of Lacedaemon were sent abroad to fight in the army and navy. Commanders and soldiers came from a broader spectrum of Spartan society to meet the requirements of war on multiple fronts. A land power, Sparta was forced to become a sea power to achieve victory. In need of financial support and manpower, Spartan envoys and military leaders learned how to negotiate with the aristocracy of Persia. Multiple skills were learned to deal with this world outside of the Peloponnese. An entire generation grew up knowing nothing but war with Athens. Could they adapt to peace and a restricted horizon?

Thucydides mentions the social upheavals throughout the Hellenic world. Syracuse, Corcyra, Megara, and Lesbos are a few examples that witnessed the internal conflict between democrats and oligarchs. We know little about the internal affairs at Sparta. Greek writers mention the secrecy of their society and government (Thuc.V.68.2). What impact did the war have on Spartan society? It is a safe assumption that leaders, citizens, and noncitizens were changed. How?

What role would Sparta play in the Hellenic world as the supreme power? Would the loss of manpower and decline of those with citizenship status weaken Sparta's ability to remain the hegemon of Greece? Exposed to power and riches, would citizens be satisfied to return to a sterner life in Sparta? Emancipated helots and perioeci fought under Spartan commanders.⁴⁴⁶ Would these subjects continue to accept their servile status or demand more freedom? The bogeyman of Spartan politics was a helot revolt (Thuc.IV.80.3).

After the Persian wars Sparta and Athens dominated the Hellenic world. In the fourth century the Hellenic world witnessed attempts at hegemony by many Greek *poleis*. None would succeed for long. Sparta, Syracuse, Athens, Thebes, Phocis, and Pherae tried and failed. Political hegemony would be achieved in mainland Hellas by 338 but by a foreign power, Phillip II of Macedon. With his success and the conquest of Asia by Alexander III, the political freedom of the *poleis* would end forever.⁴⁴⁷ How did the demise of the classical *polis* occur?

Spartan Internal Affairs

Sparta was a conservative political state. The kings, ephors, and *Gerousia* (Council) together set policy for the state. The *Ecclesia* (Assembly) usually accepted the recommendations made to it by its leaders, but not always.⁴⁴⁸ The kings traditionally led the Spartan armies and represented the state in the field. War requirements brought forward other leaders who acted in the same role. Brasidas, Gylippus, Lysander, and others led victorious forces. Extreme oligarchies, supported by harmosts and garrisons, were established abroad by Lysander after Aegospotami. These men exercised power, responsibility, and leadership. Exposure to wealth and power had corrupted some citizens. Like Pausanias after the Persian War, Gylippus and Clearchus were examples of Spartans corrupted by wealth and power and punished by Sparta (Diod.XIV.12; Plut.*Lys.*16–17.1).

As demonstrated in the political upheaval in Athens, there were at least two factions within the Spartan government regarding foreign policy. King Agis II, Lysander, and their supporters favored empire and involvement throughout the Greek world. Men of ambition seeking fame, power, and glory would see the empire as a means to this achievement. As Lysander, Brasidas, and Gylippus had attained fame in war, others sought new avenues to pursue opportunities for themselves. Ruling an empire would provide these opportunities. Whether or not they favored extreme oligarchies supported with harmosts and garrisons, as Lysander did, they would certainly support oligarchy. As Lysander demonstrated in his settlements throughout the Aegean, Sparta should rule an empire with an iron fist. The faction of Agis and Lysander later supported the tyranny of the Thirty in Athens.

The other faction led by the King Pausanias feared the influence of Lysander and opposed his policies (Xen.*Hell.*II.4.30). What these fears were are not specified. They probably feared the dissolution of the Peloponnesian League because of the opposition by the allies to the peace settlement. Maintenance of the Peloponnesian League was the first priority after the maintenance of internal security.⁴⁴⁹ Sparta should only interfere in the broader world under limited conditions.⁴⁵⁰

Perhaps fearing social revolution from the unfranchised and corruption by wealth and power among the leading citizens, the conservative faction wanted maintain a tight control on the internal conduct of the people throughout Laconia and Messenia. Avoidance of empire would minimize the exposure and temptations by the citizens to the world outside the Peloponnese (Xen.*Lac.Pol.*XIV). Spartan prestige and power would best be served through the moral authority, backed by force, as the protector of Greek freedom and autonomy.

It is reasonable to assume that King Pausanias feared a reduction

of his power and influence within the state. Although Agis supported Lysander in principle, he also mistrusted his influence (Plut.*Lys.*21.1). Thucydides and Xenophon record that Agis was the only king that led Spartan forces during the last phase of the war. Was Pausanias responsible for internal order on the home front? The argument from silence suggests that whatever role Pausanias performed, it was less important than Agis' military command. Throughout Spartan history, policy differences and animosity between the Agiad and Eurypontid kings occurred. The original peace in 404 with Athens did not dictate a change of the government. As events played out, Pausanias was more accommodating to the democratic faction in Athens during its civil war after the peace. His actions as mediator facilitated their return to power. Pausanias's faction favored Athens settling its own internal affairs. After Pausanias's return from Athens, Agis favored the trial of Pausanias and cast a guilty vote. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that Pausanias and his supporters favored the wartime policy of Greek freedom and autonomy.

Despite the eventual acquittal of King Pausanias in his trial, supported by all five ephors, the supporters of imperial rule would win out (Paus.III.5.2). However, from 404 to 402 the actions of the Spartan government demonstrated that an imperial policy was not set in stone. It was a work in progress. The supporters of Agis and Lysander had not yet won out against the supporters of Pausanias and the ephorate. Only after Spartan support for Cyrus's revolt against his brother Artaxerxes II in 402, the war against Elis in 402/400, the election of Agesilaus II as king in 400 after Agis II's death, and the intervention in Asia Minor in support of the Asiatic Greeks in the 390s, was it demonstrated that the supporters of empire won out. However, this Spartan dominance would last a mere three decades. When Spartan hegemony ended in the 360s, Sparta was reduced to the border of Laconia.

A disturbing problem for the Spartans, which affected their leadership capabilities in the Greek world, was the reduction of the citizen base. The constitution of Lycurgus dictated that a *homoioi* (peer) was a citizen as long as he could provide his share of provisions to his mess. This meant that he met a minimum economic status that was based on agriculture. If he could not maintain his economic status, a Spartiate was demoted to the status of a *hypomeion* (inferior) and lost his citizenship status. He could not participate in the affairs of state through his membership in the Assembly. By law no Spartiate was allowed to pursue a different occupation to maintain his social status. His free time was devoted to the army to maintain the security of the *polis*. In the time of Lycurgus in the late ninth century, there might have

been nine thousand citizens (Plut.*Lyc.*8). Herodotus says that the citizen base was eight thousand at the time of Xerxes invasion in 480 (Hdt.VII.234). At the battle of Mantinea in 418, Thucydides states that five-sixths of the citizens were levied with the implication that about two thousand Spartiates fought (Thuc.V.68). In the Peloponnesian War, Spartan commanders often led *neodamodeis* (emancipated helots) and perioeci from Laconia rather than citizens. In 404 the citizen body perhaps numbered three thousand Spartiates as a conservative estimation.⁴⁵¹ This number dwindled further in the fourth century. In 371 Sparta perhaps had a little more than one thousand Spartiates (Arist.*Pol.*1270a10–35).⁴⁵² No social/economic reforms were made to the Lycurgan constitution to expand the citizen body. From this reduced citizen base, could Sparta find enough soldiers, commanders, administrators, advisors, treasurers, envoys, etc., to rule an empire? The eventual answer would be No!

Xenophon reports an episode that occurred in 399 that might have been an attempt to revolutionize the social and economic base of Sparta. Identified as the Cinnadon Conspiracy, a man called Cinnadon, perhaps a *hypomeion* (inferior), is alleged to have encouraged the noncitizens, inferiors, perioeci, *neodamodeis*, and helots to attack the Spartiates.⁴⁵³ What the details and goal of the plot was, no source says. Was this an isolated event or one that happened to be reported from Spartan history? We do not know. Whatever the severity of the plot, the ephors had Cinnadon and his accomplices executed (Xen.*Hell.*III.3.4–11; Arist.*Pol.*1306b35). No revolution occurred.

Plutarch reports that after the death of Lysander, Agesilaus inspected his writings and discovered a paper suggesting that the constitution should be altered in favor of making the kingship open to any citizen rather than remain hereditary (Plut.*Lys.*30.3–4). Whether this paper existed or was a bit of propaganda by Agesilaus to discredit Lysander is unknown. Although no evidence exists, it is reasonable to hypothesize that some Spartans of ability looked to advance themselves politically, socially, and economically in this new empire. A change in the constitution must have been a topic of conversation.

Sparta was and would remain a conservative constitutional state by Hellenic standards. However, wealth, power, corruption, ambitious individuals, and the demands of empire forced the authorities to keep a close eye on the internal affairs to maintain the *eunomia* (harmony) of the state. No social revolution occurred until the Hellenistic Age.

The Rule of the Thirty

In 404 the glory of Athens appeared over. The empire was gone. The navy was disbanded. The treasury was empty. The democracy was discredited. Athenian autonomy was subordinated to Spartan interests. There were internal critics, primarily the nobility, who thought that the democracy failed the state. Athens must be rebuilt on a new foundation with an extremely limited citizen body. After the surrender, the Athenians debated their political future.

Failing to get their way, the oligarchs appealed to Lysander for support. Lysander threatened the Athenians with a renewal of the war if they did not alter the constitution. He claimed that they were in violation of the peace because they had not destroyed their long walls in a timely manner. The *demos*, whether from fear, apathy, despair, etc., voted to end the democracy. The Assembly voted to select thirty men to reform the government according to the "ancient laws." They never did draw up a new constitution. With the support of Lysander, the Thirty came to power by midsummer 404. Ten men were selected to rule the Piraeus. The Thirty might have been composed of three members from each tribe. As events played out, there were two sets of viewpoints among the Thirty. However, initially they might have spoken with one voice. Critias represented the extremists. Theramenes eventually represented a group that was less extreme. Among his contemporaries as well as historians, Theramenes is a controversial person because he was a member of the oligarchy in 411 and eventually turned against it. He was an opponent of democracy. How broad he viewed the franchise of the citizen body and his policy differences with his fellow oligarchs is open to speculation (Lys.XII.71–78).

The Thirty appointed magistrates and a Council of Five Hundred. Eventually the Three Thousand would represent the citizen body. The disfranchised citizens were disarmed to prevent opposition. The powers of the Areopagus were restored by the repeal of Ephialtes's laws. Once in power, the Thirty began purging democratic opponents of the regime. As the regime became more oppressive, other citizens were purged for personal reasons.⁴⁵⁴ Eventually Theramenes opposed the regime when the Thirty limited the franchise, executed metics to confiscate their wealth, and requested a Spartan garrison and governor. Sparta did send troops and a governor to support the Thirty. When the opposition of Theramenes became obnoxious to the Thirty, he was stricken from the list of the Three Thousand, arrested, and condemned to death. While seeking sanctuary at the altar in the Council house, Theramenes was forcibly removed, dragged through the *agora* to prison, and forced to drink a cup of hemlock (Xen.*Hell.*II.3.1–3; 3.11–56; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*34–37; Diod.XIV.3–6.; Plut.*Lys.*15; Lys.XII.4–22).

Opponents of the regime began to assemble at Phyle on the northwest border of Attica. In the winter of 404/403, led by Thrasybulus, they defended themselves against forces sent by the Thirty. When their numbers grew to about seven hundred, Thrasybulus led them against Munychia in the Piraeus and defeated the forces of the Thirty. In this fight Critias was killed. After this defeat the Three Thousand deposed the Thirty and selected ten men to run the government. The remainder of the Thirty fled to Eleusis and appealed to Sparta for support.⁴⁵⁵

Within the Spartan government, Lysander urged support for the Thirty. King Pausanias opposed him and did not want him to capture Athens a second time.⁴⁵⁶ Lysander was initially assigned to take a force to support the Thirty. After Lysander's departure, Pausanias convinced three of the five ephors to support him. Pausanias departed with an army to end the Athenian civil war. Corinth and Thebes refused to join this allied army. Assigned to defend the Thirty, Pausanias's desire was to restore order and weaken Lysander's influence in the Spartan government. After a victory over Thrasybulus in the Piraeus, Pausanias sent peace overtures. Envoys were sent from the Piraeus and Athens to Sparta to discuss an end to the civil war. Sparta sent fifteen commissioners to join Pausanias to resolve the conflict. Peace was restored by September 403. With this settlement an Assembly was called and they voted to reinstate the democracy (Xen.*Hell.*II.4; Arist.*Ath.Pol.*38–39.; Plut.*Lys.*21).

Allied Opposition to the Peace

Sparta made peace. Corinth and the Boeotian League, led by the opposition of Thebes, did not. "To the victor belong the spoils." This has been a maxim in war throughout human history. What were the spoils the allies would be entitled to for their sacrifice and suffering? In a meeting of the Spartan Assembly to discuss the peace terms, the representatives of Corinth, Thebes, and others urged the destruction of Athens (Xen.*Hell.*II.2.19). Sparta refused, made peace, and allied with Athens. How would Athens' destruction benefit the allies?

Corinth possessed a small territory on the isthmus. The constitution of Corinth was oligarchic. Since the overthrow of the Cypselid tyranny in the early sixth century, a small group governed the state. This structure lasted into the Hellenistic period. Unfortunately, the information provided by the ancient sources is extremely limited. The people of the Corinthia were divided into eight tribes. Each tribe provided one *proboulos* for a total of eight *probouloi* who had administrative functions that are not known. These men combined with seventy-two other members, nine from each tribe, formed a Council of

eighty members. This Council handled the internal and external affairs of the *polis* but what their exact functions were are a matter of speculation. The *probouloi* might have prepared an agenda for the Council or Assembly. However, they may not have been magistrates handling daily functions. An Assembly existed but its exact constitutional role is not specified. It is reasonable to suggest that it was summoned to ratify certain measures of the Council. Plutarch says that it was not consulted on public affairs (Plut.*Dion*.53.2). What the property qualifications were for eligibility to in the Council and Assembly are not known. Although restricted from participating in the magistracies, a large number of citizens must have been enrolled in the Assembly. There must have been broad support among the populace for the oligarchy to remain in power for over two centuries.⁴⁵⁷

The office of *strategos* is the only magisterial position mentioned by our sources. This was probably an annually elected military official as in other *poleis*. How many *stratego*i and what the qualifications for office were are not specified. This was a collegial office but how commanders on campaign were selected is also unknown. Perhaps each tribe selected a *strategos*. Thucydides mentions as many as five *stratego*i on campaign (Thuc.I.46.2). Although Corinth was a major player in Hellenic affairs, our understanding of the government is rudimentary at best.

Agriculture was the mainstay of the economy. However, Corinthian prosperity depended on trade.⁴⁵⁸ Corinth was located at the crossroads between the Aegean basin and Italy and Sicily. Since the sixth century, trade passed through the isthmus as a shortcut route, which enabled Corinth to earn revenue from duty charges for cargoes in transit. Trade, especially with Corinthian colonies in the west, was probably substantial but difficult to quantify for lack of evidence. Corinth was the mother city for Corcyra, Syracuse, Epidamnus, Potidaea, and others. Except for Corcyra, these *poleis* looked to Corinth for support during the war. *Stasis* and the war had probably weakened their economies by their loss of trade, agricultural productivity, and destruction of manpower. Consequently, Corinthian prosperity suffered from the weakness of its trading partners.

Corinthian trade relations in northwestern Hellas and Illyria was also diminished. The silver mines in Illyria were used to mint Corinth's coinage.⁴⁵⁹ However, it is debatable whether the loss of trade was temporary or long term.⁴⁶⁰ The war also brought substantial loss to Corinthian manpower and revenue. Corinth was Sparta's strongest maritime ally. Corinth provided the largest contingent of ships during the Archidamian phase of the war when the western waters and the Corinthian Gulf were the primary theaters of conflict. Corinth did not supply as many ships when the war at sea was in the Aegean.

Perhaps these losses would have been offset with Athens' destruction. A commercial rival would be eliminated. The Corinthian navy would benefit from the addition of confiscated Athenian triremes. Rather than the Piraeus as the port of destination, trade would now flow through Corinth's ports. Increased trade implied increased revenue from duties and tolls. Corinth would again become the dominant commercial state on the Hellenic mainland. For these reasons, it is understandable why the Corinthians were angered by the peace.

Opposition to Sparta occurred among the magistrates and Council, which were supported by a portion of the citizen body. It is clear that there was a pro-Spartan and an anti-Spartan faction in the government at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Whether the anti-Spartan faction was oligarchic or democratic and wanted a greater role for the people we cannot be sure. The evidence is extremely limited about the internal politics in Corinth. Some scholars argue that the union with Argos during the Corinthian War was a democratic revolution.⁴⁶¹ This hypothesis is reasonable and best explains the union with democratic Argos. Except for this union with Argos and a short period of tyranny in the 360s under Timophanes, Corinth apparently suffered no major internal discord between factions (Plut. *Tim.*4.4). The evidence shows that Corinth was a loyal ally of Sparta prior to the Peloponnesian War and would be so after the Corinthian War. Dissatisfaction with the peace of 421 and 404, combined with their refusal to support Spartan actions in the decade prior to the Corinthian War, provides evidence of the strength of anti-Spartan sentiment. However, the pro-Spartan faction managed to maintain peace with Sparta. Only with the coalition of allies in 395 did the anti-Spartan faction win out.

Like Corinth, Megara was located on the isthmus. Her economy also was based on her maritime trade. She had ports on the Saronic and Corinthian Gulf. Her exclusion from the markets of the Athenian empire was one of the principal grievances against Athens that led to the Peloponnesian War. The agricultural base of the Megarid was ravaged during the war. Her ports were captured by Athens. Her maritime trade was also devastated. She suffered internal dissension between democrats and oligarchs. The loss of manpower and treasure was also severe. She also received no compensation in the peace agreement. Like the other allies she expected compensation, which was not forthcoming.

The Boeotian League was a federation of cities in Boeotia that came into existence about 447 after its liberation from Athens. The league was Sparta's strongest land ally. Located on Attica's northwestern border, she was also the strongest power in central

Greece. Boeotia's hoplite army alone was a match for the hoplite forces of Athens. In 424 at Delium, the Boeotian league won the only major battle of the war between hoplite forces, which ended Athens' expansion program into central Greece. Thebes was the largest city in Boeotia. Despite internal opposition within Boeotia, Thebes often acted as the hegemon of the league. She selected four of the eleven Boeotarchs.

The constitution of the league and its member cities was oligarchic. The citizen body was restricted to those who met a minimum property level, which meant at least the hoplite class. Each member maintained its internal autonomy but followed the foreign policy of the League council. No federal assembly existed. The league was divided into eleven wards. A boeotarch along with sixty representatives for the federal Boule (council) represented each ward. The boeotarchs (*boiotarchoi*) were the league magistrates who conducted foreign policy, led the league army in war, and made proposals to the league council (*Hell.Oxy.XVI.2-4*).⁴⁶² The League conducted its affairs at Thebes. The structure of the league remained until its dissolution after the Peace of Antalcidas in 387.

Unlike Corinth, the base of the Boeotian economy was agriculture. Apart from periodic ravaging, the land was not systematically ruined as Spartan armies had done to Attica. Boeotian economic recovery would be quicker. However, like all the belligerents, Boeotian casualties were substantial. Attica and Boeotia had border disputes over territory for decades. The Boeotian city of Plataea had been an ally of Athens since the sixth century. Plataea suffered destruction in 427 when her siege by the Boeotians and Spartans was ended. The Boeotian League expected territorial gains as compensation for their sacrifices. A stronger Boeotia implied a stronger Thebes. A stronger Boeotia would enhance Theban ability to dominate its neighbors in central Greece. This scenario would play out three decades later.

Corinth and Thebes did not sign a peace treaty. Their opposition to this peace was not confined to 404 alone. Along with Megara and Elis, they opposed the Peace of Nicias in 421 (*Thuc.V.17.1-2; V.22*). This peace provided no territorial and financial compensation to the allies who suffered much. The peace in 404 left a defeated Athens humbled but still in control of Attica. Sparta did not give her allies territorial compensation from the defunct empire. The booty collected by Lysander was sent to Sparta rather than shared with the allies. Thebes claimed a 10 percent share of the spoils of war (*Xen.Hell.III.5.5; Plut.Lys.27.2*).

Allied disenchantment with Sparta was demonstrated in multiple examples in the next few years. During the rule of the Thirty in Athens,

Corinth, Thebes, and Megara accepted Athenian exiles banished by the Thirty despite warnings from against harboring the exiles (Diod.Sic.XIV.6). Next, Corinth and Thebes refused to send contingents to the forces assembled by Sparta to support the Athenian oligarchy in 403. They claimed that Athens had not violated the peace and they feared Athenian subordination to Sparta (Xen.Hell.2.4.30). During Sparta's war against Elis in 402, Thebes and Corinth again refused to send contingents to the forces of Agis (Xen.Hell.3.2.25).

The Restoration of the Democracy

After the withdrawal of the Spartan army, the Athenians concentrated on rebuilding the democracy. A year of turmoil was ended. The oligarchs were allowed to leave Athens and reside in Eleusis. The supporters of Thrasybulus kept control of Athens. The Thirty, the Ten (from the Piraeus), and the Eleven (men who controlled the prisons) were not exonerated but could settle in Eleusis (Xen.Hell.II.4.38). An amnesty applied to all other Athenians.⁴⁶³ All Athenians were to be restored to their homes. Athenian exiles were allowed to return.⁴⁶⁴ In a sworn oath, the citizens agreed to accept the restored democracy with no call for vengeance (Andoc.I.90):

and I will harbor no grievances against any citizen, save only the Thirty, the Ten, and the Eleven: and even of them against none who shall consent to render account of his office.⁴⁶⁵

Although a proposal was put forward to limit the franchise to the landowners, the measure failed. The *thetes* remained part of the citizen body and were allowed to hold office. The Periclean citizenship law of 451, which had lapsed during the war, was restored. Thus, citizenship was again restricted to those born to an Athenian mother and father. The Athenians accepted the debts incurred during the rule of the Thirty and agreed to pay the sum owed Sparta (Arist.Ath.Pol.40.3; 42.1). A revision of the laws was to be undertaken. No law could be enforced unless it was published (Andoc.I.85). To protect the restored democracy, another law was passed that allowed anyone to murder a person who threatened the democracy (Andoc.I.96). It says,

If anyone shall suppress the democracy at Athens or hold any public office after its suppression, he shall become a public enemy and be slain with impunity; his goods shall be confiscated and a tithe given to the Goddess. No sin shall he commit, no defilement shall he suffer who slays such an one or who conspires to slay him.⁴⁶⁶

In time, the revision of the laws was complete. The functions of the magistrates, Council of Five Hundred, Assembly, and law courts were resumed without major reforms. The army and navy remained small. The treaty with Sparta was obeyed. Political and social harmony was reestablished. The return of economic prosperity would take some time since the state revenue was weak (Lys.XXI.13).⁴⁶⁷ In 401 the oligarchs at Eleusis, under threat of destruction by the democrats, dissolved their state and joined Athens when they were granted an amnesty. Attica was again united. The restored democracy would last another eighty years. However, within ten years the Athenians felt confident enough to join the anti-Spartan coalition in the Corinthian War.

The Settlement of the Hellenic World

After the Athenian intervention, the Spartan ephors declared in the fall of 403 that they would support the implementation of “ancestral constitutions” in the *poleis* throughout Hellas (Xen.*Hell.*III.4.2). The extreme oligarchies (decarchies) of Lysander would be replaced with more moderate regimes. This declaration was not necessarily a repudiation of the policy of Lysander but a return to the traditional policy of oligarchies with a broader base of citizenship. The harmosts and garrisons established by Lysander remained. However, Diodorus tells us that the harmost and garrison in Byzantium was removed by 402 when the Byzantines requested aid against the Thracians (Diod.XIV.12.2). In conjunction with their support for the democracy in Athens and the acquittal of Pausanias, this measure must have been intended to garner support for Sparta among the former allies of Athens. A broader citizen base would allow greater participation in the government of their *polis* and provide wider support for their city if their government was friendly to Sparta. The Spartan ephorate was trying to put a velvet glove over the iron fist of Lysander. The Spartan government was searching for a policy for imperial rule over the former subjects of Athens.

Elean opposition to the peace of 421 and 404, the alliance with Athens and Argos in 418, insults to the Spartans at the Olympic games of 420, and Elean refusal to allow King Agis to consult the oracle of Zeus at Olympia after the Peloponnesian War, were grievances by Sparta that led to war with Elis. In 402 Sparta insisted that the Eleans free some perioeci on their border. Elis refused claiming that they were prizes of war. Sparta summoned the allies and sent Agis against Elis. Corinth and Thebes again refused to participate. Athens supported Sparta. A three-year war was finally ended in 400 with the submission of Elis.⁴⁶⁸ The democrats, after an internal conflict with the oligarchs,

agreed to the peace. Some perioeci were declared autonomous and Elis was forced back into the Peloponnesian League. However, Elis retained control of Olympia and the games (Xen.*Hell.*III.2.21–31; Diod.XIV.17.4–12; XIV.34.1). Sparta refrained from further interference in Elis.

Sparta next expelled the Messenians from Naupactus and Cephallenia. Athens had installed the Messenians at Naupactus in the 450s and at Cephallenia in the 420s. These Messenians fled to Sicily (Diod.XIV.34.2–3). The expulsion of these Messenians removed any refuge the helots of Messenia had within the Peloponnese if they escaped or revolted from Sparta. Therefore, these expulsions were probably designed as a security measure by Sparta to maintain internal peace among the helot population. With the Peloponnesian front secure, the Spartans could concentrate on their external relations within the Hellenic world.

These actions demonstrate that Sparta would govern the Peloponnese with an iron hand. However, these actions do not necessarily imply that the imperial faction was in control in Sparta. These actions conform to traditional Spartan policies, which suppressed all opposition within the Peloponnese.

Postwar Spartan Relations with Persia

After the war, Sparta was obligated by treaty to surrender control of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia. Lysander's close relationship with the Persian prince Cyrus kept the Persian gold flowing to finance Spartan victory. In 405/404 King Darius II died. His son Artaxerxes II, Cyrus's older brother, became the Great King. Cyrus revolted in the spring of 401. In exchange for Spartan support, he offered to set aside the treaties of 412/411. The Asiatic Greeks would be left under Spartan control. Whatever the internal debate was within the Spartan government, Sparta agreed to support Cyrus. Samius, the Spartan navarch, was ordered to support Cyrus with the fleet. He sailed to Cilicia in support (Xen.*Hell.*III.1.1; Xen.*Anab.*I.1.1–6; Plut.*Artax.*1–11). Cyrus marched against his brother with an army spearheaded by 13,000 Greek mercenaries commanded by the Spartan Clearchus. In the fall of 401 at Cunaxa in Babylonia, Cyrus's army was defeated and Cyrus was killed. The revolt was over. The story of the return of the Ten Thousand Greek mercenaries from Cyrus army is told in Xenophon's *Anabasis*. Eventually these mercenaries would again fight Persia under the Spartan flag in 399.

After the death of Cyrus, Artaxerxes assigned Tissaphernes to return to his satrapy in Ionia to implement the Persian sovereignty over the Asiatic Greeks. The Asiatic Greeks had supported Cyrus during his

revolt. Unwilling to become subordinate to Persia, they appealed for support from Sparta. Sparta had not surrendered the Asiatic Greeks at the end of the war. Although the evidence from Xenophon is ambiguous, there might have been a "Treaty of Boeotius" in 407 made between Sparta and Darius II that granted the Asiatic Greeks autonomy provided they paid tribute to Persia (*Xen.Hell.I.4.1–7*).⁴⁶⁹ The evidence is too scanty to accept this treaty. However, the third treaty of 411 left the status of the Asiatic Greeks uncertain. The vagueness of the terminology of the treaty allowed each party to interpret it to their advantage. An understanding between Cyrus and Sparta might have allowed the Spartans to maintain their control after the war. Cyrus's death removed the pro-Spartan policy of Persia. Artaxerxes II was free to enforce Persian sovereignty over the Greeks of Asia Minor. Whatever the legal status of the Asiatic Greeks to Persia, Sparta chose to support them. Persia and Sparta were at war (*Xen.Hell.III.1.3–3*; *Diod.XIV.35*).

War with Persia

In the fall of 400, Spartan forces, commanded by Thibron, were sent to Asia Minor with the assigned objective of attacking Caria. The silence of our sources implies that the Spartan fleet was not ordered to cooperate with Thibron. The army of Thibron comprised one thousand *neodamodeis*, four thousand troops from the Peloponnesian League, and three hundred Athenian cavalymen. The Athenians were probably glad to send the cavalry as they had supported the Thirty. Their removal eliminated an internal threat to the restored democracy. Upon his arrival in Asia, Thibron recruited men from the Greek cities. In 399 he enlisted six thousand mercenaries that had marched with Cyrus. During his march from the Hellespont, he captured some cities and plundered the land. This lack of discipline by his troops caused the Asiatic Greeks to protest his actions to the Spartan government. In the spring of 399 Thibron was recalled and replaced by Dercyllidas. Upon his return Thibron was found guilty of plundering Sparta's allies. He was banished from Sparta (*Xen.Hell.III.1.4–8*).

Dercyllidas, assigned the same objective as Thibron, encountered the resistance of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. Aware of the enmity between the two satraps, Dercyllidas made a truce with Tissaphernes and marched against Pharnabazus. Despite plundering the territory of Hellespontine Phrygia and capturing some minor cities, no major engagement occurred with Persian forces. Dercyllidas feared the Persian cavalry and Pharnabazus feared the Greek infantry. In the fall of 399 Dercyllidas and Pharnabazus made a truce. Aware of the burden his army would be on the local Greeks for logistical support if

he remained for the winter, Dercyllidas marched his forces to Bithynia near the Bosphorus. Here he raided supplies and booty to sustain the army (Xen.*Hell.*III.1.9–2.5; Diod.XIV.38.1–3).

In the spring of 398 Dercyllidas marched his forces to Lampsacus on the Hellespont. Here he was met by envoys sent from Sparta who reviewed and approved his actions. They also confirmed him in command for the upcoming campaign. Informed by these envoys of Thracian raids against the Greeks in the Chersonese, Dercyllidas made another truce with Pharnabazus and crossed over to the Chersonese. Discovering the richness of the land, Dercyllidas had the army build a wall across the isthmus to protect the Greek towns. Upon completion of this task he returned to Asia with the army. Dercyllidas marched south along the coast for Ephesus. At Atarneus, opposite the island of Chios, after an eight-month siege he captured it from Chian exiles (Xen.*Hell.*III.2.6–11; Diod.XIV.38.1–3).

To challenge Sparta at sea, Pharnabazus urged the king to build a fleet and employ Conon, the exiled Athenian who was with Evagoras in Cyprus, to command it. Conon accepted the appointment by Pharnabazus. After two years of campaigning, the conquest of Caria was a failure. The Persian objective, control of the coastal Greek cities, was still elusive. Neither side suffered a major military defeat. The war was a stalemate (Diod.XIV.39.1–4).

To break the stalemate, in 397 the Spartan government ordered the fleet, under Pharax, to cooperate with the army and secure Caria. To prevent assistance to the satraps, Pharax had blockaded the Persian fleet at Caunus in Cilicia. Dercyllidas marched into Caria. The forces of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus united and lured him back to Ionia. Finally, both forces met but again refused to fight fearing the strength of the other side. Tissaphernes offered a truce, which Dercyllidas agreed to. The proposed peace required that the Spartan army, governors, and garrisons withdraw from Asia in exchange for the Greek cities to remain autonomous.⁴⁷⁰ The proposals were submitted to the Great King and Sparta (Xen.*Hell.*III.2.12–20; Diod.XIV.39.5–6).

During the winter of 397/396, the Spartan government was informed by a Syracusan sailor of the buildup of the Persian fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Convinced that the truce negotiated by Tissaphernes was a ruse, the Spartan government appointed King Agesilaus to lead the campaign for 396. Lysander and thirty Spartiates were assigned to accompany the campaign. Lysander's past success in naval warfare and experience in Asia would provide good council to the inexperienced king. Lysander hoped to be the power behind the throne and implement his former policies to control the Asiatic Greek cities. This implied the restoration of extreme oligarchies, governors, and garrisons. If implemented, Spartan control of the empire would be

tighter (Isoc.V.87). The appointment of King Agesilaus and Lysander, its most famous citizen, demonstrates that Sparta was escalating the Persian war.⁴⁷¹ Sparta already had a strong army and fleet in Asia. Stronger leadership was required. A successful land and naval campaign would secure the control of the Greeks throughout the Aegean basin and force Persia to make peace. Displaying imperial ambitions, Agesilaus hoped to repeat the success of Agamemnon at Troy. Upon his departure he stopped at Aulis in Boeotia, like Agamemnon, to offer a sacrifice for victory in Asia (Xen.*Hell.*III.4.1–4; Plut.*Lys.*23.1–3; Plut.*Ages.*6.1–3).

Agesilaus arrived in Ephesus in the spring of 396 with two thousand *neodamodeis* from Lacedaemon and six thousand reinforcements from the allies to augment the forces of Dercyllidas. Athens, Boeotia, and Corinth did not send troops. After Agesilaus's arrival, the Spartan fleet was chased away from Caunus by a relief force led by Pharnabazus. Supported by the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus and Conon, Rhodes revolted from Sparta. Tissaphernes asked for a truce and Agesilaus agreed. Again the freedom of the Greeks was demanded by Agesilaus. Using these negotiations to stall for time, Tissaphernes asked the Great King for troops. Honoring the truce, Agesilaus marched against Hellespontine Phrygia (Xen.*Hell.*III.4.5–6; Diod.XIV.79; *Hell.Oxy.*15).

Prior to the campaign against Pharnabazus, a power struggle ensued between Lysander and Agesilaus. Lysander had supported Agesilaus during his quest to succeed Agis. Throughout their lives, both men favored policies and actions that increased the power of Sparta. Each man believed that Sparta should be the only hegemon in the Hellenic world. We are not directly informed by our sources of the personal reasons for the animosity that developed between these former allies. However, it seems reasonable to make the following suggestions. Based on his fame, experience, role of kingmaker, and assignment by the government to accompany the new king, Lysander probably expected that Agesilaus would follow his council in Asian affairs. As king, Agesilaus was unwilling to be a puppet dancing to the strings of Lysander. Jealous of Lysander's fame and power, Agesilaus was determined to achieve his own glory. If Agesilaus was the new Agamemnon, he did not want Lysander to be Achilles challenging his authority.

The public fallout probably began when the friends of Lysander appealed to him for reinstatement to their former positions among the Asian *poleis*. Agesilaus refused their restoration. He maintained Sparta's policy of supporting the ancestral constitutions that Sparta proclaimed in 403. The current governments of the Asiatic *poleis* would remain in power. By his refusal to support Lysander, Agesilaus

emphasized that the king was commander and represented the state outside of Sparta. He also demonstrated his strength of will and that he would be his own man. Realizing that he had minimal influence with the king, Lysander asked to be sent on an assignment to benefit Sparta. Agesilaus sent Lysander to the Hellespont. Lysander secured the revolt of Spithridates from Pharnabazus. Lysander's return to Agesilaus with Spithridates was the catalyst for Agesilaus's decision to attack Pharnabazus later on. In 395 Lysander returned to Sparta when the original thirty Spartiate advisers were replaced by a new group (Xen.*Hell.*III.4.7–10; Plut.*Ages.*7–8; Plut.*Lys.*22.3–24.2).

While at Ephesus attending to the settlement of Greek affairs, Agesilaus was informed that a new army was at the disposal of Tissaphernes. Expecting that Agesilaus would attack Caria as previous commanders were ordered, Tissaphernes sent his Persian infantry there. The geography of Caria was inhospitable to cavalry, and Agesilaus was weak in this military branch. Contrary to Tissaphernes's expectations, Agesilaus marched north to Hellespontine Phrygia. Like earlier campaigns Agesilaus merely devastated the land to supply his men and confiscated booty. Without a strong cavalry force, he could not engage the Persian forces. During the winter of 396/395 Agesilaus recruited a cavalry force from the Asiatic Greeks (Xen.*Hell.*III.4.11–15; Plut.*Ages.*11.1–4).

In the spring of 395 Agesilaus gathered his forces at Ephesus to campaign against Tissaphernes. Agesilaus marched to Sardis in Lydia. An engagement occurred near Sardis on the Pactolus River in which the Persians were defeated. Whether a conventional cavalry battle or an ambush, the accounts of our sources differ, this defeat was the last straw for Artaxerxes. He replaced Tissaphernes with Tithraustes. Tissaphernes paid for his failure with his life. Tithraustes offered similar peace terms as past truces. The Asiatic Greeks would be autonomous provided they paid a tribute to the Great King in exchange for a Spartan withdrawal from Asia. Claiming that only the Spartan government could make peace, Agesilaus accepted a truce while the terms were submitted to Sparta. Tithraustes provided thirty talents for supplies to encourage Agesilaus to again attack the satrapy of Pharnabazus. Receiving orders from Sparta to take command of the fleet also, Agesilaus ordered the building of more triremes and appointed Peisander, his brother-in-law, as admiral (Xen.*Hell.*III.4.11–29; Diod.XIV.80; *Hell Oxy.*XI.3–6; Plut.*Ages.*10).

The remainder of 395 was used to plunder Hellespontine Phrygia. He used the cavalry forces of Spithridates to plunder the satrapy. However, Spithridates abandoned Agesilaus after a dispute with Agesilaus's aide Herripidas over captured booty. After ravaging the land, a meeting was arranged between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus.

Agesilaus encouraged Pharnabazus to revolt from Artaxerxes but he refused. Agesilaus again marched south to supply his army for the campaign of 394 (Xen.*Hell.*IV.1.1–2.5; Plut.*Ages.*11–12).

This was the end of the road in the war for Agesilaus. The outbreak of the Corinthian War would force Sparta to recall the king home. The war would continue intermittently with second-tier commanders. Despite his hope to return, Agesilaus would not become the new Agamemnon. Confronted by the coalition of Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, Sparta relegated Asia to a secondary front. To force Agesilaus's departure from Asia, in the fall of 396 Tithraustes sent Timocrates of Rhodes with fifty talents to Hellas to encourage the opponents of Sparta to challenge Spartan hegemony. Persian gold was the added weight that tipped the scale for war by the Greek opposition. Eight years later Persia would impose the Peace of Antalcidas on the *poleis* of Hellas.

The Outbreak of the Corinthian War

How did the anti-Spartan coalition come together? In 404 Sparta was the recognized hegemon of Greece. By 395 friend and foe challenged Spartan hegemony. Athens, Argos, Thebes, Corinth, and Persia were arrayed against Sparta. Grievances multiplied beginning with the peace settlement with Athens.

The peace of 404 was a turning point in the relations between Thebes and Sparta. In opposition to Athens' imperial designs, Thebes and Sparta maintained friendly relations since the mid-fifth century. After Athens' defeat, hostile relations existed throughout the fourth century between the two *polis*. The Oxyrhynchus Historian reports that in 395 there was a pro-Spartan faction led by Leontiades, Astias, and Corrantadas and an anti-Spartan faction under the leadership of Ismenias, Antitheus, and Androcleidas in Thebes (*Hell.Oxy.*XVII.1–2).⁴⁷² It is uncertain which faction was in control of the government. Either way, the opposition was strong enough to prevent domination by the other faction. Although we are not informed by our sources that these factions existed in 404, we do know that there was discord within Thebes and the Boeotian League over the peace settlement. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that this anti-Spartan faction existed and was strong enough to prevent a peace agreement with Athens, provide asylum for Athenian exiles at Phyle, and prevent Boeotian participation when Spartan forces were sent against Athens (403), Elis (402), and Persia (399). By these actions, the anti-Spartan faction of Ismenias opposed Spartan interference in the affairs of another Greek state. They also opposed Hellenic support for a war with Persia. They insulted Agesilaus when they refused to let him

perform a sacrifice at Aulis before his departure for Asia (Xen.*Hell.*III.4.4; Plut.*Ages.*6.4–6). However, they were not strong enough to persuade the Boeotian League to openly support the Athenian exiles under Thrasybulus, challenge Sparta militarily, or form an anti-Spartan coalition with Corinth, Megara, Elis, Argos, etc. For a decade the anti-Spartan faction bided their time. By 395 they became the dominant faction and provoked the Corinthian War (*Hell.Oxy.*XVIII.2).

Until 395 Athens accepted subordination to Sparta. After the restoration, there appears to be at least two political factions. The moderate democrats, led by Thrasybulus, Aesimus, and Anytus, favored peace with Sparta. The radical democrats, led by Epicrates and Cephalus, were hostile to Sparta but did not advocate conflict (*Hell.Oxy.*VII.2).⁴⁷³ After the rule of the Thirty, any oligarchic supporters were discredited. With a depleted treasury, a rebuilding economy, no navy, no defensive walls, and an insecure political and social order, the Athenians were in no position to challenge Sparta. Despite Boeotian support against the Thirty, some hostility remained between Athens and Thebes (Lys.XXX.22). Consequently, the moderates obeyed Sparta and sent troops to support the campaign against Elis in 402 and Persia in 399 (Xen.*Hell.*III.1.4; III.2.25). Only after war began between Thebes and Sparta did the Athenians ally with Thebes (Xen.*Hell.*III.5.16).

Corinth also opposed the peace with Athens. As mentioned earlier, of all Sparta's allies, Corinth might have suffered the most in the war. Loss of manpower, revenue, trade, and military power with no compensation in the peace left many Corinthians disenchanted with Spartan policy. However, the economic ramifications of the war cannot be quantified. Thus, it is debatable how severe the economic consequences were.⁴⁷⁴ Like Thebes, Corinth remained an oligarchy and was divided between a pro-Spartan faction and an anti-Spartan faction led by Timolaus and Polyanthes (Xen.*Hell.*III.5.1; *Hell.Oxy.*VII.3).⁴⁷⁵ Corinth did not aid Pausanias when he overthrew the Thirty in Athens. Nor did Corinth assist Sparta against Elis. They may not have sent troops to Asia in 399.⁴⁷⁶ When war began in 395, Corinth did not send troops to aid Pausanias when he invaded Boeotia (Xen.*Hell.*III.5.17). Only after the battle of Haliartus did Corinth join the coalition. Despite their displeasure with the peace, the Corinthians were unable or unwilling to challenge the dominance of Sparta until war began.

The last ally against Sparta was Argos. The explanation for Argive hostility is easily explained. For centuries Argos was a rival for dominance in the Peloponnese. Argos had a democratic constitution. Argos suffered little from the Peloponnesian War. A new generation of

Argives matured since the last conflict with Sparta at Mantinea in 418. Consequently, Argos was in a position to sow the seeds of dissension among Sparta's allies. Argos was prepared to aid Corinth if the Corinthians decided to abandon the Spartan alliance.

The catalyst for the Corinthian War was probably the arrival of Timocrates with fifty talents of Persian gold in the fall of 396.⁴⁷⁷ Xenophon tells us that Ismenias, Androcleidas, and Gallaxidorus at Thebes; Timolaus and Polyanthes at Corinth; and Cylon and associates at Argos accepted the money. The Athenians accepted no Persian bribes but were ready to reassert their right to rule (Xen.*Hell.*III.5.1–2). These factions were in contact with each other while encouraging internal opposition within their *poleis* to prepare the citizens for war. Although the financial burden of war would be borne by the *poleis*, prospective Persian subsidies probably eased the financial fears that opponents of war with Sparta would have had.

Perhaps more influential than the bribery of Timocrates was the revolt of Rhodes in the summer of 396 (Diod.XIV.79.6). The Persian fleet, commanded by the Athenian exile Conon, supported the revolt as an initial move to regain mastery of the Aegean Sea. A Persian naval offensive in the Aegean would distract the Spartans and force them to devote naval resources to check the Persians. Ultimately the Spartans failed to check the Persian naval offensive. Persia regained mastery of the Aegean after the victory over Sparta at the battle of Cnidus in August 394. The control of the Aegean allowed Conon and the Persians to interfere on the Greek mainland to support the opponents of Sparta.

Although Persian gold is the excuse used by Xenophon, Diodorus and the Oxyrhynchus Historian claim that the primary cause for the war was the resentment by the major states of Hellas of the "harsh rule" of Sparta (Diod.XIV.82.2; *Hell.Oxy.*VII.2–5).⁴⁷⁸ This statement is probably the correct explanation for a Greek coalition to challenge Sparta now. Although Persian gold probably tipped the scales for war by the anti-Spartan coalition, it was probably a minor factor. We have no idea what promise Timocrates may have made for future Persian subsidies. By 395 there was strong anti-Spartan opposition in the various *poleis*. We cannot exclude economic motives for war by Athens and Corinth to improve their prosperity. Unfortunately, apart from a handful of snapshot pictures already documented of Theban, Corinthian, and Athenian actions hostile to Sparta, we cannot produce a motion picture that sequentially ties together the internal and external events that brought forth this coalition. Whatever the actual perception and psychology by the Hellenes of this "harsh rule," the anti-Spartan factions in these *poleis* won out in their internal politics.

In conclusion, there were multiple reasons for the belligerents engaging in the Corinthian War. After Spartan interference in Elis, we have no evidence of their interference in other *poleis* on the mainland. At war with Persia, the Spartans did not want war in Hellas. However, they would not ignore the provocation of Thebes. The Thebans apparently believed the opportunity had come to reduce Spartan domination of Hellas.

The Corinthian War (395–387 BC)

Xenophon and the Oxyrhynchus Historian blame Thebes for starting the conflict (Xen.*Hell.*III.5.3–5; *Hell.Oxy.* XVIII). Engaged in war with Persia, the Spartans were unwilling to fight on two fronts. Thus, the Thebans took the initiative by provoking a border dispute between the Ozolian Locrians and Phocians in the summer of 395. The Phocians invaded Locris and ravaged the land. Locris appealed to the Boeotian League for assistance and it was granted. Phocis appealed to Sparta for aid. The ephors warned the Boeotians not to invade Phocis and any grievances should be settled by arbitration. The Boeotians rejected the Spartan demands. The Boeotians then invaded Phocis and ravaged the land in late summer. The ephors called out the army with Lysander and King Pausanias assigned to command separate forces to invade Boeotia.⁴⁷⁹ Although the anti-Spartan Thebans are blamed for the conflict, they apparently believed that they had the support of the Boeotian League when they intrigued with Locris.

While Sparta mobilized, Thebes sent envoys to Athens seeking an alliance. The Athenians agreed to a defensive alliance in perpetuity with the Boeotian League (Xen.*Hell.*III.5.8–16; R&O 6).⁴⁸⁰ Athens first displayed its independence when it refused to send forces with Agesilaus in 396. By 395 the Athenians' recovery from the war had made progress. Therefore, they were willing to exercise leadership in the Greek world again. Spartan difficulties in Asia combined with the anti-Spartan factions in other *poleis* persuaded the Athenians that the time was ripe to challenge Sparta to regain full independence. In Thebes and the Boeotian League, Athens had a strong ally to check Spartan power.

In a two-pronged offensive against Boeotia during the summer, Lysander led one force to Boeotia via Phocis while Pausanias led the other to Boeotia via the Megarid. Lysander picked up allies in central Greece to enlarge his army. The two commanders were to join forces at Haliartus to engage the Boeotian army. Whether Lysander arrived early or Pausanias arrived late for the rendezvous, Lysander decided to attack the Boeotian forces inside Haliartus. Caught between the

Boeotian troops inside the city and a relief force, Lysander's men were defeated and he was killed beneath the walls. When he arrived, Pausanias learned that Lysander was dead and the Boeotians were reinforced by the Athenians. The remaining Spartan forces were reluctant to fight another battle. After consultation with his officers, Pausanias agreed to a truce to recover the dead. Then he led the Lacedaemonian army home. Pausanias was put on trial and condemned for mission failure and harming Spartan honor by not recovering the dead though battle. Refusing to appear at the trial, Pausanias went into exile again and lived out his days in Tegea (Xen.*Hell.*III.5.6–7; 5.17–25; Diod.XIV.81.1–3; Plut.*Lys.*28–29). The exile of Pausanias clearly indicates that the supporters of Lysander and the empire were firmly in control in Sparta.

After the Spartan defeat at Haliartus, Corinth and Argos joined the alliance. Diodorus states that a common council was established for the coalition to set its objectives.⁴⁸¹ Envoys were then sent around Greece to enroll more allies. *Poleis* from Euboea, Chalcidice, and western Hellas joined the coalition, but no other Peloponnesians joined. Further Spartan setbacks occurred when the Spartan garrisons at Pharsalus in Thessaly and Trachinian Heraclea were captured by the allies in the fall of 395. The combination of defeats and exile of Pausanias forced the ephors to recall Agesilaus (Xen.*Hell.*IV.2.1–3; Diod.XIV.82–83.1; Plut.*Ages.*15).

By the spring of 394, while Agesilaus was marching home, the coalition had gathered a large army near Corinth with the intention of confining Sparta to the Peloponnese. In early summer the allies met the Peloponnesian army near the river Nemea west of Corinth. The Regent Aristodemus commanded twenty thousand hoplites, six hundred cavalry, and some light-armed troops.⁴⁸² The allied force of Boeotians, Corinthians, Argives, Euboeans, and Athenians numbered 24,000 hoplites, 1,500 cavalry, and some light-armed troops. The allies had no commander-in-chief, but on the day of battle, the Boeotians commanded the right wing with the Athenians located on the left opposite the Spartan contingent. The Spartans defeated the Athenians and then wheeled their army to attack and defeat the rest of the coalition piecemeal. The defeated forces fled to Corinth. The Spartans suffered 1,100 casualties while the allies lost 2,800 men (Xen.*Hell.*IV.2.9–23; Diod.XIV.83.1–2; Plut.*Ages.*17–19). This battle set the tone for much of the war. The Corinthia and the northeast Peloponnese would be the geographical center of the conflict for the remainder of the war.

Prior to Agesilaus arrival in Hellas, the Persian fleet, under the command of Pharnabazus and Conon, defeated the Spartan fleet of Peisander at Cnidus off the southwest coast of Asia Minor in August.

With this victory, the Persian fleet gained control of the Aegean Sea. Conon and Pharnabazus sailed the fleet along the coast of Asia Minor and the islands eliminating Spartan garrisons and claiming that the Greeks would remain autonomous. This was done to minimize Greek hostility to Persia and support Persian propaganda that Persia wanted the “freedom for the Greeks.” Conon followed up this success by sailing to the Hellespont region to secure control over the Greek states (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.1.6; Diod.XIV.83.5–7). As a result of this naval campaign, Spartan forces controlled only a few strongholds in Asia. Spartan forces by land and sea were no longer a serious threat to Persia in Asia.

Agessilaus’s army, composed of mercenaries and the Asiatic Greeks along with one thousand talents in booty, traveled through Thrace, Macedonia, and Thessaly. In Thessaly he defeated a cavalry force of Thessalians aligned with Boeotia. Arriving at Chaeronea in Boeotia by August 394, he was informed of the Spartan defeat at Cnidus. Aware of the harmful effect to Spartan morale, he informed his troops that Peisander was dead but the fleet was victorious. In late August at Coronea he engaged the coalition forces and emerged victorious. His right wing, composed of the Asiatic Greeks, defeated the Argives. The left wing, composed of the Orchomenians, was defeated by the Thebans. Returning from their pursuit of the Orchomenians, the Thebans were caught in a frontal attack by Agessilaus. The battle was hard fought with Agessilaus receiving multiple wounds. The Thebans broke through the Spartan line to join their allies at Mount Helicon. The next day a truce was declared to bury the dead. After the victory, Agessilaus went to Delphi and donated one hundred talents for his victories in Asia and Greece (Xen.*Hell.*IV.3–21; Diod.XIV.84.1–2; Plut.*Ages.*18–19.3). Agessilaus disbanded his forces and sent them to their respective homes, and he returned to Sparta. The dual land victories of Sparta at the Nemea and Coronea reestablished the superiority of Spartan led hoplites. Not until Leuctra in 371 would a Spartan hoplite army be challenged again.

The balance of the Corinthian War would be fought by both sides with smaller forces employing mercenaries and peltasts (light-armed troops). These soldiers replaced the citizen soldier of the hoplite forces of the various *poleis*. This war confirmed, initially used in the Peloponnesian War, that the mobility of peltasts under good leadership could routinely defeat heavily armed infantrymen. The Athenian commander Iphicrates became famous for his use of peltasts to defeat a Spartan hoplite force in 390. The employment of mercenaries reduced the demands on the citizen soldier. Also, mercenaries were more obedient to orders. Sparta engaged mercenaries to preserve its

shrinking citizen body. Mercenaries would be used with greater frequency throughout the fourth century from Dionysius I in Syracuse to Alexander the Great and his successors in the Hellenistic age.⁴⁸³

In 393 Persia launched a naval offensive against Sparta. The Persian fleet under the command of Pharnabazus and Conon sailed to Hellas. They raided the coast of Laconia and captured the island of Cythera. They established a garrison under an Athenian governor to threaten the Laconian coast. Next they sailed to Corinth and gave the allies the money they brought to sustain their war effort. Pharnabazus then sailed back to Asia. Conon, assigned to gather money from the islands, was allowed initially to sail to Athens to provide it with funds to complete the reconstruction of the Long Walls to the Piraeus and the walls around the Piraeus. His sailors were allowed to assist in the final construction (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.7–10; Diod.XIV.85; R&O 9).⁴⁸⁴

Demosthenes mentions an inscription that says Conon “freed the allies of Athens,” and the Athenians dedicated a bronze statue to him (Dem.XX.68–70). Conon’s arrival might have been perceived as the end of subjugation to Sparta. Apparently, the Athenians in their celebration conveniently overlooked the fact that the naval victory at Cnidus was a Persian achievement. Regardless, the ghost of Aegospotami was exorcised.⁴⁸⁵

It is not certain that Conon engaged in further naval activities in 393. However, Corinth manned a fleet to contest control of the Corinthian Gulf. The fleet, under the command of the Corinthian admiral Agathinus, defeated a Spartan fleet, commanded by Podanemus, in the eastern Corinthian Gulf. Podanemus was killed, and his vice admiral wounded (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.10–11). By the end of the year the allies controlled the eastern part of the Corinthian Gulf but Sparta maintained control of the western part.⁴⁸⁶ The year 393 was a good year for the coalition.

The year 392 was a turning point in the war. The Corinthia and the Corinthian Gulf became ground zero for the conflict. Corinth and Argos would now provide the lion’s share of the manpower and fighting that the coalition would undertake against Sparta. The year saw political change in Corinth as well. Allied military gains on land and sea led to peace overtures by Sparta to Persia to end the war. The war was going against Sparta.

During this year, Athens regained the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros and established cleruchs on them. These islands secured the grain route to the Black Sea. Through Conon’s employment of Athenians in the Persian fleet, he was surreptitiously rebuilding the Athenian fleet by training crews for future ships. Athenian honors to Dionysius I of Syracuse and Evagoras of Cyprus were extending the diplomatic relationships to find new allies. The Boeotians were rarely

involved in fighting after 394, but when they were, it was outside Boeotia. With allied control of the isthmus and Persian control of the Aegean, Sparta was hindered from sending forces outside the Peloponnese (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.10–11; IV.8.15).

Stasis in Corinth led to a political revolution the nature of which is still debated by historians. Xenophon does not mention a democratic opposition but Diodorus does (Diod.XIV.86.1). Whether the dispute was between pro-Spartan and anti-Spartan factions within the ruling oligarchy or between oligarchic and democratic factions among the people, the anti-Spartan faction won out.⁴⁸⁷ Whether the anti-Spartan faction was democratic or not, it certainly was more radical and hostile to Sparta. The allies supported the anti-Spartan faction to overthrow the government.

During the festival of Artemis Euclea, the radicals attacked and massacred 120 members of the opposition. The Argives sent troops to support the radical faction. The pro-Spartan oligarchs fled Corinth. Under an amnesty agreement the oligarchs returned. Some type of union agreement with Argos occurred at this time. Citizenship rights were exchanged between the *poleis*. Argives could participate in the Corinthian government. Military requirements meant that Argive troops would be stationed at Corinth for defensive purposes at least. Disenchanted with the new government over their participation role, the oligarchs conspired with Praxitas, the Spartan commander at Sicyon. They allowed the Spartans within the Corinthian long walls. The Spartan forces built a stockade for protection. The Argives, Corinthians, and Athenians counterattacked but were defeated. The Spartans demolished part of the long walls and seized the port of Lechaëum from the Boeotian troops stationed there. Praxitas proceeded to capture Sidous and Crommyon (Xen.*Hell.*IV.4.1–14.; Diod.XIV.86). The capture of these places weakened allied control of the Isthmus. A land route was again open to central Hellas for Sparta.

Although Xenophon implies a full union with Argos in 392, it is more likely that this development did not occur until 389 (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.34; Diod.XIV.92.1).⁴⁸⁸ Initially, the union was probably an *isopoliteia* (isopolity) which entailed the grant of citizenship to both *polis*. Xenophon mentions that boundary stones were removed and Corinth was called Argos (Xen.*Hell.*IV.4.6). If true and Corinth became Argos, then a *sympoliteia* (sympolity) occurred, which was the full merger of one state within another.⁴⁸⁹ Corinth ceased to exist as a *polis*. This is highly doubtful. Whatever the nature of the union, it was popular with the Corinthian people. They opposed the dissolution of the union with Argos in the Peace of Antalcidas (Xen.*Hell.*V.1.34). In conclusion, we can agree that a political revolution occurred in Corinth but not necessarily by a democratic faction. The initial merger was an

isopoliteia but Corinth remained an independent *polis*. It is likely that a *sympoliteia* between Argos and Corinth happened by the spring of 389. Later this union would be negated by the Peace of Antalcidas in 387/386.

The success of the allies checking Spartan ambitions forced the Spartan government to look to Persia to sue for peace. They sent Antalcidas to Sardis as ambassador to the satrap Tiribazus to offer terms. Sparta offered to surrender the Asiatic Greeks to Persia in exchange for Persian support of autonomy for all Greek *poleis* on the mainland. Athens, Corinth, Argos, and Boeotia also sent envoys to Tiribazus to counter Spartan diplomacy. When Conon arrived with the Athenian delegation, Tiribazus had him arrested for not representing the Persian interests.⁴⁹⁰ At a conference under the tutelage of Tiribazus, the allies rejected the autonomy clause. They feared their territorial gains would be lost and the Boeotian League would be dissolved along with the union of Argos and Corinth. Their fears were justified as these events did occur five years later when peace was agreed to. After the failure of this peace conference, Persia again reversed policy. Tiribazus secretly provided Antalcidas with money to sustain the Spartan war effort. After the breakup of the conference, Tiribazus visited the Great King to garner support for a pro-Spartan policy. However, Artaxerxes II was not sympathetic to Sparta. Struthas was sent as Tiribazus's replacement. He favored the allied cause (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.12–17).

During the ensuing winter Sparta made a further effort at peace and summoned a conference at Sparta. Perhaps attempting to break up the coalition, Athens was offered the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. The Boeotian League would remain intact except that Orchomenus, which Lysander had detached prior to Haliartus, would retain its independence. In his speech *On the Peace with Sparta*, Andocides, one of the Athenian ambassadors, implies there was sentiment within Athens and Boeotia to accept a peace. The opposition of Corinth and Argos suggests that Sparta insisted on the dissolution of their union (Andoc.III.12–27). Sparta could not allow this merger to threaten its control of the Peloponnese. Unfortunately for the combatants, the terms were rejected again. The Athenians rejected the peace. An advocate for peace, Andocides and some of his supporters were exiled. Subsequent Athenian activities in the Aegean demonstrate that the Athenians had imperial ambitions to restore part of their empire. What would be the Spartans next move?

In 391 the Spartan forces went on the offensive in Greece and Asia. In the Peloponnese, Agesilaus invaded Argos with the full Spartan contingent, minus one regiment, and ravaged the land. He then marched into the Corinthia. Outmaneuvering allied forces he

captured the rebuilt long walls. In conjunction with this success, his brother Teleutias with twelve ships captured the port of Lecheum. The capture of Lechaem provided Sparta with naval supremacy in the Corinthian Gulf since the coalition possessed no other port. After these successes, Agesilaus returned home (Xen.*Hell.*IV.4.19; Xen.*Ag.*2.17; Diod.XIV.97.4).

While Dercyllidas controlled the Hellespont, the Spartan forces, again under the command of Thibron, attacked Struthas's satrapy in Ionia. Apparently caught in an ambush by Struthas's cavalry, Thibron was killed and his men fled to the coast. Sparta sent out Diphridas to replace Thibron. He campaigned against Struthas and managed to capture his daughter and her husband. Struthas paid a ransom for their return, which provided Diphridas with the money to pay his troops and hire more mercenaries. To assist the pro-Spartan oligarchs in Rhodes, the Spartans assigned Ecdicus with eight ships to sail there. Arriving at Cnidus, he learned that Rhodes was already controlled by the democrats. He remained here awaiting further orders from Sparta (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.18–23; Diod.XIV.99.1–3). The Spartan offensive made little progress in Asia.

In 390 Teleutias was sent with twelve ships to replace Ecdicus. Arriving at Samos, he collected another seven ships and proceeded to Rhodes with a fleet of twenty-seven vessels. Encountering an Athenian fleet of ten ships, led by Philocrates, to assist Evagoras of Cyprus in his revolt against Persia, Teleutias captured all ten. Returning to Cnidus, Teleutias sold the captured booty. He then sailed to Rhodes. With his assistance the oligarchs captured the city of Rhodes by autumn and expelled the democrats (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.24; Diod.XIV.98).

Since 392 the Persian fleet was inactive due to the imprisonment of Conon. His subsequent death removed a pro-Athenian voice in Persian circles. Athens also remained quiet in the Aegean. However, the activity of the Spartan fleet in the Aegean encouraged the Athenians to send an expedition out in 390. Assigned forty ships, Thrasybulus was ordered to sail to Rhodes to support the democrats. Probably in need of money to fund his expedition, he sailed to the Hellespont where he made an alliance with the Thracian kings Amodocus and Seuthes. In Byzantium he replaced the oligarchy with a pro-Athenian democracy and secured the friendship of Chalcedon. Sailing south he captured some cities on Lesbos. Proceeding along the Asiatic coast he collected booty to pay his men. After plundering the Aspendians, he was attacked and killed (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.25–34; Diod.XIV.99.4–5). These successes indicate that he was restoring the empire in the Thracian and Bosphorus areas as well as the islands.

He was also securing the grain route to the Black Sea. Despite these gains, Athens failed to rescue Rhodes and drive the Spartan fleet from the Aegean.

In 390 Agesilaus launched a major offensive against the Corinthia. Xenophon states that the objectives were the seizure of cattle kept in the Piraeum area north of Corinth and control of the isthmian land route from Attica and Boeotia to Corinth. Control of the land route would hinder allied reinforcements for Corinth and provide a gateway for a Spartan offensive into Attica and Boeotia. During the invasion he encountered the Argives and Corinthians preparing to conduct the Isthmian Games. Upon his approach they fled to Corinth. The games were then conducted under the tutelage of the Corinthian oligarchs and protected by Agesilaus's army. Upon completion of the games he threatened Corinth, which was protected by the peltasts of Iphicrates. Next Agesilaus seized the undefended Piraeum isthmus northwest of Corinth. The fort at Oenoe near Megara was also captured. Agesilaus then captured the Heraeum district to the northeast of Corinth. While ravaging these areas he encountered ambassadors from Boeotia heading to Corinth. Since they would not identify their mission, he refused their passage to Corinth. Unfortunately for Agesilaus, his success was nullified by the destruction of a Spartan *mora* by the peltasts of Iphicrates.⁴⁹¹ Caught returning to their base at Lechaeum, this force of six hundred hoplites was defeated with the loss of 250 men. Returning to Lechaeum, Agesilaus replaced the defeated *mora* with some Corinthian exiles and other Spartan troops. He then marched home with his army. Iphicrates then captured all the areas taken by Agesilaus. He also attacked Phlius and Sicyon, inflicted a few casualties, and then withdrew. The Corinthians and Argives now conducted a second set of Isthmian Games with many of the original participants (Xen.*Hell.*IV.5; Xen.*Ages.*2.18–19.; Plut.*Ages.*21–22).

Although Iphicrates won great fame for his victory over the Spartan *mora*, strategically it accomplished little for the allies. Spartan control of Lechaeum still allowed the Spartans to threaten Corinth, control the Gulf, and partially keep open access to the Isthmus. Despite the initial tactical victories the campaign was a strategic failure for the Sparta. Sparta only retained the port of Lechaeum. The destruction of a *mora* further depleted Spartan manpower. The isthmus remained a land route for Athenian and Boeotian forces. Allied occupation of the isthmus prevented Sparta from entering central Greece except by sea. Attica and Boeotia could not be ravaged by a hostile army. The union of Corinth and Argos remained. To protect the union, Argive forces eventually replaced the Athenian forces of Iphicrates. Sparta was stalemated in the Peloponnese.

Northwest Greece and the Hellespont became the theaters of operations for 389. The Acarnanians, with the support of Boeotia and Athens, attacked the city of Calydon, which was in the possession of Achaëa. Achaëa appealed to Sparta for assistance. Agesilaus was dispatched with a Lacedaemonian force to assist the Achaeans. Crossing the Corinthian Gulf, he landed in Acarnania and threatened the Acarnanians with destruction of their land unless they abandoned their alliance with Athens and Boeotia. The Acarnanians refused. He ravaged the land and defeated the Acarnanians in battle. In the fall he returned to Sparta leaving the Acarnanians chastised but still hostile. In the following spring Agesilaus threatened them with another invasion. Unwilling to suffer further pillage, the Acarnanians made peace and accepted an alliance with Sparta (Xen.*Hell.*IV.6–7.1; Ages.2.20; Plut.*Ages.*22.5).

During the winter of 390/389, Iphicrates was recalled from Corinth after some dispute with Argos. Iphicrates might have attempted a coup to remove Argive control of Corinth.⁴⁹² In the spring the Athenians sent Iphicrates, with eight ships and 1,200 peltasts, to the Hellespont to secure the gains Thrasylbulus made the previous year. Arriving in the Chersonese, he engaged the forces of the Spartan Anaxibius in guerilla raids. Anaxibius withdrew his forces to Antandrus across the Straits. Crossing the Hellespont, Iphicrates ambushed the troops of Anaxibius. The Lacedaemonians were defeated and Anaxibius was killed. Iphicrates then crossed back to the Chersonese (Xen.*Hell.*IV.8.34–39). The Athenian offensive launched in 390 was now secured by Iphicrates. Spartan influence was reduced to a toehold in Asia Minor.

In the Saronic Gulf the Athenians invaded the island of Aegina. The Spartan harmost, Eteonicus, used Aegina as a base to raid Attica. Athens sent a force under Pamphilus to neutralize these raids. Pamphilus established a garrison on the island. Teleutias arrived from Rhodes to check these Athenian activities. He succeeded in defeating the Athenian fleet but failed to drive the Athenian garrison from the island. Teleutias was replaced by Hierax as Spartan navarch. Hierax then sailed to Rhodes but kept twelve ships under the command of Gorgopas to protect Aegina. Despite the existence of the Athenian garrison, raids on Attica continued from Aegina. The struggle for Aegina carried on into the following year. In 388 the Athenians under Chabrias attacked the island. Engaging the Aeginetans and Gorgopas's men, Chabrias defeated them and Gorgopas was killed. Again Teleutias was assigned the ships at Aegina to replace the dead Gorgopas. He continued the naval war against Athens by raiding the Piraeus and capturing some vessels. He remained at Aegina and

captured various commercial ships sailing the Saronic Gulf (Xen.*Hell.*V.1.1–24). None of these activities reversed Sparta's deteriorating position in Hellas.

Unable to attack Boeotia or Athens, the Spartan government decided to settle affairs with Argos in 388. What the mission was is open to speculation. Xenophon clouds the campaign with oracles and omens. It is reasonable to assume that the destruction of the Argive army was desired. The Spartan army was commanded by King Agesipolis, the son of the exiled Pausanias. Agesipolis proceeded to ravage the Argolid without interference from the Argive army. Unable to engage the Argive army, he established a garrison on the border to Argos. Using negative omens from a sacrifice as an excuse, he led the army home (Xen.*Hell.*IV.7.2–7). Perhaps Agesipolis used these negative omens as political cover for not engaging the Argive army. This is the first campaign of the war conducted by a king other than Agesilaus since the exile of Pausanias. The son of an exile, perhaps Agesipolis did not want to appear a failure against Sparta's age-old enemy. Whether the campaign was viewed as a success or not by the government, we have no evidence of hostility to Agesipolis in Sparta.

Sparta assigned Antalcidas navarch of the Aegean fleet to succeed Hierax in 388. Antalcidas proceeded to Ephesus. From here he sent his lieutenant Nicolochus, with twenty-five ships to Abydus. Here the Spartans were besieged by an Athenian fleet of thirty-two ships. Taking leave of the fleet, Antalcidas travelled to the Great King Artaxerxes II to negotiate a peace. Persian sentiment was turning against the allies. Athens had allied itself with Evagoras of Cyprus and the rebel Acoris of Egypt.⁴⁹³ From Aegina Chabrias sailed to Evagoras to give support. The anti-Spartan satrap Pharnabazus was also recalled to Susa. In the spring of 387, accompanied by Tiribazus, Antalcidas returned with peace terms from Artaxerxes II. Proceeding to Abydus, Antalcidas resumed his command. After defeating the Athenian fleet near Abydus, he was reinforced with ships from Persia, Syracuse, and Italy. The Spartan fleet was again the master of the Hellespont. Like Lysander in 405, Antalcidas was in position to restrict Athens' food supply from the Black Sea. The diplomatic and military success of Antalcidas paved the way for peace. After eight years of war, all belligerents were war-weary. Artaxerxes's support for Sparta tipped the scale for peace (Xen.*Hell.*V.1.1.6–7; V.1.25–30).

The Peace of Antalcidas (King's Peace) – 387/386 BC

Summoned to Sardis by Tiribazus in the fall of 387, the belligerents sent their ambassadors to hear the terms. The terms

dictated by the king state (Xen.*Hell.V.1.31*):

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands, and that the other Greek cities, both small and great, should be left independent, except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros; and these should belong as of old, to the Athenians. But whichever of the two parties does not accept this peace, upon them I will make war, in company with those who desire this arrangement, both by land and by sea, with ships and with money.⁴⁹⁴

The ambassadors reported the terms to their respective *poleis*. We have no evidence about the internal debates in the various states. Whatever opposition existed, it was suppressed by the peace supporters. The ambassadors reconvened at Sparta to swear to the peace. It is doubtful that the terms were accepted without further negotiations. This “common peace” became the template for future peace arrangements. What the final terms of this peace were is open to debate. Other terms are mentioned in similar treaties of the 370s. Athens apparently accepted the terms as is. However, Thebes wanted to swear to the peace on behalf of the Boeotian League. Corinth wanted to keep the union with Argos. Sparta refused these modifications. Under threat from Agesilaus to continue the war, Thebes, Argos, and Corinth agreed to the terms (Xen.*Hell.V.1.31–36*; Diod.XIV.110; Plut.*Ages.23.3*).

The conclusion of the peace witnessed the demise of the Boeotian League in compliance with the autonomy clause. Consequently, Thebes was weakened without the Boeotian allies. The union between Corinth and Argos was dissolved. Corinth rejoined the Peloponnesian League. Some Corinthians were exiled and settled in Athens (Dem.XX.54). Argos was again isolated in the Peloponnese. Athens was the only coalition member that emerged with a gain from the war. Athens now controlled certain islands in the Aegean. The Long Walls and fortification of the Piraeus were secured. The foundation for a new naval dominance was laid. Friendly relations were established with many *poleis* in Thrace, the Bosphorus, and the islands. Therefore, it is not surprising that the Athenians accepted the peace.

Sparta did not win the war. The war was fought to a stalemate. However, the peace provided Sparta with the checkmate move to win the game. Despite the diplomatic victory of Antalcidas, the Spartans were confined to the control of the Peloponnese. Sparta remained the strongest military power with the dissolution of the Boeotian League. However, its fleet no longer dominated the Aegean. The empire acquired from Athens disappeared. The Greeks of Asia Minor were

subordinate to Persia. Other subjects revolted during the war and remained independent. Only the renewed alliance with Persia secured Spartan hegemony of the Peloponnese. Unknown at the time, the peace only bought Sparta fifteen more years of dominance. The cost of this dominance was increased animosity in the Greek world. Allied with the Great King and the Syracusan tyrant Dionysius I, Sparta was viewed as part of the “axis of evil.” The slogan of freedom and autonomy championed by Sparta in the sixth and fifth centuries was replaced by acts of repression and subordination in the fourth century.

This Peace of Antalcidas is often referred to as the “King’s Peace” or “Common Peace” (*koine eirene*) by Greek writers. This peace imposed by Artaxerxes II became the diplomatic template used by the various Greek *poleis* to settle their conflicts in the following decades. All would appeal to Persia to interfere on their behalf. “Freedom and autonomy” would continue to be buzz words in the Hellenic propaganda campaign by the various political leaders of Sparta, Thebes, and Athens. Persian gold would not only subsidize these warring states but it would also provide employment for thousands of Greeks as mercenaries in the Persian army and navy. Revolt by the satraps, another Egyptian rebellion, and the rise of Macedonia required extensive use of Greek mercenaries by the Great King throughout the fourth century. The golden hand of Persia would rest on the Greek throat until its collapse under the mailed fist of Alexander the Great.

445 (De Ste. Croix 1972), 342–345. In Appendix XXI, de Ste. Croix argues that the Corinthians and Thebans opposed the peace from fear of Sparta as much as their hatred of Athens! An alliance of Sparta and Athens was a threat to them. An extreme oligarchic regime in Athens, following the policy of Sparta, increased the power of the Spartans to impose their will on friend or foe.

446 The Cinnadon affair related by Xenophon suggests that there were those within Sparta who wished to see the citizen body expanded (Xen.*Hell.*III.3.4–11; Arist.*Pol.*1306b35).

447 (Hammond and Walbank 2008), 180–182. Tribal organizations (*ethnos*) now formed leagues. These leagues combined with the new prestige of kingship replaced the *polis* as the dominant political institutions in the Hellenistic Age.

448 (Thompson 1973), 55.

449 (Cartledge 2004), 209. Perhaps they wanted a peaceful existence with Athens and restoration of the dual hegemony.

450 (Hamilton 1979), 97–98. Hamilton suggests that there were three factions in Sparta led by Lysander, Agis, and Pausanias. Agis differed from Lysander because he wanted Sparta to concentrate on the control of the mainland and ignore the Greeks of Asia and the islands.

451 (N. Hammond 1986), 441.

452 (Cartledge 2004), 226.

- 453 (Rhodes 2010), 245. (N. Hammond 1986), 441.
- 454 The fourth-century orator Aeschines stated that over fifteen hundred citizens were killed by the Thirty (Aesch.III.235).
- 455 Previously the men of Salamis and Eleusis were killed by the Thirty (Lys.XII.52).
- 456 See Lewis in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 36–37.
- 457 (Salmon 1984), 231–233. Salmon provides a basic description of the Corinthian constitution.
- 458 (Salmon 1984), 154–155.
- 459 (Beaumont 1936), 181–184. (Kagan 1969), 210–213. Kagan is skeptical of the importance of the silver trade with Illyria for Corinth.
- 460 (Salmon 1984), 180–185. Salmon suggests that the evidence for economic hardship from the Peloponnesian War is weak. He suggests that Corinthian prosperity did not decline until after the Corinthian War.
- 461 (Griffith 1950), 236–256. (Kagan 1962), 447–453. (C. Hamilton 1972), 261–268.
- 462 (Moore 1975), 127–133. (P. K. Mckechnie 2015), 80–83. (J. Larsen 1955), 40–41.
- 463 Ibid, 38–39. (N. Hammond 1986), 447. (Rhodes 2010), 295–297.
- 464 This amnesty allowed Andocides to return in 403. He was a participant in the mutilation of the Hermes in 415. His speech *On The Mysteries* in 399, which was his defense against a charge of impiety, provides valuable information on the laws passed after the restoration.
- 465 (Andocides 1968), 409.
- 466 Ibid, 413–415.
- 467 In his speech *Against Nicomachus* in 399, Lysias also mentions that the Athenians could not pay two talents to the Boeotians, pay money owed Sparta, fund the repair of the ship sheds in the Piraeus, and repair the walls (Lys.XXX.22).
- 468 The date of the Elean war is a matter of controversy. Xenophon dates the war to 399–397. Diodorus dates it to 402–400. Scholars have not resolved the conflict. (N. Hammond 1986), 450. Hammond accepts Xenophon's date. (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 41. Lewis accepts Diodorus.
- 469 (Rhodes 2010), 156.
- 470 It is unclear if this autonomy meant control of internal affairs only or freedom to conduct internal and external affairs. (M. H. Hansen 2006), 49. By the fourth century, the definition of autonomy did not necessarily imply external freedom.
- 471 (Perlman 1976), 18.
- 472 Although Thebes opposed the peace, Thebes had prospered economically in the Peloponnesian War (*Hell.Oxy.XVII.3–4*). Theban opposition to Sparta was political. (Kagan 1961), 329. There is no distinct evidence to indicate that the factions within Thebes were divided along the ideological line of democrat versus oligarch. The Boeotian Federation was organized on oligarchic principles.
- 473 (Perlman 1964), 66–67. Perlman accepts the view of two factions. (Kagan 1961), 325–326. Kagan argues for three factions: wealthy “notables,” moderate democrats, and radical democrats.
- 474 (Kagan 1961), 335–338. Kagan suggests that the nobles may not have suffered much, but craftsmen and merchants would have suffered with the loss of trade. (Salmon 1984), 180–185. Salmon questions whether Corinthian prosperity suffered from the Peloponnesian War.
- 475 There is no definitive evidence that confirms that the anti-Spartan faction favored a democracy. Aside from the brief flirtation with democracy in the proposed union with Argos in the Corinthian War, Corinth never established a democracy. Unfortunately, there is little information about Corinthian internal affairs.
- 476 Xenophon says Thibron took four thousand Peloponnesian troops. He does not

- specify the component states (Xen. *Hell.*III.1.4)
- 477 Who sponsored Timocrates varies among the ancient authors. Xenophon claims it was the satrap Tithraustes (Xen.*Hell.*III.5.1). Pharnabazus, another satrap, is the sponsor according to the Oxyrhynchus Historian (*Hell.Oxy.*VII.5). Plutarch claims it was the Great King Artaxerxes II (Plut.*Lys.*27; *Artax.*20).
- 478 (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), P.98. Seager agrees that the harsh rule of Sparta brought forth the coalition. (Perlman 1964), 64. Perlman argues that Spartan imperial ambitions in Asia and fear of future Spartan interference in Hellas were the primary causes for the war.
- 479 Xenophon and the Oxyrhynchus Historian blame Thebes for the conflict. Xenophon, who is pro-Spartan, strongly blames Thebes and has Sparta wanting war to settle scores with Thebes. The Oxyrhynchus Historian also blames Phocis's role in the conflict and implies that Sparta was more reluctant for war by offering arbitration of grievances. (Bruce 1960), 5–8.
- 480 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 38–39. Inscription number 6 is a copy of the treaty indicating a defensive alliance.
- 481 How this council functioned is unknown.
- 482 Pausanias's son Agesipolis was a minor. Thus, Aristodemus was appointed regent.
- 483 (Adcock 1957), 19–24. Adcock discusses the growth of light armed and mercenary troops from the Peloponnesian War into the fourth century.
- 484 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 46–48. Inscription number 9 demonstrates that the Athenians began the reconstruction of the Long Walls in summer 395 or 394 prior to battle of Cnidus (August 394). Perhaps they began rebuilding them after the Theban alliance or the battle of Haliartus in 395.
- 485 Conon was one of the Athenian commanders at Aegospotami. He escaped with eight ships and fled to Persia. He did not want to suffer the fate of the Athenian commanders after Arginusae in 406.
- 486 These events may have occurred in the spring of 392. See Seager in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 105.
- 487 (Salmon 1984), 354–362. Salmon argues that the revolution occurred between anti-Spartan and pro-Spartan factions within the ruling oligarchy. He also argues that the union with Argos was not the elimination of the Corinthian state. (Griffith 1950), 240–242. Griffith argues that the democratic revolution occurred in March 392 and there was a strong democratic faction due to “a broken middle class and an impoverished treasury” (Kagan 1962), 454–457. Kagan also argues that Corinth became a democracy.
- 488 (Griffith 1950), 242–244. Griffith believes the union occurred in stages and was complete by spring 389. (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 106. Seager thinks the union was basically complete in 392.
- 489 In his *On the Peace with Sparta* speech presented in the winter of 392/391, the Athenian Andocides implies that the Argive and Corinthian envoys present were separate missions (Andoc.III.41). If this interpretation is correct, then the union was not yet a full merger and Xenophon's statement is in error.
- 490 This was the last mission of Conon. Nepos reports that he either was executed by orders of Artaxerxes II or he later escaped (Nepos.Con.V.4). If he escaped, he fled to Cyprus and died there.
- 491 A *mora* was a regiment of the Spartan army. The commander of a *mora* was called a polemarch. By the fourth century the *mora* was composed of Spartiates and selected perioeci. Iphicrates troops were peltasts.
- 492 See Seager in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 111.
- 493 In the *Plutus*, performed in 388, Aristophanes makes a reference to an Egyptian

alliance (*Ar. Plut.*178).

494 (Xenophon 1968), Vol.II.21.

Sparta Resurgent – The Road to Leuctra

The Peloponnese

Alliance with Persia secured, Sparta embarked on a path to tighten its hegemony of the mainland Greeks. With Corinth back in the fold and Argos neutralized, Sparta used the terms of the King's Peace to justify its interference first in the Peloponnese and then throughout the Greek mainland. With the surrender of the Asiatic Greeks, the Spartan forces in Asia were disbanded. Xenophon tells us that the Spartans wished to chastise their enemies to prevent another hostile coalition that would threaten Spartan hegemony (*Xen.Hell.V.2.1*). Agesilaus favored an aggressive imperial policy. In particular, Agesilaus always followed an anti-Theban policy. He perceived Thebes to be the main threat to Sparta. A weak Thebes would be unable to resurrect the Boeotian League. Theban weakness, combined with a pacified Peloponnese, meant that only Athens might oppose Sparta. However, Athens favored the peace. The Athenian outlook was still centered on restoring influence along the north Aegean coast and among the islanders. Within a decade Athens would inaugurate the Second Athenian League.

Pro-Spartan oligarchs were back in power in Corinth. The supporters of the union with Argos were in exile. Although we have little evidence regarding the internal condition of Corinth, the oligarchs reestablished the traditional constitution and followed Spartan leadership. Due to support by Sparta, probable war weariness by the people, and exile of the anti-Spartan faction, we are not informed of any political discord. Since the Corinthia was the focal point of military action on the mainland, it suffered the most physical destruction of the allies. The people concentrated on rebuilding their lives, homes, farms, businesses, ports, etc. Involved in two major wars in the past forty years, Corinthian power and influence within the Peloponnesian League was severely reduced.⁴⁹⁵

The first victim of Sparta was Mantinea in Arcadia in 385. Declaring that the Mantineans did not adequately support Sparta during the war and provided food to Argos, Sparta ordered the Mantineans to dismantle their walls. Without fortifications, Mantinea would be vulnerable to the depredations of the Lacedaemonian army.

Mantineia refused the order. Mantineia appealed to Athens for support but was refused. King Agesipolis was assigned to enforce the order. While besieging Mantineia, Agesipolis used the fall rainy season to divert the river, which flowed through the city to flood the city and undermine the walls. With the city flooded, the Mantineans surrendered. The *polis* suffered *diokismos* (dissolution) into four separate villages controlled by oligarchs.⁴⁹⁶ Through the intervention of Agesipolis's father Pausanias, an exile in Tegea, the Mantinean democrats were allowed to leave. The Spartans refrained from any other punishment (Xen.*Hell.*V.2.1–7; Diod.XV.5.3–5; XV.12). Only after Leuctra, would Mantineia be reestablished as a *polis*. The punishment of Mantineia strengthened Spartan control over Arcadia but sent shock waves throughout Hellas. Where and when would Sparta impose its will next?

In the small *polis* of Phlius Sparta ordered the restoration of the pro-Spartan oligarchs in 384. In 381 the oligarchs claimed that their civic interests were violated and appealed to Sparta for support. Agesilaus refused overtures from the democratic faction and besieged the city, which surrendered in 379 due to famine. An extreme oligarchy was established and a garrison left for six months to defend the new government. Agesilaus also assigned fifty exiles and fifty citizens to review the behavior of the populace to determine if some citizens should be executed (Xen.*Hell.*V.2.8–10; 3.10–25). Although Phlius was a small *polis*, its fate demonstrated that Sparta, under Agesilaus's leadership, would tolerate no opposition within the Peloponnese. Only oligarchic government was allowed.

The Chalcidian War (382–379 BC)

Outside the Peloponnese, Sparta intervened in the Chalcidice in 382 when envoys from Apollonia and Acanthus appeared to complain of the growth of Olynthian power as hegemon of the Chalcidian League. This League, founded during the Peloponnesian War, expanded during the fourth century as it incorporated many *poleis* within the Chalcidic peninsula. Some Macedonian cities were also incorporated after the Illyrians invaded Macedonia and overran much of the kingdom in 383/382 (Diod.XV.19.2). After his kingdom was partially restored, King Amyntas III requested the return of these Macedonian cities from the League but was denied. Olynthus was developing into a major power in northern Hellas.

Addressing the Spartan Assembly and allies early in the year, Cleigenes of Acanthus listed three complaints against Olynthus. The first stated that the Olynthians were forcibly subjugating cities in the Chalcidice and Macedonia to join the League. The second claimed that

Olynthus was building a federation under Olynthian hegemony and had appealed to Athens and Thebes for an alliance. A third grievance was that if the Thracians and the gold mines near Mount Pangaeum came under Olynthian influence, Olynthus would acquire additional resources to become a major power. Therefore, an alliance of Olynthus, Athens, and Thebes would create a powerful coalition to challenge Sparta. Consequently, these threats should spur Sparta to curb the power of Olynthus before it was too late.

Whether or not Sparta invoked the autonomy principle in the King's Peace, the Spartans and their allies agreed to send an army to the Chalcidice to dissolve the Olynthian federation. Xenophon states that the allies could contribute money rather than men to the allied army.⁴⁹⁷ Manpower shortages caused by a reduction of citizenship in Sparta and other Greek states led to the increased use of professional mercenaries in the fourth century. An initial force of two thousand men, which included emancipated helots and perioeci, commanded by Eudamidas was assigned to aid the Chalcidians. Sparta also agreed to an alliance with King Amyntas. Eudamidas shortly proceeded to the Chalcidice with only a partial force. He was welcomed by Potidaea and other cities that he garrisoned. His brother Phoebidas was to follow with the remainder of the assigned troops (*Xen.Hell.V.2.11–24*; *Diod.XV.19.3–4*).

Following Eudamidas's expeditionary force, Phoebidas marched north through Boeotia with the remainder of the assigned troops. As he camped outside Thebes, he was approached by the pro-Spartan polemarch Leontiades to gain Spartan assistance to seize control of the city. Thebes had refused to join Sparta against Olynthus. Ismenias, the leader of the anti-Spartan faction for many years, was also a polemarch. Exercising his own initiative, Phoebidas agreed to support the faction of Leontiades. With the aid of Leontiades, Phoebidas sized the Cadmea in broad daylight during the festival of the Thesmophoria. Leontiades arrested Ismenias and imprisoned him in the Cadmea. Three hundred supporters of Ismenias eventually fled for refuge in Athens. Leontiades traveled to Sparta to explain that his followers now controlled the government. Encountering hostility by the ephors and most Spartans, for the unauthorized and sacrilegious action of Phoebidas, Leontiades justified these actions before the Spartan assembly.⁴⁹⁸ Although the action was unauthorized, Agesilaus argued that his action should be sanctioned if it benefitted the state. Plutarch says that Phoebidas was fined one hundred thousand drachmas. Regardless of the punishment of Phoebidas, the Spartan government agreed to maintain the occupation of Thebes. Judges from Sparta and the allies were sent to Thebes to try Ismenias. Tried for his anti-

Spartan activities and medizing prior to the Corinthian War, he was found guilty and executed. Under Leontiades, Spartan control of Thebes was secure. To secure control of Boeotia, Spartan garrisons were established in other *poleis* (Xen.*Hell.*V.2.25–36; V.4.46; Diod.XV.20; Plut.*Ages.*23.2–7; Plut.*Pel.*5–6.1).

This example of power politics, despite the moral opprobrium attached during a religious festival, was a political disaster in the long term. Theban hostility was even greater when liberated a few years later. This action violated the autonomy principle of the Peace of Antalcidas.⁴⁹⁹ Sparta's turnabout from the initial repudiation of Phoebidas's action was another demonstration that the moral claim to defend the autonomy principle propagandized since the Peloponnesian War was a sham. This Spartan arrogance increased the animosity in other states, which would eventually look to Athens and Thebes for protection. Although the political ramifications were negative, the control of Boeotia provided strategic advantages that supports Agesilaus's claim that the state benefitted. Control of Boeotia secured the land route north, provided easy access to central Greece, prevented closer relations between Thebes and Athens, and provided Boeotian manpower for the Spartan alliance. Unfortunately for Hellas, the autonomy principle would be abused and interpreted by the various dominant states in their own interest until their subjection under Philip II and Alexander III.

To supplement the expeditionary force, Agesilaus's brother Teleutias was given command of an allied army of ten thousand men to conduct the Olynthic war. Teleutias requested support from Amyntas of Macedon and other local kings. In the fall of 382 he proceeded north without incident and collected the Macedonians along the way. He defeated the Olynthians outside their walls and proceeded to ravage the land. At the end of the campaign he released all the local allies. The Olynthians then raided the local allies of Teleutias. In 381, during another engagement outside Olynthus, the Spartan army was defeated and Teleutias was killed. With Spartan interest damaged by this defeat, the Spartan government assigned King Agesipolis, with thirty Spartiates, to prosecute the war. On campaign in the summer of 381 Agesipolis fell ill and died. Sparta then assigned Polybiades to succeed Agesipolis. In 379, besieged and suffering from famine, Olynthus sent envoys to Sparta to sue for peace. Peace was agreed and Olynthus became a subject ally of Sparta. The Chalcidian League was disbanded (Xen.*Hell.*V.2.37–3.9; 3.18–26; Diod.XV.22–23.). However, the power of Olynthus and the Chalcidian League was only temporarily checked.

Xenophon states that the year 379 represented Sparta at the peak of its imperial power (Xen.*Hell.*V.3.27). The Peloponnesians,

Boeotia, the Chalcidice, and Macedonia were in alliance. Sparta controlled many cities with governors and garrisons. Spartan relations with the Greeks of Sicily and Italy were good. Under the reign of Agesilaus, Sparta achieved a hegemony not known previously. Sparta's arch foes Thebes, now garrisoned, and Argos, isolated within the Peloponnese, were subservient. Athens had imperial ambitions but as yet these were not in direct conflict with Sparta. Unknown at the time, the year 378 would begin the permanent decline of Sparta.

Thebes Liberated

During the winter of 379/378, a conspiracy of Theban exiles in Athens, with their supporters within Thebes, was made to restore Theban independence. Xenophon and Diodorus tell different stories regarding Thebes' liberation. Phillidas, an assistant to the three Theban polemarchs, was in touch with the exiles in Athens. One December day the twelve conspirators, which included Melon and Pelopidas, dressed as hunters left Athens and secretly entered Thebes. They hid in the house of one of the conspirators still residing in Thebes. A few days later, at a prearranged time, Phillidas allowed the exiles into an evening party by the polemarchs. Here the polemarchs Archias and Philip were murdered. A few conspirators proceeded to the homes of the pro-Spartans Leontiades and Hipates and killed them. The conspirators proceeded to free and arm supporters who were imprisoned. Proceeding to the Ampheum, a Theban shrine, these men proclaimed the liberation of Thebes.

When daylight arrived, the Thebans rallied to their support. The conspirators sent for the other exiles, led by Epaminondas, and the Athenian troops stationed at the border. In the Theban Assembly, new magistrates were elected. Then the Thebans and Athenians attacked the Spartan garrison, consisting of 1,500 troops, on the Cadmea. Xenophon suggests that the garrison surrendered after an initial assault. Diodorus indicates a lengthy siege. Diodorus claims that Athenian assistance only arrived later after an appeal arrived from Thebes for support against an expected Spartan army.⁵⁰⁰ Regardless of when, the garrison commanders surrendered on condition that the men could leave the city unharmed. During the departure of the garrison, Theban sympathizers of Sparta attempted to leave with them. Unfortunately, many sympathizers were seized and killed by the Thebans. Meanwhile, the ephors sent the League army, under the command of King Cleombrotus, to support the besieged garrison. Marching to Boeotia, Cleombrotus encountered the departed garrison in the Megarid. Continuing into Boeotia, Cleombrotus strengthened the

garrisons in the other *poleis* throughout Boeotia. Failing to punish Thebes, he left Sphodrias as governor with a strong garrison at Thespieae to oversee Boeotian affairs. He then returned to Laconia. Arriving in Sparta, the commanders of the departed garrison were condemned for surrendering before the relief force had arrived. Two were executed, and the third was heavily fined (Xen.*Hell.*V.4.1–18; Diod.XV.25–27; Plut.*Pel.*7–13).

The accounts of Xenophon and Plutarch differ in crediting the conspirators. Xenophon, biased against Thebes throughout his history, does not mention Pelopidas and Epaminondas as major players among the conspirators. Plutarch, a native of Boeotia, emphasizes their role because they were the leaders who brought Thebes to preeminence during the decade of the 360s. Their later prominence indicates that Plutarch's account of the conspirators is probably more accurate. He equates their role to that of Thrasybulus liberating Athens from the rule of the Thirty (Plut.*Pel.*13.3).

Athens was involved with the conspiracy. Aside from the Athenian commanders, which Athenians supported the conspirators is unknown. Athenian support of the Thebans during the siege of the Cadmea must have contributed to its surrender prior to the Spartan relief force arriving. The Athenian punishment of their generals, on the approach of the army of Cleombrotus, was a disguise to mask the Athenian role in the conspiracy (Xen.*Hell.*V.4.19). The Athenians were not prepared to challenge Sparta at this stage of the game. Although a rejuvenated Thebes would be good ally, the Athenians were unwilling to engage in another land war at this time.

Isocrates claims that after Thebes' liberation, Theban envoys went to Sparta to offer friendship and a renewal of their alliance (Isoc.XIV.28–29). Spartan terms were the restoration of the exiles and removal of the coup leaders. The Thebans refused. By the end of 378 Athens and Thebes were again allies but Athens was the dominant partner.

Although our sources report no specific factions within the Spartan government, they do mention internal opposition to Agesilaus. It is surprising that a more vigorous campaign was not conducted against Thebes.⁵⁰¹ Citing old age, Agesilaus, now over sixty years old, claimed he was unable to lead the campaign. Was this a smokescreen to hide the fact that his foreign policy was in disgrace? His anti-Theban and aggressive imperial policy was well known throughout the Greek world. It suggests that Cleombrotus was sent because he was less hostile to Thebes. A younger man, Cleombrotus and his supporters might have been reevaluating Spartan policy toward Thebes. Failing to attack Thebes, whose army would have been small without Boeotian support, Cleombrotus probably endorsed a policy that advocated

improved relations with Thebes (Plut.*Ages*.26.2). Although speculative, perhaps he encouraged the Thebans to send the embassy mentioned by Isocrates. No evidence exists that Cleombrotus was reprimanded for failing to restore Spartan control over Thebes. This contrasts to the fate of Pausanias in 403 during the democratic restoration in Athens. Since no hostile action was taken against Athens for supporting Thebes, Cleombrotus may also have supported the policy of his father Pausanias to maintain friendly relations with the Athenians. If Cleombrotus and his faction did extend an olive branch to Thebes, it failed when Spartan ephors demanded that Thebes accept the return of the pro-Spartan Thebans.

Xenophon states that in 378 Sphodrias, encouraged by Theban bribery, invaded Attica on his own initiative with the intention of seizing the Piraeus (Xen.*Hell*.V.4.20). However, Diodorus states that Cleombrotus, without informing the ephors, encouraged Sphodrias (Diod.XV.29.5). Leaving during the night, Sphodrias planned to capture the Piraeus at daybreak. Behind schedule when dawn arrived, he stopped near Eleusis, plundered the area, and returned to Thespieae. In response to Athenian protests, the ephors recalled Sphodrias to stand trial for his actions. Refusing to appear, Sphodrias was tried in absentia. Cleombrotus supported Sphodrias. Agesilaus originally opposed exoneration of Sphodrias but voted acquittal because of a love relationship between the sons of Agesilaus and Sphodrias. Apparently the evidence demonstrated Sphodrias's guilt because even Xenophon states the verdict was unjust (Xen.*Hell*.V.4.24).⁵⁰² Hostility in Athens led to the alliance with Thebes later in the year to resist Spartan interference in their affairs (Xen.*Hell*.V.4.20–34; Plut.*Ages*.24.3–26.1; Plut.*Pel*.14).

If Diodorus is correct, the implication of the Sphodrias affair is that Cleombrotus favored a pro-Theban/anti-Athenian policy in contrast to the anti-Theban policy advocated by Agesilaus. The attempted coup on the Piraeus and avoidance of a conflict with Thebes suggests that the supporters of Cleombrotus attempted to provoke Athens into hostility. Why would Cleombrotus provoke Athens now if he initially refrained from punishing Athens immediately after the coup? Plutarch supports Diodorus in claiming Cleombrotus's opposition to a Theban war (Plut.*Ages*.26.2). For lack of conclusive evidence, Diodorus's claim that Cleombrotus sponsored Sphodrias rings hollow. Who sponsored Sphodrias will probably remain a mystery. Xenophon's account seems more reasonable. Thebes needed an ally. Athenian hostility toward Sparta would benefit the new Theban leaders. The failure of the peace overture by Thebes strengthened the position of the opponents of Sparta. Instead of a renewed Spartan-Theban alliance, a renewed Athenian-Theban alliance occurred.

In the summers of 378 and 377 Agesilaus invaded Boeotia, but he failed to reduce Thebes. His assignment to command these expeditions suggests that his supporters were again dominant in the Sparta. Apparently Agesilaus's old age excuse of the previous year was conveniently ignored. Despite the death of Phoebeidas in a cavalry encounter in the winter of 378/377, these campaigns resulted in skirmishing but little was accomplished. Thebes remained independent while some Boeotian cities remained subordinate to Sparta. Suffering from a food shortage, due to the destruction of their crops for the past two years, the Thebans in 377 managed to capture Oreus, which secured a route for the importation of grain from Thessaly. Refusing to engage a combined force of Thebans and Athenians in a superior tactical position in 377, Agesilaus ravaged part of Boeotia and retired. Returning home at the end of the campaign, a blood vessel burst in Agesilaus's leg. This medical condition incapacitated him for the next few years. Consequently, Cleombrotus led the forces into Boeotia in 376. Encountering a Theban-Athenian force occupying the heights of Cithaeron, a minor engagement ensued. Since he claimed that he could not defeat this force, Cleombrotus returned to Sparta (Xen.*Hell.*V.4.35–59; Diod.XV.31–33; Plut.*Ages.*26–27.2; Plut.*Pel.*15). Until his death in 371, Cleombrotus continued to command the Lacedaemonian army. The conflict with Thebes dragged on.

What the internal political situation was in Sparta remains a mystery. The Spartans were reported to be unhappy with the unauthorized actions of Phoebeidas and Sphodrias, but neither man was executed or exiled. What role the ephors, Gerousia, and Assembly played in the conflict between the two kings is unknown. The kings are portrayed as dictating policy but this cannot be true. The ephors, as the chief magistrates, enforced policy determined by the Gerousia. They had the constitutional authority to call out the army and assign which king to command. In principle, two ephors accompanied the king on campaign. Whether they always did cannot be verified. The safest judgment we can suggest is that all Spartan factions were unwilling to surrender Spartan supremacy. The policy and means to maintain that supremacy cannot be definitively determined.

The Second Athenian League (Confederacy)

In the Peace of Antalcidas, Athens only gain from the Corinthian War was the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. Goodwill created during the Corinthian War induced the states of Byzantium, Mytilene, and Chios to remain friendly afterwards (Isoc.XIV.28). Through maritime trade Athens maintained close contact with *poleis* throughout the Aegean basin. In 384/383 Athens made a defensive alliance with

Chios, an original member Delian League, in which the Athenians promised to respect the freedom and autonomy in compliance with the peace (R&O 20).⁵⁰³ Since the Athenians were unwilling to engage in military activities, Athenian generals such as Iphicrates and Chabrias were hired out as soldiers of fortune. However, protest from the Persian satrap Pharnabazus forced the Athenians to recall Chabrias who had unofficially come to the aid of the rebel Acoris in Egypt (Diod.XV.29.2). Athenian support for the Theban liberation provided an example of their promise to respect the freedom and independence of the Greeks. During the winter of 378/377 the Athenians sent envoys throughout Hellas inviting them to join Athens in opposition to Sparta. The Athenians were ready to assume the mantra of defender of Greek freedom and renew their role as the first city of Hellas (Isoc.XIV.17).

Xenophon makes no mention of the birth of the alliance historians now call the Second Athenian League or Second Athenian Confederacy. Fortunately, the foundation of this new League is reported by Diodorus. Accepting the invitation to form an anti-Spartan alliance were the states of Chios, Byzantium, Rhodes, Mytilene, and perhaps Methymna. In the spring of 378 envoys from these states met at Athens to organize the League. The decree of Aristoteles in the spring of 377 outlines the terms of the alliance. It was an *epimachia* (defensive alliance). This alliance was a dual partnership similar to the Peloponnesian League (R&O 22).⁵⁰⁴ Athens was one partner with the allies the other partner. The allies established a *synedrion* (council) to organize their half of the alliance. This body, located at Athens, deliberated independently of the Athenian Assembly. The Athenian Assembly determined Athens policy. The Athenian Assembly in agreement with a majority of league members in their *synedrion* must approve a policy or action before embarked upon. The constitution of the league was based on the principles of freedom and autonomy of each member. Each allied member had one vote in their *synedrion*. Athens was the hegemon, but all members were equal. All future states came in as equal members. Greek and non-Greek states can be members unless subject to Persia. No garrisons or governors will be imposed on member states. No Athenian can hold property in a member state.⁵⁰⁵ These last two clauses were designed to prevent Athenian abuses in the original Delian League.

Although no mechanism was created to fund the league, eventually this alliance would be funded with a *syntaxeis* (contribution) from the allies and an assessment to the Athenian state. This replaced the *phoros* (tribute) assessed in the Delian League. The implication of *syntaxeis* is that there was not a continual revenue stream to fund the alliance. Perhaps each state was to fund its own forces in league actions. This terminology avoided the stigma of allied subordination to

Athens as the term *phoros* symbolized in the fifth century. Executive functions were conducted by Athens as the hegemon. The executive functions were usually conducted by the Athenian generals in the field. Officially designated "The Athenians and the Allies," the title reflects the duality of the alliance. The alliance eventually contained seventy members according to Diodorus (Diod.XV.28–30.2; Dem.XLIX.49; R&O 22).

After the Sphodrias episode, Athens went to war with Sparta. Thebes enrolled in the alliance as a member of the allied *synedrion*. To maintain peaceful relations with Persia, Athens recalled Chabrias from Egypt and dispatched Iphicrates to Pharnabazus to aid the Persians to suppress the Egyptian revolt. In 377 the Thebans conducted the war on land and began to rebuild the Boeotian Federation under the hegemony of Thebes. After Chabrias assisted the Thebans to repulse Agesilaus, he left to conduct a siege of Hestiaea on Euboea, which was loyal to Sparta (Xen.*Hell*.V.4.54–58). Although Chabrias failed in the siege of Hestiaea, he led a naval expedition that recruited other islanders in the Cyclades to join the new Confederation. In 376 the Spartan fleet of sixty ships, under the command of Pollis, attempted a capture of the grain fleet. Patrolling the Saronic Gulf and the Cyclades, the Spartans failed to intercept the fleet and the Athenians successfully guided the grain fleet into the Piraeus. While Chabrias was besieging the island of Naxos, Pollis sailed to support the Naxians. In September, Chabrias, commanding eighty-three ships, defeated the Spartan fleet of sixty-five ships off Naxos. Although the Athenians lost eighteen ships, the Spartans lost twenty-four vessels with another eight ships captured. The victory was complete. This was the first Athenian naval victory over Sparta since the Peloponnesian War. With this victory the Athenians secured the sea-lanes for the grain fleet as well as control of the Cyclades in the central Aegean.

In 375 Chabrias sailed along the Thracian coast recruiting new allies and defended Abdera against some Thracians. In this same year Thebes appealed to Athens for support against a Spartan invasion of Boeotia across the Corinthian Gulf. The Athenians dispatched Timotheus with sixty ships around the Peloponnese. He brought Corcyra and other Ionian islands into the Athenian alliance. The Spartans sent Nicolochus with fifty-five ships against him. At Alyzia Timotheus defeated the Spartan fleet (Xen.*Hell*.V.4.60–66; Diod.Sic.XV.34–36).⁵⁰⁶ These naval victories at Naxos and Alyzia reinvigorated the Athenians and the alliance. Athens was again mistress of the sea around the Hellenic mainland!

Theban Offensive

The failure of the Spartan offensives in Boeotia since Thebes' liberation allowed the Thebans to strengthen their position against their neighbors. In 378 the Thebans campaigned against Thespieae and defeated the Spartan force under Phoebidas, but Thespieae remained under Spartan control. The failure of the Spartan invasions in 377 and 376 allowed Thebes to subdue the Boeotian neighbors. Returning from a campaign in Locris in 375, at Tegyra a Spartan army, consisting of two *morai* and outnumbering their opponents, was defeated by the Sacred Band and a small cavalry force led by Pelopidas.⁵⁰⁷ Although this was probably a minor engagement, this defeat was another blow against the prestige of the Spartan army. After this defeat, Orchomenus was the last Boeotian *polis* to submit to Theban leadership.⁵⁰⁸ Although the exact date cannot be determined, between 378 and 375 the Boeotian League was revived. Plutarch tells us that Pelopidas, who died in 364, was a Boeotarch thirteen times (Plut.*Pel.*34.5). This would imply a date of 377 for the League revival (Diod.XV.37.1–2; Plut.*Pel.*16–17; Plut.*Ages.*27.3).

The constitution of the new federation is unclear. Xenophon makes no mention of it. Historians debate whether the new League was similar to the previous League or a modification with Thebes absorbing some of the smaller *poleis* by synoecism.⁵⁰⁹ We do know that the executive officials were still called Boeotarchs and a League Assembly existed (Diod.XVII.9.1). Apparently there was no League Council. The Assembly was sovereign and determined policy. Its members might have been selected on a democratic basis representing all Boeotian cantons now reduced to seven.⁵¹⁰ The League Boeotarchs were reduced from eleven to seven. The Assembly met at Thebes. Regardless of the political structure, Thebes dominated the League. Since Theban leaders monopolized League magistracies, Theban policies predominated.

By 375 with the Boeotian League restored, Thebes looked to expand into central Greece. Thebes formed an alliance with Jason, the tyrant of Pherae, who had become *tagos* of a restored Thessalian League (Xen.*Hell.*VI.4.28).⁵¹¹ The moment seemed opportune to subjugate Phocis. Thebes invaded Phocis. However, Phocis appealed to Sparta for support, which was granted. A Spartan force under Cleombrotus was dispatched. To avoid a conflict with Cleombrotus, the Thebans withdrew from Phocis. An appeal from Polydamas of Pharsalus for Spartan support against Jason was rejected by Sparta. The Spartans were stretched too thin to intervene in Thessaly (Xen.*Hell.*VI.1).

As a result of the Boeotian reunification, formation of the Second Athenian League, and failure to defeat this Theban/Athenian coalition, Sparta favored another diplomatic common peace. Xenophon

mentions Athenian financial exhaustion and fear of Theban power as reasons for Athens' interest in peace (Xen.*Hell.*VI.2.1). The Athenians also probably wanted peace because their imperial objectives were achieved. Peace would allow Athens to consolidate its gains. Xenophon makes no mention of Spartan weakness or exhaustion. Since this peace was proposed by Persia, Diodorus tells us that Persia had an interest in peace because the Great King wanted to hire Greek mercenaries to subdue Egypt. It is unclear why Thebes would want peace. Was it war weariness? Did Thebes need peace to consolidate its control of Boeotia? It is uncertain whether Thebes agreed to this peace on its behalf or represented all Boeotia. This common peace of 375, based on the terms agreed to in the Peace of Antalcidas of 386, was accepted by all (Xen.*Hell.*VI.2; Diod.XV.38).

Unfortunately, the peace was broken within a year by all parties due to mutual suspicions. Theban ambitions were not checked. The Thebans consolidated their control over Boeotia. This consolidation would cost them the support of Athens. In 373/372 Thebes again destroyed the restored Plataea and the inhabitants fled to Athens for refuge. Thebes might have applied the same fate to Thespieae in 372/371. Theban expansion into central Greece and the alliance with Jason of Pherae were perceived as threats to Athenian interests. Although Thebes contributed ships to Timotheus's naval campaign in 373 and participated in the *synedrion* of the league in 372, Theban financial contributions to the Second Athenian League were ended (Xen.*Hell.*VI.3.1; Diod.XV.46.4–6; R & O 29).⁵¹²

Athenian/Spartan Conflict

The common peace of 375 did not end the naval war between Athens and Sparta.⁵¹³ Timotheus, summoned home after the peace, stopped at Zacynthus and restored some exiles. The Zacynthians protested this restoration to Sparta. Claiming that this action violated the peace, in the spring of 374 the Spartans dispatched a fleet of twenty-five ships under Aristocrates to settle Zacynthian affairs. Meanwhile, the people of Corcyra were again engaged in civil war between the democrats and oligarchs. The democrats gained the upper hand. The oligarchs appealed to Sparta. In 373 the Spartans launched a fleet of sixty ships under the command of Mnasippus to settle affairs in western waters. Accompanied by Lacedaemonian troops and 1,500 mercenaries, Mnasippus sailed for Corcyra. Upon arrival he ravaged the land and besieged the city under the control of the democracy. The Corcyraeans appealed to Athens for support. The Athenians assigned Timotheus to command a relief expedition of sixty ships to Zacynthus and Corcyra. Lacking money and manpower,

Timotheus sailed with a partial fleet. Sailing through the Cyclades, and perhaps Thrace, to gather men and money, he arrived late in the season back at Athens without sailing to the west. Placed on trial for treason, he was convicted and removed from command ([Dem.].XLIX.6–24).

Still lacking the financial resources to launch the fleet, the Athenians sent a mercenary force of six hundred men under Ctesicles overland to Epirus during the winter of 373/372. From here they were transported to Corcyra. Avoiding the Spartan forces, Ctesicles arrived unhindered in the city. Timotheus's replacement was Iphicrates. He sailed westward with seventy ships later this winter. Sailing slowly around the Peloponnese to train his troops and settle political affairs in the west, the Athenians reached Corcyra by spring. By this time Mnasippus was killed in battle on Corcyra and the Spartan forces retreated to the island of Leucas. Soon after his arrival, Iphicrates captured a Syracusan relief squadron sent by Dionysius I to support Sparta. Still lacking financial resources to maintain the fleet, Iphicrates used his sailors to help the Corcyraeans restore their island in exchange for pay for his crews. With the hoplites and peltasts, he sailed with part of the fleet to Acarnania to aid the friends of Athens and perhaps also raise money. After defeating the Thyrians, he returned to Corcyra. Combining the fleet of Corcyra with the Athenians, he now commanded ninety ships to conduct raids against the Peloponnese (Xen.*Hell.*VI.2.1–38; Diod.XV.45–47). However, these raids would never take place as Athens made peace again with Sparta.

Although successful in these endeavors, Athenian resources were stretched to the limit. The new naval alliance was defensive by treaty and based on contributions rather than tribute. Apparently the contributions were insufficient to supply the fleet adequately. As demonstrated, Athenian commanders spent more time raising revenue and recruiting men rather than engaging the enemy. Athenian actions were slow and defensive. The Athenians were reacting to Spartan initiatives rather than inaugurating actions of their own. It is reasonable to suspect that the Athenians and their allies were halfheartedly committed to this latest war. Consequently, the growth of Theban power, war weariness, and their own financial exhaustion again motivated the Athenians to favor another peace agreement by 371.

Leuctra

In 371 the Athenians sent ambassadors to Thebes and Sparta to make another version of the common peace. The peace conference met at Sparta in midsummer. Speaking before the Spartan Assembly,

the Athenian ambassadors proposed a new common peace based on the freedom and autonomy of the Greeks. The speech of Callistratus clearly demonstrates Athens fear of the growth of Theban power (Xen.*Hell.*VI.3.13). Athens and Sparta agreed to a peace. They would withdraw their land and sea forces, eliminate garrisons and governors, and respect the freedom and autonomy of the Greeks. The Spartans swore to the peace on behalf of the Peloponnesian League but Athens and the allies swore separately. The Thebans initially agreed to the terms as "Thebans," but then the next day Epaminondas insisted that the term be changed to "Boeotians" indicating that Thebes represented the League, and therefore, the autonomy clause would not apply to the restored Boeotian League. Plutarch states that Epaminondas said that Thebes would cease control of Boeotia if the Spartans would end their control of Laconia. Agesilaus refused to change the treaty terminology. The peace was agreed to by the various Greek embassies except the Thebans (Xen.*Hell.*VI.3.2–20; Diod.XV.50.4–6; Plut.*Pel.*20.1; Plut.*Ages.*28.1–2).

At the time of the peace conference, Cleombrotus was leading a Peloponnesian army in Phocis. The Spartan leaders ordered Cleombrotus to march against Thebes to enforce the terms of the peace. Invading Boeotia via an unguarded mountainous route, he made camp at Leuctra by mid-August. The Boeotian army led by Epaminondas, currently a Boeotarch, and Pelopidas, commander of the Theban Sacred Band, camped on a hill nearby. Both sides were determined to bring on an engagement. Using novel battle tactics, Epaminondas put his striking force on his left opposite the Spartan right wing, which was always composed of Spartan citizens.⁵¹⁴ While approaching the Spartan army, he drew his phalanx obliquely to the left to separate the Spartan right wing with its king from the rest of the army. The ruse worked. A gap opened in the Lacedaemonian line. Pelopidas led the Sacred Band into the gap and attacked the Spartiates. In the ensuing struggle Cleombrotus was killed along with four hundred of the seven hundred Spartiates present. Total Lacedaemonian casualties were about a thousand (Xen.*Hell.*VI.4.15).⁵¹⁵ Although the surviving Spartiates wanted to renew the battle to retrieve their honor, their allies refused. Since the Thebans were also unwilling to renew the conflict, both sides held their positions for a few days awaiting reinforcements. The Thebans granted the Spartans a truce to gather their dead. Learning of this disaster during their celebration of the Gymnopaedia, the ephors forbade the surviving relatives to mourn. The next day the ephors called out the remnants of the Spartan army to rescue the remaining forces (Xen.*Hell.*VI.4.1–19; Diod.XV.51–56; Plut.*Pel.*23; Plut.*Ages.*28.3–6).

After the battle, the Thebans sent heralds to Athens to announce

their victory and request Athenian aid to destroy the Spartans. As allies against Sparta, the Theban leadership probably expected Athens to honor the alliance. Stunned by the news, the Athenians sent the Thebans away without responding to their request. The Thebans also requested the aid of Jason of Pherae to support them against a Spartan counterattack. Jason marched his Thessalians through Phocis into Boeotia. Advising the Thebans not to be rash in their actions, Jason encouraged them to consolidate their gains before embarking on further action against Sparta. Most likely Jason hoped to play the role of power broker between Thebes and Sparta since his strong forces could swing the military balance of power to either side. Consequently, Jason negotiated a truce with the remaining Spartan forces at Leuctra. Probably suspicious of the truce and the Thebans, the survivors left secretly at night. Arriving in the Megarid, they encountered the Spartan relief force commanded by Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus. Upon the arrival of the remaining allies, Archidamus decided not to invade Boeotia. Why did he withdraw? Xenophon does not say. What instructions the ephors assigned Archidamus is unknown. Perhaps his army was demoralized by the casualties suffered by the survivors. Since the survivors were returning and the dead buried, perhaps there was no military value in continuing on.⁵¹⁶ Whatever the reasons, Archidamus led the allies back to Corinth and disbanded them. He led the Lacedaemonians home (*Xen. Hell.* VI.4.20–26).

Summary

This disaster was the straw that broke the camel's back of Spartan imperialism. The year 371, along with the years of 480 and 404, is a milestone in Hellenic history. After Leuctra the military reputation of Sparta passed into legend. The military legacy of Sparta would be replaced by the Macedonian legacy later in the century. Although events would need to play out, Sparta would never again be the leading *polis* of Hellas. Since the late sixth century Sparta was the acknowledged land power of Hellas. As hegemon of the Peloponnesian League, Sparta commanded the strongest army. Only Athens challenged that supremacy with the naval empire in the fifth century. Sparta's victory in the Peloponnesian War made it supreme. However, this supremacy was short-lived. Sparta failed to establish a harmonious peace. Checked militarily in the Corinthian War, Sparta emerged victorious with the peace but only at the price of alliance with Persia. The Peace of Antalcidas temporarily checked the increasing power of Thebes and a rejuvenated Athens. The defeat at Leuctra destroyed Spartan manpower. Few Spartiates remained. The ensuing

invasions of the Peloponnese in the 360s by Theban forces would destroy Sparta's economic foundation.

The liberation of Thebes and the birth of the Second Athenian League in 377 set in motion forces Sparta could not check. Designed to counter Spartan aggression, the new Athenian alliance would encompass seventy members. Beside defense, perhaps the greatest benefit to its members was the economic opportunities for increased prosperity. If true, this prosperity did not translate to more revenue for the League because the constitution prevented the imposition of tribute. League finances were based on the voluntary contributions of member states. Therefore, Athenian military actions and territorial gains were restricted due to lack of financial resources. Athens could not become the imperial power it was in the fifth century.

The liberation of Thebes set loose forces not seen before in Boeotia. Between 378 and 371 Theban leadership brought forth a restored Boeotian League under Theban hegemony. The constitution of this league had a broader citizen base than the earlier league. Whether this league can be classified as oligarchic or democratic is subject to debate. Often a major player in Hellenic history, Thebes now became *the* player. Epaminondas and Pelopidas introduced leadership qualities that previous Theban leaders never demonstrated. The rise of Thebes under these two able men brings up a major debate throughout history. Do historical forces or great men and women determine history? Was the rise of Thebes due to the talents of these men or the military and economic weakness of Sparta and Athens? This is not meant to be an either/or question. Historical causation is not that simple. Humans interact with their times. In today's computer parlance, any historical period is the output of the input of forces and human actions that preceded it. This writer tends to subscribe to human over historical forces if the scale of evaluation is about balanced. While they lived, these two men were selected annual officials in the Boeotian League. All military and diplomatic accomplishments occurred under their leadership. Unfortunately, as we will see, with their demise went the fortunes of Thebes. Although Thebes would remain a major player until its defeat in 338 and destruction in 335, the Thebans never again experienced the dominant position they would hold for the next decade.

Despite their imperial ambitions, the Spartans never reformed the Lycurgan constitution to meet the challenges of the fourth century. Spartan obligations and ambitions exceeded the material resources the Spartans could bring to the table. The Lycurgan constitution was not altered to increase the declining citizen population. From a citizen base of eight thousand men in 480, Sparta had perhaps less than a

thousand after Leuctra.⁵¹⁷ Allies, liberated helots, perioeci, and mercenaries primarily composed Spartan armies. Spartiates, despite their professionalism, were now too few to maintain their military leadership. The agrarian economic base was not diversified to adapt to a money economy and market exchanges that developed throughout the eastern Mediterranean basin.

Sparta's army viewed as a bastion of freedom in the Persian War in 480 was now viewed as a bastion of tyranny in 371. A defender of Hellenic autonomy and freedom in 480, Sparta made a mockery of those concepts after 404. Through the application of military threats, the imposition of governors and garrisons, support for extreme oligarchies, and alliance with Persia, Sparta maintained the hegemony of Hellas. The defense of Greek freedom at Thermopylae under Leonidas became the suppression of that freedom under Agesilaus. A glorious past would not be missed by Hellenes who now despised Spartan arrogance. Sparta passed from liberator to tyrant. The majority of contemporary Hellenes did not mourn the reduction of Sparta to a mediocre un-walled *polis* on the Eurotas River in Laconia.

-
- 495 (Salmon 1984), 371.
- 496 *Diokismos* (dioecism) refers to the physical dismantling of the *polis*.
- 497 (Smith 1953-1954), 275–276. This was the first recorded example that Sparta accepted money in lieu of manpower from League members (Xen.*Hell.V.2.21–22*). Mercenaries were more subservient to Spartan command than the citizen soldiers of the allies. Sparta could also act more independently from the allies. Thus, they adopted the policy that Athens used to create the fifth-century empire.
- 498 Xenophon implies condemnation of this action (Xen.*Hell.V.2.32*). Plutarch mentions an opposition in Sparta to Agesilaus's policies (Plut.*Ages.23.3–4*). He also suggests that Agesilaus sponsored Phoebidas's actions (Plut.*Ages.24.1*).
- 499 See Seager in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 156. Seager suggests that Thebes may have been allied to Sparta after the peace (Plut.*Pel.5.1*).
- 500 See Seager in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 165. Seager prefers Diodorus's account. (N. Hammond 1986), 482. Hammond accepts Xenophon's account.
- 501 (Smith 1953-1954), 280–288. Smith argues that an opposition party to Agesilaus was led by Cleombrotus in the 370s. Cleombrotus was pro-Theban and favored conflict with Athens. Sparta should expand in the Aegean and leave the mainland alone. Agesilaus's policy was anti-Theban. He advocated Spartan control of the mainland. He abandoned the Aegean and the Asiatic Greeks in the Peace of Antalcidas.
- 502 Although Xenophon emphasizes Spartan respect for the law and their magistrates (Xen.*Lac.Pol.VIII.1*), apparently Spartans could be blind in their implementation of justice. Somehow, internal politics trumped the law in the Sphodrias's acquittal.
- 503 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 82–86. Inscription number 20 is a copy of the treaty.
- 504 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 92–105. Inscription number 22 is a prospectus of the league outlining the terms of the treaty and the members of the League. (N. Hammond 1986), 486–488.
- 505 This clause prohibited the establishment of cleruchs in the member states that were unpopular in the fifth century Empire.
- 506 Isocrates claims the victory of Timotheus encouraged the Spartans to agree to a peace (Isoc.XV.108–110).
- 507 A Spartan *mora* consisted of 500 to 900 men reports Plutarch (Plut.*Pel.17.2*). The Sacred Band at Thebes consisted of three hundred chosen men sponsored by the *polis* for special military training. Originally they fought as individuals. However, from this time under the command of Pelopidas to their demise at Chaeronea in 338, these men fought as a unit and were at the head of the Boeotian phalanx (Plut.*Pel.18–19*).
- 508 In 364 Orchomenus suffered the fate of *andrapodismos* by Thebes. The city was razed, part of the population was executed, and the remainder were enslaved.
- 509 See Seager in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 177–178. Seager suggests that there may have been a synoecism into a single Boeotian state dominated by Thebes.
- 510 (N. Hammond 1986), 485. Hammond suggests the new league was organized on democratic principles. (Rhodes 2010), 283–284. Rhodes says that there is little evidence that the League was organized on a democratic basis. Citizenship was

still based on property qualifications.

- 511 *Tagos* was the title of the elected supreme civil and military leader of the
Thessalian League.
- 512 Inscription number 29 mentions Thebes conducting the *synedrion* in Athens in
372, which indicates it was still a member of the Athenian alliance. (Rhodes and
Osborne 2003), 146–149.
- 513 Diodorus and Nepos claimed that Sparta recognized Athenian hegemony at sea
in the peace (Diod.XV.38.4; Nepos.*Tim*.2.2).
- 514 (Adcock 1957), 24. Adcock considers Epaminondas the greatest military
innovator the Greeks produced.
- 515 Diodorus says the Lacedaemonians suffered more than four thousand dead while
the Boeotians lost three hundred men (Diod.XV.56.4). (Anderson 1970), 207–
208. Anderson believes Diodorus exaggerated the casualty figures.
- 516 (Anderson 1970), 205.
- 517 (Cartledge 2004), 226.

Thebes Ascendant (371–362 BC)

The Peloponnese

After the victory at Leuctra, Thebes ceased being a member of the Athenian Confederacy. How or why Thebes left we are not told. The cold reception the Theban envoys received in Athens after they announced their victory over Sparta must have demonstrated to the Theban leadership that friendly relations with Athens were over. In the fall of 371 Thebes did not participate in the new common peace arranged by Athens and the Persian king. Athens and its League allied with Sparta. Thebes consolidated its position in Boeotia by forcing Orchomenus into the Boeotian league. Next Thebes strengthened its position in central Greece with an alliance with Phocis, Locris, and Aetolia (Xen.*Hell.*6.5.1–3; Diod.XV.57.1). With their back secure, the Thebans were prepared for a final showdown to destroy Spartan power.

While Thebes consolidated its position in 370, there was turmoil in Thessaly and the Peloponnese. Jason of Pherae, as *tagos* of the Thessalian League, was at the height of his power and in position to challenge any Greek state for hegemony. Xenophon says that he was the greatest man of his day in Hellas (Xen.*Hell.*VI.4.28). Unfortunately, for Jason, while presiding over some league affair, he was assassinated. As a consequence of his death, in the next few years various successors became tyrants in Pherae and attempted to dominate Thessalian affairs. Their actions would draw in Thebes to protect the Thessalian *poleis* who wished to remain independent (Xen.*Hell.*VI.4.29–37). Pelopidas, representing Theban interests, would be involved in numerous incidents that would eventually cost him his life in 364.

In the Peloponnese, the earthquake that was the defeat at Leuctra left deep fissures in the political landscape. Other Peloponnesian states saw their opportunity to throw off the Spartan yoke. Argos, Elis, and the Arcadian *poleis* expected a new dawn with the sunset of Sparta. Argos suffered a bout of *stasis* between democrats and oligarchs. Whatever triggered this episode, the result was that over 1,200 Argives were killed by the democrats. Later they killed their own leaders (Diod.XV.57.3–58.4). This turmoil prevented

Argos from stepping into Sparta's shoes to exercise a leading role in Peloponnesian affairs.

Mantineia, which had been dissolved into smaller villages in 385/384 by Sparta, was restored as a *polis* in 370. Supported by most Arcadians and Elis, Mantineia rebuffed an initiative by Agesilaus to prevent the reunification.⁵¹⁸ Realizing Spartan weakness, Agesilaus did not militarily interfere with this synoecism. In other Arcadian cities a movement began to create an Arcadian League that would be independent of Sparta. Lycomedes of Mantineia spearheaded the formation of the League.⁵¹⁹ The Mantineans sent troops to Tegea to aid the democrats who favored the League against the pro-Spartan oligarchs. Many oligarchs fled to Sparta after they witnessed their fellow citizens killed by their democratic opponents (*Xen.Hell.VI.5.6–10*). The ephors ordered Agesilaus to lead a Spartan force to Tegea to restore the exiles and dissolve the Arcadian League. Argos and Elis came to the aid of the Arcadians. This coalition requested an alliance with Athens, but the Athenians refused. Envoys were then sent to Thebes requesting an alliance. Meanwhile, Agesilaus ravaged Arcadia up to Mantineia. Since both sides avoided battle, Agesilaus returned with his army to Laconia for the winter.

In a winter campaign Epaminondas led a Boeotian army to Arcadia to ensure the survival of the Arcadian League.⁵²⁰ Initially intending to return home after the Spartan withdrawal, Epaminondas was urged by the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans to attack Sparta in its weakened condition. Initially hesitant, Epaminondas eventually agreed. Epaminondas threatened Sparta itself but did not launch a direct assault. Only with extreme difficulty did the Spartans and their allies rally to defend their unfortified city. Had Epaminondas pressed the issue, Sparta probably would have fallen. For whatever reason, Epaminondas neither now nor in the future attempted to erase Sparta from the map.

The allied force of forty thousand soldiers then ravaged much of Laconia including the port of Gytheum. Then they liberated Messenia.⁵²¹ Along with the liberation of the helots of Messenia, some Laconian helots and perioeci were also removed from Spartan control. Informed of the invasion, the Athenians voted to aid Sparta. They sent out Iphicrates with an army. Iphicrates eventually reached Arcadia but failed to hinder Epaminondas's campaign. After a three-month campaign, Epaminondas withdrew his army in the spring of 369. Iphicrates then led the Athenians home. (*Xen.Hell.VI.5.3–52*; *Diod.XV.62–66.6*; *Plut.Ages.30.5–32*).

At Leuctra, the military power and pride of Sparta was destroyed. This winter campaign destroyed the economic base of Sparta.⁵²² Laconia was severely ravaged and much booty taken. The liberation of

Messenia removed the helot servile labor. This loss of land and population destroyed the agricultural base that supported the Spartan army for centuries. The foundation of the new *polis* of Messene on Mount Ithome for the Messenians was designed to prevent a Spartan reconquest. Messene was constructed with a strong wall to protect the new urban center. Although Epaminondas was given credit for its foundation, the Arcadians were in complete agreement. Messene was populated from local inhabitants as well as Messenian emigres, whose ancestors had fled Messenia in previous generations to avoid the Spartan yoke (Plut.*Pel.*24.5; Plut.*Ages.*34.1).

These accomplishments by Epaminondas far exceeded his original objective, which was the defense of Arcadia. The Spartans neither accepted the liberation of Messenia nor the loss of some of their subject population in Laconia. However, they were unable to reverse these losses. Their inability or unwillingness to reform the Lycurgan constitution, to improve the social and economic foundation, left Sparta with a citizen population too small to restore the strength of the army. A quarter century earlier Agesilaus invaded the Persian Empire. Now he could barely defend Laconia. Unfortunately for Sparta, despite a temporary recovery with Athenian help, Spartan fortunes would sink lower still by the end of the decade.

The alliance between Athens and Sparta did not prevent a second Theban invasion of the Peloponnese in 369 (Diod.XV.67.1). Encouraged by the success of the winter campaign, the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans persuaded the Boeotians to return and reorganize the Peloponnese. Epaminondas again led the expedition. Attacking Sparta's allies, he subdued Sicyon but kept the oligarchic government in place. Failing to capture Troezen, Epidaurus, and finally Corinth, which was defended by the Athenians, Spartans, and mercenaries sent by Dionysius I, Epaminondas returned to Thebes. After Epaminondas's departure, Argos, Elis, and the Arcadians campaigned against some of the smaller Peloponnesian *poleis* without much success (Xen.*Hell.*VII.1.1–26; Diod.XV.68–70.1). Although checked at Corinth, Epaminondas leadership of the allied army forced the coalition of Sparta and Athens to remain on the defensive. They danced to the tune that Epaminondas chose. The Thebans demonstrated that they could intervene in the Peloponnese anytime they chose.

In the winter of 369/368 the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes sent Philiscus with a large sum of money to Hellas. Whether his mission was to create another common peace or recruit mercenaries for Persia, he failed on both counts. He arranged for a peace conference at Delphi. Sparta and Thebes failed to agree to the peace because Thebes would not abandon the freedom of the Messenians. After this failure, Philiscus recruited two thousand mercenaries for Sparta and

returned to Asia (Xen.*Hell.*VII.1.27; Diod.XV.70.2).

In 368 the Thebans ignored Peloponnesian affairs. The Arcadians and Argives supported Euphron in Sicyon when he replaced the oligarchic government with a democratic one. Eventually he became tyrant of Sicyon and banished the democrats. In southwestern Arcadia, the Arcadians trapped the Spartan army under Archidamus but lost a battle. In this “Tearless Battle” Xenophon claims that the Spartans suffered no casualties while many Arcadians were killed. He also states that the Thebans and Eleans, whose relations with Arcadia were strained due to the Arcadian League’s independent actions, were not disappointed with this defeat (Xen.*Hell.*VII.1.28–32). Whether these relations were strained or wishful thinking by Xenophon, the Thebans continued to support the Arcadian League. In response to this defeat, the Arcadians established a new *polis* called Megalopolis in southwest Arcadia. The synoecism of this new fortified urban center was composed of some forty villages. The establishment of Megalopolis provided another bulwark to prevent Spartan forces from invading the northern Peloponnese. Despite Xenophon’s silence, Pausanias tells us that Epaminondas encouraged the foundation and sent one thousand troops under Pammenes to protect the construction. Lycomedes of Mantinea was chosen one of the founders (Diod.XV.72; Plut.*Ages.*33.3–5; Paus.VIII.27.2).

Thebes was proclaimed the liberator of Hellas by the Peloponnesians. Sparta was reduced to the borders of Laconia. The restoration of Mantinea (370), the foundation of Messene (369), and the addition of Megalopolis (368) created a new ring of fortified cities in the Peloponnese to keep Sparta in check.⁵²³ Although it took a few years before Megalopolis was firmly established as a *polis*, its foundation further strengthened the Arcadian League. Only the Athenian alliance and Persian gold kept Sparta a relevant player in the Peloponnese. The loss of the Arcadia, Elis, and Sicyon left the old Peloponnesian League but a shell of its former self. Within a couple of years, the League would disband after Corinth abandoned the alliance. Could Thebes liberate other Hellenes?

Thessaly and Macedonia

With Theban control of central Greece and the Peloponnese temporarily secured, the Thebans turned their attention to the north. They were drawn into the conflict between the tyrants of Pherae and the other Thessalian *poleis*. Located on the Thessaly’s northern border, Macedonia was also drawn into these disputes. In 369 Alexander of Pherae was trying to restore the dominance of Pherae

within the Thessalian League that Jason had established in 370s. As Epaminondas guided Theban interests in the Peloponnese, Pelopidas became the front man for Theban interests in Thessaly.

In 369 the Thessalian opposition, led by the *poleis* of Larissa and Pharsalus, appealed to Macedonia and Thebes for support. The Macedonian King Alexander II (370/369–368) responded first and launched a preemptive strike. He captured the *poleis* of Larissa and Crannon. However, rather than act as a protector, he acted as a conqueror. He garrisoned the two cities with Macedonian troops and subjected them to his rule (Diod.XV.61). During the rule of his father Amyntas III (393–370), the kingdom of Macedonia had reached its nadir of power. Defeated by the Illyrians and the Chalcidian League, Amyntas became a puppet of Sparta in the 370s. At his death in 370 Macedonia was smaller in terms of territory, militarily weaker, and less prosperous than at his accession. The actions of Alexander II were the beginning steps to rebuild the kingdom.⁵²⁴

Responding to the Thessalian appeal, with Epaminondas in the Peloponnese, the Thebans assigned an army under Pelopidas to settle the Thessalian issue. In the 370s the friendship between Thebes and Jason of Pherae secured the Boeotian northern backdoor. After Jason's death, tensions increased between Alexander of Pherae, who had murdered Jason's brother and seized the tyranny, and the Boeotian League. Avoiding a military confrontation with Pherae and Macedonia, Pelopidas recovered Larissa and Crannon from Macedonian control. At this time Pelopidas might have organized the Thessalian opposition to Pherae into a new Thessalian League.⁵²⁵ Pelopidas urged Alexander of Pherae to moderate his rule but did not force him from his tyranny. Proceeding to Macedonia, Pelopidas arranged an alliance with Alexander II. Alexander secured the alliance by sending hostages to Thebes (Diod.XV.67.3–4; Plut.*Pel.*26).⁵²⁶

Unfortunately, Thessalian and Macedonian affairs remained unsettled. In 368 King Alexander II was assassinated. Ptolemy (368–365), who might have been a cousin and one of the assassins, ruled as regent for the future Perdiccas III (365–359). Thus, Macedonia, in a state of turmoil, was unable to interfere in Thessaly. In response to another appeal from the Thessalians, Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent as ambassadors to Alexander of Pherae to resolve the discord. Before settling with Alexander, Pelopidas recruited some Thessalians and marched into Macedonia. Perhaps this intervention resulted from the request of the supporters of the murdered Alexander II based on the Theban alliance. Avoiding a military encounter, Pelopidas reached an agreement and alliance with Ptolemy, who was challenged by the pretender Pausanias then campaigning in the northern part of the Chalcidice. Ptolemy secured the alliance by sending the future Philip II,

Alexander II's younger brother, as a hostage to Thebes. Perhaps this agreement with Ptolemy was also designed to counter Athenian ambitions toward Amphipolis. Athens had dispatched Iphicrates with a force to take advantage of the turmoil within Macedonia to gain new allies and exploit the natural resources (timber, silver, gold, etc.) of the Thracian area. Iphicrates chased the pretender Pausanias from Macedonia and remained in the Thrace until replaced in 365.

Pelopidas and Ismenias returned to Thessaly to negotiate with Alexander of Pherae. Without a Boeotian army to support them, Alexander imprisoned both men. He then proceeded to capture Pharsalus. Outraged, the Thebans sent an army of eight thousand hoplites and six hundred cavalry against Alexander to rescue the ambassadors. Fearing Thebes, Alexander entered into an alliance with Athens. Athens responded with an army of one thousand men. Creating sound and fury the Theban army accomplished nothing. Diodorus claims that harassed by the forces of Alexander and Athens and abandoned by their Thessalian allies, the Boeotian army was extricated from a difficult situation by Epaminondas who was serving as a private soldier. This army failed to rescue Pelopidas and Ismenias. Returning home with the army, the Theban generals were fined (Diod.XV.71).

In the spring of 367 Epaminondas, again elected a Boeotarch, was assigned command of the army and invaded Thessaly. Plutarch says that Epaminondas was not militarily aggressive because he feared for the safety of the ambassadors. This claim is probably true. Epaminondas also understood the popularity of Pelopidas and his value to the Thebes. Therefore, he did not want to see Pelopidas executed by Alexander in a desperate gambit to remain in power. Alexander had demonstrated how ruthless he could become when he killed the Thessalian inhabitants of Meliboea and Scotussa. Avoiding a conflict, Epaminondas maneuvered Alexander into seeking peace. What Athens' position was in these negotiations is unknown. It is uncertain that Athenian troops were even present since there is no mention of them. However, the negotiations progressed, peace was not achieved. Both sides did agree to a thirty-day truce. Alexander released his prisoners unharmed. Epaminondas led the army home and Alexander remained in power (Diod.XV.75; Plut.*Pel.*27–29). Alexander's ambitions in Thessaly were checked but not checkmated. Fortunately for Thebes, Pelopidas would provide his services for three more years. Unfortunately for Thebes, he would then meet his destiny in Thessaly.

Peace Overtures

Looking for support from the Great King, in 367 Sparta and Athens sent ambassadors to Susa in hopes of arranging another common peace to check Theban ambitions. Antalcidas, now an old man, was sent by the Spartans as one of their ambassadors. Perhaps the Spartans hoped that Antalcidas could repeat the peace he achieved twenty years earlier. Timagoras and Leon represented Athens. Representing Thebes and its allies were Pelopidas, Antiochus for the Arcadian League, and Archidamus for Elis. Xenophon and Plutarch tell us that Pelopidas won the confidence of the Great King. The terms of this new King's Peace proposed by Pelopidas were the independence of Messene from Sparta; Athens must mothball the fleet; the Greeks should be autonomous; and whoever did not agree to these terms would be coerced by the signatories. Despite months of negotiations, the only other terms mentioned is that Elis was granted some disputed territories from Arcadia. Apparently recognizing that Thebes was the rising star, Artaxerxes II ignored the wishes of Sparta and Athens. Persian interests were protected in the Aegean if the presence of the Athenian fleet was reduced. The Boeotian League's small navy could not challenge Persia. Sparta was no longer a threat to Persia. The autonomy clause meant a fragmented Hellas could not threaten Persia.

When the ambassadors returned, the Athenians disliked the terms and executed Timagoras for failure to represent Athenian interests. Obviously Athens would not surrender the fleet or abandon the Second Athenian League based on Thebes' use of the autonomy clause. Antalcidas returned to Sparta and committed suicide. The Spartans would not accept the loss of Messenia. The Arcadians resented the loss of territory to Elis.

After the ambassadors returned, the Thebans called a peace conference in Thebes in early 366. The peace conference was a failure. Hearing the terms from the Great King's envoy, the ambassadors claimed that they were sent to hear the terms not to swear an oath of allegiance. Lycomedes, representing the Arcadian League, did not recognize the legitimacy of the conference. After the rejection of the peace, the Thebans sent ambassadors to the individual cities to urge acceptance of the peace. Their first stop was Corinth. The Corinthians refused to swear an oath. The other *poleis* followed Corinth's lead (Xen.*Hell.*VII.1.33–40; Plut.*Pel.*30). Thebes won the peace in Persia but lost it in Hellas. Theban hegemony was rejected by friends, Arcadia, and foes, Athens and Sparta. Persia gained nothing. The Great King chose an ally that could not deliver the goods. Within the next few years, multiple satraps would revolt from Artaxerxes II and they would recruit Greek mercenaries. There would be no peace on either shore of the Aegean.

The Peloponnese Revisited

The failure of diplomacy meant the use of force. In the summer of 366 Athens and the Arcadian League made a defensive alliance. To restore the prestige of Thebes, Epaminondas returned to the Peloponnese with an army. Whether to intimidate Arcadia, mend diplomatic fences, or some other reason, Epaminondas's objective must have been the restoration of the Arcadian alliance. Before confronting Arcadia, he invaded Achaëa on Arcadia's northern border to end the neutrality of the Achaean cities. The oligarchic governments came to terms with Epaminondas. Since they agreed to become allies, they remained in power. However, he removed Achaean garrisons from Dyme in western Achaëa and Naupactus and Calydon in western Locris north of the Corinthian Gulf. This action secured control of the Corinthian Gulf, which allowed Thebes to invade the Peloponnese by sea if the land route through the isthmus was blocked. Returning home, Epaminondas encountered opposition in Thebes regarding his political settlement. His settlement of Achaëa was opposed by the Arcadians and the Achaean democrats. The Theban government rejected his settlement. Theban officials were sent to the various Achaean cities. Supported by the democrats, these Theban officials expelled the oligarchs. However, this political settlement backfired against Thebes. The oligarchs banded together and attacked the various cities and overthrew all the democrats. After their restoration to power, the Achaean oligarchs' neutrality now became hostility. Allying with Sparta, the Achaeans now opposed Thebes and the Arcadians (Xen.*Hell.*VII.1.41–43; Diod.XV.75.2).

At Sicyon the Argives and Arcadians joined to overthrow Euphron who had become a tyrant. An Arcadian force led by Aeneas seized the acropolis with the support of the Theban governor. Aeneas met with the oligarchs and recalled the exiles. In a strange scenario, Euphron fled to the port of Sicyon and surrendered it to the Spartans whom he allied with. Fleeing to Athens, Euphron returned with some mercenaries when he heard of the *stasis* between the oligarchs and democrats. Gaining control of the city with support of the democrats, Euphron faced the hostility of the Theban governor occupying the acropolis. Next he visited Thebes to gain their support to regain full control of the city. Unfortunately for Euphron, he was followed by some Sicyonian oligarchs who assassinated him in Thebes. His democratic supporters brought his body home and buried him in the market place. With his death, Sicyon remained under Theban control (Xen.*Hell.*VII.1.44–46; 3.1–12). As described by Xenophon, this episode appears rather silly and Euphron appears to be a chameleon that changed alliances easily. His only objective was power. The lesson inferred from these events is that the Arcadian League would

tolerate no tyrant within its sphere of interest.

Theban influence was solidified in central Greece when it gained control of Oropus in 366. Located on the border between Boeotia and Attica, near the island of Euboea, Oropus had been under the control of Athens. Oropus provided access to the island of Euboea, which the Athenians always considered within their sphere of interest. Euboea was also a gateway to invade Attica. Therefore, occupation of part or all of Euboea was a threat to Athens. In the summer of 366 the Eritrean tyrant Themison seized the city from Athens. Athens sent a force to recover the city but was forestalled by a Theban force that was dispatched at the request of Themison. Whatever the nature of the dispute, Athens failed to recover the city in a legal arbitration. Thebes was rewarded with possession (Xen.*Hell.*VII.4.1; Diod.XV.76.1). This loss of Oropus added to the list of grievances by Athens against Thebes.

The growth of the Arcadian League since 370 gave its representatives the confidence to act more independently. Lycomedes of Mantinea was the prime spokesman and leader of the League. He urged the Arcadians to act independently. Although there were advantages to the alliance with Thebes, he wanted Arcadia to be an equal partner. Mutual interest between Arcadia and Athens led to negotiations for an alliance. An Athenian-Arcadian alliance would weaken Theban influence and enhance that of both parties. Returning to Arcadia from Athens, Lycomedes was assassinated by some Arcadian exiles in 366. Despite his death, the alliance was agreed to by both parties (Xen.*Hell.*VII.4.2–3). This alliance forced Thebes and Athens further apart. However, Thebes did not sever the alliance with Arcadia. Thebes continued to support Arcadia in the future.

In a follow up to the alliance with Arcadia, a proposal was brought before the Athenian Assembly to secure control of Corinth. Athenian troops were stationed in the Corinthia in compliance with the alliance with Sparta. Corinth was still a member of the Peloponnesian League. Fearing the loss of their autonomy, the Corinthians requested the Athenian garrisons to leave. Meanwhile Chares arrived with an Athenian fleet, claiming his mission was to protect Corinth. The Corinthians thanked Chares but refused his aid. Consequently, the Athenian fleet and garrisons returned to Athens. Fearing Athenian hostility, the Corinthians hired mercenaries for their defense.

With a hostile Boeotia, Athens, Argos, and Arcadia on their border, the Corinthians sought peace with Thebes. Receiving a positive response from Thebes, the Corinthians asked permission from Sparta to continue the peace process. The Spartans agreed. Probably realizing that they could not prevent the peace process, the Spartans

allowed the other allies to seek peace. The negotiations were concluded by spring 365. Corinth, Phlius, Epidaurus, and others agreed to a peace with Thebes, Argos, and Arcadia. They were allowed to remain autonomous (Xen.*Hell.*VII.4.4–11; Isoc.VI.91).⁵²⁷

This peace was the official end of the Peloponnesian League. For 150 years the League existed. Sparta continued the struggle with Thebes. However, except for the Achaean alliance, Sparta was now isolated in the Peloponnese. This peace delivered the third strike to Spartan hegemony. Strike 1 was the battle of Leuctra. Strike 2 was the loss of Messenia and part of Laconia. Strike 3 was the demise of the Peloponnesian League. In baseball parlance, Sparta was out. In 362 at Mantinea, the Greeks would rally to Sparta one more time. Afterwards Sparta would remain a grumpy old *polis* attempting to retrieve lost glory. However, the Hellenic family would move on without it.

The years 366/365 were a mixed bag of success and failure for the Greek *poleis*. Persian support for Thebes failed to translate to Greek support in Hellas. The failed peace of 367 ended with a new peace in 365 with the remainder of the Peloponnesian League. Arcadia was restored as an ally of the Boeotian League. However, Theban failure in Achaëa produced a new enemy. Sparta gained an ally in Achaëa but lost its old allies the following year with the demise of the Peloponnesian League. With control of Oropus Thebes gained a foothold to Euboea from which Attica could also be threatened. Athens' loss of Oropus and forced withdrawal from Corinth left it more vulnerable to a Boeotian invasion. Inter-state relations continued in a state of turmoil.

Occupied elsewhere, the Thebans did not return to the Peloponnese for the next couple of years. Unfortunately, peace remained elusive among the Peloponnesians. In 365 a border dispute broke out between Elis and the Arcadian League over the seizure by Elis of the territory of Lasion from Arcadia. Honoring its alliance, Athens sent troops to the Arcadians. They defeated the Eleans and regained the disputed territory. Dissolving their alliance with Thebes and Arcadia, the Eleans allied with Sparta. *Stasis* again arose in Elis between the oligarchs and democrats. After gaining power the oligarchs expelled the democrats. The Arcadians invaded Elis to support the democrats. Defeating the Eleans, the Arcadians occupied most of Elean territory. To support Elis, Archidamus of Sparta invaded southwest Arcadia and established a garrison at Cromnus. The Arcadians counterattacked and captured the Spartan garrison.

In 364 the Arcadians seized Olympia from Elis to conduct the Olympic Games. To reverse this seizure, Elis allied with the Achaeans. While the games were under way, the Eleans and Achaeans attacked a force of Arcadians, Athenians, and Argives. Defeated, the Eleans

retired to their city. The games continued under the auspices of the Arcadians (Xen.*Hell.*VII.4.12–32; Diod.XV.77.1–4; 78.1–3). Although peace remained elusive, no further conflict is recorded between these antagonists. Arcadia maintained control of the sanctuary of Olympia. The Eleans bided their time.

Persia and the Aegean

From the Peace of Antalcidas in 387/386 to the various attempts at a common peace in the next twenty-five years, our Greek sources continuously mention Persian involvement. Why? With no major Greek threat against Persia in Asia how did the turmoil in Hellas impact the Persian Empire?⁵²⁸ Recognizing the superiority of Greek hoplite, the Greeks were recruited by the Persians to suppress the enemies of the empire throughout the fifth century. These Greeks also fought for their enemies. Greeks were prominent in the armies of Egypt after its revolt in 403. In their dynastic dispute, Greeks fought on the side of Cyrus II and Artaxerxes II in 401 at Cunaxa. Rather than citizen soldiers, Greek mercenaries became more prevalent in the fourth century armies of Hellas and Persia. For recruitment purposes, it was in Persia's interest that these mercenaries were not engaged in Hellenic conflicts. These mercenaries were also cheaper if there was not competition for their services. The suppression of the revolts of Egypt, Evagoras in Cyprus (391), and the various satrap revolts over a twenty-year period beginning in the 370s required large amounts of Greek manpower. These manpower requirements would last until the conquest of the Persian Empire by Alexander the Great. Consequently, the need for Greek soldiers was one reason for Persian intervention in Hellas.

In 366 Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia since the 380s revolted rather than turn over his province to Artabazus, his designated successor. He requested aid in Hellas. Sparta and Athens sent help. Their hostility toward Persia was displayed with their rejection of the latest peace supported by Thebes and Persia. Probably in need of money, the Spartan government sent King Agesilaus to support Ariobarzanes. Timotheus was sent out with a fleet by Athens. Demosthenes says his instructions were to avoid war with Persia (Dem.XV.9). If true, how could Athens avoid war by supporting the revolt? Its hands tied by the revolt, it is unlikely that Persia was a threat to Athens or its allies. The results of Timotheus's actions suggest that Athens was looking to expand its influence in the eastern Aegean. During his voyage, he helped Ariobarzanes capture the island of Samos in 365 after a ten-month siege. Although the sequence of events is uncertain, Timotheus then captured Sestus and Crithote in

the Hellespont and Torone and Potidaea in the Chalcidice (Xen.*Ages*.2.26; Diod.XV.81.6; Isoc.XV.111–113). Although his mission and objectives are uncertain, it is reasonable to suggest that Athenian expansion was his mission but not at the price of war with Persia.

Challenging Athenian influence in the Aegean, in 364 Epaminondas led a naval expedition into the Aegean. How did this fleet come about? Like Sparta, Thebes had always been a land power. Boeotia has no large natural harbor to store a fleet. It also has no direct access to the Aegean. Only by sailing through the Euripus Straits past Euboea can a ship enter the Aegean from Boeotia. Where did the money come to finance it? Persia seems a reasonable answer.⁵²⁹ Where did the crews come? How were they trained? We are not told. At an unknown date, perhaps in 366, Epaminondas persuaded the Thebans to build a fleet of one hundred triremes.

Although it is doubtful that he had one hundred ships, Epaminondas sailed in 364.⁵³⁰ The objective of this mission is uncertain, but perhaps he encouraged members of the League to abandon their Athenian alliance.⁵³¹ During this cruise to Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, he avoided a major confrontation with an Athenian fleet under Laches. Diodorus claims he won a victory over Laches, but Plutarch implies that he did not. All three *poleis* were members of the Athenian Confederacy. Epaminondas encouraged them to abandon the Athenian alliance, but they refused. Achieving no diplomatic success or military victory, Epaminondas returned home (Diod.XV.78.4–79.1; Isoc.V.53; Plut.*Phil*.14.1–2). The fleet never sailed again. Whether due to the lack of funds, lack of success, or the death of Epaminondas two years later, Thebes never again showed the flag at sea. The fate of the fleet is unknown. Until Athens' defeat by Philip II, the Athenian navy remained the only Greek naval power in the Aegean.

The Death of Pelopidas

In 364 internal dissensions boiled over within the Boeotian League between those who supported the democratic constitution and those who wanted an oligarchy. The oligarchs received support from Orchomenus. Orchomenus was the traditional enemy of Thebes within Boeotia. The plot to overthrow the constitution was revealed to the Boeotarchs. The conspirators and some Orchomenians were arrested and convicted by the Assembly of the Boeotian League. Consequently, Orchomenus suffered *andrapodismos*. The city was razed. The men were killed and the women and children enslaved (Diod.XV.79.3–6). Thebes remained in control of the Boeotian League.

With the home front pacified, northern affairs could be addressed. While Epaminondas sailed the sea, Pelopidas led a small army into Thessaly. For three years Alexander of Pherae continued to impose his rule on Thessaly without Theban interference. Unable to check the tyrant, the opposition again appealed to the Boeotians for aid. Pelopidas was assigned the role. Engaging the army of Alexander at Cynoscephalae, the Boeotians were victorious but Pelopidas was killed. The Thessalians buried him with elaborate funeral rights. Seeking revenge, a larger Boeotian army was sent in the fall. It also defeated Alexander. In the peace settlement Alexander surrendered control of the Magnesians, Achaeans of Phthiotis, and removed his garrisons from various Thessalian cities. He also was forced into an alliance, became a subject of Thebes, and swore to follow Theban policy (Diod.XV.80-; Plut.*Pel.*31–35.1–2).

Diodorus and Plutarch emphasize the psychological blow the death of Pelopidas meant to the people. He liberated Thebes from Sparta. He commanded the Sacred Band of the army at Leuctra. Either Epaminondas or he, representing Thebes, was annually selected as a Boeotarch to lead the Boeotian League. He was popular with the people. Epaminondas was often referred to as a thinker. He was often described as aloof from the people. He was the brain behind Theban ascendancy. Pelopidas was a man of the people. He was the heart. He died defending the freedom of the Greeks from a tyrant. His loss was irreplaceable for Theban fortunes. In his parallel lives, Plutarch, a native Boeotian, only selected two Thebans, Epaminondas and Pelopidas. His biography of Epaminondas has not survived. Fortunately, Pelopidas has. These men were the twin pillars in Thebes's ascendancy. One was gone. Would we see the demise of the other?

The Death of Epaminondas

Epaminondas died at Mantinea in 362. How did this happen? Victorious over Elis, the Arcadian League maintained control over the sanctuary at Olympia. In 363 the magistrates of the Arcadian League used the treasure at Olympia to pay the Arcadian soldiers (*eparitōi*) who occupied Elis. The use of this treasure, which were public and private dedications to Zeus, was considered sacrilegious by most Greeks. The treasure was the property of the god. Divine retribution would fall on the violator of the sanctuary. The Mantineans opposed the use of this treasure by the League officials. The League Assembly agreed with Mantinea. The League officials were forbidden this source of revenue. The Assembly also voted to make peace with Elis. A truce was eventually agreed to. The federal officials opposed the decisions

of the Assembly. They feared an accounting of the funds already used. Most likely they had their hands in the cookie jar for personal use. The League officials requested aid from Thebes. However, the League Assembly sent ambassadors to Thebes repudiating the request for aid (Xen.*Hell.*VII.4.33–35).

While the partisans of the peace with Elis were celebrating the end of the conflict at a festival in Tegea, the League officials, supported by the *eparittoi* and the Boeotian governor, who was present with three hundred soldiers, seized and imprisoned many of the celebrants. Most of the Mantineans present, along with a few other Arcadians, escaped to Mantinea. The Mantineans armed themselves and appealed for support from other League members. The governor returned to Thebes. League ambassadors were sent to Thebes to protest the governor's actions. Epaminondas defended the governor who was not punished. Epaminondas also accused the Arcadians of making peace with Elis without consulting Thebes based on their alliance. He also threatened to march to the Peloponnese with a strong army (Xen.*Hell.*VII.4.36–40).

Returning home, the ambassadors reported these threats to the Assembly and the various cities. Mantinea and its supporters were opposed by Tegea. With the Arcadians divided, Mantinea and its supporters achieved an alliance with Elis, Achaea, Sparta, and Athens. Messenia, Tegea, Megalopolis, and Argos retained the support of Thebes (Xen.*Hell.*VII.5.1–5).

In 362 the day of reckoning occurred. Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese with a large Boeotian army supported by allies from central Greece and Thessaly. Joined by the pro-Theban Arcadians, Messenians, and Argives, Epaminondas appeared at Tegea. From here he marched into Laconia and engaged the Spartans in battle. Unwilling to engage in an urban fight within the streets of Sparta he withdrew his forces. Perhaps fearing an attack on his rear guard by the Arcadians and Spartan advance guard at Mantinea, Epaminondas withdrew his army back to Tegea.

Next, he marched against the coalition now at Mantinea. Here the showdown occurred in early summer. Under Mantinean command, the allied army assembled twenty thousand hoplites in a line probably twelve men deep. The Mantineans held the honorary right wing with the Spartans next to them. The Athenians held the left wing with the remaining allies in the center. The cavalry of two thousand men were on the wings. Countering this formation, Epaminondas had an army of thirty thousand hoplites and three thousand cavalry. Epaminondas used his right wing in a defensive manner against the Athenians. As at Leuctra, he attacked in an oblique formation, "prow on, like a trireme" (Xen.*Hell.*VII.5.23). With the left wing led by the Boeotians, who were

fifty men deep and spearheaded by the Theban Sacred Band, he attacked the Mantineans and Spartans. The Theban cavalry pinned down the Athenians. In a fierce struggle the Boeotians were emerging victorious. The enemy was retreating. However, when word passed through the army that Epaminondas was slain, the wind was removed from their sails. The Boeotians broke off the fight. Both sides set up a trophy of victory (Xen.*Hell.*VII.5.6–26; Diod.XV.82–88; Plut.*Ages.*35).

Here Xenophon concludes his history. He states that nothing was resolved with this engagement. There was more confusion than ever. Men died. Blood was spilt. No political issue was resolved. However, Xenophon was wrong. One thing changed. Epaminondas died. His political and military leadership could not be replaced. The second pillar behind the ascendancy of Thebes was gone. Xenophon, Athenian born but pro-Spartan in his history, probably would rather have sacrificed his firstborn rather than praise Thebes and Boeotia. But in his description of this final campaign, Xenophon tipped his hat when he commented on the brilliant leadership Epaminondas displayed (Xen.*Hell.*VII.5.19–24). Thebes would remain a major player until defeated at Chaeronea in 338. Alexander III (the Great) would destroy it in 335 after its revolt. However, Thebes was no longer the dominant power it had been since Leuctra. As quoted by Pausanias, the epitaph for Epaminondas as a liberator read (Paus.IX.15.4):

This came from my council:

Sparta has cut the hair of her glory:

Messene takes her children in:

a wreath of the spears of Thebe


has crowned Megalopolis:

Greece is free.⁵³²

Despite its inconclusiveness, the battle encouraged the Greeks to settle their differences in 362/361. War-weary, the Greeks created a common peace without Persian interference. All the *poleis* signed except an intransigent Sparta. The peace maintained the independence of Messenia (Diod.XV.89.1–2.; Plut.*Ages.*35). Sparta would not agree, but it no longer mattered. Thebes, Athens, and the rest of Hellas would witness the emergence of a new player in the Hellenic world. The center of attention would shift northward. Welcome Philip II of Macedon!

Map 7 – Greece during the Theban Ascendancy (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thebes_Greece).

Map 7—Greece During Theban Ascendancy



Agesilaus II

Before we tell the story of Philip II we must end this chapter with poor Agesilaus of Sparta. Agesilaus was now an old man even by the standards of the twenty-first century. Born about 444 when Pericles dominated Athens, he died in 360, the year before Philip II ascended the throne of Macedonia. Elected king in 400, he had ruled for thirty-eight years at the time of Mantinea. He had two years remaining. He became king when Sparta was at the peak of its power. Attempting to be imitate Agamemnon, he led an army across the Aegean against the Great King in Asia. Now he could barely lead an army across the Eurotas River. Then lord of the Aegean basin, now Sparta was barely lord of Laconia.

Before his death Agesilaus provided one last service to Sparta. Tachos of Egypt was now Pharaoh and in revolt against Persia. Receiving money from Tachos, the Spartans assigned Agesilaus to hire mercenaries and sail to Egypt in 361. Tachos refused to appoint him commander of the Egyptian forces. With permission from Sparta, Agesilaus backed Nectanebo when he rebelled against Tachos. He helped Nectanebo secure the throne. Shortly after this, he died in Egypt. His body was entombed in wax and returned to Sparta for burial (Plut. Ages. 36–40).

He ruled forty years. A proponent of Spartan imperialism, he took a hard line against the enemies of Sparta. An unapologetic enemy of Thebes, he outlived Thebes' two great leaders. However, he witnessed their destruction of his beloved Sparta. From the high noon of Empire,

the sun set on Sparta during his rule. Hindsight shows the truth of the Delphic oracle that warned Sparta at the time of his accession to beware a lame king (Plut.*Ages*.3.3–5).⁵³³ This lame king, idolized by Xenophon, witnessed the end of Spartan hegemony.⁵³⁴ He and Sparta passed into legend. A controversial person in life, he remains one in death. Like Sparta, few students of ancient Hellas are neutral about his character and accomplishments. You either admire him or admonish him. Like Sparta, was he a blessing or a curse to Hellas? A debate still unresolved. Either way, he was one of Sparta's most powerful kings.

- 518 Arcadian Orchomenus remained loyal to Sparta because of its enmity toward Mantinea (Xen.*Hell.*VI.5.11).
- 519 By 369 most, if not all Arcadians, were members of the Arcadian League. The assembly of the Arcadian League was called the Ten Thousand (Aesch.II.79). The Assembly was sovereign and membership was restricted by property qualifications. A council existed with administrative functions (Diod.XV.59.1). (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 156–161. Inscription number 32, dated to 369/367, list members of the League.
- 520 Thebes may have received ten talents from Elis to cover the military expenses (Xen.*Hell.*VI.5.19).
- 521 Xenophon does not mention this liberation in the *Hellenica*.
- 522 See Roy in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 191.
- 523 (Cartledge 2004), 233.
- 524 For a review of the reign of Amyntas III and the low point of Macedonian fortunes, see (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 172–180.
- 525 (Rhodes 2010), 288. Rhodes suggests that the Thessalian League was reformed in 369. (N. Hammond 1986), 501. Hammond suggests the reorganization occurred in 368. The head of the League was now an archon rather than the *tagos*. Thessaly was reorganized into four tetrarchies (cantons). League decisions were made in a League Assembly.
- 526 Diodorus and Plutarch claim that Alexander sent his brother Philip as a hostage. Historians agree with the Athenian orator Aeschines, in his *On The Embassy* speech, that Philip was sent as a hostage to Thebes by Ptolemy in 368/367 (Aesch.II.26–29). See Griffith in (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 204–205. (N. Hammond 1986), 501. (Rhodes 2010), 288.
- 527 There is a scholarly debate whether this was a common peace arranged by Persia as Diodorus suggests (Diod.XV.76.3). The peace terms are also debatable. Xenophon's description of the terms is brief at best. For a list of the scholars in this debate see footnote number 14 in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 200.
- 528 Athens' Second Confederacy never had the resources to challenge Persia in Asia as the Delian league did. The original goal of the Delian League was the removal of Persia as a threat to the Greek *poleis* of Asia, the Aegean, and the mainland. The Second Confederacy was formed to challenge Spartan hegemony.
- 529 See Roy in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 201. Roy suggests Persia although there is no evidence for the assertion. Xenophon tells us that the Spartans captured twelve Theban triremes prior to Leuctra (Xen.*Hell.*VI.4.4). If true, there was a small fleet that Epaminondas could expand from.
- 530 (Rhodes 2010), 289. Rhodes dates this maritime excursion to 364. Roy agrees in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 201. (N. Hammond 1986), 505. Hammond dates this event to the summer of 363.
- 531 See Roy in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 201. (N. Hammond 1986), 505–506. Hammond suggests that some states already revolted.
- 532 (Pausanias 1971), Vol. 1, 339.
- 533 Agesilaus was born with a bad leg.
- 534 In his *Agesilaus*, Xenophon idolizes the achievements of Agesilaus. Xenophon provides an idolized obituary (Xen.*Ages.*XI.13–16).

Sicily, Italy, and Carthage

War with Athens

After the age of tyrants ended in the 460s, the *poleis* of Sicily were divided into democracies or oligarchies. All lived peacefully with the Carthaginians who occupied the western coast. Despite some differences, there were no major wars among the Greeks except for a conflict between Acragas and Syracuse, which ended in a Syracusan victory at Himera in 446 (Diod.XII.8). Not until the Athenians began to interfere in Sicilian affairs in the 420s did the Sicilian *poleis* choose to become allies of Athens or Syracuse. Initial Athenian interference ended in 424 when the Sicilian Greeks, under the guidance of the Syracusan Hermocrates, agreed to a general peace settlement (Thuc.IV.65.1–2).

Unfortunately, the inhabitants of Sicily would suffer greatly from Athens' Sicilian Expedition. The reduction of Syracuse became the objective of the Athenians. It failed disastrously when Corinth, Sparta, and many Sicilian Greeks rallied to Syracuse's defense. Under the leadership of Hermocrates, the Syracusans withstood the strongest democracy of the ancient world. This "Great Patriotic War" destroyed the power of Athens.⁵³⁵

Displaying gratitude to the Peloponnesians and seeking revenge, the Syracusans went on the offensive in 412.⁵³⁶ By late summer Hermocrates led a Syracusan flotilla of twenty ships and two Selinuntine vessels into the Aegean Sea to join the Peloponnesian navy to liberate the cities of the Athenian Empire (Thuc.VIII.26.1). The Syracusans were praised during the Peloponnesian capture of the Persian rebel Amorges, who was supported by Athens. Hermocrates also skillfully negotiated more money from Tissaphernes to support the Peloponnesian fleet (Thuc.VIII.28.2–29). Unfortunately, the Syracusan ships were lost after the Peloponnesian defeat at Cyzicus in the spring of 410. To avoid capture by the Athenians, the Syracusans beached and burned their ships (Xen.*Hell.*I.1.11–18).

Stranded in Asia Minor, the Syracusans settled in Antandrus to rebuild their ships. Here they were informed that Hermocrates and his fellow generals were removed from command and banished from

Syracuse. The explanation for their exile is unknown. At some date after 412 the Syracusans established a democracy (Arist.*Pol.*1304a27–29). For whatever reason Hermocrates and his associates were mistrusted by the Syracusans. Perhaps they opposed the new regime. Urged by his soldiers to disobey these orders, Hermocrates declined and told them to obey the new commanders when they arrive. Hermocrates remained in command until their arrival in late 410 (Xen.*Hell.*1.1.19–31; Diod.XIII.63.1). Hermocrates remained in Asia. The rebuilt Syracusan fleet fought at Ephesus with the Peloponnesians in 409 and then returned home. Unknown at the time, their war with Athens was over.

War with Carthage

Prior to the return of the Syracusan fleet, Carthage launched an attack on Sicily in 409. This offensive was a response to aid Egesta in its war against Selinus, the ally of Syracuse. The arbitration efforts of Carthage to settle the dispute between Egesta and Selinus failed in 410 when the Punic embassy to Syracuse failed to reach an agreement with the Syracusans. Since peace overtures failed, Hannibal, the current Magonid leader and *basileus*, made preparation to attack Sicily.⁵³⁷ In 410 Carthage sent five thousand Libyans and eight hundred Campanians to Egesta. After an attack on Selinus, Egesta requested additional support from Carthage while Selinus sought aid from Syracuse (Diod.XIII.43–44). A new war with Carthage had begun.

In 409 Hannibal sailed to Sicily with sixty triremes, 1,500 transports, and perhaps one hundred thousand men from Africa and Iberia. Landing near Motya, Hannibal marched against Selinus. Since their walls were poorly maintained, Selinus fell after a siege of nine days. Casualties on both sides were heavy. Diodorus claims that 16,000 inhabitants died and five thousand were prisoners. A few escaped to Acragas. The Greek survivors were allowed to remain in Selinus and pay a tribute to Carthage. The walls of Selinus were demolished (Diod.XIII.53–57).

Hannibal quickly marched north against Himera. Hannibal, the grandson of the Hamilcar who died at Himera in 480, wanted to avenge that defeat. Joined by twenty thousand native Sicans and Sicels, he attacked Himera. Himera had been reinforced with four thousand troops from Syracuse under the command of Diocles. Diocles was defeated in a major engagement. Meanwhile, the Syracusan fleet arrived at Himera from the Aegean. Fearing a Punic assault on an undefended Syracuse, Diocles withdrew his forces to protect Syracuse. Part of the population was embarked on the triremes

for Syracuse. Unfortunately for the remainder of the inhabitants, Himera fell to the Carthaginians before the fleet could return to rescue the balance of the population. To honor his grandfather, Hannibal executed three thousand prisoners and destroyed the city. After this success, Hannibal dismissed the Campanian mercenaries, Sicels, and Sicans. Loading the remainder of the troops on the ships, he returned to Carthage with the booty and received much acclaim (Diod.XIII.58–62; Xen.*Hell.*I.1.37). In this three-month campaign, he restored the power of Carthage in Sicily and avenged the defeat of 480. The failure of Syracuse and the other Sicilian *poleis* to resist Carthage left the Greeks in Sicily in disarray.

Death of Hermocrates

Into this turmoil the exiled Hermocrates returned. With money received from the Persian satrap Pharnabazus, Hermocrates arrived at Messene sometime in late 408 or early 407.⁵³⁸ Here he had five triremes built, hired one thousand mercenaries, and gathered the survivors from Himera to return to Syracuse. Apparently his intention was to defend Syracuse against Carthage. Initially the Syracusans opposed Hermocrates's return. Unwilling to return by the use of force, Hermocrates occupied Selinus as a base of operations. Hermocrates then campaigned against Punic territory on the island (Diod.XIII.63.2–6).

Learning of political discord in Syracuse, Hermocrates led his army to Himera to gather the unburied Syracusan dead. Their remains were loaded on wagons and transported to Syracuse for burial. The return of the dead further weakened the position of Diocles in the eyes of the Syracusans. Hermocrates remained at the border of Syracusan territory. He allowed *stasis* to ferment in Syracuse. Diocles was exiled by the Syracusan Assembly. Fearing the establishment of a tyranny, the Syracusans refused to recall Hermocrates. Still unwilling to use force to secure his return, Hermocrates led his army back to Selinus. At an unknown date in 407, he marched with three thousand soldiers to Syracuse. With a small force he entered Syracuse but was met with resistance by the populace. He was killed in the ensuing melee. The survivors were exiled. Some of Hermocrates's supporters, who were reported dead, had survived when protected by their relatives. Dionysius I was one of these survivors (Diod.XIII.75). Despite the victory of the democracy, after an absence of sixty years, a new age of tyranny was about to descend on Sicily.

Carthage Renews War

Quiet since 480 the Carthaginians launched a successful

offensive in 409. In 406 Carthage would launch another offensive against Sicily. Why was Carthage becoming aggressive in Sicily now? Did they fear the growth of Syracusan power after their victory over Athens?⁵³⁹ Was there an expansionist faction in Punic domestic politics? Was their ambitions energized by the victory of 409? From the mid-sixth through the fifth century the Carthaginians devoted much energy developing commercial enterprises in Sardinia and the African interior around Cape Bon and the Mejerda valley.⁵⁴⁰ Were they looking to expand their commercial influence in Sicily now? Was *stasis* in Syracuse the opportunity they were waiting for to expand their influence? Although Greek writers believed in Punic duplicity, they portray Carthage as particularly aggressive at this time. However, they do not explain this aggressiveness. Unfortunately, there are no Punic sources that portray the internal politics of Carthage. It is reasonable to assume that some Carthaginians wanted to follow up the achievement of 409 to control a larger part of Sicily for strategic and economic reasons. Who they were and how influential their policy was remains a mystery. Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that the Carthaginians renewed their attempt to dominate Sicily.

Diodorus states that a Syracusan embassy to Carthage, prior to 406, failed to resolve their differences but he does not identify these differences. Consequently, the Carthaginians established a settlement near Himera. In the first half of 406 a Punic embassy appealed to Athens for aid against Syracuse but Athens was in no position to interfere in Sicily (Diod.XIII.79.8; M&L 92).⁵⁴¹

To prepare a new expedition would take time. Therefore, it is not surprising that a couple of years would lapse after 409 before a new invasion was launched. This new offensive in 406 was commanded by Hannibal, the victor of 409, and Himilco, a younger Magonid associate. Aware that Carthage was preparing for another invasion, the Syracusans received troops from the Greeks of Sicily and Italy. However, their embassy to the Peloponnese brought no support from that source. The Peloponnesians were focused on the defeat of Athens.

Expecting to be the target of a new Punic offensive, Acragas strengthened its defense to resist Carthage. Acragas acquired the services of the Spartan mercenary commander Dexippus, 1,500 Greek mercenaries, and the eight hundred Campanians dismissed from Carthaginian service in 409 (Diod.XIII.85.3–4). Next to Syracuse, Acragas was the largest and wealthiest *polis* in Sicily (Diod.XIII.81.4–84.). It had participated in the Greek resistance in 409. Its capture would allow Carthage to control the entire south coast of Sicily and secure the sea-lanes from North Africa.

In the spring the Punic offensive began. A fleet of fifty triremes

was dispatched to control the sea in preparation for the landing.⁵⁴² This army was composed of 120,000 men including mercenaries from Iberia, North Africa, and Campania accompanied by Punic citizens according to Timaeus (Diod.XIII.80.5). However, shortly after the invasion, Hannibal died from a plague that infested the army. Landing near Acragas, the Carthaginians began a siege of the city when the Acragantines refused to surrender. A Syracusan relief force of thirty thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry, commanded by Daphnaeus, defeated a section of the Punic army but was unable to break the siege. When the generals within Acragas refused to launch a sortie to aid the Syracusans, the populace was incensed and stoned them to death without allowing them to defend their actions.

To break the siege, the Syracusan cavalry sealed off the roads to the Punic camp. Since no food or fodder could be attained from the countryside, the Carthaginians were soon short of rations. Himilco recalled the fleet from western Sicily. Securing a naval victory over the Greeks, Himilco was able to provision his army by sea. Apparently Acragas's Italian mercenaries abandoned the city. With starvation rapidly approaching, the remaining forces and populace abandoned the city rather than face destruction. By December 406, after a seven- or eight-month siege, the Carthaginians occupied Acragas and killed those who remained behind. They wintered here. Captured booty was sent to Carthage. The refugees fled to Syracuse and Italy (Diod.XIII.85–91.1; Xen.*Hell.*I.5.21).

The Rise of Dionysius I (405–367 BC)

Arriving in Syracuse, the Acragantine refugees complained about the treachery of their generals. Other Sicilian Greeks complained about the poor leadership displayed by Syracuse. In the Syracusan Assembly, Dionysius, who was in his mid-twenties, castigated the leadership of the generals and accused them of accepting Punic bribes. When the political leaders threatened to fine Dionysius for his outspoken behavior, the wealthy noble Philistus agreed to pay any fine levied.⁵⁴³ Another noble, Hipparinus, also sponsored Dionysius (Arist.*Pol.*1306a1). Disenchanted with the war's conduct, the Assembly elected new generals, which included Dionysius. Short of manpower, Dionysius encouraged the Assembly to recall the exiles, which were probably the supporters of Hermocrates. Unwilling to serve with his fellow generals, he agitated the people to give him an independent command (Diod.XIII.91.2–92).

With two thousand soldiers and four hundred cavalry Dionysius was assigned to protect Gela. He replaced the Spartan Dexippus, who was hired by Syracuse to defend Gela. As in Syracuse, there was

stasis throughout Sicily. At Gela Dionysius supported the democratic faction. Some nobles were condemned and executed. Their wealth was confiscated to pay back wages for Dexippus's soldiers and increase the pay of the Syracusan troops. After earning the support of all the soldiers and the general population of Gela, he returned to Syracuse despite the fears of the Geloans that Himilco would soon attack them (Diod.XIII.93).

In Syracuse Dionysius launched a new political offensive against the magistrates and his fellow generals. Addressing the Assembly, he accused them of dereliction of the duty. He claimed that they were ignoring the Punic threat to Syracuse and failing to make the proper war preparations. He refused to serve further because he did not want his name associated with treachery if Syracuse lost the war. Achieving his objective, he was selected sole general (*strategos autocrator*) by the Assembly. He immediately doubled the pay of the soldiers claiming that this would encourage them to fight harder for Syracuse. Dionysius then led an all Syracusan force of men over the age of forty to Leontini to defend the city. Claiming a conspiracy against him after his arrival, he requested a bodyguard of six hundred men.⁵⁴⁴ He further selected and armed another thousand men. He selected new officers loyal to him to command the mercenaries. After his return to Syracuse, he proclaimed himself tyrant. Diodorus claims that the Syracusans accepted the proclamation because of the Carthaginian threat and the number of mercenaries stationed within Syracuse (Diod.XIII.94–96).

By these actions Diodorus claims that Dionysius aimed at tyranny from the beginning (Diod.XIII.92.2). Is this true? The result of his actions ended in a tyranny. However, his methods to achieve power appear to be constitutional. He achieved his military command by action of the Syracusan Assembly. The Punic threat was real. The Syracusans' fear of Carthage, combined with the perceived inaction by their officials, provided evidence to the Assembly to vote him extraordinary powers. It can be argued that his actions were justified by military necessity. The weak Greek defense against Carthage required a major change of strategy to prevent another Himera or Acragas. It can be argued that through the increase of manpower, improved training of soldiers, better officers, improved pay, and better morale, he was preparing a proper defense against Carthage. Perhaps his initial aim was to follow in Hermocrates's footsteps. He eventually married the daughter of Hermocrates (Diod.XIII.96.3). He might have adopted the political philosophy of Hermocrates.⁵⁴⁵ In his rise to power, he probably wished to be a leading citizen supported by the people. Whatever his political objective was, the fact remains that he gained supreme authority. Could he retain that power? He still faced the power of Carthage.

Carthage Victorious

In the early summer of 405 the Carthaginians razed Acragas when they left (Diod.XIII.106.2).⁵⁴⁶ Their destination was Gela. With thirty thousand infantry, one thousand horse, and fifty triremes, Dionysius marched to its defense (Diod.XIII.109.2). After twenty days, a three-pronged attack against the Carthaginians failed. Dionysius lost more than a thousand men while the Carthaginians lost more than six hundred troops. Despite the inconclusiveness of the battle, Dionysius took the advice of his officers and withdrew from Gela. Arriving at Camarina, Dionysius also forced the inhabitants to leave. This retreat and the sorrow of the refugees angered his soldiers. While some Italian soldiers headed home, some cavalry returned to Syracuse ahead of Dionysius. In reprisal they vandalized his house and violated his wife (Plut.*Dion.*3.2). Upon his return with a special force, Dionysius suppressed the cavalry revolt in Syracuse. The survivors fled to Aetna. The refugees from Gela and Camarina, hostile to Dionysius, settled at Leontini (Diod.XIII.106–113).

Since the Carthaginian army was suffering from the plague, Himilco sent an embassy to Dionysius to make peace. Dionysius accepted. The terms of the agreement were that Carthage kept all its original possessions plus the Elymians and Sicans. The Greeks could rebuild Acragas, Himera, Gela, Selinus, and Camarina. However, these *poleis* must remain unfortified and pay a tribute to Carthage. Leontini, Messene, and the Sicels were to remain independent. Dionysius remained in control of Syracuse. Both sides would return the ships and prisoners captured. With this agreement, the Carthaginians returned home (Diod.XIII.114.). The harshness of the terms for Dionysius indicates that the Carthaginians had the upper hand. Only devastating losses from disease forced the Carthaginians to sue for peace. Although he retained power, Dionysius would spend the next few years consolidating his power base. Controlling about 40 percent of the island, Carthaginian power in Sicily was at its peak!

Dionysius I Consolidates Power

Dionysius was tyrant but he had few remaining allies. The Sicilian and Italian Greeks, along with many mercenaries, went home. The people of Syracuse were demoralized by defeat. After ten years of war with Athens and Carthage, the Syracusans needed a respite to recover. Uncertain of his power, Dionysius transferred his base to the island of Ortygia, which he separated from the city by a wall. Here he built a stronghold and docks for a new navy. To satisfy his supporters, Dionysius gave them land confiscated from the wealthy. He retained numerous estates for himself. He also provided accommodations on

Ortygia and within the city for the loyalists. Further housing was granted to the common people of Syracuse (Diod.XIV.7.1–3).

Ignoring the treaty with Carthage, in 404 he began a campaign against the Sicels of eastern Sicily. While besieging the city of Herbessini (Herbessus), the Syracusan citizens in the army revolted. Looking for support, they summoned the exiled cavalry at Aetna. Alarmed, Dionysius returned to Syracuse to secure the city from rebellion. The rebels laid siege to Syracuse and sought support from Messene and Rhegium. Despairing of his ability to maintain power, he took the advice of Philistus and Heloris to remain in Syracuse and fight to the death (Diod.XIV.8.5–6). Sending messengers to the Campanians, who were protecting Carthaginian territory, he offered them any price to come to his rescue. Having granted Dionysius permission to sail away, the rebels were lax in their siege now believing the tyranny was ended. Their assumption was wrong. The Campanian cavalry of twelve hundred men and three hundred other mercenaries arrived in Syracuse. Dionysius attacked the Syracusans and defeated them. However, he prevented the mercenaries from inflicting heavy casualties. Some rebels fled to Aetna. Dionysius offered them amnesty if they returned. Some accepted. When they returned, there was no retaliation. Dionysius hoped to lure the remaining rebels back with this humane treatment (Diod.XIV.7.6–9.9). After this second revolt was suppressed, Dionysius faced no further challenge to his rule.

It is uncertain how the constitutional structure of Syracuse functioned. Dionysius I certainly exercised one-man rule. In war he probably retained the title of *strategos autocrator*.⁵⁴⁷ What his official title was is uncertain. He acted like a king but was he a *basileus*? In an official decree by the Athenian Council in 394, he is called “the *archon* of Sicily” (R&O 10).⁵⁴⁸ The Assembly still met. Dionysius summoned the Assembly to declare war on Carthage in 397 (Diod.XIV.45.2). Magistrates were appointed. Citizens served in the army and navy. Despite the constitution, his power rested on the loyalty of his mercenaries. We are told by Diodorus that early in his reign he walked and worked among the people (Diod.XIV.18.6–7). He provided awards to the people for special accomplishments. These gestures suggest that he continued to portray himself as a man of the *demos*. However, the portrait by Plutarch portrays him as a brutal tyrant highly suspicious of everybody (Plut.*Dion*.9.3–8).

For the next few years Dionysius developed a war machine and secured Syracusan domination over the eastern half of Sicily. He founded a colony near Mount Aetna called Adranum in 400/399 (Diod.XIV.37.5). He captured Naxos and Catana and sold the population into slavery. He resettled Naxos with Sicels and Catana

with the Campanian mercenaries. Leontini submitted and the population was transplanted to Syracuse. Rhegium and Messene allied for war against Dionysius. Before any engagement occurred, Messene withdrew from the conflict when the soldiers refused to fight. Isolated, Rhegium recalled its soldiers. By 396 Messene allied with Syracuse (Diod.XIV.44.4). Peace occurred between Messene, Rhegium, and Syracuse by 396 (Diod.XIV.40). The Greeks of Sicily were now subordinate to Dionysius.

To defend an enlarged population, Dionysius built a new circuit wall to protect Syracuse. Learning that Carthage was weakened by plague, Dionysius prepared for a future war. Offering better wages, he imported skilled workers to build armaments. He expanded the navy by increasing the number of triremes and introduced the larger quadrireme.⁵⁴⁹ Rather than an extra bank of oars, the quadrireme employed longer oars with two men to an oar.⁵⁵⁰ He wanted a three-hundred-ship navy. New ship-sheds were constructed around the Great Harbor to house the fleet. Citizens and hired mariners would man these new ships. He would provide the weaponry for his troops. With standardized equipment and improved training, the battle efficiency of the army was greatly improved. Siege equipment was built. The catapult (*katapeltes*) was invented by Dionysius's engineers.⁵⁵¹ This armament's program was built up over a period of time. Only after the armaments were complete did he hire mercenaries to use them (Diod.XIV.41–43).

How did Dionysius finance this military buildup? The answer is uncertain. The confiscation of the property of opponents is one source but it is unknown how much this would have generated. Revenue from his acquired estates is probable. Tolls, taxes, and tribute were probably sources of revenue. He issued new gold coinage and silver decadrachmas to pay the mercenaries. Where the bullion came from is unclear.

War with Carthage

In 397 Dionysius was prepared to renew the conflict with Carthage. He was a good organizer, but could he become a great general? In his first war with Carthage, he demonstrated no great skill as a military commander. His first war was instigated by Carthage. Dionysius I began this war.

A few days after his second marriage, Dionysius summoned the Syracusan Assembly to declare war on Carthage. Arguing that Carthage, presently weakened by disease, would become a threat to Sicily again, he requested the Syracusans declare war while Carthage was unprepared. Diodorus states that the Assembly voted for war for

three reasons. The first was their hatred for Carthage. The second was hope for better treatment by Dionysius. The final reason was their hope to revolt again once they had weapons in their possession (Diod.XIV.45.5–6). After the declaration of war, all property and ships of the Carthaginian inhabitants in Syracuse were seized and plundered. The rest of Greek Sicily rose in revolt and seized Carthaginian property and persons. The Carthaginians were murdered. Dionysius sent an embassy to Carthage declaring that war existed unless Carthage granted the Greek *poleis* their freedom (Diod.XIV.47.2).

By the summer of 396 Dionysius launched the offensive against the Carthaginian possessions on the western end of the island. With eighty thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, two hundred warships, and five hundred transports carrying his supplies and siege train, he arrived at Motya. Motya was an island connected to the mainland by a causeway. While Dionysius's brother Leptines began the siege of Motya, Dionysius attacked the other Punic settlements. Some surrendered while others resisted.

While preparing his forces in Carthage, Himilco sent a flotilla of ten ships against Syracuse to raid the Great Harbor to draw away the army of Dionysius. The raid succeeded in damaging many ships, but it failed to divert Dionysius. The ships returned to Carthage unharmed. Himilco sailed with one hundred triremes to relieve Motya. Catching the Syracusan fleet by surprise, he sank some ships and burned others. He sailed into the harbor of Motya to defend the city. Using his remaining ships and siege equipment, Dionysius forced the Punic fleet out of Motya. Abandoned by Himilco, Motya fell after severe fighting. The siege equipment proved their value. Motya was sacked and the inhabitants enslaved by the end of summer. A garrison was left behind. Commanding 120 ships, Leptines was ordered to watch for a Punic relief fleet. He was also ordered to attack Egesta and Entella. Dionysius returned to Syracuse with the balance of the army (Diod.XIV.47.4–53). The war was off to a good start.

In 396 Dionysius renewed the attack in the west. Halicyae formed an alliance with Dionysius but Egesta held out. Now Himilco launched his counter offensive. Despite losing fifty ships in a naval battle with Leptines, he arrived at Panormus with one hundred thousand troops. He recaptured Eryx and Motya after a siege. Dionysius retreated toward Syracuse and many cities returned to the allegiance of Carthage. Himilco led his forces against Messene. The capture of Messene would allow the Punic fleet to control the Straits and prevent reinforcements arriving from Italy or the Peloponnese. Capturing Messene, Himilco next led his fleet and army along the east coast against Syracuse. The Punic admiral Mago defeated Leptines's fleet

near Catana. Diodorus states that over one hundred ships were destroyed (Diod.XIV.60.1–5). Dionysius withdrew his troops from Catana to Syracuse. Shortly afterwards, the Punic fleet sailed into the Great Harbor and the army began a siege (Diod.XIV.54–63).

Dionysius dispatched his brother-in-law Polyxenus to Italy and the Peloponnese seeking allies. While Dionysius and Leptines were away gathering supplies, the Syracusans achieved a naval victory over the Carthaginians. In an Assembly debate, the Syracusans proposed the dismissal of Dionysius. Since the Spartan Pharacidas, who had arrived earlier with thirty Peloponnesian ships, and the mercenary soldiers of Dionysius remained loyal, Dionysius retained power (Diod.XIV.70.1–2). During the siege, the Punic army suffered a return of the plague. Dionysius launched a land and naval attack against the Punic camp and forts. The Carthaginians lost many warships and merchant vessels. Forced to begin peace negotiations, Himilco conducted secret talks with Dionysius. He gave three hundred talents to Dionysius who then agreed to allow the citizen troops of Carthage to leave but not the Punic mercenaries or allies. At a predetermined time, Himilco sailed home with forty ships, but a few were caught and sunk by the Corinthian ships. The Sicel allies of Carthage escaped to their homes. The Punic mercenaries were enslaved except for some Iberians who enrolled in Dionysius's service. The Punic camp was plundered and the booty dispersed to the soldiers (Diod.XIV.64–75).

In disgrace at Carthage, Himilco eventually starved himself to death (Diod.XIV.76.4). With the Punic army destroyed, the Punic allies in Libya revolted. After much difficulty, the rebellion was suppressed (Diod.XIV.77). In 395 Himilco's admiral Mago continued the war in Sicily, but little success was achieved in the next few years.

After the departure of Himilco, Dionysius began to resettle Sicily. The chronology of the following events is uncertain but it probably occurred over a period of a couple of years. Unable to pay his mercenaries, Dionysius bought them off with their settlement in Leontini. Determined to control the Straits between Messene and Rhegium, Dionysius resettled Messene with Italian Greeks from Locri and Medma as well as Messenians from Naupactus and Zacynthus. However, to avoid upsetting the Spartans he relocated the Messenians on the coast further west to a site the Messenians named Tyndaris. Next he settled affairs with the Sicels by capturing a number of their cities (Diod.XIV.78).

The citizens of Rhegium, although fearful of war with Dionysius, offered asylum to his opponents. They sponsored the resettlement of refugees from Naxos and Catana at Mylae, west of the Straits of Messene. Their general Heloris was assigned to besiege Messene. However, he was defeated by the mercenaries of Dionysius stationed

there. The soldiers of Messene then attacked and captured Mylae. The new settlers from Naxos were allowed to leave and settle elsewhere (Diod.XIV.87).

In 393 Carthage made a final attempt at victory. The new commander Mago attempted to recapture Messene. He created an alliance with the Sicels for support. However, after Mago devastated the countryside of Messene, he was defeated by Dionysius. Reinforced with additional troops, he marched inland to detach the Sicels from Dionysius. In the hinterland, the Punic troops were short on supplies and constantly harassed by the Greeks. Since Dionysius refused to fight Mago, the Syracusans abandoned him. However, making little progress, Mago sued for peace in 392.⁵⁵² Dionysius accepted. The peace terms were similar to 405 except that the Sicels were subordinate to Dionysius. Upon the departure of Mago, Dionysius captured Tauromenium, banished the Sicels and resettled it with his mercenaries (Diod.XIV.90; 95–96). The war with Carthage was officially over. Carthage was again confined to the western part of Sicily.

Dionysius I and Italy

After the Punic defeat, Dionysius I rivaled Sparta as the supreme power in the Hellenic world. As Dionysius emerged victorious, Sparta was confronting a coalition of Hellenic states in the Corinthian War. In a role reversal, Sparta would look to him for support. Dionysius would maintain an alliance with Sparta for the next twenty years.

In 391 Dionysius attacked Rhegium. With an army of twenty thousand troops, one thousand cavalry, and 120 ships he sailed to Locri in Italy and marched overland to Rhegium. Ravaging the countryside as he approached, he camped outside Rhegium. The Italiote League dispatched sixty ships from Croton to support Rhegium.⁵⁵³ While Dionysius attempted to capture this fleet, a gale occurred. The storm cost Dionysius seven ships and 1,500 men. He withdrew the fleet to Messene. With the approach of winter, Dionysius concluded an alliance with the Lucanians and withdrew his forces to Syracuse (Diod.XIV.100). Despite his withdrawal, Dionysius had established a foothold in Italy.

In 390 the Lucanians attacked Thurii but withdrew prior to the arrival of troops from the Italiote League to defend Thurii. When the Lucanians withdrew home, they were followed by the army of Thurii, which did not await the arrival of reinforcements for the Italiote League. Catching the men of Thurii by surprise, the Lucanians inflicted a severe defeat with ten thousand casualties. As some survivors fled toward the sea, Leptines arrived to support the Lucanians. His ships

rescued the balance of the defeated men from Thurii. Leptines then paid a ransom to free the Greek prisoners. His motive unknown, Leptines negotiated a peace settlement between the Lucanians and the Italiote League. Displeased with this peace settlement, Dionysius dismissed Leptines and replaced him with their brother Thearidas (Diod.XIV.101–102).

Renewing the offensive, Dionysius led a force of twenty thousand infantry, and three thousand cavalry to Messene.⁵⁵⁴ Thearidas approached with forty warships. Learning that ten ships from Rhegium at the Lipari Islands, Thearidas approached with thirty ships and captured all ten vessels. The prisoners were left in custody at Messene. Dionysius crossed over to Italy and besieged Caulonia. Heloris was given the command by the Italiote League to resist Dionysius. With 25,000 infantry and two thousand cavalry, he marched to Caulonia to break the siege. Caught by surprise near the Eleporus River with only a portion of his army, Heloris and his men were killed by Dionysius. The remaining ten thousand League troops were isolated on a hill without water. After two days they surrendered. To their surprise, Dionysius pardoned them without ransom. Dionysius made peace with many cities of Italy and left them independent. However, Rhegium and Caulonia were punished. Rhegium surrendered seventy warships, paid three hundred talents in tribute, and provided a hundred citizens as hostages. Caulonia was destroyed. Its territory was given to Locri. The inhabitants were transported to Syracuse (Diod.XIV.103–106). Dionysius now controlled the Straits of Messene and the toe of Italy.

Still not satisfied, Dionysius launched a final assault against an isolated Rhegium in 388. After destroying Hipponium, assigning its territory to Locri, and transplanting the population to Syracuse, Dionysius marched to Rhegium. After deceiving the people of Rhegium to provision his army, he began a siege. The siege would last eleven months with Dionysius suffering a wound to the groin. The siege was bitterly fought. Reduced by starvation, Rhegium surrendered in 387. All remaining inhabitants were transplanted to Syracuse.⁵⁵⁵ Those who could pay were ransomed there. The others were enslaved (Diod.XIV.107–108; 111–112).

The destruction of Rhegium accomplished four objectives. First, it gave Dionysius control of the Straits of Messene. Second, it eliminated Rhegium as a haven for Syracusan exiles. Third, it eliminated Rhegium as a potential ally of Carthage in a future war. Finally, in alliance with the Lucanians, Dionysius dominated the Bruttian peninsula. His influence in Italy reached as far north as Oscan Campania. His alliance with Taras (Tarentum) also gave him a dominant position around the Gulf of Tarentum. Most of the Greeks of

Sicily and Italy were now subjects or allies of Dionysius. Only Sparta now rivaled Syracuse as the leading *polis* of the Hellenic world.

The Empire of Dionysius I

During the Corinthian War Dionysius remained an ally of Sparta against Corinth, the mother city of Syracuse. Occupied with his western campaigns, he provided little support to Sparta. However, in 387 he did provide a fleet of twenty ships commanded by his brother-in-law Polyxenus. Polyxenus joined the Peloponnesian fleet, commanded by Antalcidas, and assisted the blockade of the Hellespont to prevent the grain ships from sailing to Athens (Xen.*Hell.V.1.26–28*). This action forced Athens to make peace. Although not a signatory to the Peace of Antalcidas, he remained Sparta's ally as the Spartans enforced the peace terms. His war with Carthage in 383 probably prevented him from interfering in the affairs of the mainland.

Diodorus's history next describes Dionysius's entry into the Adriatic basin. By 385/384 he was apparently interested in colonizing the area to control the sea-lanes from Hellas to the west. Whether his interest was strategic, economic, imperialistic, or a combination of all is not specified.⁵⁵⁶ Through the auspices of Alcetas, an exiled Molossian from Epirus, he made an alliance with the Illyrians and provided them with weaponry and two thousand soldiers. With this aid, Bardylis, king of the Dardanni, invaded Epirus (modern Albania).⁵⁵⁷ While the Illyrians pillaged the country, the Molossian army arrived. In a subsequent battle, the Illyrians were victorious and inflicted 15,000 casualties. The Illyrians occupied Epirus until forced out by the arrival of a Spartan army (Diod.XV.13). What the long-term relationship was between Bardylis and Dionysius is unknown.

An episode reported by Diodorus claims that Dionysius sent a fleet against the Etruscans. Allegedly to suppress piracy, this attack was probably a piratical raid to collect money. The Syracusan fleet attacked Pyrgi, the port of Etruscan Caere. The five hundred talents gathered was used to finance a war with Carthage (Diod.XV.14.3–4). If true, was this raid aimed at an ally of Carthage? Since the sixth century the Etruscans had allied with Carthage to prevent Greek expansion in the western Mediterranean.⁵⁵⁸ Was Caere an ally of Carthage? The answer is unknown.

In 383 Dionysius began another war with Carthage when he received the allegiance of some cities that were subject to Carthage. Why did he provoke war? His motives are unclear. Diodorus provides no answer. How long this war lasted is also uncertain. The details of this war are sketchy. The war was fought in Italy and Sicily. Carthage

apparently allied with the Italiote League and sent troops to Italy to support their rebellion against Dionysius. Diodorus mentions much fighting but gives few details of when and where they occurred. Two major engagements occurred in Sicily. The battle of Cabala was a Punic defeat with the Punic general Mago and ten thousand men killed. At Cronium Dionysius was defeated and his brother Leptines killed along with 14,000 men. Diodorus confines all these actions to the year 383/382, but this is impossible. When the war probably ended in 378, the terms suggest that Dionysius suffered a severe defeat.⁵⁵⁹ Carthage got Selinus and some territory that belonged to Acragas. Dionysius paid an indemnity of one thousand talents. The Halycus River was again the border between Greek and Punic Sicily (Diod.XV.15–17).

Dionysius I's Final Years

In 375 Syracuse was the second largest city in the Greek world. Although occupied for most of his reign with affairs in Sicily and Italy, the shadow of Dionysius's power was omnipresent to the mainland Greeks. War between Athens and Sparta had again broken out. In 373 Sparta asked for Syracusan assistance to subdue Corcyra to prevent an alliance between Corcyra and Athens (Xen.*Hell.*VI.2.4). Dionysius did send ten ships the following year to Corcyra to support Sparta. Approaching Corcyra, they were surprised and captured by the Athenian general Iphicrates. Their commander Cranippus committed suicide. The crews were ransomed and released (Xen.*Hell.*VI.2.33–6; Diod.XV.47.7). Dionysius provided no further aid to Sparta until the summer of 369. Then Dionysius sent two thousand Celts and Iberians, fifty cavalry, and twenty ships to support Sparta against the invasion of Epaminondas. After a short stay in the Peloponnese, they sailed home when the Thebans returned home. Another force appeared in 368 and fought against the Arcadians and Argives in the Spartan victory known as the "Tearless Battle" (Xen.*Hell.*VII.1.20–32). Shortly before his death, another war broke out in 368 between Carthage and Syracuse. After capturing Selinus, Entella, and Eryx, Dionysius failed to capture Lilybaeum, built near the destroyed Motya. However, the Punic fleet achieved a major victory in the harbor of Eryx. A truce occurred in the winter. In the spring of 367 Dionysius died (Diod.XV.73).

The Summary of Dionysius I

In 375 Dionysius I was in power for thirty years. What was the domestic front like? The consensus among ancient writers and modern historians concedes that he ruled as a tyrant in the worse sense of the word. We have mentioned that early in his career he probably

portrayed himself as a man of the people as he consolidated his power. However, he became more ruthless as his power grew through his conquests. Dionysius, as all tyrants or kings in general, faced two fundamental problems. The first problem was how to maintain power. The second problem was how to secure the succession. How did he solve these issues?

Dionysius came to power as a young man and was probably a supporter of Hermocrates. His first wife was the daughter of Hermocrates. Hermocrates's death and the Punic threat to Syracuse provided him the opportunity to step into the political arena to portray himself as the savior of Syracuse. Despite the victory of Carthage in 405, Dionysius remained in power. To secure a power base, he required the support of friends, family, and the military. Early on he received the political support of the wealthy nobles Hipparinus and Philistus in the Syracusan Assembly. Heloris, his adopted father, encouraged him to remain in power when besieged by the Syracusans in 405 (Diod.XIV.8.5). Their sponsorship allowed him to become the sole general of the military. Once in power, he relied on the support of his brothers Leptines and Thearidas and his brother-in-law Polyxenus, married to Dionysius's sister Theste, to conduct military operations and act as ambassadors (Diod.XIV.48.4; 53.5; 62.1; 63.4; 102.3). Philistus was the garrison commander of Ortygia. After his marriage to Aristomache, his brother-in-law Dion became a close adviser (Plut.*Dion*.4.1–2). These men provided him loyal support despite the eventual exile of Heloris, Leptines, Polyxenus, and Philistus.⁵⁶⁰ Through distributions of land, money, and resettlement, he secured the loyalty of the mercenaries he hired.

After the death of his first wife, he addressed the succession problem by the marriage of two wives simultaneously. Doris, the daughter of Xenetus from Locri, and Aristomache, the daughter of Hipparinus, were the mothers of his children (Diod.XIV.44.5–45.3; Plut.*Dion*.3.3–6). Doris gave him his first child and his eldest son and successor Dionysius II. Dionysius had three children with Doris and four with Aristomache. To keep power in the family, his daughters by Aristomache, Sophrosyne and Arete, became the brides of Dionysius II and Thearidas respectively. After Thearidas's death, Arete married Dion (Plut.*Dion*.6.1). As his children grew up, Dionysius always had to balance his power against a potential coup that could use his friends and family against him. We are told that Dionysius II was kept in isolation to prevent him from participating in the government (Plut.*Dion*.9.2–3). To prevent opposition rallying around a designated heir, it is probable that Dionysius never had a clear succession plan for the smooth transition of power. The natural death of Dionysius I did not prevent rumors that he might have been poisoned (Plut.*Dion*.6.2).

Apparently the rumors were unfounded since we hear of no reprisals after his death.

As supporters went into exile, it is apparent that his rule became more unpopular within the inner circle. He was ruthless in dealing with enemies in war. Populations were often slaughtered, enslaved, or transplanted to Syracuse. Some cities were resettled with his mercenaries while others were abandoned. Within Syracuse, stories claim that he isolated himself and that no one could come into his presence with any kind of weapon (Plut.*Dion.*9.3–8). Whether true or not, he allegedly had a man called Marsyas killed over a dream that Marsyas had! Dionysius is also accused of plotting the murder of Plato on his return voyage home from Syracuse in the early 380s (Plut.*Dion.*5.6–7). Except for the first war with Carthage, he used mercenaries rather than citizen troops in his wars. As a police force, his mercenaries maintained internal security. Without arms, the citizen population could not start another rebellion. If rebellion had occurred, his fortress of Ortygia protected him from the Syracusans. Despite his victories, defeats, power, and family, Dionysius died alone and unloved. Hammond provides an excellent critique:

Although Dionysius created a great city, a powerful army and navy, and a considerable empire, he did not create a unified state. By pouring a mixed population into Syracuse he deprived it of cohesion which made it a city-state, and he substituted for the ties of blood the common bond of political servitude.⁵⁶¹

Despite his defense of Hellenism against Carthage, he had no moral qualms exploiting his fellow Greeks. The welcome relief of the Syracusans at the succession of Dionysius II verifies that fear and force were the major factors that maintained his power. There is no heroic image of Dionysius by any ancient writer. He is the example par excellence of the evil tyrant. Can we doubt their judgment?

The Reign of Dionysius II

The tyrant is dead. How would the son rule? Like his father, Dionysius II was a young man, probably under thirty, when he became ruler of Syracuse. Would he be a chip off the old block or his own man? Plutarch describes him as poorly educated, indolent, and a drunk. (Plut.*Dion.*7.4–7; 10.1) At his accession, most of the old guard supporters of his father were dead. His uncle Dion remained. Philistus, now an old man, returned from exile. Would the young man follow their guidance or the council of others? Unfortunately, the information supplied by the literary evidence is meager at best. Dionysius II ruled

in two phases separated by an exile and return. After his short second term of power, he was permanently exiled to the Peloponnese. How did these events occur?

Initially Dionysius II was more restrained and less harsh in his rule. In the hope of creating a “philosopher king,” Dion, who was a disciple of Plato, persuaded Dionysius to invite Plato for a second visit to Syracuse. Dion and Plato hoped to encourage the son to be the wise ruler that the father failed to be.⁵⁶² Plato arrived in Syracuse in the summer of 366. When he returned, there were at least two political factions in Syracuse. Philistus urged the strict rule of Dionysius I. He also feared the influence that Dion and Plato may hold over the younger Dionysius. Dion, no fan of democracy, wished to moderate the rule of Dionysius II and expand his influence within the new regime (Plut.*Dion*.12.2–3). Whether or not a conspiracy existed between Dion and Carthage, Dionysius II and Philistus confronted Dion after they received some secret correspondence between Carthage and Dion. As a result, Dion was exiled. However, his property was not confiscated, nor his family punished (Plut.*Dion*.14.4–7; Diod.XVI.6.4).⁵⁶³ Out of favor under a tyranny, Dion might have been lucky that he was not executed. Dion eventually settled in Athens. Shortly after Dion’s exile, Plato returned to Athens disappointed that he failed to moderate the behavior of the younger Dionysius.

The Punic War that began in the last year of Dionysius I was formally ended by 366 with the *status quo* maintained in Sicily. With little vigor, Dionysius prosecuted a war with the Lucanians in Italy but made peace within a few years. He apparently made an attempt to suppress piracy in the Adriatic Sea and founded a couple of cities in Apulia, on the southeast coast of Italy, to check piratical activities (Diod.XVI.5.1–3). By 363 Dionysius had no foreign entanglements. He was content to maintain the state of affairs inherited from his father.

Probably in the later part of 363 Dionysius again invited Plato to return to Syracuse. Plato declined citing old age as an excuse. After further invitations, Plato arrived in Syracuse in 361 for one last attempt to put his philosophical principles into practice. It failed. The pupil preferred the role of tyrant rather than benevolent ruler. Plato also failed to achieve the recall of Dion, who was still resented by Dionysius (Plut.*Dion*.18.5–20.4; Pl.*Ep*.VII.345c-350b). With both men disenchanted by the other, Dionysius, despite threats toward Plato, allowed Plato to leave unharmed. Plato left Syracuse in the spring of 360. He would never return.

Dion and Dionysius II

At the Olympic festival later in the year, Plato informed Dion of the

state of affairs in Syracuse. Perhaps now Dion had decided that his nephew must be removed from power (Pl.*Ep.*VII.350b-e). He began preparations to accomplish that objective. His friend and accomplice was Heraclides, a former commander of Dionysius II's mercenaries, who had gone into exile. Using his personal fortune, Dion surreptitiously hired mercenaries. Without official sponsorship from any *polis* in Hellas, he raised a small private army and fleet. Corinth became his base of operations (Diod.XVI.6.5).

In the midsummer of 357 Dion launched his expedition against Syracuse. Sailing from the island of Zacynthus, Dion's small force consisted of two merchant ships and a transport with eight hundred troops accompanied by two triaconters. After a perilous voyage across the open sea, to avoid the scout ships of Dionysius, he landed on the south coast of Sicily at Minoa in Punic territory. After an agreement with the local Punic commander to temporarily store his extra weapons, Dion's men marched overland to Syracuse collecting numerous reinforcements along the way.⁵⁶⁴ Encountering little opposition, Dion entered the city. The Syracusans elected Dion and his associate Megacles generals with supreme power (Diod.XVI.9–10; Plut.*Dion.*23–29).⁵⁶⁵

Fortuitously for Dion, Dionysius II was in Italy with eighty triremes. Upon his return to Syracuse seven days later, Dionysius occupied his stronghold on Ortygia. After failed negotiations, Dionysius's soldiers attacked the city from Ortygia but were defeated after a severe engagement. While Dionysius was besieged in his island stronghold, Heraclides arrived from the Peloponnese with twenty triremes and 1,500 troops to reinforce Dion. Despite the disagreement between Heraclides and Dion regarding the new government structure, the two men worked to overthrow the tyrant. Dion probably wanted a limited oligarchy with power in his control. Heraclides wanted a broader participation by the people.⁵⁶⁶ While Dion retained the generalship, Heraclides was appointed admiral of the naval forces. After a Syracusan naval victory against Philistus, Dionysius offered to abdicate. He would sail to Italy provided he retained the revenue from some estates in Sicily. Against the advice of Dion, the Syracusans refused the terms. Dionysius appointed his oldest son Apollocrates to defend Ortygia, and then he fled to Locri in Italy. Here Dionysius remained and eventually became tyrant in 352. He ruled for six years until his return to Syracuse in 346. (Diod.XVI.11–13; 16–17.2; Plut.*Dion.*30–36.4; Just.XXI.3.9).

Heraclides was denounced by the Syracusans for his failure to prevent Dionysius's escape. To gain favor, Heraclides supported a proposal of Hippon, a democratic leader, to confiscate and redistribute property from the wealthy, deprive Dion's mercenaries of pay, and

elect new generals. Consequently, Dion was removed as general because of his autocratic methods (Plut.*Dion*.36.5–7).

Rather than start a civil war between his mercenaries and the citizens of Syracuse, Dion led his men away to Leontini. The people of Leontini welcomed Dion's forces. The inhabitants were former mercenaries settled there by the senior Dionysius. Seeking restitution for the mercenaries of Dion, the Leontines sent envoys to Syracuse. The Syracusans refused (Diod.XVI.17.3–5; Plut.*Dion*.40).

Short of supplies by midsummer of 356, the garrison in Ortygia was close to surrender. Then Nysius, sent by Dionysius, arrived with food and money. A naval encounter after his arrival resulted in a Syracusan victory. While celebrating their victory, the Syracusans did not adequately guard the city. During the revelry, Nysius launched a night attack and inflicted heavy casualties on the inhabitants. At daylight the Syracusans sent envoys to Dion at Leontini for aid. Dion agreed. The Syracusan democrats had second thoughts after the mercenaries withdrew to Ortygia. They refused to accept Dion's troops. In a second night attack by Nysius, additional death and destruction was inflicted on the Syracusans. Dion received a second appeal as he approached the city. Leading his forces into the city, a severe battle was fought against Nysius's men. Eventually Nysius withdrew back to Ortygia (Diod.XVI.18–20; Plut.*Dion*.41–46).

The democratic leaders left the city and Dion was now elected supreme commander (*strategos autocrator*) of all military forces. His supporters urged the removal of Heraclides, who was popular with the people. To achieve internal harmony, Dion retained Heraclides as naval commander. However, he vetoed the proposal of Hippon to confiscate and redistribute the property of the wealthy (Plut.*Dion*.47–48).

Unfortunately, harmony did not come to Syracuse. Dion's autocratic behavior again alienated his opponents. Plutarch reports that the Spartan Pharax arrived and began secret negotiations between Heraclides and Dionysius. Why Sparta sent an envoy is unknown. Regardless, the negotiations failed. Pharax then supported Dionysius's attempt to regain parts of Sicily. After Pharax inflicted a minor defeat on Dion near Acragas, Dion withdrew to Syracuse on the rumor that Heraclides sailed to capture the city. Dion arrived prior to Heraclides. The rumor might have been false since no immediate repercussions befell Heraclides. Gaesylus arrived from Sparta to replace Pharax and lead the Sicilian Greeks. Gaesylus returned home after negotiating some type of truce between Dion and Heraclides (Plut.*Dion*.49).

By the autumn of 355, short of food and money, Apollocrates surrendered Ortygia, presumably with his father's acquiescence. The

arms and equipment were left behind. He sailed away with five triremes that included his mother, sister, and the mercenary troops. The tyranny was ended (Plut.*Dion*.50). After fifty years, the Syracusans were officially liberated.

Dion had won acclaim among the Hellenes as a liberator. However, his autocratic behavior and disposition toward oligarchy, or tyranny as claimed by his critics, did not make him popular with many Syracusans. Despite his behavior, Aristotle claims that Dion wanted glory, not power (Arist.*Pol*.1312a21–39). To reward his supporters, Dion provided lavish gifts that outstripped his resources. Since the Syracusan Assembly refused to pay the mercenaries after liberation, Dion began to confiscate the wealth of his opponents and then oligarchic supporters to pay the mercenaries. Many wealthy citizens now joined the opposition to Dion. Idleness, lack of booty, and uncertainty of pay led to disenchantment among the mercenaries. Consequently, the opposition increased daily against the rule of Dion. Dion's political position was again tenuous.

How the oligarchic constitution functioned is unknown. How broad the franchise was is unknown, but apparently the democratic opposition was dissatisfied. A council, assembly, and magistrates existed, but their membership and duties are unknown. Since Dion did not surrender his supreme power, conflict reared again with Heraclides and other representatives of the people. Heraclides refused to participate in the council and accused Dion of autocratic behavior. This time Heraclides was the loser. He was assassinated by Dion's supporters. For Dion, his days were numbered. His aloofness and arrogance, compounded with his power as general, spurred the opposition to act. Fearful that Dion would officially become a tyrant, a conspiracy developed around the person of Callippus, an Athenian ally of Dion. Unwilling to provide himself with a bodyguard, Dion left himself exposed to his enemies. In the summer of 354, within a year of liberation, some mercenaries from Zacynthus murdered Dion in his home (Diod.XVI.31.7; Plut.*Dion*.52–57). His entire family was later murdered.⁵⁶⁷ Syracuse's liberation was short-lived.

Tyranny Restored

The death of Dion did not eliminate *stasis* in Syracuse or Sicily. Sicily was divided between Greeks, Sicans, Sicels, Carthaginians, and mercenaries, mostly Italic, settled in the island by the elder Dionysius. Dionysius II still retained power in Italy. Syracuse suffered great destruction during the liberation. Its government and social/economic structure was in disarray. Although Carthage remained neutral, many Greek *poleis* were arraigned against Syracuse. Could Syracuse

restore its democracy after fifty years of tyranny? The answer is no!

Since Callippus ruled in Syracuse for one year, the friends of Dion had fled to Leontini (Diod.XVI.31.7). Callippus was assassinated by his soldiers after he occupied Rhegium. Hipparinus, another son of Dionysius I, captured Syracuse in 353/352 and ruled for two years (Diod.XVI.36.5). After Hipparinus's death, his brother Nysaeus ruled for five years until he was ousted in 346 when Dionysius II returned and captured Syracuse. Under the sons of Dionysius I, the supporters of Dion returned to support their regimes. Unfortunately, aside from these brief statements in Diodorus, we know little about of these tyrants.

Hicetas, a supporter of Dion, was now an exile in Leontini with other supporters who opposed the return of Dionysius II. These exiles chose Hicetas to lead them against Dionysius. Unable to liberate themselves, in 345 the Syracusans sent envoys to Corinth requesting a general who could liberate them. Hicetas supported the appeal but probably expected the request to be denied. The Corinthians responded by selecting Timoleon, who hated tyranny (Diod.XVI.65.1–2; Plut. *Tim.*3.1–3).⁵⁶⁸

Looking to supplant Dionysius, Hicetas formed an alliance with Carthage. His hope was to capture Syracuse before Corinth could dispatch a relief force. The Carthaginians must have viewed the turmoil in Sicily as an opportunity to expand their control in the island. They assigned the command to Hanno with 150 triremes and fifty thousand troops. Before the Punic preparations were complete, Hicetas established a fort near Syracuse. Unable to secure an uprising by the Syracusans, he was attacked by Dionysius's troops. Dionysius was defeated and suffered three thousand casualties. Hicetas proceeded to occupy Syracuse and besiege Ortygia (Diod.XVI.66–68.3; Plut. *Tim.*7.3–4).

Timoleon

In the spring of 344 Timoleon departed Corinth with a force of seven hundred mercenaries and seven ships. Three more ships later joined from Corcyra and Leucas. Crossing the open sea to Italy, he landed at Metapontum where the Carthaginians warned him to proceed no farther. Ignoring their warning and avoiding capture by a Punic flotilla stationed at Rhegium, he reached Tauromenium in Sicily unscathed. Fearing another soldier of fortune from the Greek homeland, the Sicilian cities initially rejected his appeal for support.⁵⁶⁹ Receiving envoys from Adranum, south of Mount Aetna, Timoleon marched to Adranum to support one faction while Hicetas arrived to support the other faction. Catching the five thousand troops of Hicetas

by surprise, Timoleon's force of 1,200 men defeated Hicetas. After this victory other Sicilian cities joined Timoleon. Mamercus, the tyrant of Catana on the north coast, provided a base of operations for Timoleon. Although Mamercus was a tyrant, Timoleon accepted allies wherever he could find them (Diod.XVI.68.4–69.6; Plut. *Tim.*8–13.2).

Besieged by Hicetas on land and the Punic fleet in the Great Harbor, Dionysius was in a bad situation. Learning of Timoleon's victory, Dionysius, his garrison low on supplies and reduced to two thousand men, offered to surrender Ortygia and abdicate the tyranny. The motive behind Dionysius's appeal to Timoleon is speculative. Perhaps the animosity demonstrated by Hicetas and Carthage toward him precluded an agreement with them. Did Timoleon hint that he could retain some power in Italy? Was there a temporary alliance to check Hicetas and Carthage? Whatever the agreement was, Timoleon smuggled part of his force into Ortygia. Dionysius surrendered the stronghold and secretly sailed to Timoleon's camp and surrendered himself. Timoleon sent Dionysius II into exile at Corinth where he remained until his death (Diod.XVI.70.1–3; Plut. *Tim.*13.3–14.1).⁵⁷⁰ Plutarch states that within fifty days of his landing in Sicily, the tyranny of Dionysius ended (Plut. *Tim.*16.2).

Although Dionysius abdicated, Ortygia remained besieged by Hicetas and Carthage during the winter of 344/343. The success of Timoleon's forces in Ortygia and Dionysius's removal encouraged the Corinthians to send two thousand infantry, two hundred cavalry, and ten ships to Sicily in the spring of 343.⁵⁷¹ Arriving at Thurii in Italy, they were prevented from going to Sicily by the Carthaginian fleet. Eventually marching overland, they were able to cross unopposed to Sicily from Rhegium. Timoleon met them and proceeded to capture Messene. With these reinforcements, he then marched on Syracuse (Plut. *Tim.*16.3–4; 19–20).

Timoleon had perhaps four thousand soldiers, aside for those in Ortygia. Despite this small force, Timoleon attacked Hicetas. By this time the Punic fleet, commanded by Mago, had abandoned Hicetas and returned to Carthage. Whatever the reasons for his withdrawal, the Carthaginians disapproved of his actions. In disgrace, Mago eventually committed suicide.⁵⁷² Plutarch states that Hicetas retired to Leontini after suffering a defeat. Hicetas remained there as a tyrant. This engagement is suspicious because he also mentions that no Corinthian was wounded or killed and the city fell quickly. Without Punic support, how willing was Hicetas to face Timoleon? If, as is probable, Hicetas was unpopular with the Syracusans, did he offer serious resistance to Timoleon's attack? Was there a secret agreement that allowed Hicetas to withdraw with his troops and retain power in Leontini?⁵⁷³ Whatever the explanation, Timoleon was left in

control of Syracuse by summer (Plut. *Tim.*21).

Unlike Dion, Timoleon agreed to allow the Syracusans to destroy the fortifications on Ortygia. The houses, tombs, statues, etc., of the tyrants were also destroyed. New buildings were built over the remains. The democracy was restored. The structure of this democracy is unclear.⁵⁷⁴ New laws were implemented. The office of *amphipolos* of Olympian Zeus became the highest annual office (Diod.XVI.70.5–6).⁵⁷⁵ Further reforms were implemented by 339 when the laws of Diocles were revised with the assistance of Cephalus of Corinth (Diod.XVI.82.6–7). With Syracuse heavily damaged and depopulated, Timoleon requested Corinth to recruit colonists to resettle Syracuse (Plut. *Tim.*22–23). Eventually, exiles returned and new settlers arrived in Sicily from throughout the Greek world.

Syracuse was liberated, but Sicily was not. Syracuse could not be secure until the island was pacified. Tyrants still ruled many *polis*. Carthage was a hostile. Mercenaries were looking for employment. *Stasis* within Sicily over the past twenty years had depopulated many cities and the countryside. Economic prosperity declined (Diod.XVI.83.1). Would Timoleon stay or return to Corinth with the liberation of Syracuse?

He stayed. Elected general with supreme power (*strategos autocrator*) by the Syracusans, he launched an offensive against the tyrants in the summer of 342. Failing to capture Leontini, Timoleon did liberate Engyum and Apollonia from Leptines and exiled him to the Peloponnese. In Timoleon's absence, Hicetas attacked Syracuse but was repulsed. Short of funds to continue his offensive, Timoleon assigned some forces to raid Punic territory to collect booty to pay the troops. Some Greek, Sicel, and Sican towns submitted to Timoleon's forces (Diod.XVI.72–73; Plut. *Tim.*24).

In 341 Carthage launched a new expedition against Sicily. This army was composed of seventy thousand men, two hundred triremes, one thousand transports, and siege equipment, commanded by Hasdrubal and Hamilcar. Included in this force was the Sacred Band of 2,500 Carthaginian citizens specially trained. This force sailed to Lilybaeum. Their mission was twofold; avenge the failure of Mago and restore Punic power in Sicily. Aware of these preparations for a couple of years, Timoleon had plans in place. He reconciled with Hicetas and combined both forces.⁵⁷⁶ Taking the initiative, Timoleon marched into Punic territory with 12,000 men, which included four thousand mercenaries, three thousand Syracusans, and various allies. Before he could attack, one thousand mercenaries abandoned him as he approached Acragas. Undaunted by these desertions, Timoleon marched to the Crimisus River (modern Belice River) in Punic territory where the Carthaginians were located.

On a hot and hazy day in the month of Thargelion (June) from a hill above the river, Timoleon observed the Carthaginians crossing the river led by the Sacred Band. Timoleon assigned the allies and some mercenaries to the wings. He commanded the center, comprised of the Syracusans and his best troops. He ordered the cavalry to attack the Carthaginians, but they did little damage. He then attacked while the Carthaginians were crossing the river. Thus, he engaged the enemy piecemeal. During the hotly contested battle, a thunderstorm occurred. With the wind and rain at their backs, the Greeks had an advantage over the Carthaginians. As the rain turned the ground into a quagmire and the river into a raging torrent, the heavily armored Carthaginians could not maintain their order. If they fell, they could not get up. Those who continued to cross the river were swept away and drowned. Panic set in and the Carthaginians withdrew. Their losses were severe. Punic casualties were ten thousand killed, including the Sacred Band, and 15,000 captured. A great amount of booty was gathered after the capture of the Punic camp and baggage train. After the troops were rewarded, much booty was sent to Syracuse and Corinth as symbols of the victory (Diod.XVI.77.4–80; Plut.*Tim.*25–29).

Whether it was good fortune, superior leadership, Punic incompetence, and/or the fighting qualities of professional Greek soldiers, this victory ranks with the other great victories of Hellene over barbarian. Like Himera, Plataea, Eurymedon, and others, the Crimisus, witnessed the destruction of the enemy army. The Punic threat was removed from Sicily for a generation. However, the war dragged on.

Fearing an attack from Syracuse, the Carthaginians made preparations to defend their city. They offered peace terms, but peace remained elusive. They also made overtures to the Sicilian tyrants to ally against Timoleon. Mamercus of Catana, Hicetas of Leontini, and others united against Timoleon. Over the next couple of years, Timoleon managed to suppress the tyrannies. Hicetas was captured and executed by Timoleon. Hippon of Messene was killed by the inhabitants of Messene. Mamercus was crucified by the Syracusans. Some of the inhabitants of these liberated cities were given Syracusan citizenship. In 338 peace was made with Carthage. The terms were the freedom of the Greek cities, Carthage would withdraw support for the Greek tyrants, and the Halycus River was again the border between Punic and Greek Sicily (Diod.XVI.82.3–5; Plut.*Tim.*32–34). The inhabitants of Sicily were finally at peace.

After these accomplishments, Timoleon, now an old man, resigned his command in 337. He settled in Syracuse until his death. He never returned to Corinth. With the sponsorship of Corinth, he witnessed the influx of immigrants to the island to repopulate Syracuse, Acragas, Gela, Camarina, and other *poleis*.⁵⁷⁷ Some form of

democracy was operational in Syracuse. He helped to write new laws in Syracuse. In time prosperity returned to the island (Diod.XVI.82.5–83.1). He probably died shortly after his retirement in 337/336. He was buried with honors by the Syracusans (Diod.XVI.90.1; Plut. *Tim.*39).

Dion and Timoleon

Dion is an enigmatic character in Hellenic history. Was he a patriot, politician, philosopher, military leader, adventurer, or fool? Perhaps he was all of the above. He supported the tyranny of Dionysius I and the early years of Dionysius II. The uncle of Dionysius II, he disapproved of his nephew's rule. A friend of Plato, he was a politician with philosophical aspirations. He hoped to mold his nephew to rule wisely. Wealthy with an arrogant and aloof personality, Dion could not be a friend of the *demos*. Whether or not he ever believed in Plato's "philosopher king," he did believe in an oligarchy with government restricted to men of property and ability. He liked power and perhaps glory. He had great influence in the tyranny prior to his exile. Once he regained supreme power as a liberator, he was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to surrender it. As a military leader he could inspire his troops. In battle he displayed personal courage. A liberator, he was assassinated for acting like a tyrant. In war he could inspire hope. In peace he inspired fear. He could inspire strangers but disillusion his friends. In the end, Dion could not escape his own *hubris*. He died unmourned and dishonored.

Timoleon died honored and mourned. He is recognized as the liberator of Syracuse and Sicily. He never attempted to establish Syracusan hegemony in Sicily. He believed in and accepted constitutional government with a broad franchise. Although the constitutional developments in Syracuse over the eight years he resided there are uncertain, he sponsored new laws to reform the constitution. It is likely that the franchise was broadened to the Syracusans and new settlers. He was accepted as a *strategos autocrator*.⁵⁷⁸ There is no evidence that he abused the power. He did not display autocratic behavior. He was a friend not only of the *demos* but also all the people. No ideologue, he worked with all political factions to achieve his objectives. A skilled military commander, he was also a skilled politician and diplomat to rally various constituencies to his banner. He worked with tyrants, oligarchs, and democrats. He arrived in Sicily ravished by *stasis*, depopulation, and economic decline. He died with Sicily temporarily benefitting from *eunomia*. Population growth and economic prosperity returned. However, he did not live to witness its full development. Unfortunately, this legacy would not last. Tyranny would return. By the end of the century, Agathocles

would become tyrant of Syracuse and war would resume with Carthage. A century after the death of Timoleon, Sicily was a Roman province.

Timoleon's death coincided with the death of Philip II of Macedon. As Timoleon liberated Sicily, Philip conquered the Hellenic mainland. How did this happen?

535 In World War II the Soviets regarded the defense of the Soviet Union as "The Great Patriotic War." Syracuse was Athens' Stalingrad. Athens never again possessed the military power it had prior to the Sicilian Expedition. The alliance between Persia and Sparta put Athens on the defensive until Athens surrendered in 404.

536 The conflict between Egesta and Selinus, which led to the Athenian intervention in 415, continued after Athens defeat in 413.

537 See Picard in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 365–367. The *basileus* in Carthage is the king but actually performs the function of warlord (Hdt.VII.166). His primary functions were to lead Carthage's military forces and perform sacrifices to the gods to secure military victory. However, war had to be approved by the Carthaginian people. Other officials performed domestic functions. The *basileus* was selected for life based on abilities. The *basileus* had no colleague in the fifth and fourth centuries. Eventually his power was diminished when the government was transformed into an aristocracy in the fourth century.

538 Xenophon states that Hermocrates was part of the embassy that Pharnabazus was taking to the Great King in late 408 (Xen.Hell.I.3.13).

539 (Miles 2010), 121. (Toynbee 1965), 36–36. Toynbee suggests that Carthage used Sicily as a "beachhead" to protect its empire in Africa and Spain.

540 See Picard in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 369–370.

541 (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 280–281. Inscription number 92 is a rather obscure text that suggests that Carthage was seeking assistance from Athens. It would have been in Athens' interest to keep Syracuse occupied with Carthage.

542 Diodorus mention a sea battle between forty Punic triremes and an equal Syracusan fleet in which the Syracusans were victorious (Diod.XIII.80.6–7). It is uncertain whether Carthage sent two separate fleets. Xenophon claims that 120 triremes accompanied the army (Xen.Hell.I.5.21).

543 Philistus went on to serve Dionysius for twenty years until he was exiled. He later wrote a favorable history of Dionysius that Diodorus used.

544 Thucydides claimed that six hundred men was an elite force in Syracuse during the Sicilian Expedition (Thuc.VI.96.3). Whether Dionysius had this elite force in mind is arguable. Thucydides merely demonstrates that there was precedent for six hundred select men in the forces of Syracuse.

545 (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 133–135. Lewis suggests that he may have followed a military reform policy of Hermocrates in his rise to power. Once in power, Lewis says that he was a monarch.

546 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 188. Acragas was later refounded about 339/338 under Timoleon (Plut.*Tim*.35.2).

547 See Lewis in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 136. (N. Hammond 1986), 473.

548 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 48–50. Inscription number 10 gives this title. See

- Lewis in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 137. (Rhodes 2010), 317.
- 549 Diodorus says that the quinquereme was also introduced, but this is questionable (Diod.XIV.41.3).
- 550 (Hale 2009), 304.
- 551 (N. Hammond 1986), 474–475. This catapult was a mechanically strung bow. It arrows could pierce a shield at two hundred yards.
- 552 (Rhodes 2010), 320. See Lewis in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 145. Rhodes and Lewis claim peace was agreed to in 392. The account of Diodorus in XIV.90 and XIV.95 is confusing. The storyline is unclear and the dating uncertain. We follow the chronology in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 883. Mago's campaign is dated to 393/392. (Miles 2010), 130. See Picard in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 373. Miles and Picard makes no mention of a peace in 392. They imply that the war was ended with a peace in 373.
- 553 See Purcell in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 386–387. (Walbank 1957). 225–226. (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 255. The Italiote League was renewed about 393 to oppose Dionysius (Diod.XIV.91.1). The Italiote League, formed between 430 and 420 to counter Samnite and Oscan aggression, originally comprised the Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia (Polyb.II.39.2–6). By 393 Thurii, Hipponium, Rhegium, and Elea had joined. The League had a Council and a sacred temple of Zeus at Croton where they met. According to Polybius, the League succumbed to the power of Dionysius I and the Italic peoples.
- 554 The dates are uncertain when these events began. See Lewis in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 146–147; 885. The date for these events is 390. (Rhodes 2010), P321. Rhodes dates them to 388. (N. Hammond 1986), 478. Hammond assigns them to 389.
- 555 What Dionysius did with the site is uncertain. Rhegium was refounded by his son Dionysius II. By 351 Rhegium was an independent *polis* (Diod.XVI.45.9).
- 556 The silver mines of the Damastini, an Illyrian tribe, provided coinage and bullion for export for the western Balkan inhabitants.
- 557 At the beginning of the fourth century, Bardylis unified many Illyrian tribes identified as Dardanni (Dardanians). Until the rise of Philip II, Bardylis continued to raid Epirus, Macedonia, and other Balkan people. He reigned about forty years.
- 558 The Etruscans and Carthaginians were allies at the battle of Alalia in 535 (Hdt.I.165–166).
- 559 (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 885. The date is unsure but listed as 378. (N. Hammond 1986), 479.
- 560 Leptines eventually returned, but Philistus and Heloris did not. Heloris died fighting in Italy against Dionysius (Diod.XIV.104.3). Philistus wrote a history of Dionysius I that Diodorus used (Diod.XIV.11.6–7). He returned from exile under Dionysius II. Polyxenus's reason for voluntary exile is unknown (Plut.*Dion*.21.7–9). (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 152. Lewis suggests that Dionysius I may have imagined a conspiracy between Leptines and Philistus when Philistus married a daughter of Leptines without Dionysius's approval.
- 561 (N. Hammond 1986), 481.
- 562 In the 388/387 Plato made a first visit to Dionysius to teach him some philosophical rules for wise governance.
- 563 Eventually Dionysius II did confiscate Dion's property for personal use (Plut.*Dion*.18.1–2; 19.8).
- 564 Diodorus claims he collected twenty thousand men (Diod.XVI.9.4). Plutarch says

- that five thousand men joined (Plut.*Dion*.27.5).
- 565 See Westlake in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 699. Westlake says Dion and Megacles were given supreme power. (Rhodes 2010), 325. Rhodes claims that Dion and Megacles did not accept supreme power but were part of a board of twenty generals.
- 566 Ibid, 700.
- 567 Plutarch relates their fate (Plut.*Dion*.58.8–10).
- 568 About 265 Timoleon killed his own brother Timophanes, who attempted to become a tyrant in Corinth (Diod.XVI.65.3–4; Plut.*Tim*.4.4–8). Diodorus implies that this act of tyrannicide was more recent, but the date is uncertain.
- 569 The Athenian Callippus and the Spartan Pharax were remembered without affection (Plut.*Dion*.48.8–49; 58.1–6).
- 570 Diodorus and Plutarch tell two different stories about the liberation of Syracuse. Diodorus's account stretches over a period of three years (Diod.XVI.68–70). This author prefers the short period of Plutarch.
- 571 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 368–370. Inscription number 74 is a commemoration that suggests Corinth and its colonies supported Timoleon more than is implied in Diodorus and Plutarch.
- 572 (Plut.*Tim*.22.8). It is unclear why Mago returned. He may have viewed the military situation as unfavorable at Syracuse, or perhaps there was internal turmoil at Carthage. His return to Carthage was unexpected. He was denounced by his countrymen.
- 573 See Westlake in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 712.
- 574 It may mean no more than constitutional government with magistrates, council, and assembly. Under Corinthian influence, property qualifications probably made political participation more restrictive. However, this is speculative.
- 575 Diodorus does not specify its religious and/or political functions. However, the Syracusans named their years after this official.
- 576 There are no references that Carthage made overtures to Hicetas. Therefore, it is probable that Carthage wanted to punish him also.
- 577 Plutarch discusses the measures Corinth implemented to recruit settlers for Sicily (Plut.*Tim*.23.1–5).
- 578 See Westlake in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 717.

The Rise of Macedonia

The Sources

After the battle of Mantinea, Xenophon's *Hellenica* is concluded. From Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, we have a continuous narrative of Hellenic history by contemporary writers from the Persian wars to 362. Although other writers continue the story, we do not have a complete narrative. The next complete narrative that we have is that of the Diodorus Siculus who wrote in the first century BC. He has a complete narrative of the rise of Philip II but it relies on the narrative of Ephorus and other sources.⁵⁷⁹ To supplement Diodorus, we must rely on the contemporary Athenian orators Isocrates, Demosthenes, Lycurgus, and Aeschines and others for further information. However, these sources often use information to justify their political positions regarding Philip II. These speeches were often given in court or the Athenian Assembly in defense of their actions or to promote a particular policy. Since they often played fast and loose with the facts, we must be vigilant in analyzing the evidence provided. Demosthenes was always hostile toward Philip and labored to develop a Greek coalition against Philip. Demosthenes always presented Philip's actions as steps in the subjugation of Hellas. He also always advocated the concept that what was good for Athens was good for Hellas. Aeschines and Isocrates were more favorable to Philip. We have no source that writes from the Macedonian perspective! Consequently, we are forced to evaluate Philip through Hellenic eyes.

Plutarch's lives of Phocion and Demosthenes provide further information. The brief lives of Cornelius Nepos also provide some information. Pompeius Trogus is a Latin writer of the late first century BC, who reports information derived from earlier Greek writers. His history is revealed in an epitome by Justin, a Latin writer of the later Roman Empire. Arrian was a Greek who wrote in the second century AD. His *Anabasis* is a history of Alexander III (the Great) that provides information about Macedonia and Philip as it pertains to Alexander. Contemporary inscriptions provide information not found in the ancient writers. Coinage provides information about the political situation and economy of the period.

Hellas After Mantinea

After the battle of Mantinea Sparta was a broken reed. The resurgence of Thebes was checked. Thebes would need to find new leadership to carry the torch passed on by the deaths of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. Thessaly was divided between the tyrants of Pherae, attempting to restore the power of Jason, and those *poleis*, led by Larissa, who refused to submit. The Peloponnesian states needed to adapt to a new order with the demise of the Peloponnesian League. The new *poleis* of Messene and Megalopolis needed time to develop. Corinth was no longer a major player in Hellenic affairs. Some Arcadians wanted to resurrect the Arcadian league, but Arcadia remained divided. Suffering from *stasis*, Argos was too weak to step into Sparta's shoes. After the death of Dionysius I in 367, the power of Syracuse declined. Athens, as the leader of a naval confederacy, was not a participant at Mantinea. Though powerful on paper, Athens never had the resources to dominate the allies as it had done under the Delian League. Since the Satrap's Revolt was not fully suppressed, the Great King was unable to interfere in Hellenic affairs. After Mantinea, there was no dominant power in the Greek world. This situation would change drastically in the next decade. Under the leadership of Philip II, Macedonia would step to the forefront to become the rising star in the Aegean world.

Macedonia Before Philip II

Located north and east of Thessaly and separated by a mountain range, the region was called Macedonia or Macedon by the Greeks (Hdt.V.17; Thuc.I.58.1). Macedonia comprised two separate areas identified as Lower and Upper Macedonia. Lower Macedonia occupied the plain along the coastline of the Thermaic Gulf. It was bordered to the east by the Chalcidic peninsula. To the north and west, separated by hills, lies Upper Macedonia. Upper Macedonia's western border was separated from Illyria, located along the Adriatic Sea, by a range of mountains. Upper Macedonia comprised a number of small independent kingdoms that paid allegiance to the central monarchy only if the king was a strong leader. Under a weak central monarchy, these Macedonian aristocrats were kings and pursued their own agenda.⁵⁸⁰ Through most of the archaic and classical periods, Upper and Lower Macedonia remained separate entities.

Lacking cities, the Upper Macedonians were an agricultural and pastoral people based on tribal organizations. Lower Macedonia, with fertile valleys, was agricultural but also had *poleis* with close contacts to the surrounding Greek *poleis*. The Macedonian *polis* had local self-government but obeyed the policies determined by the king. Lower

Macedonia was the primary land route for commerce and armies to move from the Hellespont to the Peloponnese.

The ethnic name for the natives of Macedonia is “Macedones.”⁵⁸¹ The Macedonians were a mixture of many different types of people. Upper and Lower Macedonians considered themselves ethnically different. Macedonians, Illyrians, Paeonians, Greeks, and others appear to mingle in the classical period. The tribal distinctions within Macedonia are similar to Illyrians, Thracians, Epirots, and western Greeks. In the classical period, their language was a form of Aeolic Greek and some could speak the common Greek, called “koine,” in the fourth century.⁵⁸² However, for the average Macedonian and Greek, the linguistic differences probably made communication extremely difficult.⁵⁸³ Macedonian never became a literary language. Greek was the language for correspondence with the Hellenes. Despite the philhellenism of some Macedonian kings, the Macedonians and Greeks viewed each other as unrelated people.

Prior to the classical period, Macedonia remained on the periphery of the Hellenic world. During the late sixth and early fifth century, Macedonia and Thrace were under the control of the Persians after Darius I’s Scythian expedition. Only after the defeat of Xerxes, did King Alexander I (495–452) regain Macedonian independence. He was a strong king and expanded Macedonian territory eastward to the Strymon River. Macedonia rivaled Athens for control of Thrace in the 470s. After his death, Perdiccas II (452–413) became king and the kingdom was reduced in size due to a succession dispute. Perdiccas emerged as the winner by the mid-430s. During the Peloponnesian War, he continuously shifted his alliance between Athens and Sparta and made a treaty with Athens after a dispute with Brasidas in 423. He never restored the territorial size of the kingdom that Alexander I ruled.

His successor Archelaus (413–400/399) managed to restore the kingdom. With Athens defeated and Sparta preoccupied with other interests, Macedonia was ignored by the Greek powers. He rebuilt the economy, military, and infrastructure (Thuc.II.100.2). He also moved the capital from Aegae to Pella to better govern Lower Macedonia. Shortly after he intervened in Thessaly in 400 against Larissa, he was assassinated.⁵⁸⁴ Orestes (400/399–398/397), Aeropos (398/397–395/394), and perhaps the combination of Amyntas II and Pausanias (394/393) ruled between Archelaus and Amyntas III (Diod.XIV.84.6).⁵⁸⁵ Aeropos opposed Sparta and supported Thebes in the Corinthian War. The reigns of these four kings in six years accomplished little.

The fortunes of Macedonia would reach a low point under King Amyntas III (393–370/369). Shortly after his accession, he fled the kingdom when Bardylis, the king of the Dardanni who led a coalition of Illyrian tribes, invaded Macedonia (Diod.XIV.92.3–4). After a two-year

absence, he was restored to a smaller kingdom with the assistance of the Aleuadae regime of Thessalian Larissa. In 383/382 the Illyrians again invaded Macedonia and Amyntas was defeated. He consequently surrendered part of the kingdom to the Chalcidian League in return for their aid against the Illyrians. He later recovered this territory when Sparta defeated Olynthus (Xen.*Hell.*V.2.11–13; V.3.26; Diod.XV.19.2–3). After Leuctra, Amyntas allied with Jason of Pherae but died shortly afterward (Diod.XV.60.2–3). Although Amyntas barely kept a reduced kingdom intact, he was given divine honors at his death by the Macedonians. He left three sons, Alexander II, Perdiccas III, and Philip II by his wife Eurydice. All would eventually rule.

Alexander II (370/369–368/367), the eldest son, succeeded Amyntas. During his short reign, he managed to check the ambition of Alexander, the tyrant of Pherae. He seized and garrisoned Larissa and Crannon in Thessaly in 369. However, his control of these cities was short-lived. In 368 Pelopidas arrived from Thebes, at the request of the Thessalian opposition, to check the power of Alexander of Pherae. Pelopidas proceeded to Macedonia to mediate the conflict between Alexander II and Ptolemy of Alorus, Alexander's brother-in-law, for control of the kingdom. Pelopidas and Alexander agreed to an alliance. Alexander surrendered some hostages to secure the alliance.⁵⁸⁶ During his short reign, he began the transformation of the army from light infantry to the heavily armed hoplite. Shortly after the alliance, while attending a Macedonian festival, he was the victim of an assassin hired by Ptolemy of Alorus (Diod.XV.71.1).

Ptolemy (368/367–365/364) ruled for the next three years as regent for Perdiccas III. He also encountered a succession crisis in early 367 when Pausanias entered the arena as a pretender to the throne.⁵⁸⁷ Pausanias had enrolled Greek mercenaries to support his bid for power. Ptolemy was able to entice the Athenian commander Iphicrates, who was nearby with a few ships, to come to his assistance (Aesch.II.29). They forced Pausanias to flee Macedonia. Later that spring, Pelopidas invaded Macedonia with a force of mercenaries. Unable to resist Pelopidas, Ptolemy agreed to an alliance with Thebes. He surrendered his son Philoxenus, the future Philip II, and fifty supporters as hostages to Thebes (Plut.*Pel.*27.2–4). Macedonia became a subject ally of Thebes. It was now that he sent troops to Amphipolis to protect it against an Athenian attack. We know nothing else of his reign except his death a couple of years later. He also met his fate at the hands of an assassin (Diod.XV.77.5).

Ptolemy was succeeded by Perdiccas III (365/364–359), now age eighteen. Perdiccas renewed the alliance with Thebes. In exchange, Philip II, now seventeen, returned to Macedonia in 365. In 364 the

Athenians launched an offensive and secured a number of cities along the Thermaic Gulf (Diod.XV.81.5). Perdiccas's weakness forced him to accept some type of alliance with Athens, but within a year he abandoned the agreement. The Athenians forced him to accept a truce in 362 (Aesch.II.30). Although Perdiccas remained hostile, he avoided war with Athens. Perdiccas was aware of the Illyrian threat to his western borders by King Bardylis, who had defeated his father years earlier. He suffered some type of early defeat by Bardyllis but the date is unknown. In 359 the showdown came arrived. The Illyrians invaded Upper Macedonia. A battle occurred in which the Macedonians were severely defeated. Perdiccas and four thousand Macedonians were killed. The Illyrians proceeded to pillage Macedonia. Besides the Illyrians, the Macedonians were threatened by the Athenians, who were attempting to consolidate control of the Thracian coastline. Internally, the Macedonians were also threatened by the pretender Pausanias (Diod.XVI.2.4–6).

With three kings in a decade, severe military defeats by Greeks and Illyrians, internal turmoil, and loss of territory, Macedonia was on the verge of total destruction. Could the kingdom be rescued one more time? Who would be the new king? From the ashes, a new phoenix arose, Philip II! Under his leadership, Macedonia would become the greatest power in the Aegean world. How did this happen?

The Structure of the Macedonian Kingdom

First and foremost, Macedonia was a hereditary monarchy. The royal house was called the Temenidae, who allegedly arrived from Argos, in the Peloponnese, about 650 under the founder Perdiccas I (Hdt.V.20; VIII.137; Thuc.II.99.3). Therefore, the royal house was Greek.⁵⁸⁸ The king was the state, but it was not an absolute monarchy.⁵⁸⁹

Although hereditary, the successor was approved by an Assembly of the Macedones (Macedonians under arms). The Macedones were those Macedonians who served in the regular forces of the king. This excluded the local militia. They maintained that status when their years of service were complete.⁵⁹⁰ However, there were occasions when the Macedonian Assembly met as a civilian body.⁵⁹¹ The king was chosen by acclamation. Once approved, the Macedones swore an oath of loyalty to the king. The king ruled for life unless removed by the Assembly. The succession could be challenged if the heir was a minor, deemed incompetent, or no direct descendant existed. If the heir was a minor, a regent would need to be appointed. Once elected, the king wore the royal robes and received a signet ring symbolizing his authority. The king had absolute authority in principle. However, he

was subject to the rules of custom. If he violated these rules, he sacrificed the goodwill of the Macedones and could be removed from office.⁵⁹² The king made laws and treaties by royal decree. He handled all domestic and foreign affairs. He selected his advisors and envoys. He handled major judicial decisions. His ruling was final in secular and religious affairs.

The king was the commander of the army. His orders were absolute. In battle, the king personally led the best troops whether infantry or cavalry. A council of commanders was only summoned at the king's discretion. The commanders were appointed or removed at the king's command. The king could discipline any soldier (Arr.*Anab.*VII.8.3).⁵⁹³ The king was accompanied into battle by his "Companions" (foot or horse), who acted as a bodyguard. War booty was divided by the army with the king entitled to the property of the opposing king. The primary duty of the king was to lead the Macedones in war.

The king represented the Macedones in the daily relationship to the gods. The Olympian gods were the acknowledged deities. There was no official priesthood to handle the sacred duties. On special occasions (i.e., weddings, sacred festivals, etc.), the king led the religious ceremonies. In war, the king sought divine support.

The king probably did not own all the land in Macedonia. The king owned hereditary lands as well as "spear won" lands from war.⁵⁹⁴ He could award his own land in any manner chosen.⁵⁹⁵ The natural resources of the kingdom belonged to the king. The king received revenue from forests, minerals, precious metals, land, harbor dues, etc. He could disburse these resources as he chose.⁵⁹⁶ Philip II's revenue was greatly enhanced as he exploited the gold and silver mines of Mount Pangaeum near Amphipolis after its conquest in 457 (Diod.XVI.8.2).

On the domestic front, the king was often polygamous having married multiple wives. Philip II married seven wives. The production of an heir was paramount. All children were legitimate regardless of the social hierarchy of the wives. Multiple children were preferable due to the uncertainties of life and high mortality rates. The eldest son would be the heir apparent but the rule was not written in stone. The king approved the marriage of sisters and daughters who were often assigned to other royal houses within the Balkan kingdoms. Homosexuality was also practiced by the Macedonians. Aristotle claims that King Archelaus was a victim of assassination because of his amorous adventures (Arist.*Pol.*1311b8–35). Diodorus claims that Philip II had a relationship with a certain Pausanias (Diod.XVI.93.3–4). Regardless of the relationship, Macedonian kings were extremely amorous.

The women of the royal court performed the same functions that a common wife would. These duties include the supervision of children and domestic help, cooking, sewing, caring for the sick, etc. (Hdt.VIII.137). Unlike the homes of Greek aristocrats, there may not have been slaves in the royal house. There is no evidence to support slavery in Macedonian homes in the classical period.

Upon his death, the king was buried at Aegae. As in Homer's epics, sacrifices and games were held to honor the king (Diod.XVIII.28.4). Kings were not recognized as gods until the Hellenistic period. All kings were buried here until Alexander III. He was destined to be buried here until his corpse was kidnapped by Ptolemy I and taken to Alexandria.

The Assembly of the Macedones was in principle supreme because they approved or removed a king. Whenever the Assembly met, they were usually under arms. Only those men who attended under arms were considered Macedone citizens. The king summoned and dismissed the Assembly. However, it appears that the Assembly could summon itself to depose a king. The Assembly comprised nobles and commoners. In the Assembly, according to Polybius, any Macedone could speak (Polyb.V.27.6). Decisions of the Assembly were determined by acclamation. The Assembly determined the punishment for treason cases, which was immediately carried out. When not under arms, the men returned to their civilian occupations. Only the nobles, who usually served in the cavalry, saw the military as a profession. Like most Greeks, the average citizen was a citizen soldier. Under Philip II, they became professionals due to the continuous campaigns. The king and Assembly "were the only organs of the state."⁵⁹⁷

The king selected members from his Companions to act as an advisory council. In war or peace their advice was sought but the king could reject that advice. The Companions were often the aristocracy of Macedonia but also could be foreigners. Merit, not heredity, was the primary basis for selection as a Companion. This merit was usually demonstrated by success on the battlefield. Exposed on all borders by hostile neighbors, the Macedonians had plenty of opportunity to demonstrate their martial skill. Prior to Philip II, the Companions primarily came from the cavalry. This was the main branch of the military. The infantry was primarily lightly armed and poorly trained. The famed Macedonian phalanx only appeared with the reform of the army by Philip (Diod.XVI.3.1–2).⁵⁹⁸

The Accession of Philip II (359–336 BC)

In 359 the Macedonian kingdom was in crisis. The death of

Perdiccas III and four thousand Macedonians left the kingdom without a king and a viable army. Perdiccas left a young son Amyntas as heir. Born in 382, Philip II was the youngest son of Amyntas III. Would the Assembly of the Macedones choose Philip as regent or king? Philip was now about twenty-three years old. Had he demonstrated skills that would convince the army to elect him king?⁵⁹⁹ The answer was yes. Whatever qualifications Philip had, the Macedones made him king rather than regent.⁶⁰⁰ He was a king, but did he have a kingdom?

The Illyrians occupied the northwestern part of Upper Macedonia and were assembling an army to invade deeper into Macedonia (Diod.XVI.2.6). The Paeonians threatened the northern border. On the eastern border, the pretender Pausanias had support from the Thracian King Berisades. Another pretender, Argaeus, had support from Athens, which could attack Lower Macedonia anywhere along the Thermaic Gulf. To survive, Philip needed time to reorganize the kingdom. Would his enemies give him that time? With a devastated army, Philip relied on diplomacy and marriage to buy that time.

Through the institution of marriage, Philip began to rebuild the kingdom. He would marry seven times. Polygamy was not a problem for a Macedonian king. All, except his last marriage, appear to have been motivated to strengthen the kingdom. His first marriage probably occurred during his first year as king, when the Illyrian princess Audata (358) became his bride. Shortly after, his second marriage was to Phila (358), the sister of Derdas, who ruled the Upper Macedonian principality of Elimeia.⁶⁰¹ This marriage would unite Upper and Lower Macedonia. His third marriage was to Philinna, the daughter of a Thessalian aristocrat from Larissa. In 357, he married the Molossian princess Olympias, the mother of Alexander the Great. She was the niece of King Arybbas of Epirus. This marriage united the kingdoms of Macedonia and Epirus. It might have been designed to prevent an Illyrian invasion of either kingdom. Within two years of his accession, he entered four marriages. All designed to secure the Macedonian borders.

With the army destroyed by the Illyrians, Philip relied on the only weapon at his disposal to defend the kingdom. Diplomacy! Sending an embassy to Paeonia in 359, through unknown promises and the bribery of some leading Paeonians, Philip persuaded the Paeonians to remain peaceful. Through the same methods, Berisades was bought off and remained quiet. Without the support of Berisades, the pretender Pausanias was temporarily neutralized. For reasons unknown, Bardylis did not launch an invasion of Macedonia.⁶⁰² The other pretender Argaeus, with a force of three thousand mercenaries, marched on the ancient capital of Aegae but the people refused to support his cause. While retreating, Argaeus was caught by the

remnant of the Macedonian army under Philip and defeated. The size and composition of this remnant army is unknown. Philip released the captives of Argaeus's army under a truce without ransom (Diod.XVI.3.4–6). Since many of these mercenaries were Athenians, this was a probably a diplomatic gesture to make peace with the Athens. The gesture was successful. At some point later in 359, a peace with Athens did occur. This military success was probably a small affair, but it allowed Philip to prove his mettle before the soldiers. It also raised the morale of the soldiers after their Illyrian defeat.

Understanding that only through the army could the Macedonian people be defended, Philip II began to rebuild the army during the winter of 359/358 (Diod.XVI.3.1–2). How this was done is uncertain. It is likely that he restructured the army through improved training, recruiting, rearming, implementation of new tactics, and the perhaps the appointment of new commanders. He might have implemented lessons learned while a captive at Thebes. His observations of the Boeotian army, under the leadership of Epaminondas, might have been the model he wished to emulate. The basic structure of the phalanx and battle tactics were probably created with these reforms. Although it probably took years to perfect the reforms, the initial change proved highly effective. Unfortunately, how he consolidated political power and funded these reforms is unknown.

Learning of the death of King Agis, Philip invaded Paeonia in the spring of 358. Victorious in battle, Philip forced the new Paeonian king into an alliance (Diod.XVI.4.2). After this success, Philip led the rejuvenated army into Upper Macedonia to attack Bardylis and his Illyrians. Bardylis offered peace terms based on the *status quo*. Philip refused. With ten thousand soldiers and six hundred cavalry, the Macedonians engaged an equal force of Illyrians. Each belligerent wanted the showdown. Philip II commanded the right wing of the infantry. The Illyrians entered battle in a hollow square formation. The Macedonians attacked the Illyrian flanks. After the Macedonian infantry broke into the hollow center, the Macedonian cavalry followed and attacked the flanks and rear of the Illyrians. The Illyrians fled.⁶⁰³ Suffering seven thousand casualties, Bardylis made peace and withdrew from Upper Macedonia. The peace was ensured when Philip married the Illyrian princess Audata, Bardylis's daughter or granddaughter (Diod.XVI.4.4–7). Philip's reforms created a "New Model" army.⁶⁰⁴ A year after nearly being destroyed, this reformed Macedonian army destroyed its Illyrian nemesis of the past forty years. Within a year of Philip's accession, the borders of the Macedonian kingdom were secured. The foundation was laid for the rise of Macedonia.

Athens and Thebes

In 361 Pammenes led a Theban army to Megalopolis to prevent some of the new Arcadian settlers from returning to their original homes. He restored order and prevented the dissolution of the *polis* (Diod.XV.94.1–3). This episode demonstrates that part of Arcadia, led by Tegea, maintained an alliance with Thebes after Mantinea. In opposition, the Mantinean faction of Arcadia together with Achaëa, Elis, and Phlius formed a defensive alliance with Athens (R&O 41).⁶⁰⁵ The division of the Arcadian League between Athens and Thebes prevented the Arcadians from developing a league to become a dominant influence in the Peloponnese. There was no power that could unite the Peloponnesian states. In the 350s Thebes would be involved in the Sacred War against Phocis. With this involvement, Thebes basically turned its back on Thessaly and the Peloponnese. Consequently, the Thessalians would look to Athens for support against the tyrants of Pherae. Although Athens and Thebes would remain the leading powers in Hellas for another twenty years, their mutual hostility prevented either *polis* from becoming dominant in Hellas.

Athens after Leuctra

After Leuctra the Athenians rejected the appeal of the Arcadians to protect them from Sparta. Fearing the growth of Theban power, the Athenians sent Iphicrates to attack the Theban forces on their return from the Peloponnese in the winter of 370/369. However, he failed to engage the Thebans who returned to Boeotia unharmed (Xen.*Hell.*VI.49–52). In 368/367, the Athenians formed a defensive alliance with Dionysius I of Syracuse (R&O 34).⁶⁰⁶ It appears that the alliance was with Athens and not the Athenian League. Shortly after the alliance, Dionysius died. Athens received little benefit from the alliance.

To check Theban power in the 360s, the Athenians attempted to expand their influence in the Thraceward area, Macedonia, and Thessaly. In 368 Iphicrates was sent north to the Chalcidic peninsula. Interfering in the power struggle for the Macedonian throne, Iphicrates supported Ptolemy against the pretender Pausanias. Iphicrates forced Pausanias to flee Macedonia. Despite an alliance between Ptolemy and Thebes, Iphicrates remained in the north until replaced by Timotheus in 365 (Aeschin.II.25–29; Dem.XXIII.149).

Since Thebes became an opponent of the tyrant Alexander of Pherae, Athens supported him. In 368 the Athenians sent a force of thirty ships and one thousand men under Autocles to aid Alexander when attacked by the Thebans (Diod.XV.71.3–7) Abandoned by their

Thessalian allies, the Thebans withdrew after incurring a minor defeat when confronted by the forces of Athens and Pherae. Thessaly and Macedonia were battlegrounds that Athens and Thebes vied to control.

In 366 Athens joined Sparta in support of the Satrap's Revolt in Asia Minor. Under orders to avoid violating the King's peace, Timotheus aided the rebel Ariobarzanes. Timotheus besieged Samos, which was under Persian control, with a force of thirty triremes and eight thousand light-armed troops. After a ten-month siege, Samos succumbed in the fall of 365. Rather than liberating Samos, the Athenians exiled the Samians and placed cleruchs on the island. After Samos' capitulation, Timotheus sailed to the Hellespont and captured Sestus and Chrithote. Next he campaigned in the Chalcidice and Macedonia. Around the Thermaic Gulf, he captured Methone, Torone, Potidaea, and Pydna. How these campaigns progressed is uncertain. These results occurred by the end of the decade (Dem.XV.9; Diod.XV.81.6; Isoc.XV.111–113; Nep.1.3). However, Timotheus had one notable failure. He failed to capture Amphipolis in 360/359. Philip's capture of Amphipolis in 357 and refusal to surrender it to Athens resulted in war between Philip and Athens. Athens' failure to recover Amphipolis remained an impediment to peace between these two protagonists for the next twenty years.

After the battle of Mantinea, the Athenians were in a position to restore Athens as the dominant *polis* in Hellas. Although Thebes remained powerful, the new leaders refrained from interference in the affairs of the Peloponnese, Thessaly, and Macedonia. Involved in the Sacred War against Phocis in the 350s, Thebes avoided other entanglements. Thebes was a land power. The Thebans primary interest was the control of central Hellas. The Aegean Sea belonged to Athens.

As hegemon of the Second Athenian League, in 363/362 the Athenians suppressed the revolt of the island of Ceos off the southeast coast of Attica (R&O 39).⁶⁰⁷ With Thebes weakened, in 361 Alexander of Pherae ended his alliance with Athens. He sent ships on a piratical raid against some islands in the Cyclades. An Athenian flotilla, under the command of Leosthenes, was defeated by Alexander's ships. Following this success, they raided the Piraeus. Enraged, the Athenians condemned Leosthenes to death. However, his replacement Chares failed to check the Thessalians (Diod.XV.95.1–3). As a countermeasure in 361/360, Athens formed an alliance with the other *poleis* of the Thessalian League that opposed Pherae (R&O 44).⁶⁰⁸ This alliance failed to benefit either party. In the coming years, the opponents of Alexander of Pherae looked to Macedonia for support. Philip accepted this opportunity to secure his southern border with Hellas. By 352 Philip was the leader of the Thessalian League.

In the course of the 360s Cotys, king of the Odrysian Thracians, extended his kingdom along the Black Sea and the Hellespont. Following in his father Seuthes's footsteps, he maintained a hostile relationship with Athens. In 360 Cotys captured Sestus in the Chersonese. This loss left Athens with a minor foothold at Crithote and Elaeus in the Chersonese to protect the grain fleets sailing through the Hellespont (Nepos.*Tim.*1). The threat to the food supply made the Athenians nervous. Consequently, they embarked on an offensive to protect their lifeline.

In 359 Cotys was murdered and succeeded by his son Cersobleptes (Arist.*Pol.*1311b23). The other Thracian kings Berisades and Amodocus, who had paid fealty to Cotys, refused to extend their support to Cersobleptes. To weaken Cersobleptes's power, Athens supported these rivals. As a result, Cotys' kingdom was divided between the three rulers. By 357 Athens was an ally of all three rulers but provided little aid in their opposition to Philip (R&O 47).⁶⁰⁹ However, this alliance protected the security of the Hellespont for Athens' food supply. This diplomacy secured what the Athenian navy could not in the 360s. Although relations with the rulers of Thrace remained uneasy, Athens had more pressing problems in Hellas.

In the heyday of Theban power, the *poleis* of Euboea were allied with Thebes (Xen.*Hell.*VI.5.23). In 357 many *poleis* in Euboea suffered from conflict between supporters of Thebes and supporters of Athens. Thebes and Athens sent troops to the island to assist their supporters. After a short war of thirty days with no major engagement, the Thebans withdrew from the island. The explanation for their withdrawal remains speculative. Athens regained control of the island and made an alliance with many *poleis* (Diod.XVI.7.2; Aesch.III.85; R&O 48).⁶¹⁰ These *poleis* were again members of the Second Athenian League.

Athens, Philip II, and the Social War (357–355 BC)

Disenchantment among members of the League with the aggressive behavior of the Athenians led to a revolt and the beginning of the Social War (357–355).⁶¹¹ Byzantium, Rhodes, Chios, and Cos began the revolt. Mausolus, the satrap of Caria, might have sponsored the rebellion to expand his power and influence over the Asian Greek *poleis* (Dem.XV.2–3). The Athenians assigned Chares to command the expedition to suppress the revolt. Although Diodorus claims that Chabrias was a general, he was probably a private citizen in this expedition. In a sea battle off Chios (356/355) against the coalition, the Athenians were defeated and Chabrias killed (Diod.XVI.7.3–4; Dem.XX.81; Nepos.*Chab.*4; Plut.*Phoc.*6.1).

Always short of money in the war, Athens was unable to pursue

an aggressive policy. In 356, the rebels, with one hundred ships, launched raids against Lemnos, Imbros, and other islands. Then they besieged Samos. In response, Athens managed to assemble sixty ships under the command of Timotheus and Iphicrates. They sailed to join Chares near Chios, who commanded another sixty ships. The combined fleet of 120 ships sailed for Byzantium. They were followed by the rebel fleet. At Embata, between Chios and the coast of Asia Minor, the two fleets faced off in the autumn of 356. Despite Chares' desire to fight, Iphicrates and Timotheus refused claiming bad weather and rough seas. As commander, Chares took the fleet into battle but was defeated. Subsequently Chares sent a letter to the Athenian Assembly accusing them of treason. Timotheus and Iphicrates were recalled, replaced as generals, and put on trial.⁶¹²

Seeking money to pay his men, Chares joined the Persian Artabazus, who was in revolt against the Great King Artaxerxes Ochus (III). Defeating the king's forces, Chares received enough money to pay and resupply his men. Artaxerxes threatened war with Athens. Fearing the combination of the rebels with the Persian king, the Athenians made peace with the allies in the summer of 355 (Diod.XVI.21–22.2). Byzantium, Cos, Rhodes, and other *poleis* left the Athenian alliance. Cos and Rhodes became subordinate to Mausolus. Mausolus replaced their democracy with oligarchy (Dem.XV.19; 26). After the war, Athens' alliance was reduced to some islands in the north Aegean, the Cyclades, a few cities in Thrace, and the island of Euboea. Athens' only allies on the mainland were Phocis and Sparta. Perhaps worse than the loss of many member *poleis*, was the bankruptcy of the treasury and loss of prestige.⁶¹³ By 355 the Athenians might have been in the worst political position since their surrender in 404. In his *On The Embassy* speech Aeschines says,

And instead of respect and the hegemony of Hellas,
Athens had a name that stank like a nest of
Myonnesian pirates. (Aesch.II.71–72)⁶¹⁴

The Athenians needed time, revenue, and internal reform to recover their role as a major player in Hellenic affairs. Would they get it? They were still at war with Macedonia.

After the Social War, Eubulus was the most prominent Athenian leader and he advocated restraint in military affairs. As the chief Commissioner of the Theoric Fund from 354–350, he persuaded the Athenian Assembly to enact a measure that dictated that all surplus revenue should go to the Theoric Fund. The Theoric Fund, perhaps established in 358, was designed to fund the participation of the poorer citizens in the festivals and functions of the *polis*.⁶¹⁵ This measure provided a financial incentive to the *thetes*, who manned the fleet for income, to avoid military activities. Combined with the reluctance of the

wealthy to fund military activities, the majority of Athenians became unwilling to engage in military activities. This policy allowed Athens to recover financially and curtailed Athenian military activities. Consequently, the Athenians were reluctant to send large military forces to Thrace or the Chalcidice as Philip pursued his aggressive policies in these areas. However, as Philip's power increased, Demosthenes by 349, in his *Olynthiac* orations, would ridicule this policy and encourage the surplus revenue be devoted to the military (Dem.III.10–12).

Involved in the Social War, Athens was unable to prevent Philip expanding his influence in the Thraceward area. Claiming a hostile attitude by the inhabitants of Amphipolis, Philip besieged Amphipolis in 357. Probably Philip's real intention was to control the silver and gold mines in the area around Mount Pangaeum. Although the sequence of events is uncertain for 357, Amphipolis was probably taken prior to the outbreak of the Social War. After Amphipolis's capitulation, he captured and the nearby town of Crenides, which he later renamed Philippi after he placed additional settlers there.⁶¹⁶ Philip placed a garrison here to protect it from the Thracian King Cetriporis, who considered Crenides part of his kingdom. In late 357, Philip seized Pydna on the Thermaic Gulf and made an alliance with the Chalcidians led by Olynthus (Diod.XVI.8.2–5; R&O 50).⁶¹⁷ After these events, Athens declared war on Philip when the Athenians realized that Philip would not surrender Amphipolis to them (Dem.II.6–7; Aesch.II.70).⁶¹⁸

With Athens involved in the eastern Aegean in the Social War, Philip II proceeded to capture Potidaea in 356. The Athenian cleruchs/garrison within was released without ransom by the fall of 356. The Potidaeans were sold into slavery. Potidaea was handed over to the Chalcidian League (Diod.XVI.8.6–7; Dem.I.9). During the summer, Philip's general Parmenio defeated an Illyrian army, led by Grabus, in the west. Illyria ceased to be a threat on the western border. His son Alexander was born in this same time frame. Late in 356 Philip marched eastward in a show of force against Cetriporis to protect Crenides. Philip negotiated an agreement with Cetriporis whereby he became a tribute paying vassal to Philip.⁶¹⁹ These military and diplomatic successes, along with the birth of an heir, made 356 a very good year for the development of Philip's kingdom.

In 355 Philip further subordinated other towns around Mount Pangaeum (Diod.XVI.8.2–7). In the winter of 355/354, he besieged Methone, which capitulated in the spring of 354. In this siege, Philip lost his right eye from an arrow (Diod.XVI.34.5). He now dominated the north Aegean coast from the Thermaic Gulf to the Nestus River. Before he could continue his expansion eastward, he was drawn southward. Delphi, Thessaly, Boeotia, the Amphictyonic League, and

the Sacred War appeared on his radar screen.

The Third Sacred War (355–346 BC)

In the fall of 355 war broke out between Phocis and the Amphictyonic League.⁶²⁰ The Amphictyonic League was originally created in the archaic period to protect the shrine of Apollo at Delphi.⁶²¹ It consisted of small states located near the shrine. By the fourth century, Sparta, Thebes, and Athens had become members. In the early 350s, the Thebans, as the dominant member of the alliance, managed to get the League council to impose a fine on Sparta for its occupation of the Cadmea in 382. Phocis was also fined for cultivating the sacred ground near Cirrha, below Delphi. As allies, Sparta and Phocis refused to pay. After the Phocian refusal, a curse was laid on the territory of Phocis. In the spring of 356 the League agreed to declare a sacred war if the fines were not paid. The Phocian Philomelus persuaded his fellow citizens to ignore the fines. Elected *strategos autocrator* by the Phocians, he negotiated a secret agreement with King Archidamus III. Sparta would secretly support Phocis with money and mercenaries but would not provide Spartan troops. With this assurance, Philomelus hired mercenaries and enrolled one thousand Phocians as peltasts. He seized and occupied Delphi. He sent envoys around Hellas to justify his action and ask for support. In the fall of 355 the League council declared a sacred war on Phocis (Diod.XVI.23–24).

Some Greeks supported the Phocians while others were appalled at the desecration of Apollo's shrine. Philomelus forced the Pythia to provide an oracle on the state of the war (Diod.XVI.27.1).⁶²² Sparta, Athens, and the Achaeans supported the Phocians. The defenders of Delphi were the Boeotians, Thessalians, and other members of the Amphictyonic League (Diod.XVI.29.1). Realizing the strength of the opposition, Philomelus now seized the Delphian treasures to hire more mercenaries. In the spring of 354 the Boeotians and Locrians attacked the Phocians but were defeated. Philomelus also defeated a Thessalian force of six thousand men in Locris. However, his string of successes ended in the fall when he was defeated by the allies at Neon. He committed suicide and was succeeded by his fellow general Onomarchus. Onomarchus withdrew the remnants of the army to fight another day (Diod.XVI.25–31.5; Paus.X.2.4). In need of revenue and apparently believing the Phocians were no longer a threat, the Thebans, during the winter of 354/353, sent Pammenes with five thousand troops to Asia to support the revolt of Artabazus. At Delphi, the Phocians decided to continue the war under the leadership of Onomarchus who was given the supreme command as *strategos*

autocrator. Using the treasure of Delphi, Onomarchus recruited more mercenaries, built up supplies, and bribed leaders in other states to remain at peace with Phocis. With the bulk of Theban forces in Asia, Onomarchus restored the fortunes of Phocis in central Hellas by the end of summer 353.

In early 353 Philip II campaigned in central Thrace against Abdera and Maronea, but he failed to capture these cities. He made some type of peace with Cersobleptes. He ended this campaign when summoned to Thessaly to oppose the tyrant Lycophron of Pherae, who replaced the murdered Alexander. After his arrival Philip defeated the Phocians, commanded by Phayllus, Onomarchus's brother, who were allies of Pherae. Onomarchus now appeared with the full Phocian contingent to support Lycophron. In two separate battles, he defeated Philip and forced him to return to Macedonia. Marching into Boeotia late in the year, Onomarchus defeated the Boeotians and captured Coronea (Diod.XVI.32–35.3). By the end of the year, the Phocians dominated central Hellas.

Diodorus states that Philip's troops were so demoralized after the defeats by Onomarchus that only with difficulty did Philip secure their obedience (Diod.XVI.35.2). Diodorus does not give an explanation for this statement. If true, Philip's leadership was severely tested to maintain his authority. Since his accession, the Macedonian army only knew victory. Now the Macedonians tasted defeat. Were the officers and/or rank and file questioning his generalship? Was it the Macedones, allies, or both who were unhappy? Were the soldiers tired of continuous campaigns? Were the recently conquered subjects not yet fully integrated into the army? Did their loyalty to the king rest on quicksand? Did Philip display poor leadership during this campaign? The questions and answers remain speculative. Whatever the reasons, and by methods unknown, Philip was able to restore order and morale after the return to Macedonia.

In the spring of 352 Philip II returned to Thessaly determined to restore his reputation. He had persuaded the Thessalian League to continue the war against Lycophron. Coming to the aid of Lycophron, Onomarchus marched along the coast with twenty thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry. His objective was to unite with the Athenian fleet, under Chares, which was near the Thessalian port of Pegasae. Philip had captured the port to prevent Athenian interference in his attack against Pherae. The Macedonians and Thessalians, with twenty thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, then engaged the forces of Onomarchus at the Crocus Field (Crocus Plain) near the Gulf of Pegasae in the summer.⁶²³ The Phocians were defeated with heavy losses. Some six thousand men were killed and three thousand were prisoners. Onomarchus was killed, but it is unclear from Diodorus

whether he died in battle or was killed by his own men. Philip hung his dead body as sacred punishment for pillaging Delphi. The three thousand prisoners were drowned by order of the Amphictyonic League for sacrilege. Whatever his motives, Philip did not oppose their harsh judgment. Phayllus succeeded to command of the Phocians (Diod.XVI.35.4–36.1; Paus.X.2.5).

After the battle Philip restored some seceded Thessalian cities to the League. At Pherae, he forced Lycophron and his accomplice Pittholaus to surrender their tyranny. The inhabitants of Pherae were not punished by the League. He then reorganized the Thessalian League and was elected archon for life.⁶²⁴ Pherae's port of Pegasae became a possession of Macedonia and its harbor dues went to Philip. Perhaps to unify the Thessalians and cement his control, Philip married his fifth wife Nicesipolis, the niece of the dead tyrant Jason of Pherae. By midsummer he then marched to Thermopylae with the Macedonian and Thessalian troops to aid the Boeotians against Phocis. Here he found his way blocked by troops from Athens, Sparta, and Phocis. Unwilling to challenge these strong forces, Philip withdrew to Macedonia (Diod.XVI.37.3; 38.1–2; Dem.XIX.84). He would not return for five years.

While Philip was engaged in Thessaly the past two years, the Athenians and Thracians were renewing alliances to check Philip. In 353 the Athenian general Chares captured Sestus. He killed some inhabitants and enslaved the rest. By midsummer 352 Athenian cleruchs were sent to Sestus and other cities in the Chersonese (Diod.XVI.34.3–4). Cersobleptes renewed an alliance with Athens and ceded to Athens the cities of the Chersonese, except Cardia. This renewed friendship alarmed Philip. He marched eastward in the autumn of 352. Philip allied with Cardia, Byzantium, and Perinthus. However, the campaign proceeded, Cersobleptes was defeated. He was forced to cede disputed territory and became a tribute paying vassal of Philip.⁶²⁵ He was forced to end his alliance with Athens. While besieging Heraeum on the coast of the Propontis, Philip fell seriously ill during the winter of 352/351. He was forced to return home to recover after Heraeum was captured (Dem.III.4–5). His success consolidated his position in Thrace by spring 351. A foundation was laid for future campaigns in the Propontis and Bosphorus regions. For the next few years he ignored the Chersonese. Athens' lifeline to the Black Sea remained secure.

Although the Sacred War would continue for many more years, it degenerated into small engagements mostly fought between the Boeotians and Phocians. In 351 Phayllus, after some minor engagement with the Boeotians, fell ill and died. He was succeeded by Phalaecus, the son of Onomarchus. In this same year a war developed

between Sparta and Megalopolis. The Boeotians sent troops to Megalopolis and the Phocians aided Sparta. The Sacred War now expanded to the Peloponnese. Although Diodorus combines multiple events into one year, this war probably lasted until 349.⁶²⁶ With neither side victorious, an armistice was concluded between Sparta and Megalopolis. In 350 the Boeotians received a Persian subsidy of three hundred talents to continue the war. The Phocians continued to use the wealth of Delphi. It is unclear when the Boeotians and Phocians ended their participation in the Peloponnese but certainly after the truce. Regardless, the Boeotians and Phocians continued the war through multiple minor engagements in central Hellas that exhausted each side. Their conflict became a sideshow. By 346 the Sacred War was a stalemate between Boeotia and Phocis (Diod.XVI.38.3–40.2).

From 351 onward Philip and Athens had other fish to fry. Their operations of importance involved the Thraceward region. Although both belligerents avoided direct confrontations, they continuously nipped at each other's heels through raids against various cities along the Aegean coast and piracy in the shipping lanes of the north Aegean and the Hellespont (Dem.XIX.315). Meanwhile, the power of Macedonia continued to grow. Who would be the next object of Philip's attention?

The Olynthian War (349–348 BC)

The activity of Philip in 351 and 350 is sketchily portrayed by the ancient writers. Philip probably campaigned in Paeonia, Illyria, and Epirus (Dem.I.12–13).⁶²⁷ It is unclear if he personally conducted these campaigns or left them to his generals. It might have been at this time that Philip brought the future king of Epirus, Olympias's brother Alexander, to Pella to be groomed as a Macedonian vassal. In 342 Philip removed King Arybbas of Epirus and replaced him with Alexander.⁶²⁸

By 349 hostility had broken out between Olynthus and Philip II. The exact nature of the dispute is uncertain. Olynthus probably feared the growth of Macedonian power. An ally with Philip since 357, Olynthus initially benefitted when Philip awarded Potidaea to it and prevented Athenian inroads in the Chalcidice. Economic benefits also occurred. It was easier for the import or export of Macedonian goods from Chalcidian ports because they were located along the major sea-lanes. This increased trade generated more revenue for the Chalcidians from taxes and harbor dues. Since 357 Philip had secured the Macedonian borders, expanded eastward against Thrace, become hegemon of Thessaly, and emerged victorious in the Sacred War. The Chalcidian peninsula was now encased by the Macedonians. Although

an alliance between Athens and Olynthus was not yet formalized, a rapprochement had begun between the Chalcidian League and Athens by the late 350s.

The immediate excuse for war might have been the refusal of the Olynthians to surrender Philip's half brothers, Menelaus and Arrhidaeus, who had taken refuge at Olynthus. Were they conspiring with the Olynthians to challenge Philip for his throne? The answer is unknown. By late summer of 349 Philip entered the Chalcidice and captured the town of Zeira, which he destroyed. Consequently, perhaps fearing the same fate, other members of the Chalcidian League capitulated (Diod.XVI.52.9). Athens sent a small relief force to aid the Chalcidians, but it achieved little. Unfortunately for Philip, he could not follow up this success.

Thessaly demanded his attention. Peitholaus, the brother of the expelled Lycophron, managed to reestablish the tyranny in Pherae at some point in 349 (Diod.XVI.52.9). As archon of the Thessalian League, Philip could not ignore the appeal of the other members for assistance. Since they had other complaints, the Thessalians might have refused to pay him the harbor and market fees due the archon of the League (Dem.I.22). Philip could not ignore the turmoil on his southern border that jeopardized his control of Thessaly. Philip suspended his activities in the Chalcidice and marched south. How he settled the Thessalian affairs is unknown. Whatever actions were taken, the result was that Thessaly remained quiet for a few years.

By the spring of 348 Olynthus and Athens had formed an alliance. Once again Philip invaded the Chalcidian peninsula and the cities along his march apparently surrendered without resistance. The capture of Olynthus' port Mecyberna and Torone left Olynthus isolated. Sealed off from the sea, the Olynthians could expect no support from an Athenian fleet. After two battles the Olynthians were besieged. An Athenian relief force commanded by Chares arrived too late to rescue Olynthus. Suffering from *stasis* within and the bribery of officials by Philip, by autumn the Olynthians capitulated after a large portion of their cavalry defected (Dem.IX.56). Diodorus comments that gold often accomplished for Philip what force could not (Diod.XVI.53–54). As punishment, Philip performed the ultimate act of *andrapodismos*. The city was razed the city and the inhabitants enslaved. The *polis* of Olynthus was erased from the map. The Chalcidian League was disbanded. The *poleis* of the Chalcidic peninsula were now vassals of Macedonia.

The end of the Chalcidian League was not the only disaster for Athens this year. Athens lost control of the island of Euboea. After the restoration of Athenian control in 357, the Athenians apparently did not actively participate in Euboean affairs. Plutarch made himself tyrant in

Eretria by the late 350s. Fearing internal opposition on the island, perhaps encouraged by the Macedonians, Plutarch appealed to Athens for assistance.⁶²⁹ The Athenians sent a force commanded by Phocion to support Plutarch. After achieving some victories and stabilizing the situation, Phocion realized that Athenian support for Plutarch was bad policy. He was recalled and replaced. Afterwards the conflict went badly for Athens. The opposition, supported by mercenaries from Phocis, emerged victorious. Plutarch was expelled as tyrant of Eretria. By the end of 348 Athens granted independence to all the Euboean *poleis*. Carystus alone remained an ally of Athens (Plut.*Phoc.*12–14; Aesch.III.86–88; Dem.V.5).⁶³⁰

With the loss of Euboea, the Athenians expected Philip to march south to settle the war with Athens. To their surprise, Philip sent envoys offering peace. When the envoys arrived from Euboea to discuss peace, they also delivered the message that Philip desired a peace settlement. Whether this offer was genuine or designed to prevent Athenian assistance to Olynthus, the Athenians were skeptical. Throughout the year, Demosthenes continued to urge resistance and support for Olynthus in his three *Olynthiac* speeches. In the summer, during the Olympic truce, the Athenian Phrynon was captured by pirates but was ransomed and released by the Macedonians. Upon his return to Athens, he requested that an official envoy be sent to Philip to request compensation for the violation of the Olympic truce. The Athenians sent Ctesiphon. He returned in late 348, after the fall of Olynthus, bringing further peace overtures from Philip. In the Athenian Assembly, Philocrates proposed that Athens invite ambassadors from Philip to discuss peace. Philocrates was brought to trial because his proposal violated some law. He was acquitted when Demosthenes came to his defense (Aesch.II.12–14). There was no peace this year.

During the winter of 348/347 the Athenian opponents of Philip accepted a proposal by Eubulus to send envoys throughout Hellas to build an anti-Macedonian coalition (Aesch.II.57–60). Within a few months the envoys returned. Their mission failed. Athens was alone. The ball was in Athens' court. The Athenians still delayed a peace settlement. Philip likewise engaged in no major military offensive until late 347. Invited to arbitrate a dispute between Amodocus and Cersobleptes in Thrace, Philip intervened militarily and reduced both kings to vassals of Macedonia. Cersobleptes was required to surrender a son as hostage for good behavior (Aesch.II.81). This was a short campaign since Philip was back at Pella to receive the Athenian embassy in March.

The Peace of Philocrates (346 BC)

In 347 the opponents of Philip were still prominent. Demosthenes and Philocrates were on the Council of Five Hundred. This was one of the rare occasions that Demosthenes had an official position in the government. The Athenians sent an expedition to Thrace and joined with Cersobleptes to establish garrisons in the Chersonese and Propontis region. Philip did not interfere.

Perhaps in the late fall of 347 Athens sent the envoy Aristodemus to Philip II seeking the release of the Athenian prisoners captured when Olynthus fell. Philip agreed if Athens would make peace. Aristodemus returned to Athens with Philip's offer of peace but delayed reporting it to the Council. Later Philip released an Athenian prisoner, Iatrocles, with the same offer. Learning the truth from Iatrocles, many Athenians were angry that the peace offer was not presented to the people. Under pressure from the Assembly, ten members were selected to go on the embassy to Philip to discuss peace. Philocrates, Aeschines, and Demosthenes were ambassadors. These ten men probably left by the end of February 346 and arrived in Pella in early March (Aesch.II.15–19).

Arriving in Pella, all the envoys made speeches discussing the terms of peace. Philip agreed to consider them (Aesch.II.20–39). A foundation for peace was acknowledged by both sides. During these negotiations, Philip evaluated which ambassadors might be friendly to him. It is likely that Philocrates was bribed.⁶³¹ Although never convicted, Aeschines was later accused of accepting bribes since he maintained a friendlier attitude toward Philip. The embassy returned to Athens with a favorable letter from Philip. Philip then sent ambassadors composed of his Companions Antipater, Parmenio, and Eurylochus to discuss peace terms (Dem.XIX.69). Philip might have restricted their ability to alter the terms he proposed.

After the Athenians returned home, Philip launched a campaign against Cersobleptes in eastern Thrace. By early summer Philip had captured Doriscus and forced Cersobleptes to dismantle the recently established forts. Cersobleptes' vassal status with Philip was probably reduced further. A son of Cersobleptes was made a hostage of Philip to guarantee good behavior by Cersobleptes (Aesch.II.81; 90–92; Dem. XIX.156–158). Meanwhile, Philip maintained a diplomatic offensive with the Greek states.

In a two-day meeting in mid-April (eighteenth and nineteenth of Elphebolion) of the Athenian Assembly the peace terms were debated. There were two proposals. The first outlined by Philocrates listed Philip's terms. The second from Athens' League allies, who had convened earlier, suggested that no final agreement be made until the return of the ambassadors sent out earlier to the other Greek states.⁶³² The allies wanted a common peace (*koine eirene*) arranged

through a general congress. The allied proposal had public support in the Athenian Assembly. However, the next day Demosthenes had Antipater spoke before the Assembly declaring that the second proposal was unacceptable. Consequently, the Athenians must choose peace or the continuance of war (Aesch.II.60–68; III.68–75). The Athenians vacillated over which course to pursue. Demosthenes implies that Eubulus told the Athenians that they must prepare for war if they rejected the peace (Dem.XIX.291). The Assembly voted to accept the peace. The terms were also accepted by the allies in a vote of their *synedrion*. Under the guidance of Demosthenes, as president of the Assembly that day, a proposal to include Cersobleptes and Phocis in this peace agreement was rejected (Aesch.II.81–85).⁶³³ The ambassadors of Philip attained the sworn oaths of the Athenians and their allies. The Macedonians returned home.

Later the original ten ambassadors, along with an ambassador from the allies, returned to Pella to finalize the peace and swear the oaths with Philip (Aesch.II.97). Knowing that Philip was away, the envoys' journey to Macedonia was a slow one (Dem.XIX.155). At Pella, the ambassadors of Sparta, Thebes, Thessaly, Phocis and other *poleis* were present to witness the peace agreement (Aesch.II.136–137). All waited the return of Philip from Thrace.⁶³⁴ Upon his return in mid-June, discussions proceeded toward peace until Demosthenes sabotaged the negotiations by offering to immediately ransom the Athenian captives from Olynthus.⁶³⁵ Philip had earlier offered to release the prisoners by the Panathenaean Festival (July/August) if peace was attained. Angered, Philip refused Demosthenes's offer. His peace initiative was getting side tracked. Would this peace initiative fail?

Further negotiations were held between Philip and the ambassadors from Sparta and Athens. The Thebans and Phocians were excluded. Although allies in the Amphictyonic League, the Thebans probably feared Philip's motives.⁶³⁶ The Boeotians were bitter enemies of the Phocians because many Boeotian cities were ruined in the war (Aesch.II.116). If Philip made peace with the Athenians and Spartans, who were allied to Phocis, what was the fate of Thebes, the enemy of both since the 360s? Would a peace be dictated to the Boeotians and Phocians? Although there is no solid evidence, Philip might have had secret correspondence with the Phocians.⁶³⁷

Negotiations continued when Philip headed south toward Thermopylae to settle the Sacred War. Unwilling to show his hand, Philip kept the poker game going. All the ambassadors followed wondering what his hole card was. Pressure mounted on the Hellenic ambassadors to make peace before all parties were dragged into a

major battle to settle the Sacred War. As an ally of Philip, the Thebans called out their army, but its mission was uncertain. Would they fight the Phocians or the Macedonians? The Phocians were apprehensive despite Philip's mild treatment of their envoys (Dem.IX.11). Their army was small and the money was gone to maintain the war. The Thessalians were mobilized and would obey whatever orders Philip issued. Athens and Sparta were committed to Phocis by alliance. Would they fight if the negotiations failed? As he approached the Hot Gates of Thermopylae, the pass was still undefended although a Spartan force under King Archidamus was nearby. Philip's delaying tactics achieved its objective. The gateway to central Hellas was open.

Finally, two days before his arrival at Thermopylae in midsummer, Philip and selected allies gave their sworn oaths to the Athenians and their allies.⁶³⁸ The peace was a bilateral agreement. What were the final terms? The Athenian prisoners from Olynthus would be surrendered without ransom. Philip would assist to rebuild Thespieae and Plataea in Boeotia.⁶³⁹ Athens could have Euboea and Oropus on the border with Boeotia (Dem.VI.30). The Chersonese was acknowledged as Athens' sphere of interest, except for Cardia, which was allied to Philip (Dem.XIX.78). However, Philip would not return Amphipolis to Athenian control. Thus, the primary cause of the war was not settled to Athenian satisfaction. Both parties would suppress piracy (Dem.VII.14–15). Philip and Athens also agreed to a defensive alliance (Dem.XIX.40). The issues of Phocis, Cersobleptes, and the possession of Halus were excluded from the peace (Dem.XIX.174).⁶⁴⁰ These terms were to remain confidential until the Sacred War was settled. This agreement meant that Thermopylae remained unguarded. Philip could enter central Greece without opposition. The Athenian embassy returned to Athens on the thirteenth Scirophorion (July). By now Philip passed through Thermopylae. Three days later, the Athenians ratified the peace (Dem.XIX.58).

Now allies, Philip requested Athenian troops within a few days of the peace. However, the Athenians only agreed to send troops if the Phocians did not surrender Delphi (Dem.XIX.49). Demosthenes refused to serve on a third embassy to Philip. Citing illness, Aeschines did not go either. Did Aeschines remain in Athens to counter the opposition of Demosthenes? The answer is unknown. The other ambassadors reluctantly returned to Philip with Athens' ratification but conveyed the Athenian reluctance to provide troops. By this time Philip was probably sitting near Thermopylae for a week.

The Sacred War

In 347 the Sacred War again appeared on Philip's radar screen.

Phocis and Boeotia had fought to a stalemate with both sides exhausted. Apparently *stasis* had arisen among the Phocians. The reasons are unknown. Sometime in 347 the Phocians replaced Phalaecus as commander under the accusation of theft of sacred treasures. He was replaced by a board of three generals who began an investigation of the missing funds. His predecessors, beginning with Onomarchus, had been using the Delphic treasure to fund Phocian armies. As allies of Athens, some of the treasure was disbursed to Athens and Sparta (Diod.XVI.56–57.1). Although Diodorus provides no other explanation, it is reasonable to suggest that Phalaecus's removal may also have derived from the lack of success by Phocis to end the war. Regardless, the war dragged on.

In 347 the Phocians requested aid from Sparta and Athens. The new leaders offered to surrender the forts at Alponus, Thronion, and Nicaea to Athens. These forts guarded the road to Thermopylae. At Athens, a force was collected under the general Proxenus to occupy the pass. The Spartans sent one thousand hoplites commanded by King Archidamus III. The Phocians then reneged on the offer to both allies by February 346 (Aesch.II.132–134).⁶⁴¹ This probably occurred when Phalaecus returned to command by early 346. After an appeal for aid by the Boeotians and Thessalian, Philip responded by leading his Macedonians southward. He was accompanied by the Thessalian League. Aware of the diplomatic negotiations among the Hellenes and Philip, Phalaecus might have had some secret negotiations as well. Short of funds and realizing his army was no match for Philip, Phalaecus sought terms with Philip. After the Peace of Philocrates, Philip agreed to terms. Whatever the details of the agreement, Phalaecus, with his eight thousand troops, was allowed to retire to the Peloponnese (Diod.XVI.58–59). Philip's achievement was bloodless. Diplomacy, not arms, ended the Sacred War.

A meeting of the Amphictyonic League was convened in the summer of 346 to discuss a peace settlement. Led by Aeschines, Athens sent a delegation that requested leniency for the Phocians. The Athenians plea was ignored. The Amphictyonic Council granted Philip II membership in the League. Macedonia was allotted the two votes previously possessed by Phocis. The Spartans lost their vote when expelled from the League. Although the Athenians kept their one vote, they had less influence than Philip. The Phocians were banned from the shrine of Delphi. The independent status of Delphi was restored. It received back the two votes that the Phocians deprived them during the war. The Phocians were removed from their *poleis*. These cities were destroyed and the walls torn down. They were forced to settle in small villages. An annual tribute was to be paid to Delphi but was deferred for a few years. There was no war reparation imposed on the

Phocians. The Phocians could not own weapons or horses. The terms were harsh. However, the people were not killed or enslaved as urged by the Thessalians and Thebans (Aesch.II.140–142). In honor of the victory, Philip, the Boeotians, and the Thessalians were allowed to host the Pythian Games (Diod.XVI.60). After the Pythian Games were conducted, Philip returned to Macedonia.

The Thebans, relieved that Philip maintained the alliance, never the less were probably unhappy with the settlement and their relationship with Philip.⁶⁴² The loss of Oropus to Athens was unacceptable. They received no compensation for conducting the war alone for the last few years. Boeotia had suffered much devastation in the conflict. Some Boeotian *poleis* (i.e., Orchomenus) had defected to the Phocians during the war. However, after the peace, Philip did not interfere when the Thebans regained control of the Boeotian League and destroyed Orchomenus. The milder treatment of the Phocians demonstrated that Philip wanted to placate Athens more than Thebes. Philip had peace with Athens, would Sparta follow?⁶⁴³ Although it remained the strongest land power in central Hellas, Thebes was too exhausted to oppose the peace settlement. For the next few years, Thebes was divided between a pro-Macedonian and a pro-Athenian faction. In 339 the pro-Athenian faction emerged dominant with disastrous consequences for Thebes.

Summation

Peace had come to Hellas. However, it would be an uneasy peace. It was no common peace (*koine eirene*). War still existed in the Peloponnese. Sparta never made peace with Philip. The Spartans still strived to regain their old glory. Through diplomacy, greased with Macedonian gold, Philip kept Sparta confined to the Peloponnese by supporting the Arcadian, Argive, and Messenian opponents of Sparta. Sparta was too weak to be a priority for Philip.

Philip was probably satisfied that the hostility among some Greek states remained unresolved. Internecine conflict would prevent the formation of a coalition against him. Although Philip's objectives were not completely achieved, many were. Peace with Athens was achieved. The Sacred War was ended. He was hegemon of the Thessalian League. As the dominant member of the Amphictyonic League, he was a protector of Apollo's shrine at Delphi.

Though chastened, Thebes was still hostile toward Athens, Sparta, and the Phocians. The Thebans were also unhappy with peace settlement by the Amphictyonic League. However, Theban exhaustion forced them to adhere to Philip's settlement. Hostility toward Athens

prevented a reconciliation of these powers.

Although the Athenians were allies of Philip, they were not satisfied with the peace. Macedonia, not Athens, was the dominant power in Hellas. Demosthenes and others never trusted Philip. They viewed the Peace of Philocrates as a necessary evil to be abandoned when they could build another anti-Macedonian coalition. They advocated an aggressive policy to check Philip. The Athenian strategic objectives in the north Aegean and Thrace were checked. Athens' food supply was still threatened if Philip ever gained control of the Hellespont and Bosphorus. Amphipolis still remained a point of dispute.⁶⁴⁴ Athenian control of the Chersonese was not secured. Their loss of influence in the Amphictyonic League was unacceptable to many Athenians. Their desire to regain lost glory as hegemon of Hellas was checked. On paper, the Athenian navy of three hundred triremes was a formidable weapon. In reality, the lack of money, manpower, and willpower prevented the Athenians from using it (Dem.VIII.21–22). Consequently, many Athenians perceived more negative than positive elements to the Peace of Philocrates.

Thirteen years earlier, Philip, in his early twenties, became ruler of a broken kingdom. His borders were reduced to Lower Macedonia located along the shores of the Thermaic Gulf. Surrounded by external enemies in Illyria, Paeonia, Thrace, and Hellas and threatened by internal pretenders to the throne, no gambler would have bet on Philip II's reign surviving long. However, within two years he secured his western and northern border. Upper and Lower Macedonia were under his control. He initiated military reforms to rejuvenate the army. He selected highly competent men to be his Companions to lead the kingdom. He was expanding eastward toward Thrace and the Greeks in the Chalcidian peninsula. His seizure of Amphipolis and other areas in 357 brought him war with Athens. However, it also provided him with increased revenue from the captured gold and silver mines. In time his military campaigns, led by him or his Companions, established Macedonian control over Illyria, Paeonia, and much of Thrace. Through his marriages to foreign princesses, he secured alliances with the Molossian house of Epirus and the Dardanians of Illyria.

As his power was consolidated and the kingdom unified, Philip was drawn south into Hellenic affairs. It began when he was invited by the Thessalian League to protect the various members from the incursions by the tyrants of Pherae. He became an ally. Eventually he was elected as archon of the Thessalian League by 352. His conquest of the Chalcidian League and destruction of Olynthus gave him control of the Chalcidice in 348. Thessaly's involvement in the Third Sacred War, as a member of the Amphictyonic League, allowed Philip to seize an opportunity to intervene further in the affairs of the warring Greeks.

His defeat of Onomarchus in 352 ended a major Phocian threat. However, his withdrawal from further intervention allowed the war to drag on between Boeotia and Phocis. His intervention in 346 brought the Sacred War to a conclusion. As archon of Thessaly and member of the Amphictyonic League, he was the dominant member in both alliances. With the Peace of Philocrates, Athens and Philip ended their war and formed an uneasy alliance. Unfortunately, it was not a common peace. Only future war would attain this.

After thirteen years of rule, Philip II was king of a strong, prosperous, and unified state. Through his internal reforms, the military was powerful, the administration effective, and the economy growing. The territory and population was expanded. His borders were secure. From Illyria to eastern Thrace, he dominated the southern Balkans. As archon of the Thessalian League, master of the Chalcidice, and the dominant power in the Delphic Amphictyony, Philip had a platform for continued involvement in Hellenic affairs. He was the hegemon of Hellas north of the Corinthian Gulf. However, his supremacy was not acknowledged by the old guard. More work was required. Despite these accomplishments, Philip had further goals for his Macedones. What would he do next?

Map 8 – Macedonia in 336 BC (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Expansion_of_Macedon 2016).

Map 8—Macedonia Under Philip II



Author: MaryroseB54

- 579 (N. Hammond 1994), 12–14. Hammond provides an excellent analysis of the sources for Diodorus's Book XVI, which covers the reign of Philip II.
- 580 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 14–22. (N. Hammond 1994), 5. (Worthington 2008), 6. Upper Macedonia comprised the cantons of Tymphaea, Elimeia, Orestis, Eordaea, Lynceus, and Derriopus. Lower Macedonia comprised the areas of Emathia, Bottiaea, Eordaea, and Almopia and were inhabited by ethnic Macedones. Thucydides lists the inhabitants of Macedonia (Thuc.II.99).
- 581 (Hansen and Nielsen 2004), 795.
- 582 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 46–50.
- 583 (E. Badian 2014), 293–295. Badian provides examples under Alexander the Great where Macedonian was spoken to the army to ensure that orders were understood.
- 584 Assassination was not an uncommon way to remove Macedonian kings. It is uncertain whether Alexander I was killed or died a natural death. However, Archelaus, Alexander II, Ptolemy, and Philip II would be assassinated in the fourth century. Although Alexander III (the Great) probably died a natural death, there are those from antiquity to the present who suspect he was murdered.
- 585 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 168–171. Orestes was a minor and killed by Aeropos (Diod.XIV.37.6). Aeropos died of some illness and was succeeded by Pausanias (Diod.XIV.84.6). Griffith adds the rule of Amyntas II before Pausanias.
- 586 Diodorus and Plutarch claim that Alexander II surrendered his brother Philip as a hostage (Diod.XV.67.4; Plut.*Pel.*26.3–4). However, historians agree with Aeschines that Philip was sent to Thebes as a hostage by Ptolemy after Alexander II's death (Aesch.II.26–29).
- 587 Ibid, 184. Hammond says that Pausanias was a son of King Archelaus (413–399).
- 588 Alexander I was accepted as an Argive Greek by the *hellenodikai* in the Olympic Games (Hdt.V.22). (E. Badian 2014), 284. Herodotus does not date this event but 476 is possible. Whether this was based on evidence or a political decision is unknown. Consequently, for lack of refutable evidence, we must accept the decision of antiquity.
- 589 Unlike Pharaoh in Egypt, who became a god at death, or the absolute monarchs of Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who ruled by divine right, the kings of Macedon were approved by the Macedonian citizens.
- 590 (N. Hammond 1994), 6. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 160–162.
- 591 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 389–390. Griffith argues that on certain peace time occasions the Assembly met.
- 592 Ibid. P175. Hammond lists possible ancient evidence for the expulsion of Amyntas III.
- 593 In 330, Alexander sentenced Philotas, the son of Parmenio, to execution by the Macedones (Diod.XVII.79.5–80.1; Arr.*An.*III.26.1–3).
- 594 When he crossed into Asia in 334, Alexander the Great, tossed a spear into the ground to proclaim that Asia belonged to him by right of conquest (Diod.XVII.17.2).
- 595 Perdiccas awarded some of his land in Mygdonia to the Chalcidians in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc.I.58.2).
- 596 Andocides received lumber from King Archelaus (Andoc.II.11). (Meiggs and Lewis 1969), 277–280. Inscription number 91 has Athens honoring Archelaus for his probable provision of timber for the fleet.

- 597 (N. Hammond 1994), 7.
- 598 As a hostage in Thebes, Philip II had the opportunity to witness the Theban army, with the Sacred Band, which was the finest army in Hellas. He also had the opportunity to observe the leadership of Epaminondas and Pelopidas (Plu.*Pel.*26.5).
- 599 (N. Hammond 1994), 18. Hammond suggests that Philip was given a military command protecting the eastern border of Macedon after his return from Thebes in 365.
- 600 (Ellis 1976), 47. (Errington 1990), 37. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 208–209. (Worthington 2008), 20–21. Ellis, Errington, Griffith, and Worthington argue that Philip was elected king immediately in 359. In contrast to their view see (N. Hammond 1994), 23–24. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 702–704. Agreeing with Justin (Just.VII.5.9–10), Hammond argues that Amyntas was elected king but Philip was made regent. The Macedones elected Philip king in 357 after his military successes. (E. Badian 2014), 106. Badian also claims Philip was regent before he became king.
- 601 (Worthington 2008), 19. (Ellis 1976), 38. Worthington and Ellis claim that Philip's first marriage was to Phila shortly before or after his accession. (N. Hammond 1994), 28. Hammond says Phila was Philip's second marriage.
- 602 There is no evidence of Illyrian affairs in the ancient sources. Bardylis was now an old man at about ninety years old. Any reasons suggested to explain Bardylis's inactivity are mere speculation.
- 603 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 213–214. Hammond gives an analysis of the battle. The infantry now fought as a phalanx. Hammond suggests that this battle did for the Macedonians what Leuctra did for the Thebans. This battle was a game changer for the development of the Macedonian army.
- 604 This was the name of the army of Oliver Cromwell in the English Civil War of the 1640's.
- 605 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 211–213. Inscription number 41 provides the terms of the treaty.
- 606 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 164–168. Inscription number 34 provides the terms of the treaty,
- 607 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 196–203. Inscription number 39 gives the terms with the community of Iulis, which was one of four communities on the island. Rhodes suggests that Athens may have wanted to deal with the four cities as separate entities rather than one unit.
- 608 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 218–225. Inscription number 44 provides the terms.
- 609 *Ibid.*, 234–237. Inscription number 47 provides the partial terms of the alliance. The Greek cities of the Chersonese were to be free and autonomous but pay tribute to the Thracians and the syntaxeis to Athens.
- 610 *Ibid.*, 238–242. Inscription number 48 mentions the Euboean cities that Athens sent envoys to.
- 611 In the *On The Peace* essay, Isocrates implies that the Athenians had established garrisons among the allies (Isoc.VIII.16). In his *For The Liberty Of The Rhodians* speech, Demosthenes states the rebellion began because of alleged Athenian plots against them (Dem.XV.3). He does not specify the plots. Demosthenes probably gave this speech in 351 in support of the exiled Rhodian democrats who requested that Athens assist their return to power.
- 612 Timotheus was fined 100 talents and withdrew from Athens to Chalcis where he died. Nepos claims Iphicrates was acquitted of the charges (Nepos.*Tim.*3.5; *Iphic.*3.3).
- 613 (Cawkwell 1963), 61–62. Cawkwell discusses the poor state of Athenian revenue

at the end of the Social War.

614 (Aeschines 1968), 213. The speech was given in 343.

615 (N. Hammond 1986), 531–532.

616 This was site of the famous battle in 42 BC when Octavian and Antony defeated the army of Brutus and Cassius to avenge Julius Caesar's murder.

617 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 244–248. Inscription number 50 mentions the terms of the treaty.

618 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 240–243. Griffith provides an analysis of the diplomatic exchange between Athens and Philip. He argues that Philip and Athens discussed an exchange of Amphipolis to Athens and Pydna to Macedon. However, Philip never intended to surrender Amphipolis, and no agreement was made. (De Ste Croix 1963) 110–119. De Ste Croix argues that there is no strong evidence to indicate a secret agreement between Athens and Philip to exchange Amphipolis for Pydna sometime between 359–357. Also a secret agreement could not be maintained when the Athenian Assembly was required to ratify an agreement. (N. Hammond 1994), 30–31. Hammond believes Philip made a secret pact with Athens to exchange Amphipolis for Pydna.

619 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 252.

620 (Brunt 1969), 247. Brunt dates the origin of the war to the summer of 356.

621 There were originally twelve members of the League (Aesch.II.116). Each member had an equal vote.

622 (Hornblower and Spawforth 1996), 445. The Pythia was a Delphic woman who was the chief priestess and served for life. In a special ritual, she relayed the oracle from Apollo, through a prophetess (interpreter), to the Greek suppliants.

623 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 273–277. See Griffith for a discussion of this battle and its aftermath.

624 (Ellis 1976), 83. Ellis dates the election to 353 but no later than 352. He equates the terms *archon* and *tagos*. For a discussion of Philip's election, see note 103 (260). Ellis says the term *tagos* was discredited.

625 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 282–284.

626 (N. Hammond 1994), 80.

627 (N. Hammond 1994), 50–51.

628 Philip allied with Arybbas in 357 when he married Olympias.

629 (Brunt 1969), 230. Brunt argues that there were no Macedonian troops in Euboea prior to 342.

630 The Euboea *poleis* and Athens had a tempestuous relationship. Members of the Athenian League in the 370s, they joined the Thebans after Leuctra. In 357 they rejoined the Athenian alliance. After 348, they were again independent from Athens. By 340 some *poleis* would again be allied with Athens.

631 Later, Philocrates fled Athens when accused of bribery. He was convicted *in absentia* (Aesch.II.6).

632 Athens' League allies held their own *synedrion* in Athens since the creation of the League in 378/377.

633 By now a message was received from the Athenian general Chares stating that Philip had defeated Cersobleptes.

Since the agreement with Philip did not include peace with Cersobleptes, the Athenians would have complicated the negotiations of the second embassy to Philip if they had accepted Cersobleptes as an ally to be included in the peace. Philip may have nullified the agreement had Thrace been included in the agreement.

634 In his *On the Embassy* (also called *On the False Legation*) speech, Demosthenes claims the ambassadors were there for ninety days (Dem.XIX.57).

635 Demosthenes suggests that Philip attempted to bribe all the Athenian

ambassadors to accept his terms (Dem.XIX.166–170). He also describes his ransom attempt.

- 636 (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 756. Ellis says the Thebans were excluded from negotiations. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 342–343. Griffith claims the Thebans were included in negotiations because Philip needed their army when he moved against Phocis. He also argues that negotiations were more like a general peace conference and were conducted openly. Demosthenes says Philip negotiated with the Thebans (Dem.XIX.139–142).
- 637 Evidence for this secret correspondence is suggested by the friendly attitude Philip maintained toward the Phocian envoys as they moved south and the eventual surrender of Phalaecus and his army without a fight (Dem.IX.11).
- 638 Demosthenes claims that Philip, but not his allies, agreed to peace in Pella but kept the peace secret (Dem.XVIII.32).
- 639 These *poleis* were destroyed by Thebes. Their restoration would be an insult to Thebes and a goodwill gesture to Athens. Athens and Platea had close relations since the late sixth century.
- 640 Halus, on the Gulf of Pegasae, had recently been captured by the Macedonian general Parmenio (Dem.XIX.163).
- 641 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 333.
- 642 (Ellis 1976), 147.
- 643 After the peace, Archidamus returned to Sparta. He was involved in war against Messene and Argos, which ended in 344. After a short intervention in Crete, he went to Italy with his mercenaries to support Tarentum in its war with the Lucanians. Archidamus was killed in battle in 343/342 (Diod.XVI.62.4–63.1).
- 644 Although it is difficult for us to understand today, the Athenians never escaped the psychological hangover from the loss of Amphipolis in the Peloponnesian War. Despite its loss seventy years earlier, the Athenians always believed that Amphipolis was their possession. Whether true or false, the Athenians believed that Philip betrayed a promise to return Amphipolis to them (Dem.II.6–7).

The Hegemony of Macedonia

The Macedonian State

After 346 Macedonia was the strongest power in the Hellenic world. We have told the story of Macedonia's external accomplishments. What were the internal changes that created this new power in the north Aegean?

From a constitutional perspective, there were no changes. The king (*basileus*) remained the state. Only through death or a vote by the "Macedones" in their Assembly could the king be removed from power.⁶⁴⁵ The king made all decisions unless he delegated that power to his trusted Companions. When away on campaign, he could designate a deputy to handle domestic affairs. Alexander, as heir apparent, was appointed regent in 340 (Plut.*Alex.*9.1). The king led the army on campaign. If military campaigns were required on multiple fronts, he appointed the commander and determined the objectives of the campaign. Parmenio commanded the army in 356 against the Illyrians while Philip campaigned in the Chalcidice. As demonstrated during the Peace of Philocrates, Philip conducted all major diplomatic negotiations. Preliminary negotiations could take place by appointed subordinates, like Antipater, but they could make no final decisions. Philip ratified the terms of any agreement.

For judicial administration, Philip appointed judges to travel throughout the kingdom to handle major judicial decisions. These major cases were probably referred to the king as the final court of appeal. The only exceptions were treason, sacrilege, and certain cases for homicide, which were heard by the Assembly of the Macedones.⁶⁴⁶ Laws existed whether published or based on custom. Unfortunately, these laws are basically unknown. No code of laws has been discovered from Macedonia.

Lacking a large bureaucracy, Philip allowed a large degree of self-government throughout the kingdom. There were magistrates to administer affairs throughout the country but their titles and duties are unknown. Whether for urban or rural regions, magistrates were probably appointed by the king from his Companions based on politics and merit. It is reasonable to suggest that Philip probably designated members of the aristocracy in Upper Macedonia to select minor

officials in their spheres of rule. The organization of Upper Macedonia was based on tribal affiliation not an urban center. However, there was some urban growth with the founding of cities, but these cities remained small. The number of officials certainly expanded as the size of the kingdom grew. Whether stationed in the towns, cities, forts, or other centers of administration (the rural lands of Upper Macedonia), they represented the king and were ultimately responsible to him.

Lower Macedonia was urbanized and its cities organized as *poleis*. No Macedonian *polis* was independent. All Macedonians were subjects of the king. These cities had local self-government and collected revenue in the form of taxes, rents, and dues. A portion of this revenue was assigned to the king. New cities created by Philip had their officials initially appointed by the king since they were founded along the frontier as the kingdom expanded.⁶⁴⁷ Many Macedones, assigned to these cities, were initially soldiers to guard the frontiers. They were granted lands worked by the local inhabitants, who supported them through rents in the form of goods and services rather than currency. As these cities grew and matured, they were granted local self-government. Regardless of status, the administration of all cities was subject to royal interference.

As dominant and energetic a personality as Philip was, he could not govern the kingdom alone. Since there was no governing body independent of the king, he required trusted subordinates to help. Who were they? His Companions! This ancient institution was used by previous kings. Its membership consisted of trusted men selected by the king to provide whatever functions the king commanded. Under Philip, these men came from Upper and Lower Macedonia, Thessaly, areas of Hellas, and probably from the Balkan tribes. They could be citizens or noncitizens of Macedonia. If they were noncitizens, Philip had the royal prerogative to grant citizenship.⁶⁴⁸ Some were probably wealthy hereditary aristocrats such as the former “kings” of Upper Macedonia.⁶⁴⁹ Most men caught Philip’s attention based on merit. However, it is likely that political considerations also entered into the selection process. To unify the kingdom, he needed representatives from the traditional homeland as well as the newly incorporated regions. From former foes he selected some to become “trusted friends” to create harmony and self-government in conquered territories. No source suggests that there was hostility to Philip from his Companions.⁶⁵⁰ It is also reasonable to suggest that if former enemies lost his trust, they were killed or exiled. Although possible assassination was a hazard of the monarchy, Philip could not create unity without gaining the confidence or replacement of some former foes. As the kingdom expanded, the number of Companions did

likewise. Through merit, politics, and/or training, the number of Companions increased to eight hundred men. It is unlikely that all the Companions of Philip admired him or his actions but we hear of no conspiracies until his assassination.⁶⁵¹

These Companions became administrators, ambassadors, generals, councilors, drinking companions, and most importantly competent leaders. It is unlikely that they were categorized into separate spheres of governance. Nor is there evidence of a ranking system among the Companions. They were jacks-of-all-trade. Their tasks were whatever Philip assigned. Their contributions expanded the kingdom from a rump state around the Thermaic Gulf to control of the Balkans south of the Danube River. Although we are not well informed of who they were or what they did under Philip, we know their exploits under Alexander. Parmenio, Antipater, Perdiccas, Craterus, Leonnatus, Coenus, and Antigonus were all prominent commanders and administrators. Antipater, who helped negotiate the Peace of Philocrates, was regent of Macedonia when Alexander left for Asia. Parmenio was second in command to Alexander. Antigonus was a successful governor and commander in Asia Minor. His heirs would create the Antigonid dynasty in Hellenistic Macedonia. The others were gifted military commanders. Except for Antipater and Parmenio, the actions and duties of Philip's Companions remain obscure.

Despite the abilities of these Companions, their fame, wealth, and power derived from their association with the king. Philip awarded landed estates and honors for their loyalty and achievements. They were his ruling class. No intelligentsia, they operated in the rough and tumble world of intrigue, politics, diplomacy, and war. They were men of action who received and gave orders.

Along with the Companions, Philip either inaugurated or reformed a school of royal pages (*basilikoi paides*) to serve the monarchy (Arr.*Anab*.IV.13.1). When this occurred is uncertain but was in place by the late 340s. At the age of fourteen, the young sons of Companions and/or aristocrats from Macedonia and the conquered territories entered the School of Pages. They were brought to the royal palace to serve the king, gain an education, increase their loyalty to serve the kingdom in the future, and act as hostages for the good behavior of the nobility. Some of these pages became the close friends of Alexander III as they grew up together. The pages were educated by tutors approved by the king. They served the king in various capacities. When they reached the age of eighteen, they graduated to serve in the military or administrative affairs of the kingdom. How the selection and assignment process worked is unknown.⁶⁵²

Philip's ultimate power rested on the success of his army. His initial reform of the infantry saved the kingdom from Illyrian conquest.

The continuous development of the army resulted in the conquest of the southern Balkans. How did the Macedonian army become the most feared military force in the ancient world only to be surpassed by the legions of Rome?

We begin with the elite forces. Under Philip, his Foot Companions (*pezhetairoi*) were an elite body guard selected by strength and height.⁶⁵³ In 358, when Philip defeated Bardylis, his infantry comprised ten thousand men, which might have come primarily from Lower Macedonia (Diod.XVI.4.3). For the remainder of Philip's reign, we have no evidence that illustrates the size and growth of the infantry and cavalry.⁶⁵⁴ We have a few total figures, which often include allies, but no figures for the various units. Although Diodorus mentions Philip's reforms, he combines all the reforms for the year 358 (Diod.XVI.3.1–3). It is likely that these reforms were introduced over a period of time as the army grew and its skill level increased. By 334 Alexander had at least 24,000 Macedonian infantry (Diod.XVII.17.3). Thus, the infantry increased at least two and half times under Philip.

What were the reforms? He introduced the phalanx formation and new methods for training and maneuvers. These reforms might have imitated the Theban army of the 360s when Philip was a hostage and witnessed the Theban army with its Sacred Band led by Epaminondas and Pelopidas. The units of the phalanx were organized on a regional and ethnic basis. The individual phalangite was equipped with the *sarissa*, a twelve-to-eighteen-foot (4 to 5.5 meters) long pike with an iron tip, which required both hands to wield. The phalangite had a smaller round shield about two feet in diameter (60–80 cm). He wore a bronze helmet, greaves, leather coat and carried a short sword for close combat. Unlike the typical Greek hoplite engagement, where the phalanx was usually eight ranks deep, the Macedonian phalanx varied from eight to thirty-two ranks deep. The smaller shield also allowed the phalangite to stand closer together in formation. Thus, the Macedonian phalanx was denser than the Greek phalanx. When Alexander invaded Asia he had twelve thousand Macedonian infantry (Diod.XVII.17.3). He left another twelve thousand infantry with Antipater. Under Alexander, the phalanx was comprised of six fifteen hundred-man units called a *taxis*. One unit was the Royal Bodyguard identified as the *agema*. Philip's battle tactics are uncertain. Under Alexander the phalanx was primarily used as a holding force. Its responsibility was to engage and hold the enemies main force. Therefore, it was positioned in the center of the line.

The striking force of the Macedonian army was the cavalry. Before Philip, the cavalry was always the strength of the army. In 358 Philip had six hundred cavalry against Bardylis (Diod.XVI.4.3). The Macedonian aristocracy had the wealth and estates to maintain the

cavalry. They were the heart of the army and the superior fighting force. Like the phalanx, the cavalry was organized by regions. The cavalry wore light armor consisting of a helmet, corselet, and shield. Weaponry consisted of a longer lance than used by Hellenic cavalry and a short sword. The Horse Companions (*hetairoi*) were an elite cavalry force of perhaps three hundred men at the beginning of the reign. Eventually it became the Royal Squadron of three hundred men. Like the infantry, we cannot trace the growth of the cavalry force. Under Alexander, there were eight squadrons of cavalry with one squadron called the Royal Guard (*ile basilike*). These squadrons were organized on a regional and ethnic basis.⁶⁵⁵ When Alexander invaded Asia, he took over 1,800 Macedonian cavalry and left 1,500 Macedonian cavalry with Antipater (Diod.XVII.17.4). If true, the cavalry force grew by 500 percent under Philip.

As the striking force, the cavalry was stationed on the wings to attack the enemy on their flank. When he reached maturity, Alexander III commanded the Macedonian cavalry in battle. When the enemy forces collapsed, the cavalry pursued the retreating forces. Under Philip, the Thessalian cavalry became a large and effective part of his army. As archon of the Thessalian League, he commanded the Thessalian forces. The Thessalian cavalry occupied the left wing of the Macedonian line while the Companions occupied the right wing under Alexander.

In addition to the heavy infantry and cavalry, Philip incorporated light-armed troops as skirmishers. Light cavalry was used as scouts. The biggest innovation was his increased use of and technical improvement in siege equipment. His siege train was a specialized unit with its own engineers who developed new technology to capture walled cities. New types of rams, siege towers, torsion catapults, etc., were a few technical innovations. Rather than wait for starvation or internal dissent to take effect, Philip preferred to capture the cities by assault in the shortest period of time possible. His sieges were not always successful, but he altered the mind set about besieging cities.

How did Philip develop the socioeconomic structure of his kingdom? Although the progression of this development cannot be clearly identified, a basic picture can be drawn. At his accession, the economy of Upper Macedonia was based on agriculture and pastoralism. Many inhabitants were nomads who annually transferred sheep and goats from the high to low country. This use of the land reduced agricultural output and limited population growth. The yield of agriculture, which existed on the estates of the local nobility, was limited by the mountainous terrain, which was often covered by timber and subject to flooding in the plains.

Under Philip, pastoralism declined as land reclamation projects were undertaken. Timber was cut down to clear land for agriculture. Besides an energy source, timber was used for the construction of buildings, ships, and export to the Greek cities in the south. Pitch was exported for naval construction. In the west, salt, copper, gold, silver and iron mines were opened to meet the requirements for natural resources. Philip might have acquired the mines at Damastium, near Lake Lychnitis, after the defeat of Bardylis in 358. In the east, gold and silver mines were expanded. In addition to the mines near Mount Pangaeum, he probably acquired the mines near Stratonici, on the eastern side of the Chalcidian peninsula, after the destruction of Olynthus. Flood control was begun to expand agricultural production and build new towns and cities.⁶⁵⁶ Settlers came to these new lands to build farms and the subsidiary industries that accompanied the development of the natural resources of these areas. Although new roads were initially built to facilitate the movement of the army, improved communication and transportation resulted. This facilitated the expansion of urban growth and the exchange of goods to markets requiring food and natural resources. Although initiated for security against foreign invasion, this new urbanization assisted economic expansion to support the new inhabitants and pacify frontier zones. Philip did this at Crenides (Philippi) in Thrace after 356 (Diod.XVI.3.7). In an often quoted passage from Arrian, Alexander states (Arr.*Anab.*VII.9.2–3):

Philip found you a tribe of impoverished vagabonds, most of you dressed in skins, feeding a few sheep on the hills and fighting, feebly enough, to keep them from your neighbors—Thracians, Triballians, and Illyrians. He gave you cloaks to wear instead of skins; he brought you down from the hills into the plains; he taught you to fight on equal terms with the enemy on your borders, till you knew that your safety lay not, as once, in your mountain strongholds, but in your own valour. He made you city-dwellers; he brought you law, he civilized you.⁶⁵⁷

Although Lower Macedonia was urbanized, agriculturally productive, and had established trade with the Greek states, Philip increased productivity further. Some Greek cities, along the Thermaic Gulf, were incorporated into the kingdom. New lands were opened up and population growth developed from new settlers. Resettlement also occurred in the Chalcidian peninsula, which further expanded agriculture, industry, and trade. Philip first introduced new Macedonian settlers in 354 to the territory of Methone.

Philip's policy toward the conquered cities varied. The conquest of Amphipolis in 357 resulted in the expulsion of the population who were anti-Macedonian (R&O 49).⁶⁵⁸ However, the democratic government remained but a Macedonian garrison was installed. The surrender of Pydna later in the year also witnessed the expulsion of part of the population. Philip probably redistributed some land among his Greek and Macedonian supporters. The capture of Potidaea in 356 resulted in the expulsion of the local Athenians, the enslavement of the inhabitants, and its territory given to the Olynthians. In 354 the inhabitants of Methone were allowed to leave, the city destroyed, and its territory redistributed among the Macedonians (Diod.XVI.34.5). After its capture in 357, the garrison town of Crenides, later renamed Philippi, received new settlers and local self-government. In 348 Philip destroyed Olynthus to end the war. Some Chalcidian cities were probably made allies in the war since some survived unharmed. As Philip expanded eastward, other cities such as Cardia in the Chersonese became allies.

It is apparent that those cities that resisted Philip faced destruction. Those that did not resist survived. Thus, his policy toward captured cities depended on the particular situation. Populations that resisted were killed, enslaved, or deported. Their property redistributed. His Companions were rewarded with new or expanded estates. Whether they actually owned the land or not, they were granted the revenue in the form of rent or tithes from the occupants. Macedones from the lower ranks of the army received smaller plots to support their families. Consequently, these rewards increased the loyalty of the Macedones of all ranks to Philip. Other confiscated land was opened up to new inhabitants from the conquered territories. The incorporation of former Greek *poleis* into Macedonia increased the urbanization of the kingdom and expanded the economy. The demand for goods and services created by this urbanization stimulated agricultural production, industrial goods, and increased trade. However, unlike the Greeks and Romans, Philip accomplished economic expansion without the use of slave labor. Hammond states that Illyrians and Scythians were incorporated as free citizens.⁶⁵⁹ Through these various measures, the prosperity of the kingdom increased.⁶⁶⁰

As the economy expanded and prospered, revenue increased from taxation, rents, and dues. Grain, fruit, and olive production increased with agricultural expansion. Timber was harvested in greater amounts for construction and trade. The expansion of gold and silver mines around Mount Pangaeum supplied the precious metals to mint the coins to pay the troops, hire mercenaries, stimulate trade, and improve infrastructure. The revenue from these mines eventually

provided him a thousand talents annually in the 340s (Diod.XVI.8.6–7). One indication of this new prosperity is demonstrated by the types of coinage minted by Philip. Under Perdiccas III in the 360s, coinage was only minted in bronze. Philip coined in gold and silver based on the Attic and Thracian standards respectively. We cannot chart the exponential increased revenue growth for lack of hard data, but this can be inferred from urban growth, population growth, increased trade, infrastructure development, military growth, and improved coinage.

Persia and Macedonia

After the Peace of Philocrates, the ancient writers began to discuss Philip's relationship with Persia. Did Philip have a Persian policy in 346? If so, did he have a goal to conquer part of the Persian Empire? Or was it only the dream of Isocrates for Macedonia to launch a war of revenge against Persia to unite the Hellenes of the Greek homeland? Philip eventually had a policy to attack Persia but the origins of that policy remain speculative.

What is the evidence for a Persian policy? Diodorus claims that he had an interest to attack Persia after the Peace of Philocrates (Diod.XVI.60.5). Was this his own opinion based on later events or did he have evidence for this judgment from the writers more contemporary with Philip? Isocrates certainly encouraged him in his essay *To Philip*, written in 346 after the peace, to end conflict among the Greeks and lead them in a war against Persia (Isoc.V.15–16). It is likely that Philip either read the essay or was told of it by his informants in Athens. But whether this was Isocrates's view or he knew of Philip's intentions is unknown and probably irrelevant.⁶⁶¹

There is no hard evidence that Philip wanted to attack Persia in the 340s.⁶⁶² If he did, there were obstacles in his path. He was not yet the master of Hellas. Thrace was not yet fully pacified. The Greek *poleis* from the Hellespont to the Bosphorus were either independent or allies of Athens. Consequently, his land route to Asia Minor was blocked. His navy was too weak to challenge Athens or Persia at sea. His peace overtures to Athens have been interpreted as part of his policy to ally with Athens to eventually attack Persia. However, in the Peace of Philocrates, his alliance with Athens was defensive only. The Athenians were not ready to accept Macedonian hegemony. His campaigns in Thrace and the north illustrate that the Balkans were not completely pacified. By the time he pacified these areas, he was again at war with Athens. We also have no evidence that suggests that Persia was hostile toward Macedonia in 346. All these road blocks indicate that it was a distant goal for Philip to attack Persia "if" he contemplated this objective. The answer remains speculative at what

point he developed an anti-Persian policy.

Persia

What was the position of Persia by the 340s? In the 380s and 370s, Persia interfered in Hellenic affairs by brokering numerous common peace agreements in the name of the Great King Artaxerxes II. Beginning in 372 the Persian Empire was racked by numerous rebellions among the satraps of Asia Minor. In a series of four revolts beginning with the rebellion of Datames in 372 in northern Cappadocia, the Great king was required to concentrate on maintaining the integrity of his empire. Datames successful break from Persia inspired other satraps to follow. The second revolt occurred in 365 when Ariobarzanes of Hellespontine Phrygia refused to surrender his satrapy to his nephew Artabazus. He was supported by Athens and Sparta who sent Timotheus and Agesilaus in support (Xen.*Ages.*II.26; Dem.XV.9). Following Ariobarzanes's lead, Orontes of Armenia joined with Datames and Tachos of Egypt. By 362 the provinces of Asia Minor, Phoenicia, and Egypt were in revolt. Within the next few years, this general rebellion was suppressed when Orontes returned to the king's allegiance and the other rebels were murdered or captured.⁶⁶³

Shortly afterwards, Artaxerxes II died in 359 and was succeeded by Artaxerxes III (Ochus). A fourth rebellion began about 356 when Artabazus revolted. He received support from Athens, which then abandoned its involvement when Artaxerxes III threatened to aid the allies in the Social War. Then Thebes sent Pammenes with five thousand soldiers in 353 to aid the rebels (Diod.XVI.34.1–2).⁶⁶⁴ Phoenicia and Cyprus joined the revolt (Diod.XVI.42.3–5). After the suppression of Artabazus, Artaxerxes Ochus attacked Egypt in 351/350, but he failed to recapture it (Dem.XV.11–12). Preoccupied with Egypt's recovery, Artaxerxes III renewed the offensive and restored Egypt to the Persian Empire in 343/342.

From their accession in 359, Philip II was building his kingdom while Artaxerxes III concentrated on restoring the Persian Empire. Consequently, both kings had little interest in the affairs of the other. After the suppression of the Satrap's revolt, Artabazus escaped and took refuge with Philip. Harboring a rebel probably did not earn Philip any favors with Artaxerxes. Therefore, Artaxerxes might have observed this rising star in the west with a jaundiced eye. The tyrant Hermias of Atarneus, in northwest Asia Minor, was captured by Artaxerxes's general Mentor in 341.⁶⁶⁵ He was sent to Artaxerxes who executed him after torture. In the *Fourth Philippic*, Demosthenes suggests that Hermias had correspondence with Philip (Dem.X.32). If true, we are not told what that correspondence was but it does provide

some evidence that Philip was concerned with the affairs in Asia. Although there was no open hostility between these two powers at this point, this would soon change when Philip besieged Perinthus and Byzantium in 340.

Isocrates's Plea

After the Peace of Philocrates, Philip returned to home. What would he do next? Would he attempt to improve the uneasy relations with Athens? Like Epaminondas, would he attempt to pacify the Peloponnese? Would he attempt to pacify the rest of Thrace? Would he look north to pacify the tribes along the Danube River? Would he make the Adriatic Sea his western border? Would he concentrate on internal affairs to give the kingdom some relief from war? For thirteen years, the Macedonians were in a continuous state of war on all fronts. It is likely that the people wanted peace to enjoy the fruits of victory. What did Philip want? The answer was provided in the following year. Philip would not rest on his laurels.

That proverbial piper of Greek unity, Isocrates urged Philip to pick up the baton to unify the Hellenes in a war of revenge against Persia. Born in 436 in Periclean Athens, Isocrates during his lifetime witnessed the destructiveness of the Greeks' internecine wars for hegemony. Athens failed in 404. Sparta failed by 371. Thebes failed in 362. Athens failed again after the Social war in 355. Never a politician or magistrate, the idealistic Isocrates took on the role of political commentator, propagandist, and spokesman for Panhellenism. Beginning in 380, when he produced his *Panegyricus*, Isocrates had been urging Greek unity and a crusade against Persia. Although disillusioned, Isocrates, now age ninety, made one last desperate attempt to find a unifier. In his essay *Philip*, Isocrates urged Philip to unify Hellas under Macedonian hegemony with Athens as a junior partner. Early in the essay, Isocrates states his plea:

But although I was in joyful accord with the resolutions which were adopted regarding the peace, and was convinced that they would be beneficial, not only to us, but also to you and all the other Hellenes, I could not divorce my thought from the possibilities connected with this step, but found myself in a state of mind where I began at once to consider how the results which had been achieved might be made permanent for us, and how our city could be prevented from setting her heart upon further wars, after a short interval of peace. As I kept going over these questions in my own thoughts, I

found that on no other condition could Athens remain at peace, unless the greatest states of Hellas should resolve to put an end to their mutual quarrels and carry the war beyond our borders into Asia, and should determine to wrest from the barbarians the advantages which they now think it proper to get for themselves at the expense of the Hellenes. (Isoc.V.8–9)⁶⁶⁶

Isocrates later mentions the greatest states of Hellas are Athens, Thebes, Sparta, and Argos (Isoc.V.30). It would be in Macedonia's interest to reconcile their differences. The other Greek *poleis* would follow Macedonia if these four were at peace. Sadly for Isocrates, Philip did not follow his plea. Even if he had, Demosthenes and the Athenians were not ready to accept Macedonian domination. Neither were the Spartans nor Thebans. Their citizens wanted to dominate Hellas under their hegemony. The vast majority of Hellenes never read Isocrates or probably even heard of him. For those who had, it is doubtful that his ideas resonated with the average Greek, who was loyal to his *polis*. Although Isocrates was famous in antiquity among the literate upper class, his message of Hellenic unification and crusade against Persia had little meaning for most contemporary Greeks.

Like Pericles, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, and other famous Greeks during Isocrates's lifetime, Philip had a different agenda for his people. He, like them, was not interested in Greek unity but hegemony. At this time Philip had no interest in a crusade against the descendants of Xerxes. We cannot even be sure that he ever read Isocrates essay. He had other objectives for the Macedonians.

Illyria and Thessaly

In the spring of 345 Philip did not look south. He looked west. The last campaign in the west was conducted in 351 but the results are unknown. The Illyrians along the Adriatic coast (modern Albania) were the objective (Diod.XVI.69.7; Just.VIII.6.1–3)). What the motives were for this offensive is unknown. This might have been the last section of Illyria still unconquered (Isoc.V.21). What tribes were involved is uncertain, but the Ardiaei were certain and the Dardanians likely. The Dardanians might have been the first objective. Following their defeat, Philip attacked the Ardiaei of King Pleuratus. Although victorious, Philip was wounded in his right leg against the forces of Pleuratus.⁶⁶⁷ Pleuratus probably became a client king of Macedonia. Whatever the political settlement, Philip annexed the copper, silver, and gold mines of the region as well as valuable agricultural lands.⁶⁶⁸ Since this

offensive probably took most of the campaigning season, Philip paid little attention to Hellas.

Despite the importance of Athens in Philip's settlement of Hellas, Thessaly was the most important part of Hellas on strategic grounds.⁶⁶⁹ Thessaly was the entrance point to Hellas. *Stasis* in Thessaly was a threat to the security of Lower Macedonia. By 344 the Thessalian cavalry was a major part of his military strength. Although Thessalian revenue was probably not critical for his budget, the income was not insignificant. Philip could conduct no other activity if the home front was exposed.

In 344 Philip faced a crisis in Thessaly. With the end of the Sacred War, some Thessalians were unhappy with their dependence on Macedonia. As archon of the League, Philip was entitled to revenue from the harbor dues at Pegasae, the port for Pherae. He also possessed the territories of Magnesia and Perrhaebia. He controlled the military forces of Thessaly. Many *poleis* had conflicts between the ruling oligarchies or tyrants and the *demos*. His close relationship with the Aleuadae of Larissa had deteriorated. It was the Aleuadae who asked Philip to intervene against Pherae in the early 350s. In Larissa, the authority of the Aleuadae had declined for reasons unknown. There was *stasis* within the *polis* (Arist.*Pol.*1306a26–32). Simus, a powerful oligarch, was appointed to mediate the discord. He was given mercenary troops to enforce his authority. However, he began to act like a tyrant in Larissa, which exacerbated the discord. Whatever the reasons for the discord among the Thessalians, Philip intervened as archon of the Thessalian League. He pacified Thessaly by replacing tyrants in various cities. He garrisoned Pherae and installed a decarchy (“board of ten”) to govern it (Diod.XVI.69.7–8; Dem.VI.22).⁶⁷⁰ He might have garrisoned Larissa and other cities also.⁶⁷¹

Sometime between 344 and 342, Philip II reorganized the Thessalian League. He replaced the four polemarchs, who commanded the league army and were annually elected officials, with four tetrarchs appointed by Philip as archon of the League (Dem.IX.26). The tetrarchs represented the four geographical (or tribal) tetrarchies that Thessaly had been divided into for centuries. These officials served at the discretion of Philip. The administration of Thessaly would now follow regional lines rather than centered on the larger *poleis* (Pherae, Larissa, and Pharsalus). The cities lost some authority but remained intact with local self-government. Inter-city squabbles were reduced. If not earlier, Philip was now elected archon for life.⁶⁷² Philip emerged in full control of the Thessalian League, and his rule became more authoritarian. Though never annexed, Thessaly became an integral part of the kingdom. Thessaly remained quiet for

the remainder of Philip's and Alexander's life.

An Uneasy Peace

Also in 344, war occurred between Sparta, Argos, and Messene. The reasons are unknown. By this time, Philip had alliances with Megalopolis, Messene, Argos, and other Peloponnesian *poleis* (Dem.V.18–19; XVIII.64). Although Demosthenes, in many speeches, called these pro-Macedonian supporters traitors to Hellas, the second century Greek historian Polybius, who was born in Megalopolis, called these men patriots to their *poleis* and Greek freedom (Polyb.XVIII.14). Unlike Demosthenes, these men did not view Athens as the sun that the Hellenic world revolved around! Philip supported the opponents of Sparta with money and mercenary troops (Dem.VI.15). How large the assistance was is uncertain. These alliances demonstrate that these *poleis* preferred Philip's protection rather than another Greek state.⁶⁷³ Early in 344 Megalopolis and Messene had applied for membership in the Amphictyonic League but the members rejected their admission.⁶⁷⁴ Philip provided aid to Argos and Messene to resist Spartan attempts to control the Peloponnese. The war was short-lived since peace occurred by the end of the year. Whatever the events of the war, Sparta ceased the attempt to recapture Messenia.

However, this war exacerbated the hostility between Athens and Philip. As an ally, Athens supported Sparta. In the summer of 344 Demosthenes led an Athenian embassy into the Peloponnese to create an anti-Macedonian coalition (Dem.VI.19–27). The mission failed. To many Peloponnesians, Sparta was perceived to be the larger threat. After the return of Demosthenes, Philip sent an embassy, led by Python of Byzantium, to Athens in late summer. In accompaniment were ambassadors from Messene and Argos to complain of Athens' support for Sparta. Philip instructed Python to offer Athens an olive branch (Dem.XVIII.136). In Python's address to the Athenian Assembly, he criticized the false accusations against Philip and then relayed the offer that Philip was willing to amend (*epanorthosis*) the Peace of Philocrates. However, he did not mention specific proposals ([Dem.].VII.22). Specific proposals were left to Athens to request ([Dem.].VII.18).⁶⁷⁵ The initial response of the Assembly was favorable to Python's speech. Python was a capable orator who studied rhetoric under Isocrates. It is not certain whether Demosthenes's *Second Philippic* oration preceded or was contemporary with Python's mission. Either way, Demosthenes complained about Macedonian aggression and the unreliability of Philip's word.⁶⁷⁶

The Athenian Assembly approved two proposals to revise the treaty. The first proposal was to alter the bilateral agreement of peace

to a common peace (*koine eirene*) including other Greek *poleis*.⁶⁷⁷ The second proposal was “that each side should retain its own possessions” ([Dem.].VII.18). In other words, the Athenians were claiming that previous possessions such as Amphipolis, Potidaea, and other *poleis* now under Philip’s control should be returned to them. Again Amphipolis was the proverbial itch that the Athenians could not scratch. By this time the mines around Amphipolis and neighboring Philippi were providing annual revenue of a thousand talents to Philip (Diod.XVI.8.6). There was no way that he would surrender this income stream.

Hegesippus was appointed the head of the embassy to Philip to revise the Peace. He traveled to Pella in late fall. Unfortunately, the selection of Hegesippus was a poor choice.⁶⁷⁸ A supporter of Demosthenes, he was unfavorably received by Philip (Dem.XIX.331). However, the negotiations proceeded, Philip rejected the terms to amend the Peace of Philocrates.⁶⁷⁹ By the spring of 343 at the latest, Hegesippus returned to Athens. The *status quo* of the Peace was maintained, but its popularity continued to deteriorate in Athens. A cold war developed between the friends and allies of Philip and those of Athens. Demosthenes and his supporters would continue to fan the embers to convert the cold war to a hot war. Within two years their effort would succeed.

In the late summer of 344, while Philip and Athens were playing their game of cat and mouse, an embassy arrived in Hellas from Persia.⁶⁸⁰ Its objective was the recruitment of Greek mercenaries for Artaxerxes Ochus’s invasion of Egypt. Traveling through Hellas, the embassy achieved mixed results. The Athenians and Spartans rejected their overtures for reasons not specified.⁶⁸¹ The Thebans agreed to supply one thousand men under Lacrates and the Argives sent three thousand men commanded by Nicostratus.⁶⁸² Another six thousand men were recruited among the *poleis* of Asia Minor, probably because they were subjects of the Great King (Diod.XVI.44.1–4; Dem.X.34).⁶⁸³ These men accompanied the Persian invasion of Egypt in the winter of 343/342. Persian victory was achieved by the spring of 342.

The failure to modify the Peace increased tensions throughout Hellas in 343. In the first half of the year, there was *stasis* in Megara and Elis between democrats and oligarchs. Demosthenes implies that the oligarchs were pro-Macedonian and that Philip secretly supported them (Dem.XIX.294–296). Although Demosthenes’ evidence is speculative, the oligarchs might have received some type of support from Philip.⁶⁸⁴ However, it is unlikely that Philip provided any military support. The Megarian oligarchs enlisted some mercenaries and

appealed for aid from Thebes. The Athenians received an appeal from the democrats. The Athenians arrived first under the command of Phocion. No details are provided but Plutarch mentions that he saved the city, fortified the port of Nisaea, and connected it with long walls to Megara (Plut.*Phoc.*15). In Elis, the oligarchs replaced the democratic regime that came to power in the late 350s. If the Elean oligarchs were pro-Macedonian, they did not fight with Philip at Chaeronea in 338.

Trouble was also brewing within the *poleis* on Euboea. In Eretria and Oreus, the typical conflict of oligarchs and democrats reared its ugly head again. The democracies were replaced with pro-Macedonian oligarchies. In Eretria, the pro-Macedonian oligarchs gained control of the city but the democrats gained control of Porthmus, Eretria's port. Eventually with the assistance of one thousand mercenaries under Hipponicus, supported by Philip, the oligarchs gained control of the port in 342 (Dem.IX.57). In Chalcis, the influential leader Callias was friendly toward Philip with the intention of developing an anti-Athenian league of Euboeans. Philip rejected Callias's goal, which would have undermined his relationship with Athens and Thebes. Both cities still coveted the control of Euboea for their security. Callias then made overtures to Thebes and was rejected. Finally, by 341 this chameleon had Chalcis allied with Athens (Aesch.III.89–93).⁶⁸⁵ Although it is questionable if Philip intervened in the Peloponnese, it is likely that he had his hands in the cookie jar in Euboea in 342. Bordering Attica and central Greece, Euboea was strategic ground for Philip to extend control over central Hellas. Through his intervention in the local disputes, Macedonian influence in Euboea might keep a hostile Athens and Thebes in check.⁶⁸⁶ Still hopeful to maintain peace with Athens, Philip minimized direct intervention, but the groundwork was laid for garrisoning Euboea if necessary.

In Athens, the friends of Philip were under attack. The Athenians were aware of the turmoil in Hellas and suspected that the hidden hand of Philip was behind it. Consequently, in the fall of 343 Aeschines was accused of misconduct for his role in the peace negotiations in 346. Demosthenes acted as the prosecutor in his speech *On the Embassy* (Dem.XIX).⁶⁸⁷ He claimed that Aeschines had misled the Athenians by misrepresenting Philip's intentions in the peace debate. He also accused Aeschines of accepting bribes and acting as an agent for Philip. Their associate Philocrates was previously charged with bribery. Rather than stand trial, Philocrates fled and was convicted *in absentia* (Aesch.II.6). Aeschines was acquitted by only thirty votes by the jury of 1,501 citizens. Public opinion was evenly divided between the pro and anti-Macedonian factions. However, the anti-Macedonian opinion was growing. During the winter of 343/342, Athenian envoys again solicited alliances throughout Hellas but with little success.

By 342, for reasons open to speculation, Philip decided to remove Arybbas as king of the Molossians in Epirus. His replacement would be Alexander, Olympias's brother, who was now age twenty (Diod.XVI.72.1). Arybbas was exiled. In early 342 Philip invaded Epirus with a small force and captured three small Greek cities along the north coast of the Gulf of Ambracia ([Dem.].VII.32).⁶⁸⁸ These cities he gave to Alexander who incorporated them into his kingdom. This expansion of the Molossian state brought its borders to the Gulf of Ambracia in western Greece. Obviously, Philip was assured of Alexander's loyalty to him. Although a vassal, Alexander was granted greater independence. Alexander never betrayed Philip's trust.

The Ambraciots fearing the arrival of Philip sought support from Corinth (Dem.IX.34). The Acarnanians received forces from Athens. The people of the western island of Leucas were also fearful. The Achaeans along the north shore of the Corinthian Gulf were alarmed when Philip formed an alliance with the Aetolians. Philip offered to give Naupactus to the Aetolians. This coalition of western Greeks deterred Philip from consolidating further gains in western Hellas. At this point, he was not willing to engage in war over a remote area of Hellas. The area had little strategic or economic value to Macedonia. However, his actions increased the hostility of Athens and threatened Corinthian trade with the western Greeks. Philip backpedaled from the west. By spring of 342 he was in Thessaly. Thrace was his next objective.

Before he moved east, Philip made a final attempt to salvage peace with Athens. In the spring of 342 Philip sent a letter to Athens offering to surrender the island of Halonnesus in the north Aegean near the island of Lemnos. Halonnesus had been under the control of Athens until it was captured by pirates after 346. Philip's forces at some point expelled the pirates and occupied the island. Now Philip offered to surrender the island and settle other issues through arbitration. He also agreed to expand the Peace of Philocrates in to a common peace if other Greeks were willing. In the *On Halonnesus* speech, Hegesippus urges the Athenians to reject Philip's peace offering.⁶⁸⁹ Ultimately, the Athenians rejected Philip's proposals. The failure of these negotiations was the straw that broke the camel's back. Philip made his final offer to maintain peace. His focus was now eastern Thrace.

Philip's Thracian Campaign (342–340 BC)

In the summer of 342 Philip launched his campaign against Thrace. Unexpected at the time, events would cause Philip to spend his energies on this front for the next three years. He would ultimately campaign against the Thracians, Greeks, Scythians, and Paeonians.

This offensive brought war with Athens and hostility from Persia. How did this happen?

His probable objective was the complete submission of Thrace.⁶⁹⁰ Although Cersobleptes was made a vassal in 346, his hostile activities were a thorn in Philip's side. Past Macedonian campaigns were primarily concerned with establishing control along the north Aegean coast to the Sea of Marmara. Now Philip decided to campaign in the interior regions of Thrace and remove Cersobleptes as king. Diodorus provides a generic explanation for Philip's offensive when he states that the Greek *poleis* along the Hellespont were under attack by Cersobleptes (Diod.XVI.71.1). Although in earlier campaigns Philip had annexed parts of Thrace into Macedonia, the remainder under the subject kings, Cersobleptes and Teres, was still a large territory. How the campaign progressed is unknown but we are told of severe engagements won and lost. Resistance from Cersobleptes was strong. His Thracians were fierce fighters. After a ten-month campaign (July 342 to April 341) Cersobleptes and Teres were expelled from their kingdoms (Dem.VIII.2; [Dem.].XII.8–10). In this campaign, Macedonian garrisons were established and colonists settled in the new *poleis* of Beroe and Philippopolis.⁶⁹¹ Although the organization of the newly conquered territories is unclear, Philip neither annexed the territory to Macedonia nor created a province. He probably relied on allied cities, colonies, and his garrisons to control their local territories. The conquered inhabitants paid tribute to Macedonia (Diod.XVI.71.2).

By late 342 Philip, accepting the initiative of King Cothelas of the Getae, formed an alliance with this Scythian tribe whose territory stretched from northern Thrace to the Danube River. Philip married Cothelas's daughter Meda as his sixth wife. Why did Cothelas and Philip form this alliance? Cothelas was probably facing pressure from the Scythians moving southward under King Atheas, who was in conflict with the Histriani near the Danube River. The seriousness of this threat remains speculative. Philip would be a strong ally to oppose the Scythians. Philip might have valued this alliance as a bulwark in the north against a Scythian invasion into Thrace.⁶⁹²

The Athenians were alarmed by Philip's success. Demosthenes was stoking the flames of hostility by insisting that Philip was taking territory that belonged to Athens (Dem.VIII.6). His speech *On The Chersonese*, delivered in the spring of 341, like most others, portrayed Philip's actions with a jaundiced eye and from an Athenocentric perspective. What territory in the Chersonese and Thrace Demosthenes claimed was Athenian is not specified. To many Athenians, much of the territory was probably viewed as Athenian based on historical claims dating to the fifth century Empire. Later in the same speech, Demosthenes urges the Athenians to prepare for

war since Athens' subjection is Philip's ultimate objective. He says, This, then, is the first thing needful, to recognize in Philip the inveterate enemy of constitutional government and democracy, for unless you are heartily persuaded of this, you will not consent to take your politics seriously. Your second need is to convince yourselves that all his activity and all his organization is preparing the way for an attack on our city, and that where any resistance is offered to him, that resistance is our gain (Dem.VIII.43).⁶⁹³

Regardless of this rhetoric, the Athenians were not quiescent.

Since 342 the Athenian general Diopeithes was active in the Chersonese. Diopeithes had brought cleruchs to reinforce the Athenian settlements in the Chersonese. Short of money, he was also active raising funds locally by means fair or foul (Dem.VIII.21). Diopeithes raided Thrace, capturing some towns and enslaving the population. He also captured merchant ships, sailing through the Hellespont, holding them for ransom. Through his activities, he aroused the antagonism of Cardia, Philip's ally. In 341, after the failure of Philip and Athens to arbitrate their differences in the Chersonese, Philip installed a garrison in Cardia at the request of the Cardians (Dem.VIII.58; 64). In the late summer of 341 Demosthenes urged resistance again in his *Third Philippic* and *Fourth Philippic* orations. The Athenians sent reinforcements to the Chersonese. Despite the tensions in the Chersonese, Philip and the Athenians avoided war. Diopeithes remained in the Chersonese in 341 to protect Athenian interests.

While Philip was engaged in Thrace, events in Euboea drew the attention of Athens and Macedonia. In the spring of 341, the ambassadors of Callias of Chalcis were in Athens negotiating a defensive alliance (Aesch.III.92). Macedonia and Thebes were his enemies. In early summer the forces of Athens, Megara, and Chalcis liberated Oreus from its pro-Macedonian tyrant Philistides. The Athenians made alliances with other Euboean *poleis*, but they did not join the Second Athenian League. Later in the year, the Athenian *strategos* Phocion liberated Eretria from its tyrant Cleitarchus (Diod.XVI.74.1). Thus, the Euboeans, if they chose, were free to form their own league.

Late in 341 Demosthenes and Callias visited the *poleis* of the Peloponnese urging resistance to Philip and developing an anti-Macedonian coalition (Aesch.III.95–99). Men, money, and ships were promised by the anti-Macedonian cities. Although it is doubtful that Callias captured some cities along the Gulf of Pegasae in 340, he might have conducted some type of piratical raid with little long-term

consequences ([Dem.].XII.5). Like a mosquito bite, these actions might have been an irritant to Macedonia but no more. Philip did not abandon his northern campaigns.

With Thrace subdued, Philip marched north toward the cities along the Black Sea coast. What his objective was is open to speculation. Whether he was showing the flag of Macedonian power, attempting to gain a foothold on the Black sea, supporting some allies, or some other objective, his purpose remains speculative. Regardless, by early 340 he formed an alliance with King Atheas of the Scythians (Just.IX.2.1).

Philip's success in Thrace and alliance with the northern tribes were making the Byzantines nervous (Dem.VIII.14–15). The Byzantines had been friends of Macedonia when they were at odds with the Athenians. Now the power of Philip was at their doorstep. Besides the threat to their autonomy, Philip's conquests must have impacted their trade with the eastern Balkan tribes. If he could blockade the Hellespont, Byzantium would lose substantial trade and revenue. Relying on their uneasiness, Demosthenes visited Byzantium and other *poleis*, along the grain route to the Bosphorus in the fall of 341, to encourage them to join an anti-Macedonian coalition (Dem.XVIII.301–302). Although no alliance occurred at this time, the seeds were planted for reconciliation between Athens and Byzantium.

Perinthus and Byzantium

It is certain that Philip was fully informed of Athenian hostility. The open debates in the Athenian Assembly prevented secrecy in state policy. Philip's friends and envoys certainly kept him apprised of Athenian public opinion. From Philip's friends throughout Hellas, Philip was certainly aware of the animosity growing in other *poleis*. It is certainly reasonable that by early 340 he believed war with Athens and a coalition of Greek states was likely. The Euboeans, perhaps the Megarians, were now allied with Athens and its League allies in opposition to Philip. Since war seemed imminent, Philip ended his campaign in the northeast and marched south to support his allies in the Chersonese. He was now prepared to abandon the Peace of Philocrates. The cold war would soon become a hot war.

Aware that Byzantium was now an ally of Athens, Philip summoned his fleet to support his efforts to pacify the region. Arriving in the Chersonese at Cardia, he awaited the arrival of his fleet. After the fleet's arrival, he marched around the Chersonese peninsula from west to east to protect his fleet as it sailed through the Hellespont. Fortunately for him, the fleet, its size is unknown but probably small, was not prevented from sailing through the Hellespont by the presence

of the Athenian fleet under Chares, who had perhaps forty ships. Since Athens had not yet declared war, it appears that Chares was unwilling to be the provocateur of war. Philip likewise refrained from attacking the Athenian cleruchs as he marched through the Chersonese despite their hostility to Cardia. What Philip's mission for his fleet was is uncertain. It is probable that the fleet was assigned to support the upcoming siege operations. It may also have carried his siege equipment. Whether it was also intended to capture the Athenian grain fleet from the Euxine, raid merchant vessels, or some other purpose is open to speculation. The fleet never challenged the Athenians in a naval engagement. As events played out, the fleet was unable to prevent aid arriving to Byzantium and Perinthus from the Athenians and Persians. However, it did capture part of the grain fleet.

Since the defenses of Byzantium were strong, Philip attacked its neighbor Perinthus first in the summer of 340 (Paus.IV.31.5). Although Perinthus was located on the slopes of a peninsula, it appeared to be the easier target to subdue. Diodorus describes the siege as extremely brutal (Diod.XVI.74.3–4).

He built towers eighty cubits high, which far overtopped the towers of Perinthus, and from a superior height kept wearing down the besieged. He rocked the walls with battering rams and undermined them with saps, and cast down a long stretch of the wall. The Perinthians fought stoutly in their own defense and quickly threw up a second wall; many admirable feats were performed in the open and on the fortifications. Both sides displayed great determination. The king, for his part, rained destruction with numerous and varied catapults upon the men fighting steadfastly along the battlements, while the Perinthians, although their daily losses were heavy, received reinforcements of men, missiles, and artillery from Byzantium.⁶⁹⁴

Although suffering from starvation and numerous casualties, the Perinthians held out against the best siege tactics of Philip. After the Macedonians had breached the second wall, the Perinthians fought from their homes perched on the slope of the hill like a Greek amphitheater. The Byzantines supported Perinthus with the full might of their army (Diod.XVI.74–76.3). Under orders from Artaxerxes Ochus, the western satraps supplied men, money, and supplies to Perinthus.⁶⁹⁵ Perinthus would remain under siege for over a year. Although Philip failed in the siege, the Macedonians became famous for their siege tactics.⁶⁹⁶

Unable to capture Perinthus, Philip divided his forces. He kept

Perinthus under siege and extended it to nearby Selymbria west of Byzantium. During the sieges of Perinthus and Selymbria, the Athenian fleet under Chares did not interfere. Athens had not yet declared war. During the summer, Chares observed the Macedonians and began to collect the grain fleet arriving from the Black Sea. These ships rendezvoused at Heiron, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus near Chalcedon. Here they waited to be escorted through the Hellespont by the Athenian triremes. By late summer Philip was resolved to seize the grain fleet. Fortunately for the Macedonians, Chares was absent from the fleet meeting with Persian officials. In their first attempt, the Macedonian fleet was repulsed by the Athenian fleet. However, on the second attempt, the Macedonians landed an amphibious force on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus and captured the grain fleet.⁶⁹⁷

This was a disaster of the first order for Athens. The Macedonians captured 230 vessels. Philip released fifty ships that might have belonged to neutral states. The crews were probably ransomed and the goods sold since Philip received a revenue of seven hundred talents to pay his troops and other expenses. The hulls of the ships were cannibalized for the siege operations.⁶⁹⁸ Some of the grain was used to feed his army. The captured Athenian triremes and their crews were sent to Macedonia. This was the immediate event that caused the Athenians to declare war (Dem.XVIII.73). For the Athenians, the loss of their food supply threatened starvation. The economic loss to the merchants was enormous. In *Philip's Letter* to the Athenians after the seizure of the grain fleet, the king listed his grievances and basically stated that he would now defend himself with all his power ([Dem.].XII). Although not a declaration of war, the letter hinted that diplomacy was running out of time.⁶⁹⁹ The Athenian Assembly voted for war (Diod.XVI.77).

In the fall of 340 Philip moved against Byzantium with the bulk of his army. The Athenians assigned Chares with forty triremes to defend Byzantium. However, he was refused admission into the harbors of many *poleis* due to the poor reputation he and his fleet had accrued. Chares stationed his fleet on the eastern side of the Bosphorus to observe events. The Byzantines defeated the Macedonian fleet and forced it to flee into the Black Sea. Lacking aggressiveness in defense of Byzantium, Chares was replaced by Phocion in 339. Phocion and his fleet were welcomed by the Byzantines (Plut.*Phoc.*14.3–5). Byzantium was also supported Athens League allies Chios, Rhodes, Cos, and other Greek states. Although the siege of Byzantium lasted into the spring of 339, little is known about the siege. However, the successful defense of Byzantium by the Greek coalition discouraged the Macedonians. Making no headway in the sieges of Byzantium,

Perinthus, and Selymbria, Philip cut his losses and made peace with the coalition except Athens (Diod.XVI.77.3). Although the peace terms and participants are unknown, it is highly likely that the island *poleis* joined Byzantium in the peace.⁷⁰⁰

Rather than return to Macedonia, Philip headed north with the army. Through stealth, during the peace negotiations, the Macedonian fleet eluded the Athenians, sailed through the Hellespont, and returned to Macedonia. Atheas, the Scythian king, refused to pay a subsidy to Philip during his siege of Byzantium. Now he renounced the alliance with Philip. Philip decided that he could not ignore this challenge to his authority. Since no Greek source talks about this campaign, the information provided by the Roman author Justin is sketchy. Philip defeated Atheas. These Scythians, south of the Danube River, might have been made vassals but it is not certain. As booty, Philip collected twenty thousand horses for breeding. In addition, he captured twenty thousand inhabitants, cattle, and other possessions (Just.IX.2.2–16). Returning home through the country of the Triballians, Philip refused to surrender part of his booty in exchange for safe passage. Apparently this was a bad decision. A battle ensued with the Triballians in which Philip was wounded in the thigh. Whether they were victorious or not, the Macedonians lost much of their booty (Just.IX.3.1–3). By late summer Philip was back in Pella.

The pacification of Thrace was thorough. For three years the Macedonians campaigned. They subjugated all inhabitants in their wake. Philip did not personally conduct all the campaigns. In the summer of 340 Alexander III, acting regent at age sixteen, conducted a campaign against the Maedi and founded a city called Alexandropolis (Plut.*Alex*.9.1). While besieging Byzantium, Philip assigned independent commands to Parmenio and Antipater to subjugate inland tribes. They were successful. In the pacification process, garrisons were established, cities founded, inhabitants resettled, the surviving ruling elites made loyal to Macedonia, and some natives incorporated into the Macedonian army. Philip allowed local self-government since most inhabitants belonged to tribal organizations. Although incomplete, this amalgamation process went a long way in establishing the loyalty of the local people to Macedonian rule. Many native Thracians later served in Alexander's army of conquest (Diod.XVII.17.3–4; Arr.*Anab*.I.5.2–3). This was no small achievement. It must be remembered that ancient Thrace is now divided among the modern countries of Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. Territorially, Thrace was seven times larger than Macedonia with a population perhaps five times larger.⁷⁰¹ Philip now controlled his northern, western, and eastern borders from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. Only the Athenians and their allies denied his hegemony.

Back home in Pella, Philip found no time to relax. He was at war with Athens. The Amphictyonic League was at war with Amphissa, on the Corinthian Gulf, in the Fourth Sacred War. There were administrative issues requiring his attention in Macedonia and Thessaly. Diplomatic embassies awaited his return. With a sixth wife, he probably had domestic issues to settle. There was no rest. By late fall Philip was marching south and a date with destiny.

The Road to Chaeronea

Now involved in the Fourth Sacred War, Philip II and the Hellenes had a date with destiny. How did this happen? In the 339 spring meeting (*pylaea*) of the Amphictyonic League, the Amphissaeans, supported by Thebes, introduced a resolution against Athens condemning a recent dedication by the Athenians that listed Thebes as an ally of the Persians in the Persian wars. The Athenians should be fined fifty talents. Defending Athens, Aeschines introduced a counter measure condemning the Amphissaeans for impiety by cultivating the sacred plain of Cirrha below Delphi and collecting dues from the sacred harbor. Successfully deflecting the Council from punishing Athens, his oratory persuaded the councilors to act against Amphissa. The next day the Delphians, led by the Amphictyonic councilors, destroyed a part of the cultivated area but were forced to flee when attacked by the Amphissaeans. The Council resolved that before the next meeting, a proposal should be prepared to punish Amphissa (Aesch.III.115–124).

In the Assembly, the Athenians initially voted to punish Amphissa at the next meeting of the Amphictyonic Council. However, Demosthenes managed to get the vote reversed to avoid antagonizing Thebes (Aesch.III.125–128). The Athenians did not attend the next Amphictyonic meeting. After the meeting in early summer, League troops, commanded by the Thessalian Cottyphus, marched against Amphissa. They exiled some pro-Theban leaders, appointed new leaders, and imposed a fine. After their departure, the Amphissaeans ignored the fine and restored their exiled leaders. Thus, they thumbed their nose at the League. In the fall meeting of the Amphictyonic Council, which the Athenians and Thebans did not attend, Philip was offered the command of League forces to punish Amphissa (Dem.XVIII.143–152). Receiving the offer in Pella, he accepted.⁷⁰²

Philip marched south with the Macedonian and League forces. Rather than follow the traditional invasion route through Thermopylae, he passed through the mountains of Oetaea in central Greece and eventually reached Cytinium in Doris. He turned east, marched through Phocis, and seized Elatea near the border with Boeotia. He

was only two days' march from Athens. His swift arrival surprised the Thebans and Athenians (Diod.XVI.84). Neither *polis* had their army mobilized. Rather than immediately attack Athens, he halted his march. Why?

Although the Athenians and Thebans were on opposite sides regarding the fate of Amphissa, they were still members of the Amphictyonic League. However, Athens was at war with Philip. Although an ally of Philip, as a member of the Amphictyonic League, many Thebans were hostile toward him. Athens and Thebes were not allies. Had he moved immediately, it is probable that Thebes would have remained neutral and an isolated Athens could have been defeated. Did he get cold feet to force a military resolution? It is unlikely. The probable explanation is that he hoped to settle the war through diplomacy. Although Athens would probably withstand a siege, he knew that Thebes was divided between pro and anti-Macedonian factions. A neutral or friendly Thebes would make the assault on Athens easier. Thus, he chose to neutralize Thebes. If Thebes was reconciled, perhaps Athens would agree to a peace settlement. It was worth a try.

Sending Macedonian and Amphictyonic envoys to Thebes, Philip requested the surrender of Nicaea and either Theban participation or neutrality in his attack on Athens.⁷⁰³ In another friendly gesture, he did not ask the Thebans to participate in the punishment of Amphissa. Meanwhile in Athens, Demosthenes urged resistance by sending the army to Eleusis and seeking Theban support. Demosthenes led an embassy to Thebes to solicit an alliance (Dem.XVIII.169–179; Diod.XVI.85; Plut.*Dem.*18.1–2). In Thebes, Demosthenes agreed that in exchange for an alliance, Athens would recognize Theban control of Boeotia, pay two-thirds of the war costs on land and the full cost of the fleet, share command equally at sea, but grant full command to Thebes on land (Aesch.III.141–151). The Thebans accepted the alliance and the Macedonian ambassadors returned to Philip with the bad news.

Whether unsure of his next move or unwilling to give up on diplomacy, Philip remained at Elatea. Unfortunately, we are not informed what the attitude of the Amphictyonic League allies were in Philip's strategy. He offered further negotiations but was rebuffed. Now mobilized, the Boeotians and Athenians occupied the passes around Mount Parnassus to prevent him moving forward. There were ten thousand mercenaries at the Gravia Pass commanded by the Theban Boeotarch Proxenus and the Athenian Chares. The citizen hoplites of Athens and Thebes occupied the pass at Parapotamii. With the approach of winter, both sides avoided a major engagement. Guerilla warfare occupied the belligerents throughout the winter. Most of Hellas

stayed neutral. Philip's allies in the Peloponnese were blocked by land and sea from assisting him. The Phocians, bitter toward both sides for their punishment in the Third Sacred War, remained neutral. The western Greeks also stayed neutral. The members of the Second Athenian League provided no soldiers for the land campaign.⁷⁰⁴ When the showdown arrived, it would be Macedonia and the Amphictyonic League against Thebes, Athens, and a few other Greeks.

In the spring of 338 Philip suddenly moved. Through subterfuge, Philip's general Parmenio captured the Gravia Pass and the Greek camp. Their winter positions now exposed, the Athenians and Thebans withdrew to Chaeronea. Rather than follow up Parmenio's success, Philip again delayed for a few months. He made another peace overture to Thebes and Athens and might have tried bribery with diplomacy (Diod.XVI.85.3; Aesch.III.148–151).⁷⁰⁵ In Thebes, some Boeotarchs were disposed toward peace, which drew the wrath of Demosthenes. In Athens, Phocion urged peace but his advice was ignored (Plut.*Phoc.*16.1–3). Although the alliance was uneasy, Thebes and Athens did not succumb. Finally, Philip was resolved to the showdown. Only battle would now determine Greek freedom or Macedonian hegemony. Was Demosthenes smiling?

In August 338 the day arrived at Chaeronea.⁷⁰⁶ Since there is no detailed description of the battle by any contemporary source, the progression of the battle is uncertain. There were large cavalry forces on both sides, but no evidence exists describing their role. Philip II had two thousand cavalry and more than thirty thousand infantry. The Greek army matched the Macedonians in size but, except for the Boeotians, not in training and experience.⁷⁰⁷ The vast majority were citizen hoplites of Thebes and Athens. Philip commanded the right wing opposite the Athenians. His son Alexander led the left wing, with the Companion cavalry, opposite the Boeotians and the Theban Sacred Band. The composition of the battle line is uncertain but the Royal Guard troops were with Philip.⁷⁰⁸ As the battle developed, Philip withdrew the right wing to lure the Athenians forward. At some point he counterattacked the Athenians. Alexander led an attack against the Boeotians when a gap developed in the Greek line. The Theban Sacred Band was destroyed to the last man. When the Greeks withdrew, they were not pursued by the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry. At day's end the Athenians lost over a thousand dead and two thousand prisoners. The Boeotian losses were heavy. Demosthenes was a hoplite but fled during the course of the battle.⁷⁰⁹ The Macedonian and Amphictyonic League casualties are unknown. Philip mourned the dead and celebrated the victory (Diod.XVI.85.5–86; Plut.*Alex.*9.2–3; *Dem.*XX.2).

Peace

After the defeat, the Greeks were in a panic. Would Philip destroy Thebes and Athens and enslave the population? Since most of the casualties were citizen soldiers, there were few reserve forces to defend the cities. Following traditional Greek warfare, victory or defeat was staked on one hoplite battle. The Greek survivors retreated to Lebadea in Boeotia but were in no condition to renew the struggle. The Athenians rallied to defend their walls (Lycurg.*InLeoc*.16). Demosthenes was sent into the Aegean to gather food supplies. The Thebans were divided between the pro and anti-Macedonian factions. When would the Macedonians attack?

To the surprise of most Greeks, Philip did not attack. The iron fist won the battle, but the velvet glove would achieve the peace. While drinking in celebration of victory, Philip as he walked among the Athenian captives came across the Athenian orator Demades, who chastised Philip for his poor behavior (Diod.XVI.87.1–2). Although this story by Diodorus is dubious, for whatever reason, Philip soon released Demades and sent him to Athens to offer peace terms. Justin's claim that Philip was restrained in his victory celebration seems more likely since he offered mild peace terms to Athens (Just.IX.4.1–3).

The Athenian Assembly responded by sending Phocion, Demades, and Aeschines as ambassadors to discuss peace terms. Philip released the Athenian prisoners without ransom. The Athenian dead were accompanied to Athens by Alexander and Antipater. By these actions, Philip set the moderate tone, which convinced the Athenians to agree to a peace (Diod.XVI.87.3; Plut.*Phoc*.16.4). The specific terms of peace are unknown, but it was another bilateral agreement.⁷¹⁰ It is likely that a defensive alliance was renewed with Philip. Athens kept its fortifications and fleet. The Second Athenian League was disbanded. Athens kept the islands of Imbros, Scyros, Lemnos, and Samos. Macedonian warships could not enter the Piraeus. Philip gave Oropus to Athens. The alliance with the Euboeans was dissolved though the Euboean League remained. The Athenian control of the Chersonese was likely lost. Its allies might have become vassals of Philip. In the future disputes with Macedonia, there is no mention of Athenian interference in the Chersonese. The fate of the cleruchs is speculative, although it is likely some returned to Athens.⁷¹¹ Philip and Alexander were given Athenian citizenship.

Unfortunately for Thebes, Philip was less accommodating. As a former ally and member of the Amphictyonic League, Thebes was to be punished. It is likely that Thessaly and other League members wanted Thebes punished for supporting the impiety of Amphissa. The annihilation of Thebes' Sacred Band implies that the Thebans fought

ferociously at Chaeronea. Consequently, the Boeotians captives were ransomed. The Cadmea was garrisoned by Macedonian soldiers. Theban exiles were probably allowed to return. An oligarchic Council of Three Hundred replaced the democracy (Diod.XVI.87.3; Just.IX.4.6–9). The Boeotian League was not disbanded. However, the three *poleis* of Orchomenus, Plataea, and Thespieae, destroyed by Thebes, were to be rebuilt to prevent Theban dominance of the League.⁷¹² Philip occupied Boeotia for weeks afterwards while he sought peace with the other Greek *poleis*.

Some Greek *poleis* made peace. Others did not. The Amphictyonic Council dissolved the *polis* of Amphissa into small villages. Many states were already allies of Philip. It is doubtful that Philip demanded alliance with all these states. Aside from Thebes, Philip had garrisons in Ambracia and probably Corinth when he invaded the Peloponnese (Diod.XVII.3.3; Plut.*Arat*.23.4). The peace was general, but it was not a common peace (*koine eirene*). There was no general peace conference. The general peace consisted of bilateral agreements between Philip and numerous *poleis*. After peace was restored, the Pythian Festival was celebrated at Delphi.

In the fall Philip entered the Peloponnese. Corinth and the Achaeans fought against him at Chaeronea. Their anti-Macedonian leaders were probably replaced when a peace was arranged. Philip had friends among the Arcadians, Argives, and Messenians. Megara made peace. Sparta refused. Philip invaded Laconia but avoided Sparta. He gave territory claimed by Sparta to the Arcadians, Argives, and Messenians. Why he left Sparta intact is a mystery. Perhaps Spartan hostility kept the other *poleis* loyal to Macedonia. When the proposition to meet in a general congress (*synedrion*) at Corinth to create a “Common Peace” the following year was introduced is unknown. It is reasonable to suggest that Philip introduced the subject after the general peace was established. Late in 338 Philip retired from the Peloponnese to Corinth.

The League of Corinth

In the spring of 337 a congress of Greek representatives met at Corinth under Philip II's watchful eye. The formation of the new league is known as the Hellenic League or League of Corinth by modern historians. Representatives of many *poleis* attended. Sparta remained aloof. The proceedings of the conference are not known. Philip introduced a plan for a common peace (*koine eirene*) and suggested the time had come to implement Isocrates's dream of war with Persia. This Common Peace was an expansion of his general peace settlement to prevent further internecine wars. This new league was an

extension of the bilateral agreements between Philip and the Hellenic *poleis* of the previous year.⁷¹³ Philip sponsored the League of Corinth, but Macedonia was not a member. In the oath below, Philip is listed as a separate entity from the League. The primary purpose of the League was to provide “collective security” in Hellas and maintain the *status quo* of the general peace agreements of the previous year. When the Common Peace was accepted, an alliance was made between the Greeks and Macedonia (Arr.*Anab.*III.24.5). The Greeks appointed Philip hegemon of the League and defender of the peace. After the Common Peace and the alliance with Macedonia was ratified by the Greek states, the Greek representatives pledged their loyalty to the League and would punish any violator of the peace (Diod.XVI.89; XVII.4.9; R&O 76). The surviving inscription states,

Oath. I swear by Zeus, Earth, Sun, Poseidon, Athena, Ares, all the gods and goddesses: I shall abide by the peace (?); and I shall neither break the agreement with Philip (?) nor take up arms for harm against any of those who abide by the oaths (?), neither by land nor by sea; nor shall I take any city or guard-post nor harbour, for war, of any of those participating in the peace, by any craft of connivance; nor shall I overthrow the kingdom of Philip or his descendants, nor the constitutions existing in each state when they swore the oaths concerning the peace; nor shall I myself do anything contrary to these agreements, nor shall I allow anyone else as far as possible.

If any one does commit any breach of treaty concerning the agreements, I shall go in support as called on by those who are wronged (?), and I shall make war against the one who transgresses the common peace (?) as decided by the common council (*synedrion*) and called on by the *hegemon*; and I shall not abandon.⁷¹⁴

Although not stated in the oath, the Greeks were to remain free and autonomous ([Dem.].XVII.8). Unfortunately, this was propaganda. As in previous common peace agreements, freedom and autonomy were subject to the interpretation of the hegemon. The crushing Greek defeat at Chaeronea, as well as the establishment of Macedonian garrisons throughout Hellas, prevented the Hellenes from pursuing policies that were counter to Macedonian interests. To prevent *stasis*, social revolution was outlawed within the *poleis* and the tribal regions. The territorial and political adjustments by Philip in 338 were recognized. The Greeks would discuss common action within the

Common Council (*koinon synedrion* or General Synod) of the League. As hegemon, Philip could not interfere with the various *poleis* without approval from the Council. Although not specified, the alliance was probably a *symmachia* (defensive/offensive) to maintain the *status quo*.⁷¹⁵ The offensive action against Persia, approved by the League ambassadors, occurred after the peace was ratified by the Greek states.

The constitutional construction of the League was spelled out in greater detail in a second meeting convened later in the spring or early summer of 337. The Council was to meet annually at one of the Panhellenic festivals of Olympia, Delphi, Isthmus, or Nemea. Delegates would come from the *poleis* and *ethne* (tribes). How they were selected is unknown. Voting representation in the council was based on the military capacity of each state as determined by the Council. Decisions of the Council were determined by majority vote, which were binding on all members. Council meetings were conducted under the auspices of five presidents (*prohedroi*) selected by lot from the delegates. The Council could determine war or peace. It could make legislation for the league. It decided the size of the army, the various contingents, appointed the commanders, provided supplies, and levied taxes. It had administrative and judicial functions ([Dem.].XVII.15–16).⁷¹⁶

This agreement firmly established the hegemony of Philip and his settlement of Hellenic affairs. Except for some recalcitrant hard liners (Sparta), most Greeks were reconciled to this common peace. War with Persia was on. Macedonians and Hellenes now looked east. Would Isocrates's crusade succeed?

Philip, Olympias, and Alexander

After the formation of the League of Corinth, Philip returned to Macedonia. Hellas was pacified. It was time to make the preparations for war with Persia. The Great King Artaxerxes III was poisoned in 339. His successor Artaxerxes IV was preoccupied consolidating his position. In the spring of 336 he also met his end by poison. His successor was Darius III.⁷¹⁷ These palace intrigues left the satraps of Asia Minor uncertain of their positions. Thus, the Macedonian threat was put on the back burner by the Persian hierarchy until the position of the Great King was secured. For Philip this was an opportunity. His plan was to attack Persia in two stages. The first stage was to establish a beachhead in Asia. In the spring of 336 Philip would send an expeditionary force of ten thousand men, commanded by Parmenio and Attalus, across the Hellespont to prepare the ground for Philip's crossing with the main body in the fall (Diod.XVI.91.2). Parmenio

defeated the local Persian forces and liberated Cyzicus and other Greek *poleis*. The beachhead was secured to Ephesus. Unfortunately for Philip, he would never lead the second stage.

After his return to Pella, he created a family conflict. Philip II the conqueror was also Philip II the philanderer. For relaxation, Philip enjoyed wine, women, and song. Philip was about to embark on a seventh marriage. All six of his previous marriages were for political reasons and made during war. What role love played in any marriage is unknown. Phila, the sister of Derdas of Elimea in Upper Macedonia, was his first wife in 359. Audata, an Illyrian princess was the second in 358. Philinna, wife number three and daughter of a Thessalian noble of Larissa, was married also in 358. Olympias, the fourth wife, was married in 357. She was the niece of the Molossian King Arybbas. Nikesipolis was Philip's fifth wife and married in 352. She was the daughter of a Thessalian noble of Pherae but died in 351. The sixth wife was Meda, the daughter of Cothelas king of the Getae, in 339. Except for Olympias, all the marriages might have been short-lived. The fates of some are unknown. How many mistresses Philip had, can only be imagined?

Olympias was the chief queen and mother of Alexander III and Cleopatra. Philinna was the mother of Arrhidaeus, the half brother of Alexander, who was probably older. Unfortunately, Arrhidaeus was not of sound mind. His exact condition is unknown but might have resulted from a childhood illness. Regardless, it apparently disqualified him in Philip's judgment from becoming the next king. He would outlive Alexander and reign as Philip III. However, he became a pawn in the power struggle among Alexander's successors.

Despite Olympias's stormy relationship with Philip, Alexander was always the heir apparent. Alexander, now eighteen in 338, reached the age of maturity. He had been groomed to rule. He was educated by Aristotle and other leading lights of Hellas. He was regent in 340 and conducted his first independent military campaign against the Maedi at age sixteen (Plut.*Alex*.9.1). He commanded the left wing at Chaeronea, was ambassador to Athens with the Athenian dead, and presumably observed the formation of the League of Corinth. Alexander was ready to rule. Whether he would have been appointed regent of Macedonia or accompanied Philip in Asia will never be known.

In 337 Philip's plans for succession got side tracked by cupid's arrow. Philip fell in love with Cleopatra, the niece of Attalus, one of his Macedonian Companions. In the spring or summer he married Cleopatra. However, Olympias was still in the royal palace as queen and mother of the crown prince. There is no hard evidence that Olympias was ever divorced. Two royal wives in one palace must have

created some interesting palace intrigue! It is alleged that at a drinking party, Attalus proposed a toast to pray for a legitimate Macedonian heir. Alexander, who was part Molossian, took offense to this insult to his legitimacy. He threw a cup at Attalus. Philip, in a drunken rage, drew a sword and approached Alexander but tripped over a couch and fell to the floor. Alexander mocked his father. Whether this story is true or not, some conflict arose between father and son. Alexander and Olympias soon fled to Epirus to the court of her brother for refuge. Alexander proceeded to Illyria.⁷¹⁸ The reason for the visit is unknown. Later in the year Alexander returned to Pella, but Olympias did not. It is not certain if he returned voluntarily or was recalled. Despite hard feelings between father and son, Alexander still remained the heir apparent (Plut.*Alex.*9.6–14).⁷¹⁹

Besides trouble in the family, Philip had a political problem with a divided court between those who supported Alexander and those who favored the new queen. It is likely that Cleopatra favored the removal of Alexander. She was pregnant and would deliver an heir in 336. If she bore a son, he would be a full-blooded Macedonian. Would Philip make him the heir? It is likely that Alexander never again felt secure as the heir apparent after Philip's seventh marriage.

In late 337 palace intrigue increased further when an embassy arrived from Pixodarus, the ruler of Caria. Pixodarus offered his oldest daughter in marriage to Arrhidaeus. Why not Alexander? No explanation is available but perhaps because Arrhidaeus was the eldest son. Perhaps paranoid about his status as heir apparent, Alexander sent a secret embassy to Caria suggesting that he should marry the Carian princess. Learning of this embassy, Philip berated Alexander for degrading himself by offering to marry a foreign princess. How ironic! All Philip's wives were foreign born except Cleopatra. As punishment, Philip banished some close friends of Alexander (Plut.*Alex.*10.1–5). The marriage was off when Philip demanded that Pixodarus return Thessalus, Alexander's secret envoy, for punishment. If this story narrated by Plutarch is true, these events ended by the spring of 336. Alexander remained Philip's heir.

In the spring of 336 the Macedonian invasion of Asia began. Parmenio commanded the expeditionary force. Attalus was second in command (Diod.XVI.91.2).⁷²⁰ Philip had one more piece of domestic business to take care of. This was marriage of his daughter Cleopatra to Alexander of Epirus. Why Alexander? No specific explanation is provided. However, it is likely that it was to solidify the dynastic relationship between Epirus and Macedonia before Philip's Persian war. Olympias was still in Epirus. Was she intriguing with her brother against Philip? What were her thoughts when Philip proposed to marry her daughter to her brother? We do not know. The marriage was

arranged to occur at Aegae, the old Macedonian capital, in the late summer or early fall of 336. People were invited from throughout the Greek world to participate in the celebration (Diod.XVI.91.4–6). A great festival was also planned to honor the deification of Philip by the Macedones at this time.⁷²¹

The Assassination of Philip II

In October the wedding was performed between Alexander of Epirus and Cleopatra.⁷²² The next day, a day of celebration was about to turn into a day of tragedy. The spectators had gathered at dawn in the amphitheater to witness the entrance of the statues of the twelve Olympian gods accompanied by Philip. Philip entered with his bodyguard trailing at a distance. Suddenly he was attacked by the assassin Pausanias, a member of his bodyguard. Stabbed in the ribs, Philip died quickly. As the bodyguards came to the rescue, some attended Philip while Leonnatus, Perdikkas, and Attalus pursued Pausanias. When Pausanias tripped and fell, he was caught and killed while getting up.

Who was Pausanias? According to Diodorus, he was a jilted homosexual lover of another Pausanias who was killed within the past year in a war with the Illyrians.⁷²³ Attalus, who knew the story between the two Pausanias, got the surviving Pausanias drunk at a party who was then raped by others. Pausanias complained to Philip about Attalus's actions, but Philip refused to punish Attalus. As compensation, Philip appointed Pausanias a bodyguard. Apparently not satisfied with Attalus lack of punishment, Pausanias committed the murder (Diod.XVI.92.5–94).

Why did he murder Philip rather than Attalus? This is one of the great murder mysteries in history. Was this the act of one man or was there a conspiracy to place Alexander III on the throne? The debate is ongoing and likely will never be settled. The evidence is circumstantial. Conspiracy is more rumor and innuendo than fact. Plutarch and Justin claim conspiracy but do not confirm it (Plut.*Alex.*10.6–7; Just.IX.7.1). However, no evidence exists from a contemporary source of Philip. Olympias, Alexander, Attalus, and others have been implicated. Who had motive, willingness, and opportunity? Probably many! However, no verdict can be reached based on the current evidence available. As noted earlier, assassination was a hazard of kingship in Macedonia. Many predecessors met this fate. For conspiracy theorists, Philip and Alexander were victims. However, there is no smoking gun to solidify the case for conspiracy against either.⁷²⁴ Whether he knew the truth or not, Aristotle claims that Philip's murder was for private revenge (Arist.*Pol.*1311a25–1311b3). However, his statement does not

eliminate a conspiracy. For lack of conclusive evidence, we will accept the verdict of Aristotle.

Alexander III (the Great)

Suddenly the old warhorse of the north was dead. The young stallion succeeded. Alexander III became king. Philip's Companions rallied to him. Antipater brought Alexander before the army who proclaimed him king. The rapidity of support displayed by the Companions suggests that Alexander's fear about his succession were unfounded. An alternative explanation, hinted at in the ancient sources, is that swift action prevented a civil war. After Philip's funeral, with ruthless efficiency, Alexander consolidated his power. There were many potential rivals to the throne if Alexander displayed weakness in command. His cousin Amyntas, son of Philip's brother Perdiccas III was killed shortly after Philip's death. Heromenes and Arrhabaeus, the two sons of Aeropus of the royal house of Lyncestis in Upper Macedonia, were executed (Diod.XVII.2.1; Plut.*Alex.*10.7; Arr.*Anab.*1.25.1). A third son, another Alexander, pledged allegiance to Alexander III and was spared. Despite the disapproval of Alexander, Olympias had Cleopatra's newborn daughter killed and forced Cleopatra to commit suicide. Alexander, with the aid of Parmenio, later had Attalus murdered in Asia (Diod.XVII.2.3–6; 5.2).⁷²⁵ Alexander had other members of Attalus's family killed. Within his first year of rule, Alexander removed all immediate rivals to the throne. Only his older half brother Arrhidaeus, half sisters Cynane and Thessalonice, and sister Cleopatra, married to King Alexander of Epirus, remained.⁷²⁶

Upon his accession, Alexander addressed the Greek ambassadors, who were present to witness the wedding, to honor the peace agreement and maintain the League of Corinth (Diod.XVII.2.2; Arr.*Anab.*1.1–3). The appeal was a vain one. The Athenians secretly communicated with Attalus to arrange a revolt. The Thessalians revolted. The Ambraciots expelled their Macedonian garrison. Other Peloponnesian *poleis* declared their independence. This initial outburst of freedom was nullified when Alexander marched into Hellas with the Macedonian army shortly after the assassination. The campaign avoided war. Alexander managed to get himself elected as archon of the Thessalian League. The Amphictyonic League accepted his hegemony. He pardoned the Ambraciots. Thebes and Athens submitted and were forgiven. He summoned a meeting of the League of Corinth. The representatives confirmed his status as hegemon of the League and leader of the war against Persia (Diod.XVII.3.1–4.9; Plut.*Dem.*22; *Alex.*XI.3–4).⁷²⁷ With Hellenic affairs temporarily eased, Alexander returned to Macedonia in the winter.

While concentrating on internal Macedonian affairs, revolts eventually erupted in Thrace, Paeonia, Illyria, and Hellas again. Alexander bided his time. In the spring of 335 Alexander led the Macedonian army forth in a lightning campaign. Parmenio remained in Asia while Antipater maintained the home front. Like Philip, Alexander would personally lead the army and share the hardships of campaign. With a small army, he marched north against the Thracians near Mount Haemus and defeated them. Crossing Mount Haemus, he moved against the Triballians and inflicted three thousand casualties. Eventually their King Syrmus surrendered. The northern frontier was secured to the Danube River. While marching westward through Agriania and Paeonia, Alexander learned of a revolt in Illyria by Cleitus, king of the Dardanians, and Glaucias, king of the Taulantians. Alexander moved into Illyria. In a series of engagements, the Illyrians were defeated at Pelion. In haste to leave because of the Hellenic revolt, both kings remained in power and eventually provided soldiers for Alexander's invasion of Asia. The western border of Macedonia was now secure (Arr.*Anab.*I.4–6; Plut.*Alex.*XI.5; Diod.XVII.8.1–2).

While Alexander was up north, rumors spread throughout Hellas that Alexander was killed. An uprising began. Demosthenes allegedly received three hundred talents from Persia to stir up trouble in Hellas (Aesch.III.239; Din.I.10; Plut.*Dem.*20.5). He succeeded. Athens and Thebes revolted. In Thebes the insurgents persuaded the people to replace Philip's oligarchy with a democracy (Arr.*Anab.*I.7.1–3).⁷²⁸ Demosthenes provided funds to the Thebans to arm themselves (Diod.XVII.8.5). The Thebans besieged the Macedonian garrison. The Athenians voted to man the fleet and send troops to Thebes. The Arcadians sent troops to the isthmus to aid Thebes. The arrival of a Theban embassy failed to entice the Arcadians to march to Thebes, despite an attempt to bribe the Arcadian general. Claiming that they were obligated to serve Alexander, the Arcadians eventually returned home (Din.I.19–21). The Eleians expelled pro-Macedonian sympathizers. The Aetolians revolted. While in Illyria, Alexander was informed by Antipater of the Hellenic uprising.

After a forced march, Alexander arrived before Thebes within two weeks. Having summoned Antipater, the Macedonians had a strong force outside the walls of Thebes. For three days, Alexander gave the Thebans an opportunity to surrender. They refused. On the fourth day the Macedonians attacked and captured the city the same day. The assault was a desperate struggle with the Macedonians incurring five hundred dead (Diod.XVII.14.1). No mercy was shown the Thebans, especially by the Phocians, Thespians, and Plataeans (Arr.*Anab.*I.8.1–8). The city was sacked, six thousand Thebans killed, and thirty thousand captured. Alexander let the allies in the League of Corinth

determine Thebes' punishment. They voted for *andrapodismos*. Thebes would be completely destroyed and all inhabitants enslaved (Diod.XVII.14.3; Arr.*Anab.*I.9.9–10).⁷²⁹ The enslavement of the population generated 440 talents for Alexander's treasury (Diod.XVII.14.4). A few Thebans escaped and were granted refuge in Athens. The city was razed except for the temples and the house of Pindar. The Cadmea was garrisoned by the allies. Alexander spared Athens but demanded the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders, which included Demosthenes and Lycurgus. After a debate in the Assembly, the Athenians refused the demands. The Athenians offered to try the accused in Athenian courts. A second embassy from Athens persuaded Alexander to rescind his demands. Only the Athenian general Charidemus was exiled.⁷³⁰ Why Alexander accepted this lenient punishment of Athens is a mystery. A reasonable explanation is that he wanted a quick end to the rebellion to begin preparations for his attack on Persia. To avoid retaliation, the Arcadians executed their leaders who urged their revolt. The Eleans recalled the exiles. The Aetolians made peace. The shock of Thebes' destruction coerced all opposition. With order restored, the League of Corinth agreed to provide troops to the campaign against Persia (Arr.*Anab.*I.7.4–9; Plut.*Alex.*11.6–12; *Phoc.*17.2; Diod.XVII.8.3–15.5). By the fall of 335 Alexander returned to Macedonia.

Now firmly in power, Alexander prepared for the Persian campaign. In the spring of 334 he would lead Philip's military machine against Persia. At his death eleven years later, he was no longer Alexander III, son of Philip II, but Alexander the Great, the son of Zeus Ammon! From mortal to immortal, Alexander exceeded Philip's achievements.⁷³¹ The Greek world would be expanded into the heart of Asia. Eventually Alexander's empire was divided by his generals into multiple warring Hellenistic kingdoms. However, that is a story for another day.

Philip II and the Macedonians

Suddenly in 336 the old warhorse of the north was dead. The young stallion was proclaimed king as Alexander III. Philip II reigned for twenty-three years. The son would reign for thirteen. These two rulers brought power, prosperity, and fame to the Macedonians that would never be achieved again.

In 359 Philip II was an unproven young man elected as king by the Macedones. He took over a broken kingdom that was reduced to territory around the Thermaic Gulf. His brother King Perdiccas III was dead. The army severely defeated. The kingdom was in disarray. Enemies were just outside the borders. Pretenders threatened his

crown. The odds of survival were low. However, survive he did.

Through intelligence, charisma, organizational ability, diplomacy, and military skill, Philip rallied the Macedonians. He rebuilt the army. He defeated the Illyrians, Paeonians, Thracians, and Hellenes on his borders. He reunited Upper and Lower Macedonia. He secured the kingdom from internal and external foes. Through his multiple marriages, he solidified political relations with his opponents. Through the expansion of his Companions, he united the various factions within the kingdom. Through military success and territorial expansion, he rewarded these Companions with grants of land, which increased their wealth and loyalty. With the expansion of the army, Philip also proclaimed more citizens as Macedones. Consequently, as all classes prospered, their loyalty grew. As the Macedonians became the center of his universe, he became the center of the Macedonians' universe. King and people were integrated to a degree never achieved by his predecessors.⁷³²

The people were rewarded through his internal development. New economic opportunities arose for the average Macedonian when new land was open through conquest or reclamation projects. Farms were added. Mines were added. Timber lands made more accessible. New cities were founded through colonization or transplantation of populations. Roads built for military use now facilitated the transportation and exchange of goods. They also improved communication between cities and the hinterland. Consequently, agricultural, industrial, and trade expansion increased the prosperity of the kingdom and its people.

Through multiple steps in succession, Philip secured the western border with Illyria, the southern border with Hellas, the eastern border with the Greeks and Thracians, and finally the northern border with the various tribes up to the Danube River. Through war, diplomacy, and economic development, Philip became master of the southern Balkans. In 336 his kingdom stretched from the Adriatic to the Aegean Sea and from the Danube River to the border with Thessaly. Epirus was a subject kingdom controlled by Olympias's brother Alexander. The *poleis* and tribes of Hellas, in principle allies, were vassals in practice. Most Greek *poleis* of the mainland were members of the League of Corinth. Only Sparta remained aloof. By the fall of 336 his general Parmenio had already captured many cities as far as Ephesus in Asia Minor in preparation for the campaign against Persia.

On the domestic front, Philip had seven marriages. Outside of their names, little is known about them except for Olympias and Cleopatra. We know little about his private life. Olympias, the mother of Alexander and Cleopatra, remained his queen from 357 until his death. We are informed that their relationship was stormy. Whether love

existed is unknown. We are told that only his final marriage to Cleopatra was a marriage for love. If true, his quest for love brought about the destruction of his relationship with Olympias and Alexander. Whether justified or not, Alexander, as crown prince, was fearful that he would not be the successor. Prior to the last year of his life, we know few details of Philip's relationship with Alexander. However, it appears doubtful that Philip ever seriously thought of designating another as heir apparent.⁷³³

As king and military commander, Philip, like most successful leaders, understood that war, diplomacy, and politics are intertwined. He used all his tools to secure the kingdom. Either Philip was an excellent general or he accepted excellent advice from his Companions. Excluding his defeats by Onomarchus, he rarely lost a battle. He led by example. He was fearless in battle. He suffered multiple wounds through the years including the loss of an eye.⁷³⁴ This example was passed to his son. Based on the extraordinary commanders who served Alexander, he was an excellent judge of character. At his death, Philip could not have been a handsome man. He must have suffered some infirmities from his arduous life. In his mid-forties at his death, by modern standards he was in the prime of life. By ancient standards, he might have been considered an old man. We have no clue about the state of his health. However, it would be surprising if he had no health problems. Health aside, we cannot but wonder what he would have accomplished had he lived longer. But this is a futile exercise. When he died, the twenty-year-old Alexander succeeded. He inherited all the titles accumulated by Philip II. Moral judgment aside for the loss of life in their wars, the accomplishments of Philip II and Alexander III may allow them to be claimed the greatest father/son duo in history.

As King of Macedonia, archon of the Thessalian League, hegemon of the Amphictyonic League, hegemon of the League of Corinth, master of the Balkans, and successful military commander, Alexander was prepared to embark on his crowning achievement. Within two years after Philip's death, the Persian campaign began. Alexander had a date with Darius III. The Hellenic wars with Persia that began with Darius I would end with Darius III. However, it would be a son of Macedonia rather than a son of Hellas that would complete the task! So ends our story.

Conclusion

Two kings, Darius I and Philip II are the bookends for our story of the classical *poleis*. In between, we have witnessed tyranny, oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy in the Hellenic world. From the Pillars of Heracles (Spain) to the Euxine (Black) Sea (Russia and Turkey), the Greek *poleis* existed throughout the Mediterranean basin. The origins of the *polis* date to the Dark Ages. In the archaic age, the *polis* emerged as a vibrant institution in the political, social, economic, and intellectual development of Hellas. In the fourth century, the philosophers would develop the concept of the ideal *polis*. Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics* are studied in the twenty-first century despite the demise of the *polis* under the Roman Empire.

Mainland Hellas was politically comprised of tribes, *poleis*, and leagues. The fifth and fourth century witnessed the pinnacle of development for the *polis*. Over a thousand *poleis* existed in the classical period. Despite the importance of various *poleis*, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, and Syracuse became the most prominent. When not fighting each other, they defended Hellenic culture against Persia, Carthage, Etruria, and Macedonia. Unfortunately, despite the celebration of Panhellenic festivals, political unity among the Hellenes was an impossible dream. Citizenship of Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Corinth, Syracuse, Miletus, etc., always trumped citizenship of Hellas!

War, peace, revolution, diplomacy, intrigue, prosperity, Panhellenism, individualism, hegemony, and subjection, were experienced by the Hellenes of the fifth and fourth centuries BC. The Hellenes idolized freedom (*eleutheria*), autonomy (*autonomia*), and harmony (*eunomia*). They often got internal discord (*stasis*), subjection, and slavery. Economic prosperity increased with population growth; the expansion of agriculture, industry, and trade; the development of natural resources such as mines; new roads; the policing of sea-lanes; etc. Unfortunately, there were often setbacks from war and natural disasters. For commercial centers with large populations, like Athens and Corinth, their citizens faced starvation if the grain fleets did not arrive on time. Piracy and brigandage at sea or on land hampered trade and enslaved individuals. Merchant ships were vulnerable to piracy and the bad weather. Trade was curtailed in the winter because of natural hazards at sea and poor roads on land.

We have witnessed movers and shakers in the form of kings, politicians, generals, thinkers, writers, orators, traders, and athletes. From Darius I to Philip II, kings impacted the Hellenic world. The Greeks successfully withstood the challenge of Darius I and Xerxes

but succumbed to Philip II. From Athens, we encountered men such as Cleisthenes, Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Aeschylus, Cimon, Pericles, Cleon, Alcibiades, Socrates, Iphicrates, Plato, Isocrates, and Demosthenes. Sparta provided Cleomenes I, Leonidas, Pausanias, Archidamus II, Brasidas, Agis II, Lysander, and Agesilaus II. Thebes provided Pindar, Ismenias, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, and Pammenes. From Syracuse came Gelon, Hermocrates, Dionysius I, and Dion. Corinth had Timoleon. Aristotle came from Stagira. Herodotus arrived from Halicarnassus. Prominent men, too numerous to mention, derived from the *poleis* throughout the Mediterranean basin. Although we cannot tell their story, all Greeks, men, women, and children contributed to the history of the classical period. By the end of the classical period in 323 BC, Greek culture spread from Spain to India.

Although the independence of the *polis* ended in the Hellenistic period, the *polis* remained a viable self-governing institution in local affairs into the Roman Empire. Alexander and his successors introduced the *polis* into Asia as they founded new cities to consolidate their empires. Whether garrison towns or centers for economic development, these *poleis* grew into major metropolitan cities. The independent and autonomous *polis* (city-state) of the classical period evolved into the subject *polis* (city) of the Hellenistic and Roman periods. In their heyday, what a story they tell.

Glossary

These definitions are general points for reference. The terminology and meaning can vary among the *poleis* of Hellas. For detailed information of these terms, see *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

Andrapodismos. The term refers to the physical destruction of a city, killing of the male citizens, and the enslavement of the balance of the population.

Agora. An area, usually centrally located with the urban center, where people gathered to discuss political issues. Eventually it evolved into a marketplace for the exchange of goods and services.

Agôgê. The term refers to the Spartan educational system.

Apoikoi. Colonists sent out to establish an independent polis. They surrendered citizenship in their native polis.

Aristocracy (Aristocratia). The term means the rule of the few (nobility) based on birth criterion. An aristocracy was composed of magistrates and a council with membership limited to a defined social/economic status.

Archon (Archontes). He was a civilian official of the polis who had administrative, judicial, and religious functions. Prior to the fifth century, the eponymous archon was the chief magistrate of Athens.

Arête. The term means excellence physically, morally, intellectually, and spiritually.

Autonomia (Autonomy). The term means political independence of a polis to conduct internal affairs without interference by another state.

Basileus. The term means king, which was usually hereditary. In the classical period, only Sparta and some remote tribal areas of Hellas maintained kings.

Boeotarch. He was a chief magistrate of the Boeotian League. There were eleven Boeotarchs representing the membership of the Boeotian League.

Boule (Council). It was a deliberative and legislative body to conduct affairs of state on a daily basis. Membership and responsibilities varied contingent on the constitution of the polis.

Cleruchy (Clearchia). A settlement on foreign territory that was not an independent polis. The citizens remained citizens of their native polis. The term primarily refers to Athenian settlers.

Choregos. The term means the leader of a chorus. The person recruited, trained, and organizes the chorus for a play that was

performed in competition at a community festival.

Deme. The term means a local territorial area within the *polis*. In Attica, a citizen was identified with the deme he was assigned to.

Democracy (*Demokratia*). The term means the direct rule of the people (*demos*). Officials were elected by all the citizens in an assembly.

Dike. The term means justice.

Diokismos (*Dioecism*). The term means the physical dismantling of the *polis* into smaller political units such as a village.

Ecclesia (*Assembly*). The term means an assembly of all the male citizens of the *polis*, which had final decision making ability. Responsibilities varied with the constitution.

Eisphora. The term means an irregular tax levied on a section of the citizens (usually the wealthy) for a specific purpose (usually war).

Eleutheria. The term means freedom/independence of a *polis* to conduct external affairs without interference from another *polis*. The term can apply to an individual.

Emporion. The term means a designated marketplace (commercial harbor) for the exchange of goods and services.

Ephor (*Ephorate*). The term means overseer. The five ephors in Sparta were the chief magistrates of the *polis*. They supervised the behavior of the kings. They handled administrative and judicial functions. In conjunction with the *Gerousia* they set state policy in the classical period.

Epimachia (*Epimachy*). The term means a defensive alliance.

Eunomia. The term means social order or harmony and is usually assigned to the goals of an oligarchy.

Gerousia. The term means the Council of Elders in Sparta. It was comprised of the two kings and twenty-eight men, who were over the age of sixty and elected for life. It set state policy in conjunction with the Ephors.

Hegemon. The term means leader and refers to the dominant power in a political/military alliance.

Hegemonia (*Hegemony*). The term means a political/military alliance of member states subordinate to the leadership of the acknowledged hegemon.

Heilōtai (*Helots*). The term means captives or serfs. A helot was a native who resided in Laconia or Messenia. A helot had no political privileges, and tilled the soil for the Spartan masters.

Homoioi. The term means similar/peer among Spartiates. It is sometimes translated as equal.

Isopoliteia (Isopolity). The term means the merger of two *poleis* into one with equal privileges for citizens from both *poleis*.

Koine Eirene. The term means "common peace." The term was used in the fourth century that refers to a general peace agreement among multiple Greek states.

Lacedaemonian. The term means the Spartiates and perioeci inhabitants of Laconia.

Leitourgia (Liturgy). The term means a public benefaction. Wealthy citizens were expected to benefit the *polis* by financing some public undertaking at their own expense.

Medism. The term refers to the act of submission to Persia. The Persians demanded that earth and water be provided as a symbol of submission.

Metic (Metikoi). The term means a resident alien. He was noncitizen with certain legal protections. He was subject to taxation and military obligations. He could not own land, participate in the political process, or marry a native of the *polis* he resided in.

Monarchia (Monarchy). The term means hereditary oneman rule.

Neodamodeis. He was a liberated helot. A helot could earn freedom after serving in the Spartan army.

Nomos. The term means a traditional or fundamental order of the state.

Oikos. The term means the household, which includes family, slaves, house, and property (land).

Oligarchy (Oligarchia). The term means the rule of the few based on specified wealth criterion. An oligarchy was composed of magistrates, an assembly, and a council with membership limited to a defined social/economic status.

Perioeci (Perioikoi). The word means dwellers around. They were free residents of Laconia but had limited political privileges. They had military obligations to serve in the Spartan army.

Phoros. The term means tribute. In the first Athenian Empire, the member states were assigned a mandatory contribution in money or material resources to support the alliance.

Polemarch. The term means the chief military commander. He was one of the nine archons in Athens. In the fifth century, his military function was replaced by the office of *strategos*.

Polis. The term means a Hellenic city-state. It had defined territory with an urban center for administration, defense, and religious unity. It had a homogeneous population with a defined citizenship and political constitution. The urban center was often walled and provided a market-place for the *polis*.

Politeia (Constitution). The term means individual citizenship and the constitution of the state. The type of *politeia* was determined by the size of the citizenship body.

Politês (Citizen). An adult male who was enfranchised to participate in the government and the judicial system of the *polis*.

Psephisma. It is a decree of the Athenian Assembly.

Spartiatæi (Spartiate). They were the male citizens of Sparta with full citizenship.

Stasis. The term means political/social strife or civil war within the *polis*. Stasis also refers to a social group intent on overthrowing the constitution by forceful means.

Strategos (General). The term means a military commander. However, in the Athens during the fifth century, the position had political responsibilities. It became the chief magistracy by the time of Pericles. There were ten *strategoi* annually elected. In the fourth century it was strictly a military role.

Symmachia (Symmachy). The term means an offensive/defensive alliance. The ally had the same friends and enemies as the hegemon.

Sympoliteia (Sympolity). The term means joint citizenship between two separate *poleis*.

Synoikismos (Synoecism). The merger of villages or groups of people into a political union that met occasionally to settle political issues. Often the people formed a *polis* with a designated urban center.

Syntaxeis. The term means contribution. In the Second Athenian Confederacy, the member states were assigned a voluntary contribution in money or material resources to support the alliance.

Tyranny (Tyrannis). The term means one-man rule and similar to monarchy. A tyrant could come to power through constitutional methods or usurp power by military force. In the classical period, it had a negative connotation implying the loss of freedom and autonomy for the citizens. Most tyrants usurped and retained power by military force.

Talent. It is a unit of measure based on weight. Contingent on the standard adopted, a talent weighed 25.86 kg (57 lbs) in the Attic and 37.80 kg (83.3 lbs) in the Aeginetan standard. In coinage, a talent was equal to sixty minae or six thousand drachma.

Chronology

- 522 – Darius I became the Great King of Persia.
- 521 – Cleomenes I became king of Sparta.
- 510 – Sparta and the Alcmaeonidae expelled the tyrant Hippias from Athens.
- 508 – Isagoras, as archon of Athens, expelled Cleisthenes and seven hundred families from Athens.
- 507 – Cleisthenes implemented his reforms.
- 506 – Cleomenes's attack on Athens failed. The Athenians defeated Boeotia and Chalcis.
- 505 – Establishment of the Peloponnesian League was completed.
- 499 – The Ionian Revolt began.
- 498 – The Ionians burned Sardis.
- 494 – Ionians defeated in the naval battle of Lade. Sparta defeated Argos at Sepea.
- 493 – Ionian Revolt ended.
- 491 – King Cleomenes I of Sparta died.
- 490 – The Athenians and Plataeans defeated the Persians at Marathon.
- 483 – Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to use the extra revenue from the Laurium mines to expand the fleet.
- 481 – The Hellenic League formed against Xerxes.
- 480 – The Greeks are defeated at Thermopylae and Artemisium. Athens is burned. The Greeks emerged victorious in the naval battle at Salamis. In Sicily, the Greeks were victorious at Himera over the Carthaginians.
- 479 – The Greeks were victorious at Plataea. The Greeks were victorious at Mycale.
- 478/477 – The Delian League was formed under the leadership of Athens. Gelon of Syracuse died and succeeded by Hieron.
- 476/475 – Cimon campaigned in Thrace.
- 471 – Themistocles was ostracized from Athens.
- 469–466 – The Athenians were victorious over Persia at the Eurymedon River.
- 466 – The Spartan Pausanias died, and Themistocles fled to Persia.
- 465 – Thasos revolted from the Delian League. Xerxes assassinated. Artaxerxes I succeeded him.
- 465/464 – The great earthquake at Sparta and the Helot Revolt began.

463 – The revolt at Thasos suppressed. Democracy established in Syracuse.

462 – The Spartans dismissed Cimon and the Athenians from Messenia.

461 – Cimon ostracized. Ephialtes reformed the Areopagus. Ephialtes was assassinated.

460/459 – The First Peloponnesian War began. Athens assisted Egypt in its rebellion from Persia.

458 – The Spartans defeated the Athenians at Tanagra. The Athenians defeated the Boeotians at Oenophyta.

457? – The Athenians introduced pay for jurors.

456 – The Messenian helots surrendered at Mount Ithome, which ended the Messenian Revolt.

454 – Athens removed the Delian League treasury from Delos to Athens. Athenian expedition destroyed in Egypt.

451 – Five-Year Truce between Athens and Sparta began. Thirty Years Peace between Sparta and Argos completed. Pericles's citizenship law enacted in Athens. Cimon returned from exile.

450 – The death of Cimon and the Athenians were victorious over the Persians in Cyprus.

449? – Peace of Callias between Athens and Persia was alleged.

447 – Pericles building program in Athens began with the construction of the Parthenon.

446 – The Boeotians defeated the Athenians at Coronea. The Boeotian League formed.

446/445 – The Thirty Years Peace began between Sparta and Athens.

443? – Thucydides, son of Melesias, ostracized from Athens.

441/440 – Revolt of Samos began.

439 – Pericles suppressed the Samian revolt.

437/436 – Athens colonized Amphipolis in Thrace.

435–433 – The Corcyraean crisis caused the hostility between Corinth and Athens.

432 – The revolt of Potidaea began.

431 – The Peloponnesian War began. King Archidamus of Sparta invaded Attica.

430 – Plague struck Athens.

429 – The revolt of Potidaea ended. Pericles died from the plague.

427 – King Archidamus II died and the accession of Agis II in Sparta.

425 – The Athenian victory at Sphacteria forced Sparta to sue for

peace but was rejected.

424 – The Boeotians defeated the Athenians at Delium. Brasidas captured Amphipolis in Thrace. Artaxerxes I died and was succeeded by Darius II. Peace among the Sicilian Greeks ended Athens' interference in Sicily.

423 – One-year truce began between Athens and Sparta.

422 – War is renewed. The deaths of Cleon and Brasidas at Amphipolis forced both sides to sue for peace.

421 – The Peace of Nicias ended the first phase of the Peloponnesian War. Athens and Sparta agreed to a fifty-year alliance.

418 – Sparta defeated the anti-Spartan coalition at Mantinea.

415 – Athens launched the Sicilian expedition. Alcibiades fled to Sparta after his arrest by the Athenians.

413 – Athens' Sicilian expedition ended in disaster. The Peloponnesian War was renewed when Sparta occupied the fort at Decelea in Attica.

412 – Multiple revolts occurred within the Athenian Empire. Sparta allied with Persia.

411 – The Revolution of the Four Hundred in Athens began. Democracy abolished. Athenians at Samos maintained the democracy. Athenian naval victories over Sparta at Cynossema and Abydos were achieved.

410 – Spartan fleet destroyed in the battle of Cyzicus. Democracy restored at Athens.

409 – Carthage invaded Sicily and captured Selinus and Himera.

408 – Athens recovered Byzantium for the empire.

407 – Lysander appointed navarch of the Spartan fleet. Lysander established friendship with Cyrus the Younger of Persia.

406 – Lysander defeated the Athenian fleet at Notium. Alcibiades retired to Thrace. Spartans were defeated at Arginusae.

405 – Lysander captured the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami. Dionysius I became tyrant of Syracuse and ended the war with Carthage. Darius II died and was succeeded by Artaxerxes II in the winter of 405/404.

404 – Athens surrendered and ended the Peloponnesian War. The Thirty eliminated the democracy in Athens.

403 – The rule of the Thirty ended. King Pausanias ended the civil war in Athens. Democracy was restored.

401 – Oligarchic rule in Eleusis ended. Sparta was at war with Elis. Cyrus the Younger killed at Cunaxa.

400 – Sparta was at war with Tissaphernes of Persia. Agis II died and succeeded by Agesilaus II in Sparta.

- 399 – Thibron campaigned in Asia Minor against Persia.
- 399 – Dercyllidas replaced Thibron and conducted the war for the next two years.
- 397 – Conon appointed to command the Persian fleet. Dionysius I declared war on Carthage.
- 396 – Persia sponsored the mission of Timocrates to Hellas to create an anti-Spartan coalition. Agesilaus sent to Asia to lead the war against Persia. Carthage attacked Syracuse.
- 395 – The Corinthian War began. Lysander was killed in the battle of Haliartus. Agesilaus recalled to Sparta during the winter of 395/394. King Pausanias exiled from Sparta and succeeded by Agesipolis.
- 394 – The Persian fleet, under the command of Conon, defeated the Spartan fleet at Cnidus. Sparta defeated the allies at Nemea and Coronea.
- 393 – Conon arrived at Athens with the Persian fleet. Athens rebuilt the long walls.
- 392 – The political union of Corinth and Argos began. Peace negotiations failed between Antalcidas of Sparta and Tiribazus of Persia. Syracuse and Carthage agreed to peace.
- 391 – Sparta invaded Argos and recaptured the port of Lechaem. Thibron campaigned against Persia. Dionysius I invaded Italy.
- 390 – Iphicrates defeated a Spartan *mora*. Thrasybulus campaigned in the Hellespont and Thrace.
- 389 – Fighting began on Aegina between Peloponnesians and Athenians.
- 388 – Antalcidas appointed as navarch of the Spartan fleet. Antalcidas negotiated with Artaxerxes II for peace. Rhegium besieged.
- 387/386 – The Peace of Antalcidas (King's Peace) ended the Corinthian War. The Boeotian League disbanded.
- 385 – Sparta forced the Mantineans to break up the *polis* into smaller villages. War began between Carthage and Syracuse.
- 382 – Sparta seized the Cadmea in Thebes.
- 381 – King Agesipolis died at Olynthus. Cleombrotus succeeded him as king in Sparta.
- 379 – Olynthus surrendered to Sparta.
- 378 – Thebes was liberated from Spartan control. Syracuse and Carthage agreed to peace. Raid of Sphodrias failed.
- 378/377 – The Second Athenian League formed against Sparta.
- 376 – Athens defeated Sparta in the naval battle of Naxos.
- 375 – Thebes defeated Sparta at Tegira.

373 – Thebes recovers Thespieae and Tanagra for the Boeotian League. Thebes destroyed Plataea.

371 –Sparta was defeated at Leuctra by the Boeotians under Theban leadership

370/369 – The Arcadian League was formed. Mantinea was reestablished. Jason, the tyrant of Pherae, was assassinated. Arcadia, Argos, and Elis allied with Thebes. Thebes invaded Peloponnese twice. Helots of Messenia and Laconia were liberated. Messene founded as a *polis*. Athens allied with Sparta. Pelopidas intervened in Thessaly and Macedonia.

368 – Pelopidas intervened again in Thessaly and allied with Alexander II of Macedonia. Philip II became a hostage at Thebes. Sparta defeated Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia at the “Tearless Battle.” Megalopolis founded in Arcadia. Pelopidas imprisoned in Pherae.

367 – Thebes attacked Pherae. Pelopidas liberated. Pelopidas went to Susa to gain Persian support for a common peace. Dionysius I died in Syracuse and was succeeded by Dionysius II.

366 – A common peace is rejected. Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese. Athens sent Timotheus to aid Ariobarzanes in the Satrap’s revolt.

365 – Thebes made peace with Corinth, which ended the Peloponnesian League.

364 – Epaminondas led a naval expedition into the Aegean. Pelopidas died in Thessaly.

362 – Epaminondas died at the battle of Mantinea. Theban hegemony ended.

361 – Thebans defended Megalopolis.

360/359 – Agesilaus died in Egypt. Perdiccas III of Macedonia defeated and killed by the Illyrians. Philip II became king of Macedonia.

359/358 – Artaxerxes II died and succeeded by Artaxerxes III. Philip defeated Illyrians. He unified Upper and Lower Macedonia.

357 – Philip captured Amphipolis and began the war with Athens. The Social War began between Athens and the allies. Dion returned to Syracuse to overthrow Dionysius II.

356 – The satrap Artabazus revolted from Persia. Athens allied with Thracian kings against Philip II. Alexander III (the Great) was born. Philip captured Pydna and Potidaea. Athens defeated in the naval battle of Embata.

355 – Athens defeated in the Social War. The Third Sacred War began against Phocis. Syracuse was liberated from Dionysius II.

354 – Philip captured Methone. Phocians defeated in the battle of Neon. Dion assassinated in Syracuse. Callippus became tyrant of

Syracuse.

353 – Philip campaigned in Thrace. Philip defeated by Onomarchus in the Sacred War.

352 – Philip defeated the Phocians in the battle of the Crocus Field. Philip was elected archon of the Thessalian League. Hipparinus became tyrant of Syracuse.

351 – Philip campaigned in Thrace. Nysaeus became tyrant of Syracuse.

349 – Philip attacked the Chalcidian League. Athens aided Olynthus.

348 – Philip controlled the Chalcidice after the capture and destruction of Olynthus. Euboea revolted from Athens.

347 – Phalaecus removed from command of the Phocian troops. Athens and Cersobleptes established forts in Thrace.

346 – Peace of Philocrates agreed to between Athens and Philip II. Dionysius II returned as tyrant of Syracuse. Phocis surrendered to end the Third Sacred War. Macedonia received two votes on the Amphictyonic Council with the expulsion of Phocis.

345 – Philip campaigned in Illyria. He began the relocation and resettlement of populations within the expanded Macedonian kingdom. Syracuse appealed to Corinth for support against Dionysius II.

344 – Philip suppressed a revolt in Thessaly. Timoleon sailed for Syracuse. Dionysius II capitulated to Timoleon. Philip sent the embassy of Python to Athens. Sparta was at war with Argos and Messene.

343 – Philip offered to amend the peace with Athens. Carthaginians checked in Sicily. Timoleon established a democracy in Syracuse.

342 – Philip replaced Arybbas with Alexander as king of Epirus and campaigned in western Greece. Corinth and Athens supported the western Greeks in opposition. Timoleon attacked Punic Sicily. Philip began an extensive campaign in eastern Thrace. Athenian fleet raided Macedonia and Thrace.

341 – Philip campaigned in Thrace and defended Cardia. Athens allied with Euboean Chalcis. Timoleon defeated Carthaginians at the Crimisus River.

340 – Philip besieged Perinthus and Byzantium. Philip captured the grain fleet in the fall. Athens declared war.

339 – Philip abandoned the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium. Philip defeated the Scythians and returned home after his escape from the Triballians. Philip marched south as hegemon of the Amphictyonic League in the Fourth Sacred War.

338 – Athens and Thebes are defeated at Chaeronea. Philip established a general peace through multiple bilateral agreements.

Peace agreed to between Syracuse and Carthage. Artaxerxes III was assassinated. Artaxerxes IV became king.

338–337 – A common peace was established with the formation of the League of Corinth. Philip was appointed hegemon to lead the Greeks against Persia. Feud began between Philip, Olympias, and Alexander over the succession after Philip's marriage to Cleopatra. Timoleon died in Syracuse.

336 – Macedonian expeditionary force sent to Asia under Parmenio. Philip II is assassinated. Alexander III became King of Macedonia. Artaxerxes IV is assassinated. Darius III became the king of Persia

335 – Alexander suppressed the Greek revolt. Thebes destroyed. Athens punished. Alexander confirmed as hegemon of the League of Corinth.

334 – Alexander launched the conquest of the Persian Empire.

Bibliography

- Adcock, F.E. 1957. *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Aeschines. 1968. *The Speeches of Aeschines; The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by C. D. Adams. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Aeschylus. 1961. *Prometheus Bound, The Suppliants, Seven Against Thebes, The Persians*. Translated by Phillip Vellacott. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- . 1973. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by H. Weir Smyth. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Anderson, J.K. 1970. *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Andreau, Jean. 2002. "Twenty Years after Moses I. Finley's The Ancient Economy." In *The Ancient Economy*, edited by Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Redden, translated by Antonia Nevill, 33-49. New York: Routledge.
- Andrewes, A. 1959. "Thucydides On The Causes Of The War." *Classical Quarterly* 9: 223-239.
- Antiphon, Andocides. 1968. *Minor Attic Orators - The Loeb Classical Libray*. Translated by K.J. Maidment. Cambridge: Harvard university Press.
- Aristophanes. 1967. *The Acharnians, The Clouds, The Knights, The Wasps - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by Benjamin Bickley Rogers. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1972. *The Lysistrata, The Thesmophoriazusae, The Ecclesiazusae, The Plutus - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by Benjamin Bickley Rogers. Vol. 3. 3 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1968. *The Peace, The Birds, The Frogs - The Loeb Calassical Library*. Translated by Benjamin Bickley Rogers. Vol. 2. 3 vols. Cambridge: Harvard unuversity Press.
- Aristotle. 1977. *Politics - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by H. Rackham. Vol. 21. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1962. *The Politics*. Translated by T. A. Sinclair. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Arrian. 1976. *Anabasis of Alexander - The Loeb Classical Library*. Rev. Translated by P.A. Brunt. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- . 1971. *The Campaigns of Alexander*. Rev. by J.R. Hamilton. Translated by Audrey De Selincourt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Inc.
- Badian, E. 1987. "The Peace of Callias." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 107: 1-39.
- Badian, Ernst. 2014. "Greeks and Macedonians." In *Collected Papers On Alexander The Great*, by Ernst Badian, 282-310. New York: Routledge.
- Badian, Ernst. 2014. "The Death Of Philip II." In *Collected Papers On Alexander The Great*, by Ernst Badian, 106-112. New York: Routledge.
- Beaumont, R.L. 1936. "Greek Influence in the Adriatic Sea Before the Fourth Century B.C." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 56: 159-204.
- Bernard, Suzanne. 2001. http://plato-dialogues.org/tools/gk_wrlld.htm. December 23.
- Boardman, John, and N.G.L. Hammond, . 1982. *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Expansion of the Greek World Eighth to Sixth Centuries B.C.* 2nd. Vol. III Part 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boardman, John, I.E.S. Edwards, N.G.L. Hammond, and E. Sollberger, . 1991. *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Assyrian and Babylonian Empires and other States of the Near East, from the Eighth Centuries B.C. Vol. 3 Parts 2* 2nd ed. 2nd. Vol. III Part 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boardman, John, N.G.L. Hammond, D.M. Lewis, and M. Ostwald, . 1988. *The Cambridge Ancient History: Persia, Greece, and the Western Mediterranean 525-479 B.C.* 2nd. Vol. IV. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bonner, Robert J. 1910. "The Boeotian Federal Constitution." *Classical Philology* 5: 405-417.
- Bosworth, A.B. 1988. *Conquest And Empire: The reign of Alexander the Great*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Botsford, G.W. 1910. "The Constitution and Politics of the Boeotian League from Its Origin to the Year 387 B.C." *Political Science Quarterly* 25: 271-296.
- Bruce, I.A.F. 1960. "Internal Politics and the Outbreak of the Corinthian War." *Emerita* 28: 75-86.
- Brunt, P.A. 1969. "Euboea In The Time Of Philip II." *Classical Quarterly* 19: 245-265.
- Brunt, P.A. 1953. "The Hellenic League Against Persia." *Historia* 2: 135-163.
- Buckler, J. 1982. "Alliance and hegemony in fourth-century Greece: the case of the Theban Hegemony." *Ancient World* 5: 79-89.
- Burn, A.R. 1962. *Persia and the Greeks: The Defense of the West*

546-478 B.C. New York: Minerva Press.

- Bury, J.B., S.A. Cook, and F.E. Adcock, . 1935. *The Cambridge Ancient History: Athens 478-401 B.C.* Vol. V. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cartledge, Paul. 2013. *After Thermopylae: The Oath Of Platea And The End Of The Graeco-Persian Wars.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cartledge, Paul. 2013. "Hoplitai/Politai: Refighting Ancient Battles." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 74-84. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Cartledge, Paul. 1977. "Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 97: 11-27.
- Cartledge, Paul. 2002. "The Economy (Economies) of Ancient Greece." In *The Ancient Economy*, edited by Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Redden, 11-32. New York: Routledge.
- . 2004. *The Spartans.* New York: Vintage Books.
- . 2006. *Thermopylae: The Battle that Changed the World.* New York: The Overlook Press.
- Cawkwell, G.L. 1963. "Demosthenes' Policy After The Peace Of Philocrates. I." *Classical Quarterly* 13: 120-138 (Part I) & 200-213 (Part II).
- Cawkwell, G.L. 1963. "Eubulus." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 83: 47-67.
- Chroust, Anton-Hermann. 1972. "Aristotle and the Foreign Policy of Macedonia." *The Review of Politics* 34: 367-394.
- Cook, J.M. 1983. *The Persian Empire.* New York: Schocken Books.
- Davies, John K. 2007. "Classical Greece: Production." In *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*, edited by Walter Scheidel and Ian, Saller, Richard Morris, 333-361. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1993. *Democracy and Classical Greece.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- De Ste Croix, G.E.M. 1961. "Jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire." *Classical Quarterly* 11: 94-112 and 268-280.
- De Ste Croix, G.E.M. 1963. "The Alleged Secret Pact Between Athens And Philip II." *Classical Quarterly* 13: 110-119.
- De Ste. Croix, G.E.M. 1972. *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Delbrück, Hans. 1975. *History of the Art of War: Within the Framework of Political History.* Translated by Walter J. Renfro Jr. Vol. I. Westport: Greenwood Press.
- Demosthenes. 1970. *Olynthiacs, Philippics, Minor Public Orations - The Loeb Classical library.* Translated by J. H. Vince. Vol. 1.

- Cambridge: Harvard university Press.
- . 1936. *Orations - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by A.T. Murray. Vol. IV. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
 - . 1939. *Orations - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by C.A., Vince, J.H. Vince. Vol. II. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
 - Ehrenberg, Victor. 1973. *From Solon to Socrates: Greek History and Civilization during the Sixth and Fifth Centuries B.C.* 2nd. London: Methuen & Co. LTD.
 - . 1974. *Man, State, and Deity: Essays in Ancient History*. London: Mehtuen & Co. LTD.
 - Ehrenberg, Victor. 1948. "The Foundation of Thurii." *American Journal of Philology* 69: 149-170.
 - . 1964. *The Greek State*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc.
 - Ellis, J.R. 1976. *Phillip II and Macedonian Imperialism*. London: Thames and Hudson.
 - Errington, R. Malcolm. 1990. *A History of Macedonia*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
 - Euripides. 1966. *Iphigenia At Aulis, Rhesus, Hecuba, Daughters Of Troy, Helen - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by A. S. Way. Vol. I. 4 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
 - . 1954. *The Bacchae And Other Plays*. Translated by Philip Vellacott. Penguin Books Ltd.
 - Finley, M.I. 1980. *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*. New York: The Viking Press.
 - . 1973. *The Ancient Economy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
 - Forrest, W.G. 1968. *A History of Sparta 950-192 B.C.* New York: W.W. Norton and Company Inc.
 - . 1966. *The Emergence of Greek Democracy 800-400 BC*. New York: World University Library.
 - Foxhall, Lin. 2013. "Can We See the "Hoplite Revolution" on the Ground? Archaeological Landscapes, Material Culture, and Social Status in Early Greece." In *Men Of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 194-221. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
 - Frier, Bruce W., and Dennis P. Kehoe. 2007. "Law and economic institutions." In *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*, edited by Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard Saller, 113-143. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 - Garnsey, Peter. 1993. *Famine And Food Supply In the Graeco-Roman World: Response To Risk And Crisis*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
 - Grant, Michael. 1997. *The Classical Greeks*. New York: The History Book Club.

- . 1987. *The Rise of the Greeks*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Green, Peter. 1996. *The Greco-Persian Wars*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Griffith, G.T. 1950. "The Union of Corinth and Argos (392-386)." *Historia* 1: 236-256.
- Guthrie, W.K.C. 1950. *The Greeks and Their Gods*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Hale, John R. 2009. *Lords of the Sea: The Epic Story of the Athenian Navy and the Birth of Democracy*. New York: Viking Press.
- Hale, John R. 2013. "Not Patriots, Not Farmers, Not Amateurs: Greek Soldiers of Fortune and the Origins of Hoplite Warfare." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 176-193. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hamilton, C.D. 1970. "Spartan Politics and Policy, 405-401 B.C." *American Journal of Philology* 91: 294-314.
- Hamilton, C.D. 1972. "The Politics of Revolution in Corinth, 396-386 B.C." *Historia* 21: 21-37.
- Hamilton, Charles D. 1979. *Sparta's Bitter Victories*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hammond, N.G.L. 1986. *A History of Greece To 322 B.C.* 3rd. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1980. *Alexander The Great: King, Commander and Statesman*. Park Ridge: Noyes Press.
- Hammond, N.G.L. 1937. "Diodorus' Narrative Of The Sacred War." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 57: 44-78.
- Hammond, N.G.L. 1967. "Origins and Nature of the Athenian Alliance." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 87: 41-61.
- . 1997. *The Genius of Alexander the Great*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Hammond, N.G.L., and F.W. Walbank. 2008. *A History of Macedonia: 336-167 B.C.* Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hammond, N.G.L., and G.T. Griffith. 1979. *A History of Macedonia: 550-336 B.C.* Vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hammond, Nicholas. 1994. *Philip of Macedon*. London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd.
- Hansen, M.H. 1980. "Eisangelia in Athens: a reply." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 100: 89-95.
- Hansen, Mogens Herman. 2006. *Polis: An Introduction to the Ancient Greek City-State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hansen, Mogens Herman, and Thomas Heine Nielsen, . 2004. *An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis: An Investigation Conducted by The Copenhagen Polis Centre for the Danish*

- National Research Foundation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hanson, Victor Davis. 2013. "The Hoplite Narrative." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 256-275. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 1999. *The Other Greeks: The Family Farm and the Agrarian Roots of Western Civilization*. 2nd. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- . 1998. *The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece*. 2nd. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Herm, Gerhard. 1975. *The Phoenicians: The Purple Empire of the Ancient World*. Translated by Caroline Hillier. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.
- Herodotus. 1954. *Histories*. Translated by Aubrey De Selincourt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- . 1969-1975. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by A. D. Godfrey. 4 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Homer. 1976. *Iliad - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by A. T. Murray. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1950. *Iliad*. Translated by E. V. Rieu. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- . 1975. *Odyssey - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by A. T. Murray. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1946. *Odyssey*. Translated by E. V. Rieu. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Hopper, R.J. 1976. *The Early Greeks*. New York: Barnes & Noble.
- Hornblower, Simon, and Antony Spawforth. 1996. *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*. 3rd. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- n.d. <http://explorethemed.com/GrecoPers.asp?c=1>. Accessed July 4, 2016.
2016. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Expansion_of_Macedon. June 19. Accessed October 2016.
2006. <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Olympias.1.JPG>. November 20. Accessed August 2, 2016.
- Isocrates. 1968. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by Larue Van Hook. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1966-1968. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by George Norlin. Vol. 1 & 2. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Justin. 1994. *Justin: Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus*. Translated by J.C. Yardley. Atlanta: Scholars Press.
- Kagan, Donald. 1962. "Argive Politics and Policy after the Peace of Nicias." *Classical Philology* 57: 209-218.
- Kagan, Donald. 1960. "Corinthian Diplomacy after the Peace of Nicias." *American Journal of Philology* 81: 291-310.
- Kagan, Donald. 1962. "Corinthian Politics and the Revolution of 392

B.C." *Historia* 11: 447-457.

- . 1991. *Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- . 1974. *The Archidamian War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Kagan, Donald. 1961. "The Economic Origins Of The Corinthian War (395-387 B.C.)." *La Parola Del Passato* 16: 321-341.
- . 1969. *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War*. Ithaca: Cornell university Press.
- . 2003. *The Peloponnesian War*. New York: Viking Press.
- Kagan, Donald, and Gregory F Viggiano, . 2013. *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kagan, Donald, and Gregory F. Viggiano. 2013. "The Hoplite Debate." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 1-56. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Keegan, John. 1993. *A History of Warfare*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
- Kitto, H.D.F. 1957. *The Greeks*. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Krentz, Peter. 2013. "Hoplite Hell: How Hoplites Fought." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 134-156. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Larsen, J A O. 1940. "The Constitution and Original Purpose of the Delian League." *Harvard Studies* 51, 175-213.
- Larsen, J.A.O. 1968. *Greek Federal State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 1966. *Representative Government in Greek and Roman History*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Larsen, J.A.O. 1955. "The Boeotian Confederacy and Fifth Century Oligarchic Theory." *Transaction of the American Philological Association* 86: 40-50.
- Larsen, J.A.O. 1940. "The Constitution and the Original Purpose of the Delian League." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 51: 175-213.
- Larsen, J.A.O. 1933. "The Constitution of the Peloponnesian League." *Classical Philology* 28: 257-276.
- Larsen, J.A.O. 1934. "The Constitution of the Peloponnesian League." *Classical Philology* 29: 1-19.
- London, J.E. 2005. *Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lewis, D.M., John Boardman, J.K. Davies, and M. Ostwald, . 1992. *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Fifth Century B.C.* 2nd. Vol.

- V. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, D.M., John Boardman, Simon Hornblower, and M. Ostwald, . 1994. *The Cambridge Ancient History: The Fourth Century B.C.* 2nd. Vol. VI. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lycurgus, Dinarchus, Demades, Hyperides. 1962. *Minor Attic Orators - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by J.O. Burt. Vol. 2. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Lysias. 1967. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by W. R. M. Lamb. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Map_athenian_empire_431_BC-fr.svg. 2009. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_athenian_empire_431_BC-en.svg. September 24. Accessed July 5, 2016.
- Markle, M.M. 1974. "The Strategy Of Philip II In 346 B.C." *Classical Quarterly* 24: 253-268.
- Mattingly, H.B. 1961. "Athens And Euboea." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 81: 124-132.
- Mckechnie, P.R., and S.J. Kern. 2015. *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. Translated by P.R. Mckechnie and S.J. Kern. Oxford: Aris and Phillips.
- Mckechnie, P.R., Kern, S.J. 2015. *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. Translated by P.R., Kern, S.J. Mckechnie. Oxford: Aris & Philips.
- Meiggs, Russell. 1964. "A note on the population of Attica." *Classical Review* (14): 2-3.
- . 1975. *The Athenian Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Meiggs, Russell. 1963. "The Crisis of Athenian Imperialism." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 67: 1-36.
- Meiggs, Russell. 1943. "The Growth of Athenian Imperialism." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 63: 21-34.
- Meiggs, Russell, and David Lewis. 1969. *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Meikle, Scott. 2002. "Modernism, Economics and the Ancient Economy." In *The Ancient Economy*, edited by Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Redden, 233-250. New York: Routledge.
- Merrit, B.D. 1943. "The Early Athenian Tribute Lists." *Classical Philology* 38: 223-239.
- Miles, Richard. 2010. *Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization*. New York: Viking Press.
- Miller, Stephen G. 2012. *Arete; Greek Sports From Ancient Sources*. 4th . Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Möller, Astrid. 2007. "Classical Greece: Distribution." In *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*, edited by Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard Saller, 362-384.

- Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Moore, J.M. 1975. *Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Morris, Ian. 2007. "Early Iron Age Greece." In *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*, edited by Walter Scheidel and Ian, Saller, Richard Morris, 211-241. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Morrison, J.S., and J.T. Williams. 1968. *Greek Oared Ships 900-322 B.C.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mosley, D.J. 1971. "Diplomacy And Disunion In Ancient Greece." *Phoenix* 25: 319-330.
- Nepos, Cornelius. 1984. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by John C. Rolfe. Cambridge: Harvard University Pres.
- Ober, Josiah. 1989. *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 2015. *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Orators, Minor Attic. 1968. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by K. J. Maidment. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1962. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by J. O. Burtt. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ormerod, H.A. 1978. *Piracy In The Ancient World: An Essay On Mediterranean History*. 1924. Oxford: Liverpool University Press.
- Osborne, Robin. 2007. "Archaic Greece." In *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*, edited by Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard Saller, 277-301. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Osborne, Robin. 2002. "Pride and Prejudice, Sense and Subsistence: Exchange and Society in the Greek City." In *The Ancient Economy*, edited by Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Redden, 114-132. New York: Routledge.
- Pausanias. 1971. *Guide to Greece*. Translated by Peter Levi. 2 vols. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Perlman, S. 1976. "Panhellenism, The Polis, and Imperialism." *Historia* 25: 1-30.
- Perlman, S. 1967. "Political Leadership in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C." *La Parola del Passato* 98: 161-176.
- Perlman, S. 1964. "The Causes And Outbreak Of The Corinthian War." *Classical Quarterly* 4: 64-81.
- Perlman, S. 1963. "The Politicians In The Athenian Democracy Of The Fourth Century." *Athenaeum* 41: 327-355.
- Pindar. 1968. *The Odes of Pindar - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by Sir J.E. Sandys. Cambridge: Harvard University

Press.

- Planeaux, Christopher. 2015. <http://www.ancient.eu/article/833/>. November 6. Accessed June 29, 2016.
- Plato. 1974. *The Last Days of Socrates - Euthyphro, The Apology, Crito, Phaedo*. Translated by Hugh Tredennick. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Plutarch. 1967-1970. *Lives*. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. 7 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1973. *The Age of Alexander*. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert. Harmondsworth: Penguin books Ltd.
- . 1960. *The Rise and Fall of Athens*. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert. Harmondsworth: Penguin Book Ltd.
- Poliakoff, Michael B. 1995. *Combat Sports in the Ancient World: Competition, Violence, and Culture*. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Potter, David. 2011. *The Victor's Crown - A History of Ancient Sport from Homer to Byzantium*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raaflaub, Kurt A. 2013. "Early Greek Infantry Fighting in a Mediterranean Context." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 95-111. Princeton: Princetin University Press.
- Rahe, Paul A. 2015. *The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta: The Persian Challenge*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Rhodes, P.J. 2010. *A History of the Classical Greek World 478-323 BC*. 2nd. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Rhodes, P.J. 1970. "Thucydides on Pausanias and Themistocles." *Historia* 19: 387-400.
- Rhodes, P.J., and Robin Osborne. 2003. *Greek Historical Inscriptions 404-323 BC*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Saint Pol, Bibi. 2012. <http://www.ancient.eu/image/69/>. April 26. Accessed July 4, 2016.
- Sallares, Robert. 2007. "Ecology." In *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*, edited by Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard Saller, 15-37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Saller, Richard. 2002. "Framing the Debate over Growth in the Ancient Economy." In *The Ancient Economy*, edited by Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Redden, 251-269. New York: Routledge.
- Saller, Richard. 2007. "Household and gender." In *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*, edited by Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard Saller, 87-112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Salmon, J.B. 1984. *Wealthy Corinth: A History of the City to 338 B.C.*

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scheidel, Walter. 2007. "Demography." In *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*, edited by Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard Saller, 38-86. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scheidel, Walter. 2003. "The Greek demographic expansion: models and comparisons." *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 123: 120-140.

Scheidel, Walter, and Sitta von Redden, . 2002. *The Ancient Economy*. New York: Routledge.

Scheidel, Walter, Ian Morris, and Robert Saller, . 2007. *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schneider, Helmuth. 2007. "Technology." In *The Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World*, edited by Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard Saller, 144-171. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Schwartz, Adam. 2013. "Large Weapons, Small Greeks: The Practical Limitations of Hoplite Weapons and Equipment." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 157-175. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Scott, Michael. 2010. *From Democrats To Kings: The Downfall of Athens to the Epic Rise of Alexander the Great*. London: Icon Books Ltd.

Scullard, H. H. 1967. *The Etruscan Cities And Rome*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Seager, Robin. 1967. "Thrasybulus, Conon and the Athenian Imperialism, 395-386 B.C." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 87: 95-115.

Siculus, Diodorus. 1933-1954. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by C.H. Oldfather. Vols. 1-6. 12 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

—. 1952. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by Charles L. Sherman. Vol. 7. 12 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

—. 1963. *The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by C. Bradford Welles. Vol. 8. 12 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Smith, R.E. 1948. "Lysander and the Spartan Empire." *Classical Philology* 43: 145-156.

Smith, R.E. 1953-1954. "The Opposition to Agesilaus Foreign Policy." *Historia* 2: 274-288.

Snodgrass, A.M. 1967. *Arms and Armour of the Greeks*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Snodgrass, A.M. 1965. "The Hoplite Reform and History." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 85: 110-122.

- Snodgrass, Anthony. 2013. "Setting the Frame Chronologically." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 85-94. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sophocles. 1967. *Ajax, Electra, Trachinae, Philoctetes - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by F. Storr. Vol. 2. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1953. *Electra And Other Plays*. Translated by E.F. Watling. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Spivey, Nigel. 2012. *The Ancient Olympics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Strauss, Barry. 2004. *The Battle of Salamis: The Naval Encounter That Saved Greece-and Western Civilization*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Thomas, C.G. 1975. "On the Role of Spartan Kings." *Historia* 24: 257-270.
- Thompson, Wesley. 1973. "Observations On Spartan Politics." *Rivista Storica Dell Antichita* 3: 47-58.
- Thucydides. 1965-1976. *History of the Peloponnesian War - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by C. F. Smith. 4 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1996. *The Landmark Thucydides*. Edited by Robert B. Strassler. Translated by Richard Crawley. New York: The Free Press.
- . 1954. *The Peloponnesian War*. Translated by Rex Warner. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. 1965. *Hannibal's Legacy: The Hannibalic War's Effects On Roman Life*. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Van Wees, Hans. 2013. "Farmers and Hoplites: Models of Historical Development." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 222-255. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Vickers, Michael. 2008. *Sophocles and Alcibiades: Athenian Politics in Ancient Greek Literature*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Viggiano, Gregory F. 2013. "The Hoplite Revolution and the Rise of the Polis." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 112-133. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Viggiano, Gregory F., and Hans Van Wees. 2013. "The Arms, Armor, and Iconography of Early Greek Hoplite Warfare." In *Men of Bronze: Hoplite Warfare in Ancient Greece*, by Donald Kagan and Gregory F. Viggiano, 57-73. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Von Reden, Sitta. 2007. "Classical Greece: Consumption." In *The*

Cambridge Economic History Of The Greco-Roman World, edited by Walter Scheidel, Ian Morris and Richard Saller, 385-406. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walbank, F.W. 1957. *A Historical Commentary On Polybius*. Vol. 1. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Worthington, Ian. 2013. *By The Spear: Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Rise and Fall of the Macedonian Empire*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—. 2008. *Phillip II of Macedonia*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Xenophon. 2001. *Anabasis - The Loeb Classical Library*. Rev. by John Dillery. Translated by Carleton Brownson. Vol. 3. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

—. 1968. *Hellenica - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by Carleton L. Brownson. 2 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

—. 2013. *Memorabilia and Oeconomicus: The Loeb Classical Library*. Revised. Translated by E.C. Marchant, O.J. Todd and Jeffrey Henderson. Vol. IV. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

—. 1971. *Scripta Minora: Agesilaus; Constitution of the Lacedaemonians; Constitution of the Athenians, - The Loeb Classical Library*. Translated by E.C., Bowersock, G.W., Marchant. Vol. VII. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

—. 2011. *The Landmark Xenophon's Hellenika*. Edited by Robert B. Strassler. Translated by John Marincola. London: Quercus.

—. 1949. *The Persian Expedition*. Translated by George Cawkwell. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd.

645 (N. Hammond 1994), 6–7. The Macedones were members of the King's army whether on active duty or not.

646 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 385.

647 (N. Hammond 1994), 109–112. Hammond describes the urbanization of the kingdom and believes much came about after the Peace of Philocrates. He also describes the transplantation of people throughout the expanded kingdom.

648 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 648–649.

649 The kingdoms of Orestis, Lyncestis, Pelagonia, and Elimeia composed Upper Macedonia. Philip abolished the monarchies in these regions. Their kings became his Companions.

650 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 396–397. Griffith suggests that it was too hazardous for enemies to be part of the king's Companions.

651 Under Alexander the Great, there are numerous examples of Companions who became hostile to him and were executed, such as Philotas (330), the son of Parmenio, and the historian Callisthenes (328/327), Aristotle's nephew.

652 (N. Hammond 1994), 41–42. (Worthington 2008), 30–31.

653 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 405–406. Under Alexander, the *pezhetairoi* referred to the entire phalanx and the hypaspists were the elite infantry.

654 *Ibid*, 406. Diodorus lists the various troops Alexander took to Asia and those he left with Antipater (Diod.XVII.17.3–5). Plutarch says the infantry was between

30,000 and 43,000 with four to five thousand cavalry (Plut.*Al*.15.5). Arian says a little over thirty thousand infantry and over five thousand cavalry (Arr.*Anab*.I.11.3).

655 Ibid, 411.

656 Ibid, 658–662. See Hammond for the economic development under Philip II.

657 (Arrian 1971), 360–361.

658 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 242–245. Inscription number 49 lists opponents of Philip to be expelled. In the commentary, they question how effective the democratic government was. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 351. Griffith claims the democracy was “unimpaired.”

659 (N. Hammond 1994), 112.

660 Unfortunately, we lack the solid data to quantify these observations.

661 Isocrates had been urging a war against Persia to unite the Greeks since his *Panegyricus* was published in 380.

662 Demosthenes’s *Fourth Philippic* delivered in 341 first mentions an anti-Persian policy of Philip but he is trying to build a war coalition against Philip (Dem.X.32).

663 (Cook 1983), 221–222. (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 84–89.

664 Later Pammenes quarreled with Artabazus. Artabazus had him murdered. It is uncertain what happened to Pammenes soldiers but they may have deserted Artabazus and joined the Great King. Diodorus claims that Artaxerxes III gave the Thebans three hundred talents for mercenaries (Diod.XVI.40.1–2). (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 89–90.

665 Hermias was a supporter of Aristotle and other philosophers who lived within his kingdom at Assus in the 340s.

666 (Isocrates 1966-1968), Vol. I, 251–253. Isocrates died at age ninety-eight in the fall of 338 after the battle of Chaeronea. He never witnessed the League of Corinth developed under Philip’s hegemony.

667 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 470–472. See Griffith for a discussion of the campaign. Also see Hammond and Ellis in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 438–439; 762–763 respectively.

668 (N. Hammond 1994), 117.

669 (Errington 1990), 67.

670 Whatever the decadarchy was, it may have been a temporary organization of government. How it differed from the Lysander’s decarchies (rule of ten) mentioned by Xenophon is unclear. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 328–332. Griffith critiques the meaning of decadarchy. (N. Hammond 1986), 559. Hammond accepts that multiple decadarchies were established.

671 (Hammond and Griffith 1979). 343. Demosthenes mentions multiple garrisons (Dem.XIX.260).

672 (N. Hammond 1986), 559. (Errington 1990), 67–68.

673 Since the 360s, Thebes protected the anti-Spartan *poleis* in the Peloponnese. Demosthenes says that the Arcadians had set up bronze statues of Philip to honor him (Dem.XIX.261).

674 The reasons are unknown for the rejection. Perhaps the league members did not want to get involved in Peloponnesian affairs.

675 This speech *On Halonnesus* is believed by modern scholarship to be the work of Hegesippus, not Demosthenes.

676 (Cawkwell 1963), 123.

677 Ibid, 132. Cawkwell suggests that Python’s speech was vague enough that Philip may have hinted at a common peace.

678 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 489–495. Griffith provides a harsh criticism of

- Athenian policy and the embassy of Hegesippus. Griffith believes the term *epanorthosis* was the actual term used.
- 679 Four years later when war was renewed with Athens, *Philip's Letter* to the Athenians listed his grievances ([Dem.].XII). (Cawkwell 1963), 126. Athens may not have received Philip's rejection until mid-343.
- 680 Ibid, 133. Cawkwell assumes that this embassy may have been in Athens at the time of Python's visit.
- 681 (Cawkwell 1963), 130. Even Demosthenes probably had little interest in seeking Persian aid.
- 682 The war with Sparta was settled, which allowed Argos to send men to the east.
- 683 There is no evidence that the Persians approached Philip for Macedonian troops. Persia had been using Greek troops since the sixth century when they had accompanied Darius I in his Scythian campaign. (Cawkwell 1963), 123. In the fourth century, the Persian army was ineffective without Greek hoplites.
- 684 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 495–501. Griffith argues that Philip intervened in Megara and Elis. (Ellis 1976), 151. Ellis argues that Philip neither directly nor indirectly intervened in Megara and Elis. (Cawkwell 1963), 203. Cawkwell reminds us to interpret Demosthenes with great caution when it comes to his inferences.
- 685 (Brunt 1969), 260. Brunt suggests that Callias was a Chalcidian patriot, not a pawn of any power.
- 686 Ibid, 261. Brunt claims that Macedonian intervention in Euboea in 342 was a mistake because it galvanized Hellenic opposition to him.
- 687 The speech is also known as *The False Legation*.
- 688 (N. Hammond 1994), 120–122. Hammond claims the campaign occurred in the summer of 342.
- 689 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 510–516. Griffith provides a detailed analysis of the negotiations.
- 690 (Ellis 1976), 166.
- 691 These cities exist today in Bulgaria as Stara Zagora and Plovdiv. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 538–539. Griffith argues that these foundations were established as a *polis*.
- 692 (Ellis 1976), 166–167. (N. Hammond 1994), 124.
- 693 (Demosthenes 1970), Vol.I. 199.
- 694 (Siculus 1963), Vol.8, 45–48.
- 695 After the reconquest of Egypt in 342, Artaxerxes Ochus recognized the Macedonian threat to Asia Minor. In the fall of 341, the Athenians had dispatched an embassy to Artaxerxes requesting aid against Philip.
- 696 This was probably the first time that the torsion catapult was used.
- 697 We are not told the details of this operation.
- 698 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 576. See notes one and three for an analysis of the capture of the grain fleet.
- 699 (Ellis 1976), 176–178.
- 700 Despite Diodorus's claim that Philip made peace with Athens, historians agree with Demosthenes that no peace occurred (Dem.XVIII.145). (Ellis 1976), 184. Ellis suggests that peace with Byzantium included Chios and Rhodes. (N. Hammond 1994), 135. Hammond says Philip made peace with Byzantium and its allies but does not specifically mention the islands.
- 701 (N. Hammond 1994), 125.
- 702 (Ellis 1976), 186–190. Ellis argues that Philip provoked this war. (N. Hammond 1994), 141–142. Hammond argues that this war was imposed on Philip as

- leader of the Amphictyonic League.
- 703 The Thebans had occupied the fort of Nicaea, which overlooked Thermopylae, in the summer of 339.
- 704 According to Demosthenes, only Athens weakest allies belonged to the Second Athenian League. Chios, Rhodes, and Corcyra were not allies (Dem.XVIII.233–234).
- 705 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 594–595.
- 706 The Attic calendar date was 7 Metageitnion. Ibid, P.596. Griffith suggests August 2.
- 707 (N. Hammond 1986), 568–570. Hammond suggests the Boeotians had 12,000 hoplites, the Athenians 10,000, 5,000 mercenaries and some allied hoplites. Hammond provides a description of the battle.
- 708 (N. Hammond 1994), 149–151. Hammond provides an analysis of the composition of the Macedonian army.
- 709 Demosthenes was later accused of cowardice in battle. The charge may have been false since he was assigned to deliver the eulogy to the Athenian dead (Plut.*Dem.*XXI.1–2; Aesch.III.175; Din.I.12).
- 710 The oration *On The Treaty With Alexander* by pseudo-Demosthenes lists some of the terms ([Dem.].XVII).
- 711 Neither an inscription recording the peace terms nor a complete list of terms is mentioned in the literary sources. For a discussion of the various terms with the Greek states see: (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 606–6011. See Ellis in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 782–783. (Rhodes 2010), 356–357.
- 712 Contingents from these *poleis* fought with Alexander in the siege of Thebes in 335 (Diod.XVII.13.5).
- 713 (Bosworth 1988), 189.
- 714 (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 372–379. Inscription number 76 lists a few signatories. An analysis of the agreement is provided in the commentary. Here the dating of the oath is stated after the ratification process.
- 715 (N. Hammond 1994), 160. See Appendix 1 in (Hammond and Walbank 2008), 572–579. Hammond argues that the alliance between the League of Corinth and Macedonia was a *symmachia*. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 627. Griffith argues that the alliance was an *epimachia*. (Rhodes and Osborne 2003), 377. Rhodes suggests that regardless of the legalistic analysis, the League went from a defensive alliance to an offensive alliance also.
- 716 (N. Hammond 1986), 571–572. (Ellis 1976), P.208. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 634–646.
- 717 Artaxerxes III and IV were murdered by Bagoas the eunuch vizier. Darius III ascended the throne and then poisoned Bagoas.
- 718 Whether or not Alexander was formally banished is uncertain.
- 719 (Ellis 1976), 214–215. See Ellis in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 786–787. In both accounts, Ellis rejects this story told by Plutarch and also the following story of the embassy from Caria. The stories are improbable and the chronology of events is “implausible.” (N. Hammond 1994), 172–174. Hammond agrees with Ellis. (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 676–681. (E. Badian 2014), 106–107. (Worthington 2008), 176–180. Griffith, Badian, and Worthington accept Plutarch’s version of the events. Although not mentioned in the literary sources, Alexander’s cousin, Amyntas, the son of Philip’s brother Perdikkas III was still alive. Had Philip been killed while Alexander was a minor, Amyntas could have been selected the next king.
- 720 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 680.
- 721 (N. Hammond 1994), 182–185.
- 722 (N. Hammond 1994), 176. Hammond suggests October. (Rhodes 2010), P.360.

- 723 Pausanias may have been a lover of Philip II also.
- 724 (Hammond and Griffith 1979), 685–689. After discussing the possible conspiracy theories, Griffith concludes the Pausanias acted alone. (Ellis 1976), 226–227. Ellis agrees. (Bosworth 1988), 22–23. Bosworth does not speculate on the conspirators but merely says a political crisis derived from the assassination. (E. Badian 2014), 106–110. Badian suggests that Alexander was involved in the conspiracy due to his insecurity as the heir apparent.
- 725 Attalus was killed in the fall of 335.
- 726 Cynane was the daughter of Audata, Philip's second wife. Thessalonice was the daughter of Nikesipolis, Philip's fifth wife. Arrhidaeus was the son of Philinna, Philip's third wife.
- 727 (N. Hammond 1986), 596–597. See Bosworth in (Lewis, Boardman and Hornblower, et al. 1994), 794–795.
- 728 (N. Hammond 1997), 45–46. Hammond says Arrian's account represents the Macedonian perspective of the Theban revolt. Diodorus represents the Hellenic perspective.
- 729 (Bosworth 1988), 195. Bosworth suggests that Thebes' fate was determined by "an *ad hoc* council of allies present with Alexander, the very men who had helped in the massacre."
- 730 Charidemus fled to Persia and served in the army of Darius III against Alexander.
- 731 Philip II was deified after his death. Alexander was deified while living.
- 732 (Errington 1990), 101.
- 733 Philip's surviving children were Cynna, daughter of Audata; Arrhidaeus, son of Philinna; Alexander III and Cleopatra from Olympias; Thessalonice, daughter of Nicesipolis; and the unborn child of Cleopatra.
- 734 In his speech *On the Crown*, Demosthenes mentions that Philip had lost an eye, suffered a broken collarbone, and had a damaged hand and leg (Dem.XVIII.67).

Contents

Preface	7
Acknowledgment	9
Introduction	11
Chapter One: What Is a Greek?	25
Chapter Two: The Hellenic World in 500 BC	64
Chapter Three: The Road to Marathon	89
Chapter Four: The Persian War (480–479 BC)	111
Chapter Five: Sicily, Italy, and Carthage	168
Chapter Six: The Economy of the Classical Period	184
Chapter Seven: The Rivalry	207
Chapter Eight: Interwar Years	245
Chapter Nine: Panhellenic Festivals	272
Chapter Ten: The Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC)	289
Chapter Eleven: A New Day Denied	364
Chapter Twelve: Sparta Resurgent – The Road to Leuctra	408
Chapter Thirteen: Thebes Ascendant (371–362 BC)	431
Chapter Fourteen: Sicily, Italy, and Carthage	453
Chapter Fifteen: The Rise of Macedonia	491
Chapter Sixteen: The Hegemony of Macedonia	531
Conclusion	585
Glossary	587
Chronology	595
Bibliography	607
Index	623

List of Illustrations and Maps

Chapter Sixteen 531

Map 2—Xerxes's Invasion of Hellas

Index

A

- Abydus
 - naval battle of [352](#)
- Acragas [459](#)
 - destruction [462](#)
 - population [61](#)
 - Sicilian colony [169](#)
 - tyranny of Theron [176](#)
- Aegae [495](#)
- Aegitium [305](#)
- Aegospotami
 - naval battle [359](#)
- Aeropus
 - King of Macedon [495](#)
- Aeschines [563](#), [567](#). See Peace of Philocrates
- Aeschylus [124](#), [133](#), [135](#), [137](#), [219](#). See Persians
 - Eumenides [45](#)
- Agamemnon [385](#)
- Agatharchus [339](#)
- Agathinus [397](#)
- agema [536](#)
- Agesilaus II [416](#)
 - accession [369](#)
 - battle of Coronea [395](#)
 - commander against Persia in 396 [384](#)
 - death [451](#)
 - defends seizure of the Cadmea [412](#)
 - King of Sparta [73](#)
 - power struggle with Lysander [386](#)
- Agesipolis
 - death [413](#)
 - King of Sparta [409](#)
- Agis II [306](#), [341](#). See Decelean War
 - battle of Mantinea [325](#)
 - death [369](#)
 - King of Sparta [73](#)
- Agôgê
 - Spartan education system [72](#)
- agora [187](#)
- Agothocles
 - tyrant of Syracuse [490](#)
- Alalia
 - battle of [170](#)
- Alcaeus [94](#)
- Alcibiades [322](#), [354](#), [355](#)
 - battle of Abydus [352](#)
 - battle of Cyzicus [352](#)

- disgrace after Notium [356](#)
- elected supreme commander [355](#)
- mutilation of the Hermae [330](#)
- naval commander in 411 [349](#)
- recall from Sicilian Expedition [331](#)
- refugee with Tissaphernes [345](#)
- Alcidas [302](#), [304](#)
- Alciphron [325](#)
- Alexander
 - King of Epirus [553](#)
 - marriage to Cleopatra [576](#)
- Alexander I [101](#), [147](#)
 - battle of Plataea [156](#)
-
- King of Macedon [67](#)
- Alexander II
 - King of Macedon [436](#)
- Alexander III [537](#). See Chaeronea
 - appointed king [577](#)
 - Balkan campaign in 335 [578](#)
 - campaign against the Maedi [562](#)
 - destruction of Thebes [580](#)
 - murder of Philip II [576](#)
- Alexander of Pherae [507](#)
 - tyrant of Pherae [437](#)
- Alyzia
 - naval battle [421](#)
- Amodocus
 - Thracian king [507](#)
-
- Amompharetus [157](#), [158](#)
- Amorges [342](#), [344](#)
- Amphictyonic League [563](#). See Third Sacred war
 - conducts Pythian Games [273](#)
 - peace settlement in the Third Sacred War [526](#)
- Amphipolis [314](#)
 - capitulation to Philip II [511](#)
 - foundation [251](#)
- Amphissa [562](#), [564](#), [569](#)
- Amyntas
 - death [577](#)
 - son of Perdiccas III [501](#)
- Amyntas I
 - King of Macedon [67](#)
-
- Amyntas III
 - King of Macedon [436](#)
- Anabasis
 - Arrian [492](#)
 - Xenophon [382](#)
- Anaxilas [176](#), [180](#), [181](#)
 - tyrant of Rhegium [172](#)
- Anaximander [94](#)

- Anaximenes 94
- Anchimolius 80
- Andocides 400
- andrapodismos 99, 302, 323, 327, 422, 519, 580
 - definition 99
- Androcleidas 388, 390
- Androcles 330, 347
- Antalcidas 439, 440
 - defeats Athenian fleet 405
 - naval commander 405
 - Spartan ambassador 399
- Antandrus 353
- Antigonus 534
- Antiochus
 - Arcadian League 439
- Antipater 522, 534, 562, 567, 579
 - Macedonian envoy 521
 - supported the succession of Alexander 577
- Antiphon 348
- Antitheus 388
- apoikismos
 - definition 33
- Apollocrates 480
- Aracus 358
- Arcadian League 448
 - formation of 432
- archê 244
- Archestratus 263
- Archias 414
- Archidamian War 318
- Archidamus
 - of Elis 439
- Archidamus II
 - death 318
 - King of Sparta 73
 - policy of moderation 267
- Archidamus III 428
 - King of Sparta 525
- Areopagus
 - description and responsibilities 81
 - reform. See Ephialtes
- Arete
 - daughter of Dionysius I and Aristomache 475
- arête
 - definition 62
- Argaeus
 - pretender to the Macedonian throne 503
- Arginusae
 - naval battle of 357
- Argos
 - opposition to Sparta in 404 390
 - stasis 432
 - Thirty Years Peace 238

- Arianthidas [315](#)
- Ariobarzanes [542](#)
 - rebellion from Persia [506](#)
 - satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia [445](#)
- Aristagoras [92](#), [94](#), [96](#), [97](#), [99](#)
 - tyrant of Miletus [94](#)
- Aristides
 - battle of Salamis [139](#)
 - commander at Plataea [147](#)
 - Delian League [210](#)
 - ostracism [115](#)
- aristocracy
 - definition [35](#)
- Aristocrates
 - Athenian commander [358](#)
 - Spartan commander [424](#)
- Aristodemus
 - Athenian envoy [520](#)
 - regent of Sparta [394](#)
- Aristomache
 - wife of Dionysius I [475](#)
- Aristophanes [265](#), [355](#)
- Aristotle
 - on slavery [199](#)
 - philosopher [73](#)
 - philosophical view of polis [30](#)
 - the Good [62](#)
- Arrhabaeus [577](#)
- Arrhidaeus
 - half-brother of Alexander [573](#)
 - half-brother of Philip II [518](#)
- Arrian
 - historian [492](#), [538](#)
- Artabazus [445](#), [509](#)
 - revolt from Persia [543](#)
- Artaphernes
 - brother of Darius I and satrap of Lydia and Ionia [96](#)
 - nephew of Darius I and commander at Marathon [105](#)
 - peace terms after Ionian Revolt [99](#)
- Artaxerxes I
 - Great King of Persia [220](#)
- Artaxerxes II
 - death [543](#)
 - Great King of Persia [405](#)
- Artaxerxes III
 - end of Egyptian rebellion [543](#)
 - Great King of Persia [543](#)
- Artaxerxes IV
 - Great King of Persia [572](#)
- Artayctes [163](#)
- Artemisium
 - battle of. See Artemisium and Thermopylae

- Artemisium and Thermopylae
 - battle of [132](#)
- Arybbas
 - exiled [553](#)
 - King of Epirus [502](#)
- Assembly
 - definition. See ecclesia
 - Spartan - responsibilities [74](#)
- Assembly of the Macedones
 - duties and responsibilities [498](#)
 - judicial duties [532](#)
- Astias [388](#)
- Astyochus [347](#), [349](#)

- Spartan naval commander [345](#)
- Atheas [561](#)
 - King of the Scythians [555](#)
- Athenian Revolution [351](#)
- Athenian Tribute Lists
 - description [256](#)
- Athens. See reform of Cleisthenes; See Sicilian Expedition; See Athenian Revolution; See Rule of the Thirty; See Corinthian War; See Second Athenian League; See Social War; See Peace of Philocrates; See Chaeronea
 - alliance with Thebes against Philip II [565](#)
 - democracy restored in 410 [354](#)
 - hegemon of Delian League [212](#)
 - Peace of Callias [242](#)
 - peace terms with Philip II in 338 [568](#)
 - plague [300](#)
 - population [60](#)
 - refortification [208](#)
 - revolt from Alexander III [579](#)
 - surrender in 404 [360](#)
 - territorial size [59](#)
 - Thirty Years Peace with Sparta [241](#)
 - war with Aegina [102](#)
- war with Philip II in 357 [511](#)
- Xerxes' destruction [134](#)
- Attaginus [160](#)
- Attalus [573](#), [575](#)
 - death [578](#)
- Audata [573](#)
 - wife of Philip II [502](#)
- Autocles [506](#)

B

- Bardylis [495](#)
 - King of the Dardanni [472](#)
- basileus
 - definition [35](#)
- Berisades

Thracian king [507](#)

Boeotian League

constitution [376](#)

restoration [422](#)

boule

definition [40](#)

Brasidas

campaign against Amphipolis [314](#)

death [317](#)

Spartan commander [313](#)

Bruttians [170](#)

Byzantium [380](#)

liberation from Persia [209](#)

siege by Philip II [560](#)

C

Cabala

battle of [473](#)

Cadmea [411](#)

Callias [557](#)

leader of Euboean Chalcis [552](#)

Callicratidas

battle of Arginusae [357](#)

Spartan admiral [356](#)

Callimachus [107](#), [108](#)

Callippus [482](#), [483](#)

Callistratus [426](#)

Camarina [169](#), [175](#), [176](#), [276](#), [331](#), [332](#)

Cambyses II

King of Persia [65](#)

Carnea [287](#)

Carthage. See Crimisus

battle of Himera [178](#)

constitution [174](#)

foundation [172](#)

peace of 405 with Syracuse [462](#)

war with Syracuse in 406 [457](#)

war with Syracuse in 409 [455](#)

Cecryphalea [232](#)

Ceos [507](#)

Cersobleptes [514](#), [520](#), [521](#)

expulsion from kingdom [554](#)

King of the Odrysian Thracians [507](#)

Cetriporis [511](#)

Chabrias [420](#), [509](#)

Athenian commander [404](#)

Chaeronea

battle of [566](#)

Chalcideus [343](#)

Chalcidian League

destruction by Philip II [519](#)

- foundation [410](#)
- Chalcidian War (382379 BC) [413](#)
- Chares [515](#), [558](#), [561](#), [565](#)
 - Athenian commander [509](#)
- Charidemus [580](#)
- Charoeades [303](#)
- Chios
 - revolt in 412 [343](#)
- chora
 - definition [33](#)
- choregos
 - definition [219](#)
- Cimon [188](#), [221](#), [222](#), [243](#)
 - death [237](#)
 - ostracism [228](#)
 - pro-Spartan policy [218](#)
 - strategos [219](#)
 - victor at Eurymedon [215](#)
- Cinnadon [370](#)
- Cirrha [512](#)
- Cleandridas [240](#)

- Clearchus [349](#), [382](#)
- Cleigenes [410](#)
- Cleisthenes. See reform of Cleisthenes
- Cleitus
 - King of the Dardanians [579](#)
- Cleobulus [322](#)
- Cleombrotus [416](#), [418](#)
 - battle of Leuctra [426](#)
 - King of Sparta [414](#)
- Cleomenes I
 - battle of Sepea [92](#)
 - death [104](#)
 - King of Sparta [73](#)
 - liberation of Athens [80](#)
 - support for Isagoras [86](#)
- Cleon
 - death [317](#)
 - punishment of Mytilene [302](#)
 - Sphacterian campaign [308](#)
- Cleopatra
 - daughter of Philip II [573](#)
 - death of Philip II's wife [578](#)
 - wife of Philip II [574](#)
- Cleophon
 - Athenian leader [354](#)
- Cnidus
 - battle of [394](#)
- Coenus [534](#)
- coinage
 - types of [205](#)
- Common Peace. See Peace of Antalcidas

- Companions
 - duties and responsibilities [534](#)
 - Macedonian institution [499](#)
- Conon
 - arrest by Tiribazus [399](#)
 - Athenian general [356](#)
 - battle of Aegospotami [359](#)
 - battle of Cnidus [394](#)
 - refortifies Athens [396](#)
- Constitution of the Lacedaemonians
 - Xenophon [75](#)
- Corcyra. See Corcyraean Crisis
 - end of civil war [303](#)
- Corcyraean Crisis (435 433 BC) [261](#)
- Corinth. See Corinthian War
 - conflict with Megara [232](#)
 - constitution [373](#)
 - Corcyraean crisis [259](#)
 - hostility to Athens [265](#)
 - opposition to Sparta in 404 [389](#)
 - population [60](#)
 - union with Argos [399](#)
- Corinthian War (395 -387 BC) [407](#)
- Coronea
 - battle of [239](#)
 - battle of in 394 [395](#)
- Corrantadas [388](#)
- Corsica [93](#), [170](#), [172](#), [173](#), [178](#)
- Cothelas
 - King of the Getae [555](#)
- Cottyphus [563](#)
- Cotys
 - King of the Odrysian Thracians [507](#)
- Council. See boule
 - definition. See boule
- Council of Five Hundred
 - description and responsibilities [84](#)
- Council of Four Hundred [348](#)
 - description [80](#)
- Cranippus [474](#)
- Craterus [534](#)
- Crenides [511](#), [540](#)
- Crimisus
 - battle of [488](#)
- Critias. See Rule of the Thirty
- Crocus Field
 - battle of [515](#)
- Croesus [90](#)
- Cronium
 - battle of [473](#)
- Croton [169](#), [172](#), [180](#), [250](#)
- Ctesicles [425](#)

- Cumae [170](#), [171](#), [181](#)
- Cunaxa
 - battle of [382](#)
- Cylon [390](#)
- Cyme [99](#), [170](#), [181](#)
- Cynane
 - half-sister of Alexander III [578](#)
- Cynossema
 - naval battle of [351](#)
- Cyrus
 - the younger as viceroy of Asia Minor [355](#)
- Cyrus II
 - King of Persia [65](#), [445](#)
- Cythera [312](#)
- Cyzicus
 - naval battle of [352](#)

D

- Damastium
 - mining [538](#)
- Darius I
 - administration of the empire [66](#)
 - death [118](#)
 - Great King of Persia [65](#)
 - Scythian campaign [67](#)
- Darius II [342](#), [355](#)
 - death [381](#)
 - Great King of Persia [340](#)
- Darius III
 - Great King of Persia [572](#)
- Datames [542](#)
- Datis [105](#), [106](#), [107](#), [109](#), [113](#), [117](#)
- Daurises [98](#)
- Decelea [340](#), [342](#), [348](#), [356](#), [360](#)
- Decelean War [361](#)
 - defeat of Athens [361](#)
 - early stage [347](#)
- Decree of Themistocles [120](#), [134](#)
- Deinomenes [181](#)
- Delian League
 - foundation [210](#)
 - judicial affairs [256](#)
- Delium
 - battle of [315](#)
- Delos
 - home of Delian League [210](#)
- Delphi
 - Pythian Games [281](#)
- Demades
 - Athenian captive released by Philip II [567](#)
- Demaratus

- King of Sparta [86](#)
- removal from kingship [105](#)
- Demarete [176](#), [178](#), [180](#)
- deme
 - definition [29](#)
- democracy
 - definition [35](#)
 - origin [38](#)
- Demosthenes [563](#). See Sicilian Expedition; See Peace of Philocrates; See Fourth Philippic; See Second Philippic; See On The Embassy; See On The Chersonese; See Third Philippic
- alliance between Athens and Thebes [565](#)
- death [340](#)
- general in Peloponnesian War [305](#)
- Olynthiac speeches [519](#)
- Sphacterian campaign [306](#)
- Dercyllidas [400](#)
 - Spartan commander [347](#)
 - Spartan commander against Persia [383](#)
- dikasteria [222](#)
- Diocliides [330](#)
- diolkos [49](#)
- Diomedon [343](#), [358](#)
- Dion
 - brother-in-law of Dionysius I [475](#)
 - death [482](#)
 - disciple of Plato [477](#)
 - exile [478](#)
 - liberation of Syracuse [481](#)
- Dionysius
 - death [474](#)
 - destruction of Rhegium [471](#)
 - fortifies Syracuse [464](#)
 - general of Syracuse [460](#)
 - I, tyrant of Syracuse [463](#)
 - peace with Carthage in 378 [473](#)
 - peace with Carthage in 392 [469](#)
 - war with Carthage in 383 [473](#)
 - war with Carthage in 396 [466](#)
- Dionysius II
 - restoration of tyranny in 346 [483](#)
 - second exile [484](#)
 - son of Dionysius I and Doris [475](#)
- Diopieithes [556](#)
- Diotimus [260](#)
- Dipaea
 - battle of [224](#)
- Diphridas [400](#)
- Dorians
 - origin [26](#)
- Doris
 - wife of Dionysius I [475](#)

Doriscus [521](#)
drachma [200](#), [205](#), [226](#), [295](#), [344](#)

E

Ecbatana [65](#)
ecclesia
 definition [40](#)
Ecdicus [401](#)
Egesta [328](#), [332](#)
eisangelia
 definition [222](#)
eisphora [202](#), [203](#), [301](#)
 definiton [46](#)
Elatea [564](#), [565](#)
Eleporus
 battle of [470](#)
Eleusinian Mysteries [285](#)
eleutheria
 definition [44](#)
Elis. See Olympian Games
 synoikismos [224](#)
 war with Sparta in 402 [380](#)
Elymians [169](#), [462](#)
emporion [187](#)
Endius [342](#)

Epaminondas
 battle of Leuctra [426](#)
 campaign of 366 [440](#)
 death [449](#)
 liberation of Thebes [414](#)
 naval expedition [445](#)
 winter campaign of 370/369 [433](#)
eparittoi [448](#)
Ephialtes
 betrayed Greeks at Thermopylae [128](#)
 death [223](#)
 reform of the Areopagus [221](#)
ephors
 constitutional function of the chief magistrates in Sparta [73](#)
Ephorus [168](#), [491](#)
Epidamnus [259](#)
epidoseis
 definition [201](#)
Epipolae [332](#), [333](#), [334](#), [337](#), [338](#)
Erasinides [358](#)
Eretria
 sack by Persians [107](#)
ergasterion [191](#)
Eryx [169](#), [467](#)
Eteonicus [357](#), [404](#)
ethnos [32](#)

- definition [30](#)
- Etruria [90](#), [170](#), [173](#)
- Etruscans [64](#), [170](#), [171](#), [173](#), [181](#), [472](#)
- Euboea
 - revolt from Delian League [239](#)
- Euboean League [568](#)
- Eubulus [520](#)
 - Commisioner of Theoric fund [510](#)
- Eudamidas [411](#)
- Eumenides. See Aeschylus
- eunomia
 - definition [76](#)
- Euphemus [332](#)
- Euphron [435](#), [441](#)
- Euripus Strait [128](#)
- Eurybiades
 - battle of Salamis [138](#)
 - Spartan commander [125](#)
- Eurylochus [305](#)
 - Macedonian envoy [521](#)
- Eurymedon. See Sicilian Expedition
- Athenian general [306](#)
 - battle of [215](#)
 - Sicilian campaign [310](#)
- Evaenetus [122](#)
- Evagoras
 - king in Cyprus [359](#)

F

- First Peloponnesian War [241](#)
 - five years truce [237](#)
 - origin [230](#)
- Five Thousand. See Athenian Revolution
- Fourth Philippic [544](#)
 - speech of Demosthenes [556](#)
- Fourth Sacred War [562](#)

G

- Gaesylus [481](#)
- Gallaxidorus [390](#)
- Gela [176](#), [180](#), [182](#)
 - Sicilian colony [169](#)
 - tyranny of Cleadrus [175](#)
- Gelon
 - death [180](#)
 - rejects Hellenic League [121](#)
 - tyrant of Syracuse [121](#), [176](#)
 - victory at Himera [178](#)
- Gerousia

- definition and responsibilities [74](#)
- Glaucias
 - King of the Taulantians [579](#)
- Gorgias
 - sophist [303](#)
- Gorgopas [404](#)
- Grabus [512](#)
- Great Dionysia [254](#), [256](#), [286](#)
- Greek
 - definition [25](#)
- Greek religion [30](#)
- Gylippus. See Sicilian Expedition
 - Spartan commander [333](#)
- Gymnopaedia [287](#)

H

- Haliartus
 - battle of [393](#)
- Halonnesus [553](#)
- Halycus River [169](#), [179](#), [473](#)
- Hamilcar
 - battle of Himera [177](#)
 - Punic commander in 341 [487](#)
- Hannibal [458](#), [459](#)
 - Punic commander in 409 [455](#)
- Hanno [483](#)
- Hasdrubal
 - Punic commander in 341 [487](#)
- Hegesippus [550](#), [554](#)
- Heliaea
 - definition [223](#)
- Heliaia. See Heliaea
- Hellenica Oxyrhynchia [291](#)
- Hellenic League
 - formation against Xerxes [120](#)
- hellenodikai
 - definition [276](#)
- hellenotamiai [211](#), [255](#)
 - definition [246](#)
- Heloris [463](#), [470](#)
- helots
 - definition [34](#)
- Hephaestum [247](#)
-
- Heraclides [479](#)
- Heraclitus [94](#)
- Hermias
 - tyrant of Atarneus [543](#)
- Hermocrates [310](#), [332](#), [339](#), [345](#), [349](#)
 - appointed general of Syracuse [332](#)
 - death [457](#)
 - exile from Syracuse [353](#)

- naval commander of Syracuse in 412 [341](#)
- Herodotus
 - Athens as savior of Greece [166](#)
- Heromenes [577](#)
- Hestiaea [420](#)
- hetairoi [537](#)
- Hicetas [483](#), [484](#)
- Hierax [404](#), [405](#)
- Hieromnemes
 - definition [281](#)
- Hieron
 - death [182](#)
 - tyrant of Gela [176](#)
 - tyrant of Syracuse [180](#)
- Himera
 - battle of [177](#)
 - Syracuse defeats Acragas [453](#)
- Himilco [462](#)
 - death [467](#)
 - Punic commander in 396 [467](#)
 - Punic commander in 406 [458](#)
- hinterland
 - definition. See chora
- Hipates [414](#)
- Hipparchus [79](#)
- Hipparinus [460](#), [483](#)
- Hippias [79](#), [80](#), [87](#), [92](#), [105](#), [107](#), [108](#)
 - tyrant of Athens [77](#)
- Hippocrates
 - battle of Delium [315](#)
 - tyrant of Gela [175](#)
- Hippon [480](#)
- Hipponicus [551](#)
- Histiaeus [94](#), [96](#), [98](#)
- holkas [195](#)
- Homer
 - Iliad and Odyssey [93](#)
- Homoioi
 - definition [71](#)
- hoplite
 - definition [50](#)
 - men of bronze [36](#)
- hubris [362](#)
 - definition [228](#)
- Hyacinthia [287](#)
- Hyccara [332](#)
- Hymaees [98](#)
- hypomeion
 - definition [370](#)
- Hysiae
 - battle of [70](#)

latrocles [521](#)
ile basilike [537](#)
Iliad. See Homer
Imbros [397](#)
Inaros [230](#), [231](#)
Ionia
 cultural center [93](#)
Ionian Greeks [163](#), [288](#)
Ionian Revolt
 Persian Wars [92](#), [94](#), [95](#), [99](#), [111](#)
Ionian Sea [259](#)
Iphicrates [420](#), [433](#), [506](#), [509](#)
 Athenian commander [395](#)
 campaign in Corcyra [425](#)
 defeats Spartan mora [402](#)

Isagoras [78](#), [79](#), [81](#), [86](#), [103](#), [104](#)
Ismenias [388](#), [390](#), [411](#)
Isocrates. See Panegyricus
 death [545](#)
 essay to Philip [541](#)
 plea to Philip [544](#)
isonomia [95](#), [96](#), [97](#)
 definition [82](#)
isopoliteia
 definition [398](#)
Isthmian Games [274](#)
Italiote League [469](#), [473](#)

J

Jason [427](#)
 death [431](#)
 tagos of Thessalian League [431](#)
 tyrant of Pherae [423](#)
Justin [492](#)

K

katagein [196](#)
katapeltes [465](#)
King Pausanias. See Rule of the Thirty
 exile [393](#)
 King of Sparta [360](#)
 opposition to Lysander [367](#)
kleros [69](#)
koine eirene. See Common Peace
koinon synedrion [571](#)
krupeteia
 Spartan organization to murder helots [73](#)

L

Labdalum [333](#)
labor

- characteristics 197
- Lacedaemonius 260
- Laches 303, 304
- Lacrates 550
- Lade
 - battle of 99
- Lamachus. See Sicilian Expedition
- League of Corinth 572
 - supports Alexander III's Persian campaign 580
- leitourgia. See liturgy
- Lemnos 397
- Leon 343
 - Athenian envoy 439
 - Spartan commander 346
- Leonidas
 - battle of Thermopylae 128
 - King of Sparta 105
- Leonnatus 534
- Leontiades 388, 411, 414
- Leontini 303
- Leotychidas II
 - battle of Mycale 160
 - death of 243
 - exile 208
 - King of Sparta 103
- Leptines 470
 - brother of Dionysius I 466
- Lesbos
 - revolt from Athens 301
- Leucas 305
- Leucimme
 - battle of 259
- Leuctra
 - battle of 426
- Lichas 345
- Lilybaeum 169
- liturgy
 - definition 200
- Lucanians 170, 470
- Lycomedes 435, 440
 - assassination 442
 - formation of Arcadian League 432
- Lycophron 515
 - tyrant of Pherae 514
- Lycurgus
 - Spartan lawgiver 70
- Lysander
 - Athens surrenders 360
 - battle of Aegospotami 359
 - battle of Notium 356

- death [393](#)
- power struggle with Agesilaus [385](#)
- return as admiral [358](#)
- Spartan admiral [355](#)

Lysias

- Athenian general [358](#)
- orator [201](#), [358](#)

M

Macedones [498](#)

- ethnic name for Macedonians [494](#)

Macedonia

- geographical location [493](#)
- structure of the kingdom [497](#)

Magna Graecia [169](#), [181](#)

Mago [468](#)

- commander of Punic fleet in 343 [485](#)
- Punic admiral in 396 [467](#)

Mamercus [484](#)

Mandrocles of Samos [67](#)

Mantineia

- battle of 418 [326](#)
- battle of in 362 [449](#)
- polis dissolved in 385 [409](#)
- restoration as a polis [432](#)

Marathon [89](#), [113](#)

- battle of [109](#)

Mardonius [100](#), [146](#), [153](#), [155](#), [156](#), [159](#), [162](#). See battle of Plataea

- size of Persian army [150](#)
- Thracian campaign [100](#)

Mardontes [162](#)

Masistius [154](#)

Mausolus [509](#)

Meda [573](#)

- wife of Philip II [555](#)

Mediterranean Triad [186](#)

Megabates [96](#)

Megabazus [67](#)

Megacles [115](#)

Megalopolis

- foundation [435](#)

Megara. See Megarian Decree

- Sicilian colony [169](#)

Megarian Decree [264](#)

Melon [414](#)

Mende [316](#)

Menelaus

- half-brother of Philip II [518](#)

Mentor [543](#)

Messene [332](#)

- foundation in Messenia [434](#)
- renamed from Zancle [169](#)
- Messenia
 - liberation by Thebes [433](#)
- Methone [539](#)
- metics [46](#), [202](#), [203](#), [293](#), [294](#), [296](#), [315](#), [357](#)
 - definition [193](#)
- mianteres [277](#)
- Micythus [181](#)
- Miletus
 - battle of Mycale [161](#)
 - destruction [99](#)
 - Ionian Revolt [94](#)
- Miltiades [107](#), [108](#), [109](#), [110](#), [111](#), [114](#)
 - death [113](#)
 - siege of Paros [112](#)
 - victor of Marathon [108](#)
- Mindarus
 - battle of Cynossema [351](#)
 - battle of Cyzicus [352](#)
- mines
 - form of revenue [202](#)
- Mnasippus
 - Spartan commander [424](#)
- Monarchy
 - definition [35](#)
- mora [402](#)
- Motya [169](#), [455](#), [466](#), [467](#)
- Mycale
 - battle of [161](#)
- Mytilene [301](#), [343](#)

N

- Naucratis [93](#), [187](#)
- Naupactus [301](#), [381](#)
 - Athenian naval base [235](#)
- settlement of Messenina refugees [234](#)
- navarch
 - Spartan naval commander [344](#)
- Naxos
 - naval battle in 376 [421](#)
 - revolt from Delian League [215](#)
 - Sicilian colony [168](#)
- Neapolis [170](#)
- Nectanebo [452](#)
- Nemea
 - battle of [394](#)
- Nemean Games [274](#)
- neodamodeis [314](#), [326](#), [335](#), [369](#), [370](#), [382](#), [385](#)
- Nicesipolis
 - wife of Philip II [515](#)

Nicias [305](#), [311](#), [312](#). See Sicilian Expedition
death [340](#)
Peace of Nicias [318](#)
Nicolochus [405](#), [421](#)
Nicomedes [233](#)
Nicostratus [304](#)
Nikesipolis [573](#)
nomos
definition [41](#)
Notium
naval battle of [356](#)
Nypsius [480](#)
Nysaeus [483](#)

O

Oath of Plataea [151](#)
Odyssey. See Homer
Oenophyta.
battle of [234](#)
Oikonomikos. See Xenophon

oikos [185](#), [192](#)
Old Oligarch
historian [256](#), [257](#), [258](#)
oligarchy
definition [35](#)
Olympia
origin of Olympian Games [272](#)
types of games [279](#)
Olympian Games. See Olympia
Olympias [573](#)
wife of Philip II [502](#)
Olynthian War [519](#)
Olynthus
destruction by Philip II [519](#)
developing Chacidian League [410](#)
On Halonnesus
speech of Hegesippus [553](#)
Onomarchus [513](#), [514](#)
On The Chersonese
speech of Demosthenes [555](#)
On the Embassy
Demosthenes speech that prosecutes Aeschines [552](#)
On The Treaty With Alexander
psuedo-Demosthenes [568](#)
opposition to Alcibiades [346](#)
Orchomenus [431](#)
destruction in 364 [447](#)
Orestes
King of Macedon [495](#)
Orontes [543](#)
Ortygia [463](#), [479](#), [480](#)

- ostracism [115](#)
 - definition [114](#)
- Otanes [98](#)
- ōthismós [52](#)
- Oxyrhynchus Historian
 - historian [291](#), [388](#)

P

- Paches [302](#)
- Pagondas
 - battle of Delium [315](#)
- Pammenes [504](#), [543](#)
 - Theban commander [435](#)
- Pamphilus [404](#)
- Panathenaea [284](#)
- Panegyricus
 - Isocrates essay [544](#)
- Panormus [169](#), [467](#)
- Parmenio [521](#), [534](#), [562](#), [565](#), [579](#)
 - command in Asia [573](#)
 - defeats Illyrians [512](#)
- Paros [113](#)
- Parthenon [247](#)
- Pasargadae [65](#)
- patria potestas [185](#)
- Pausanias
 - assassin of Philip II [576](#)
 - death of Regent Pausanias [225](#)
 - Plataea campaign [150](#)
 - pretender to Macedonian throne [503](#)
 - Spartan regent [149](#)
- Peace of Antalcidas (Kings Peace) 387/386 BC [407](#)
- Peace of Callias [241](#)
- Peace of Nicias [318](#)
- Peace of Philocrates (346 BC) [525](#)
- Pedaritus [345](#), [346](#)
- Peisander [394](#)
- Peitholaus [518](#)
- Pelion [579](#)
- Pella [495](#)
- Pelopidas
 - battle of Leuctra [426](#)
 - death [447](#)
 - imprisoned in Pherae [438](#)
 - liberation of Thebes [414](#)
 - peace mission to Persia [439](#)
 - Thessalian campaign of 369 [437](#)
- Peloponnesian League
 - demise of [443](#)
 - foundation [76](#)
 - reform [87](#)
- peltasts
 - definition [55](#)

- Perdiccas I
 - King of Macedon [497](#)
- Perdiccas II
 - abandons Spartan alliance [317](#)
 - King of Macedon [494](#)
 - renews Spartan alliance [328](#)
 - supports revolt in Chalcidice against Athens [263](#)
- Perdiccas III [497](#), [541](#)
 - King of Macedon [437](#)
- Pericles [220](#)
 - building program [248](#)
-
- choregos [219](#)
- citizenship law [238](#)
- consolidation of Empire [250](#)
- death [300](#)
- Funeral Oration [62](#)
- son of Pericles [358](#)
- strategy in Peloponnesian War [297](#)
- Perinthus
 - siege by Philip II [559](#)
- perioeci [34](#)
 - definition [69](#)
- perioikoi. See perioeci
- Persepolis [65](#)
- Persian Empire [93](#), [94](#), [98](#), [173](#), [543](#)
 - Peace of Callias [242](#)
 - territorial and population size [65](#)
- Persians
 - Aeschylus [142](#)
- pezhetairoi [535](#)
- Phalaecus [516](#), [526](#)
- Pharacidas [467](#)
- Pharax [384](#), [481](#)
- Pharnabazus [351](#), [352](#), [383](#), [384](#), [396](#), [420](#)
 - satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia [342](#)
- Phayllus [515](#), [516](#)
- pheiditia
 - definition [71](#)
- Pheidon
 - King of Argos [70](#)
- Phidias [247](#)
- Phila [573](#)
 - wife of Philip II [502](#)
-
- Philinna [573](#)
 - wife of Philip II [502](#)
- Philip
 - Theban polemarch [414](#)
- Philip II. See Third Sacred War; See Olynthian War; See Peace of Philocrates;
See Chaeroneia; See League of Corinth
 - assassination [576](#)
 - defeat of Bardylis [504](#)

- King of Macedon [501](#)
- marriage to Cleopatra [574](#)
- membership in the Amphictyonic League [526](#)
- military reforms [537](#)
- reforms the army [503](#)
- reorganizes Thessalian League [547](#)
- Philips Letter [560](#)
- Philistus [460](#), [463](#), [477](#)
- Phillidas [414](#)
- Philocrates. See Peace of Philocrates
 - Athenian envoy [520](#)
- Philomelus [513](#)
- Phlius [409](#)
- Phocion [556](#), [561](#), [566](#), [567](#)
 - Athenian commander [551](#)
- Phocis. See Third Sacred War
 - battle of Thermopylae [127](#)
 - punishment after Third Sacred War [526](#)
- Phoebidas [417](#)
 - fined at Sparta [412](#)
 - seizes Theban Cadmea [411](#)
- Phoenicians
 - trade [172](#)
- Phormio [301](#)
- phoros [202](#), [210](#)
- phratry
 - definition [29](#)
- Phrynichus [348](#), [350](#)
 - Athenian general [343](#)
 - Athenian tragedian [100](#)
- Phrynon [519](#)
- phyle
 - definition [29](#)
- piracy [195](#), [296](#), [517](#), [524](#)
- Piraeum [343](#)
- Pisander [346](#), [347](#)
- Pisistratus [79](#)
- Pitholaus [515](#)
- Plataea
 - battle of [160](#)
 - destruction of [303](#), [424](#)
- Plato
 - in Syracuse to mentor Dionysius II [477](#)
 - second visit to Dionysius II [478](#)
 - the Good [62](#)
- Pleistoanax [317](#)
 - exile [240](#)
 - King of Sparta [239](#)
- Plemmyrium [334](#), [335](#)
- Pleuratus
 - King of the Ardiaei [546](#)
- Plutarch
 - tyrant of Eretria [519](#)

- Podanemus 397
- polis
 - definition 31, 32
 - good life 62
 - origin 32
 - structure 39
 - territorial size 59
 - warfare 50
- politeia
 - definition 35
- politês
 - definition 35
- Politics 38, 70, 174, 185, 192
- Polles 317
- Pollis 421
- Polyanthes 390
- Polycrates
 - tyrant of Samos 91
- Polyxenus 472
- Polyzalus 176, 180

- Pompeius Trogus 492
- population
 - of Hellas 60
- Poseidonia 170
- Potidaea
 - end of revolt 300
 - revolt form Athens 262
- privateering 195
- Procles 305
- prohedroi 572
- Propylaea 247
- proskynesis
 - definition 65
- Proxenus 565
- prytaneis
 - definition 41
- prytanis 84
- psephisma
 - definition 42
- psephismata

- definition 42
- Ptolemy 496
 - regent of Macedon 437
- Pydna 511
- pylaea 563
- Pylos 306, 308
- Pythagoras 94
- Pythen 339
- Pythian Games 526
- Pythodorus 305, 310, 338

R

- reform of Cleisthenes [85](#)
- removal of Delian League treasury [237](#)
- Republic [35](#), [38](#), [62](#)
- revenue
 - types of [200](#)
- Rhegium [169](#), [176](#), [180](#), [181](#), [303](#), [304](#), [331](#)
 - destruction by Dionysius I [471](#)
- Rhodes [345](#), [401](#)
- royal pages
 - organization under Philip II [535](#)
- Rule of the Thirty [379](#)

S

- Sacred Band [449](#)
 - Carthaginian [487](#)
 - destroyed at Chaeronea [566](#)
 - Theban [426](#)
- Salamis
 - battle of [144](#)
- Salamis in Cyprus
 - naval battle [237](#)
- Samius [381](#)
- Samos [343](#), [349](#)
 - civil war [343](#)
 - revolt from Athenian Empire [252](#)
- Sappho [94](#)
- Sardinia [172](#), [173](#), [178](#), [179](#), [457](#)
- Sardis
 - burning of [97](#)
- sarissa [536](#)
- Satrap
 - definition and responsibilities [66](#)
- Scione [316](#)
- Scyros [397](#)
- Second Athenian League (Confederacy) [420](#)
- Selinus [171](#), [178](#), [180](#), [328](#), [454](#), [455](#)
 - Sicilian colony [169](#)
- Selymbria [560](#)
- Sepea [54](#), [117](#), [224](#), [595](#)
 - battle of [92](#)
- Sicans [169](#), [329](#), [336](#), [462](#)
- Sicanus [339](#)
- Sicels [169](#), [181](#), [328](#), [329](#)
- Sicilian Expedition (415 413 BC) [340](#)
- Simonides [165](#), [275](#), [283](#)
- Simus [547](#)
- slavery
 - role in the Greek economy [199](#)
- Social War [512](#)

- Solgea [311](#)
- Sophocles
 - Athenian general [306](#)
 - Sicilian campaign [310](#)
- Sophrosyne
 - daughter of Dionysius I and Aristomache [475](#)
- Sparta. See Corinthian War; See Chalcidian War
 - earthquake [228](#)
 - hegemon of Hellenic League [120](#)
 - helot revolt [228](#)
 - Lycurgan constitution [71](#)
 - third treaty with Tissaphernes [346](#)
 - Thirty Years Peace [238](#)
 - Thirty Years Peace with Athens [241](#)
- Spartan kings
 - responsibilities [72](#)
- Spartiate
 - definition [72](#)
- Sphacteria
 - Spartan defeat [306](#)
- Sphodrias
 - march against Piraeus [416](#)
 - Spartan governor [414](#)
- Stadtstaat
 - definition [32](#)
- Sthenelaidas [267](#)
- strategos
 - military official [56](#)
 - selection of [89](#)
- strategos autocrator [460](#), [481](#)
- Stratonici [538](#)
- Strombichides [347](#), [349](#)
- Struthas
 - Persian satrap [400](#)
- Susa [65](#)
- Sybaris [169](#), [172](#), [180](#), [250](#)
- Sybota
 - battle of [260](#)
- symmachia [323](#), [571](#)
 - definition [77](#)
- sympoliteia
 - definition [399](#)
- synoecism. See synoikismos
- synoikismos
 - definition [33](#)
- syntaxeis
 - definition [420](#)
- Syracuse [303](#). See Sicilian Expedition; See Crimisus
 - Deinomenid tyranny [180](#)
 - liberation. See Timoleon
 - peace with Carthage in 405 [462](#)

Sicilian colony [169](#)
Syrmus
King of Triballians [579](#)

T

Tachos [452](#)
Tanagra
battle of [233](#)
Taras [471](#)
Tartessus [172](#)
taxis [536](#)
Tearless Battle [435](#)
Tegea
early alliance with Sparta [77](#)
Tegyra
battle of [422](#)
Teleutias [404](#), [413](#)
Spartan commander [400](#)
Temenidae [497](#)
Teres
expulsion from kingdom [554](#)
King of Thrace [554](#)
Terillus
tyrant of Himera [175](#)
Thales [94](#)
Thasos
revolt from Delian League [216](#)
Thearidas
brother of Dionysius I [470](#)
Thebes. See Boeotian League; See Corinthian War; See Third Sacred War;
See Chaeronea
alliance with Athens against Philip II [565](#)
destruction by Alexander III [580](#)
liberation in 378 [414](#)
medism [121](#)
member of Second Athenian League [420](#)
opposition to Sparta in 404 [388](#)
Philip II's punishment in 338 [568](#)
The Capture of Miletus. See Phrynichus
Themison [442](#)
Themistocles. See battle of Salamis
choregos [219](#)
eponymous archon [90](#)
exile and death [219](#)
naval bill [116](#)
ostracism [219](#)
Theoric Fund [510](#)
theoroi
definition [276](#)
Theramenes [355](#), [357](#). See Athenian Revolution; See Rule of the Thirty
battle of Cyzicus [352](#)
surrender of Athens in 404 [360](#)
Therimenes [343](#)

Thermaic Gulf [122](#), [493](#), [506](#)

Thermopylae

 battle of. See Artemisium and Thermopylae

Theron [181](#), [277](#)

 death [181](#)

 tyrant of Acragas [176](#)

Thesmophoria

 Theban festival [411](#)

Thessalian League [507](#)

Thessalonice

 half-sister of Alexander III [578](#)

Theste

 sister of Dionysius I [475](#)

thetes

 backbone of the navy [44](#)

Thibron [400](#)

 Spartan commander against Persia [382](#)

Third Philippic

 Speech of Demosthenes [556](#)

Third Sacred War [517](#)

Thirty Years Peace [238](#)

Thrasylbulus [357](#). See Athenian Revolution; See Rule of the Thirty

 Athenian general [349](#)

 battle of Cynossema [351](#)

 battle of Cyzicus [352](#)

 death [401](#)

 tyrant of Syracuse [182](#)

Thrasylbulus [180](#), [181](#)

Thrasylbulus [354](#), [356](#), [357](#), [358](#). See Athenian Revolution

 Argive general [325](#)

 Athenian general [349](#)

 battle of Cynossema [351](#)

Three Hundred Champions

 battle of [70](#)

Thucydides

 analysis of Thucydides' history [290](#)

 inevitability of the war [269](#)

Thucydides, son of Melesias

 politician [246](#)

Thurii

 foundation [250](#)

 war with Lucanians [470](#)

Tigranes

 battle of Mycale [161](#), [162](#)

Timaeus [168](#), [459](#)

Timagenidas [160](#)

Timagoras [439](#)

Timocrates [390](#)

Timolaus [390](#)

Timoleon [483](#). See Crimissus

 death [488](#)

- liberation of Syracuse [484](#)
- Timotheus [425](#), [445](#), [506](#), [509](#)
 - Athenian commander [421](#)
- Tiribazus [405](#)
 - Persian satrap [399](#)
- Tissaphernes [387](#)
 - financing Sparta [344](#)
 - satrap of Lydia [342](#)
 - third treaty with Sparta [346](#)
- Tithraustes [387](#)
- Tolmides [234](#), [239](#)
- Torone [317](#)
- Triballians [562](#)
- trieres. See trireme
- trireme
 - description [57](#)
- trittys [83](#), [84](#), [85](#)
- tyranny
 - definition [35](#)
 - development [37](#)
- Tyre [172](#), [173](#), [194](#)

W

- warfare
 - naval [57](#)
 - siege [57](#)
- wealth
 - types of [204](#)


X

- Xanthippus [84](#)
 - battle of Mycale [160](#)
 - prosecutes Miltiades [114](#)
- Xenares [322](#)
- Xenophanes [94](#)
- Xenophon. See Constitution of the Lacedaemomians
 - Anabasis [382](#)
 - Oikonomikos [185](#)
- Xerxes
 - march to Hellas [122](#)
 - march to Sardis [118](#)
 - retreat [143](#)

Z

- Zancle [171](#), [175](#), [176](#), [181](#)
 - Sicilian colony [169](#)

About the Author



Mark Luttenberger has a bachelor of science and a master of arts degree in history from the University of Wisconsin–Oshkosh. His specialty is ancient Greek and Roman history. He and his wife have traveled extensively throughout Greece and Italy exploring the ancient sites. His primary interest is the political, military, and economic history of classical Greece and Rome. In addition to history, his interests include philosophy, biology, and physics. His professional career was in industry as a quality assurance and lean manufacturing specialist. The author is retired and now devotes his time to writing history. He is married to Gail for forty years. Their family includes two daughters, their husbands, and five grandchildren. All currently reside in Wisconsin.